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The rise of ethnic politics has been a prominent feature of Latin America’s recent 
history, particularly in the Andes where much of the population claim some indigenous 
descent. Prominent politicians use ethnicity to frame important aspects of their political 
projects and identities, survey data show an emerging ethnic voting gap in several countries, 
and political protests, debates, and media coverage periodically expose strong ethnic 
undercurrents. Yet existing scholarship has not examined the precise nature or implications of 
ethnicity’s role in electoral processes, and thus key questions about ethnic politics in Latin 
America remain unanswered. How and why do voters use ethnic information in their 
decision-making? What is the impact of ethnic voting on both the quality and terms of 
democratic representation? And how do wider contextual factors affect the occurrence and 
nature of ethnic voting? These questions have important implications for assessing how (and 
how well) elections fulfil their representational and accountability functions, how candidates 
can and do appeal to different sectors of the electorate, and the wider prospects for 
democratic stability in the region. This thesis addresses these questions through a 
comparative study of ethnic politics and electoral democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, 
with a focus on presidential voting. The research design combines statistical analysis of 
nationally representative survey data, a computer-based ‘mock election’ experiment, and a 
range of materials from candidates’ campaign publicity, mainstream and social media, and 
other sources. By examining the ways in which ethnicity shapes the preferences and electoral 
decision-making of individual voters, the thesis aims to provide new insight into the 
underlying processes that drive such political behaviour. Although the empirical focus is on 
three Latin American countries, the thesis has broader theoretical ambitions, and its analysis 





Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables 5 
List of Figures 6 
List of Abbreviations 7 
Chapter 1 Ethnicity, Elections, and Democracy in Latin America 9 
Chapter 2 Research Design  42 
Chapter 3 Bolivia 62 
Chapter 4 Ecuador  123 
Chapter 5 Peru 164 
Chapter 6 How Voters Decide: Ethnic Voting at the Micro Level in Peru 226 
Chapter 7 Conclusion 267 
Works Cited 282 
Appendix A: Bolivia (Chapter Three) 297 
Appendix B: Ecuador (Chapter Four) 327 
Appendix C: Peru (Chapter Five) 335 
Appendix D: Peruvian Voting Experiment (Chapter Six) 352 






List of Tables 
 
TABLE 3.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-
identification) 
74 
TABLE 3.2: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005  (with cultural 
identification) 
75 
TABLE 3.3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 81 
TABLE 3.4: General Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 90 
TABLE 3.5: Attitudes Towards Specific Ethnic Groups and Vote Choice, 
Bolivia 2005 
91 
TABLE 3.6: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Bolivia 2005 95 
TABLE 3.7: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-
identification) 
100 
TABLE 3.8: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-
identification) 
101 
TABLE 3.9: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 105 
TABLE 3.10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 116 
TABLE 3.11: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Bolivia 2009 119 
TABLE 4.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002 142 
TABLE 4.2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002 144 
TABLE 4.3: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006  149 
TABLE 4.4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006 152 
TABLE 4.5: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009  157 
TABLE 4.6: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009 159 
TABLE 5.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Peru 2006  183 
TABLE 5.2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006 187 
TABLE 5.3: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Peru 2006 198 
TABLE 5.4: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Peru 2011  205 
TABLE 5.5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011 209 
TABLE 5.6: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Kuczynski 
over Toledo 
210 
TABLE 5.7: Summary Mediation Analysis, Peru 2011 224 
TABLE 6.1: Experimental Set-up 233 
TABLE 6.2: Hypotheses 234 
TABLE 6.3: Effects of Voter Ethnicity on Candidate Feeling Thermometers 
after Phase One 
237 
TABLE 6.4: Effects of Experimental Group on Perceived Candidate Stands 




List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linguistic Group, Bolivia 2005 85 
FIGURE 3.2: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Ethnic Self-Identification, 
Bolivia 2005 
86 
FIGURE 3.4: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linguistic Group, Bolivia 2009 111 
FIGURE 3.5: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group, Bolivia 
2009 
112 
FIGURE 5.1: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linginguistic Group, Peru 2006 191 
FIGURE 5.2: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group Peru 2006 192 
FIGURE 5.3:  Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linguistic Group, Peru 2011 215 
FIGURE 5.4: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group, Peru 
2011 
217 
FIGURE 6.1: Perceived Programmatic Stands after Phase One 239 
FIGURE 6.2: Perceived Social-Group Associations after Phase One 241 
FIGURE 6.3: Perceived Personal Characteristic after Phase One 242 
FIGURE 6.4: Perceived Candidate Stand on Nationalisations after Phase 1, 2, and 3 245 
FIGURE 6.5: Perceived Candidate Stand on Presidential Powers at Phase 1, 2, and 3 246 
FIGURE 6.6: Perceived Candidate Stand On Public Spending at Phase 1, 2, and 3 247 
FIGURE 6.7: Perceived Candidate Ideology at Phase 1, 2, and 3 248 
FIGURE 6.8: Stereotype-Conistent (P1) and Correct Candidate Placement (P2 and P3) 249 
FIGURE 6.9: Perceived Social-Group Associations after Phase Three 253 
FIGURE 6.10: Perceived Personal Characteristics after Phase Three 255 
FIGURE 6.11: Voter Issue Position and Vote Choice: Combined Measure 259 
FIGURE 6.12: Voter-Candidate Affinity and Vote Choice: Combined Measure 260 







List of Abbreviations 
 
ADN Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action) 
AF Alianza por el Futuro (Alliance for the Future) 
AME Average Marginal Effects (Statistical) 
AP Acción Popular (Popular Action) 
APGC Alianza por el Gran Cambio (Alliance for Great Change) 
APR Adjusted Probability at Representative Values (Statistical) 
APRA Partido Aprista Peruano (Peruvian Aprista Party) 
ASP Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the 
Peoples)  
CIDOB Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Indigenous Confederation of 
Eastern Bolivia) 
CMS Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (Coordinator of Social Movements) 
CNE Corte Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Court) 
CONAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) 
CONFENAIE Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana 
(Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) 
CSUTCB  
 
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unique 
Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) 
DINEIB Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural (National Interculrural Education 
Directorate) 
DPTE Dynamic Process Tracing Environment  
ECUARUNARI Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (Awakening of Ecuadorian People) 
FC Frente de Centro (Centre Front) 
FEINE Federación Ecuatoriana de Iglesias Evangélicas (Ecuadorian Federation of 
Evangelical Churches) 
FENOCIN Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (National 
Federation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organisations) 
FTA Free-Trade Agreement  
F11 Fuerza11 (Force 11) 
ID Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISPS Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for the 
Sovereingty of the Peoples) 
8 
 
LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project 
MAS Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) 
MCNP Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo País (Citizen Movement New Country) 
MNR Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) 
MUPP Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (Pachakutik Plurinational Unity 
Movement) 
NFR Nueva Fuerza Republicana (New Republican Force) 
NP Nuevo País (New Country) 
ONPE Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (National Office of Electoral Processes) 
PNP Partido Nacionalista Peruano (Peruvian Nationalist Party) 
PODEMOS Poder Democrático y Social (Social and Democratic Power) 
PP Perú Posible (Peru Possible) 
PPB-CN  
 
Plan Progreso para Bolivia – Convergencía Nacional (Plan Progress for Bolivia – 
National Convergence) 
PPC Partido Popular Cristiano (Popular Christian Party) 
PRIAN Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (Institutional Renewal Party of 
National Action) 
PSC Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party) 
PS-FA Partido Socialista – Frente Amplio (Socialist Party – Broad Front) 
PSP Partido Sociedad Partiótica, 21 de Enero (Patriotic Society Party, 21st of January) 
RED Red Ética y Democrática (Ethnics and Democracy Network) 
TSE Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Supreme Electoral Tribunal) 
UN Unidad Nacional (National Unity) 





Ethnicity, Elections, and Democracy in Latin America 
 
 
The rise of ethnic politics has been a prominent feature of Latin America’s recent 
history. Since the return to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, powerful indigenous 
movements have emerged to challenge government policy and demand social, economic, and 
political reform, propelling indigenous actors and issues into the national political arena. 
Prominent politicians and parties have increasingly used ethnicity to frame important aspects 
of their political projects and identities; they have embraced indigenous demands, employed 
indigenous symbols in their campaigns, and emphasised the non-European heritage they 
share with much of the population. Additionally, survey data from several Latin American 
countries show the emergence of a pronounced ethnic voting gap in major national elections, 
with many voters showing a marked preference for candidates from the same, or a related, 
ethnic group (Madrid 2012, 1).1 Beyond the direct political acts of organised protest, electoral 
campaigning, and voting, the politicisation of ethnicity has stirred ethnic tensions in the 
region more generally. The use of ethnic referents to frame social and political issues, as well 
as explicit racism, has recurrently featured in mass media, popular political debates, and  
public demonstrations and rallies around contentious issues (García and Lucero 2008; 
Espósito 2010; Ardito 2011; Lupien 2013). 
Yet despite evidence that ethnic identities and issues may be important components of 
contemporary Latin American politics, the existing scholarship has not fully addressed the 
nature or implications of ethnicity’s role in electoral processes. How and why do voters use 
ethnic information in their decision-making? What is the impact of ethnic voting on both the 
quality and terms of democratic representation? And how do wider contextual factors affect 
the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting? These questions have important implications for 
assessing how (and how well) elections fulfil their representational and accountability 
                                                          
1
 The concept of ethnic identity and group has been the subject of much scholarly debate, particularly in Latin 
America (e.g., Wade 1997, 2003; de la Cadena 2001; Stepan 1991). This thesis defines ethnicity in the broadest 
possible sense as social categories in which descent-based markers are important for membership (see 
discussion later in this chapter for a more detailed definition).  
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functions, how candidates can and do appeal to different sectors of the electorate, and the 
wider prospects for democratic stability in the region. 
This thesis addresses these questions through a comparative study of ethnic politics 
and electoral democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, with a focus on presidential voting. 
Each of these countries has large indigenous populations, and, unsurprisingly, the emergence 
of ethnic politics has been most pronounced in these countries. The research design combines 
a variety of quantitative and qualitative data, including nationally representative surveys from 
each country, results from a ‘mock election’ voting experiment in Peru, and a range of 
materials from candidates’ campaign publicity, mainstream and social media, and other 
sources. The analysis is concerned not only with the identification of ethnic voting behaviour 
in the three countries under investigation, but also with the underlying constituent processes 
through which ethnicity shapes vote choice. Ultimately, each aspect of the analysis 
contributes towards a broader assessment of how ethnic voting shapes the electoral 
relationship between voters and candidates, as well as the more general social and political 
characteristics of the polities in question. Although the empirical focus is on three Latin 
American countries, the thesis has broader theoretical ambitions, and its analysis builds on, 
and seeks to contribute to, a wider comparative politics literature. 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, it frames ethnic voting in the 
wider context of elections and their democratic function as instruments of political 
representation and accountability, a basic framework that is developed more fully later in this 
introduction. After defining some key terminology, the next section outlines the principal line 
of argument in the thesis, and places the research in the context of existing scholarship. The 
two following sections offer an overview of Latin American ethnic politics, and general 
theories of ethnic voting, respectively. These sections link broader empirical and theoretical 
contexts to the specific aims of this research. The final two sections lay out the research 
design, which is elaborated more fully in Chapter Two, and preview the remaining chapters. 
Elections, Representation, and Ethnic Voting 
Competitive elections are the bare minimum requirement for democracies 
(Schumpeter 1950, 269). Elections provide the basic instrument for citizens to express their 
wishes to policymakers, to structure debate about public policy, and to ensure leaders are held 
accountable for their performance in government (Powell 2000, 4). In representative 
democracy, voters can express their preferences and be included in the political process by 
11 
 
choosing candidates who represent their interests. With periodic elections, voters can 
subsequently hold elected leaders accountable for their performance in office, rewarding 
those who perform well with re-election, and punishing those who perform poorly by 
removing them from government. Thus, in order for elections to perform their basic 
representational and accountability functions, voters must have enough information to 
identify the candidate who best represents their interests, and they must be sufficiently 
vigilant to judge the performance of elected leaders in office. 
However, the interests and characteristics for which voters seek representation, and 
thus the criteria on which they judge leaders’ performance, may vary considerably. On the 
one hand, voters may seek substantive representation for their policy-based interests, which 
may include broad values and ideology, as well as specific questions of public policy related 
to material concerns. On the other hand, voters may seek descriptive representation for 
certain salient demographic characteristics, electing leaders who reflect their gender, 
occupation, region, or ethnic background.2 These candidate selection criteria have important 
implications for the quality of elections’ representative and accountability mechanisms. If 
voters select candidates based on descriptive characteristics, they lose much of their control 
over the programmatic political agenda. Leaders enter office with no clear policy-based 
mandate, and even with the best intentions, they may struggle to represent effectively the 
interests of their constituents. This scenario may also weaken accountability because leaders 
will have little incentive to follow the preferences of citizens, or be concerned about their 
substantive performance, if voters remain loyal electorally on purely descriptive grounds. 
However, descriptive representation may also have some positive effects on 
democratic stability and participation, which ultimately strengthen the electoral process. 
Some studies have shown descriptive representation to increase the perceived legitimacy and 
efficacy of the political system, strengthening trust in government and contributing to greater 
democratic stability (Swain 1993; Mansbridge 1999; Michelson, 2000; Gay, 2001; Tate, 
2001; Banducci et al., 2004; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Jones 2011). This may be particularly 
important in cases where certain groups have previously been marginalised from the political 
process. Conversely, many of the same studies have found the lack of such descriptive 
                                                          
2
 The term ‘descriptive representation’ was coined by Griffiths and Wollheim (1960, 188) and adopted by Pitkin 
(1967). In much of the subsequent literature, descriptive representation is juxtaposed to ‘substantive 
representation’, what Griffiths and Wollheim refer to as ‘representation of interests’ (1960, 190). There is a 
large literature on the relative merits of descriptive and substantive representation, mostly in reference to 
minority groups including ethnic groups (e.g., Preston 1978; Grofman 1982; Swain 1993; Phillips 1995; 
Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999; Banducci et al., 2004; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Jones 2011). 
12 
 
representation to increase feelings of distrust and antipathy towards a political system that is 
seen as unresponsive to citizens’ needs, leading to greater instability and the possible 
breakdown of democratic government.  
Ultimately, whether or not descriptive representation improves or diminishes the 
quality of elections as democratic instruments depends on the underlying motivation of 
voters. Of course, such motivations are also influenced by the behaviour of politicians and 
how they seek to mobilise voters with descriptive or substantive appeals. In general, 
descriptive representation as an expression of more or less unconditional group loyalty is 
likely to reduce the quality of electoral democracy, as outlined above. However, if descriptive 
representation leads to substantive representation because leaders tend to share and prioritise 
the interests of constituents from similar demographic backgrounds, then elections should 
still serve their basic democratic functions. Indeed, in this latter case, descriptive 
representation may actually improve substantive representation, with demographic 
characteristics providing a heuristic tool to help voters estimate the substantive profile of 
candidates. In short, the nature of descriptive representation, particularly its relationship to 
substantive representation, is crucial for assessing the quality of elections’ democratic 
functions.3 
Ethnic Voting 
In multi-ethnic societies, voters may seek descriptive representation based on ethnic 
background, thus engaging in ethnic voting. Ethnic voting occurs when members of the same 
ethnic group show an affinity for a particular party or candidate that cannot be explained by 
other demographic or substantive factors (Wolfinger 1974, 41). Descriptive ethnic 
representation – the most common aim of ethnic voting – may be an especially prominent 
form of descriptive representation because ethnic identities tend to be particularly visible, 
and, partly as a result, they are often linked to long-standing sociopolitical inequalities. 
Furthermore, ethnic background is often a key determinant of an individual’s social and 
cultural environment, which in turn shapes broad worldviews, values, and perceptions of 
interest as a result of socialisation (Kinder 1981; Kinder and Sears 1985, Graves and Lee 
2000). This may be particularly the case in societies where ethnic inequalities are 
pronounced, such as in many Latin American countries. Thus, ethnic identities are not only 
an easily-available heuristic cue, but they may also reflect a demographic feature that has a 
                                                          
3
 This applies not only to ethnic descriptive representation, but also to descriptive representation based on other 
characteristics (class, gender, geographical provenance, and so forth). 
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profound impact on voters’ political predispositions, as well as their every-day social 
experiences, interactions, and opportunities.  
These features of ethnic identities – physical visibility, spatial concentration, and 
social salience – not only make ethnicity a particularly likely basis for descriptive 
representation, but also a form of constituent-politician linkage that is particularly susceptible 
to more unconditional loyalties.4 Indeed, in ethnically divided societies, politicians may seek 
to consolidate in-group descriptive loyalties by stirring inter-ethnic distrust and resentment, 
shifting electoral competition away from substantive issues and promoting a political 
landscape based on unconditional group allegiances. Aside from the obvious reduction in 
terms of substantive representation and accountability, this scenario is likely to exacerbate 
ethnic tensions and threatens a downward spiral into ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985). Thus, 
determining the relationship between substantive and descriptive representation, and 
particularly the underlying nature of the latter, may be particularly important when ethnicity 
is a prominent descriptive characteristic in the polity. 
Definitions 
 This thesis defines ethnicity and ethnic group as categories “in which descent-based 
attributes are necessary for membership” (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 517). Typically, 
these categories are organised around relatively intransient characteristics such as physical 
appearance, language or accent, and family names (Chandra 2006; Birnir 2007, 3-4; Madrid 
2012, 5-6). However, a wide range of other demographic and achieved markers may also 
contribute to the ascription of ethnic identities, including territorial origins, occupation, 
educational level, and dress. These markers relate to ethnic identities, not only regional, 
cultural, or class identities, because the underlying human ‘types’ they are perceived to 
denote are often conceived in terms of intrinsic core characteristics that are fundamentally 
heritable (Wade 2003, 270-6). Indeed, this thesis endorses a constructivist approach to 
defining ethnic identities in general, assuming not only that ethnic identities are denoted by 
multiple markers, but also that individuals have multiple ethnic identities. These identities are 
fluid and both conditioned by other forms of social identification and subject to change over 
time and according to circumstances (Barth 1969; Chandra 2011, 2004; Laitin 1998; Posner 
2005; Wilkinson 2006). 
                                                          
4
 Previous studies have shown that ethnic inequalities and competition are likely to increase ethnic political 
activity (e.g., Kandeh 1992).  
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Indigenous peoples and indigenous population are defined according to the working 
definition of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. Thus, indigenous peoples are those which “having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
considered themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them” (United Nations 1986, paragraph 379).5  
In most cases, this thesis uses indigenous voter or indigenous constituent to refer to 
citizens who explicitly self-identify themselves as indigenous in census and survey 
interviews. It uses mestizo to refer to individuals who self-identify with a more ambiguous 
mixed ethnic identity (usually, although not exclusively, some combination of indigenous and 
European ancestry). White refers to citizens who self-identify as white or with a particular 
European identity. However, the thesis also uses the term indigenous-mestizo and white-
mestizo to differentiate within the numerically large and characteristically diverse mestizo 
group. Indigenous-mestizo refers to individuals who self-identify as mestizo, but have closer 
family or cultural ties to indigenous communities (de la Cadena 2001). This includes, but is 
not limited to, self-identified mestizos who speak an indigenous language or had parents who 
did so. White-mestizo is used to refer to individuals who self-identify as mestizo, but whose 
background is characterised primarily by European rather than indigenous heritage. White-
mestizos would typically have no knowledge of an indigenous language, and would not 
identify strongly with any specific indigenous culture. 
In the discussion of electoral strategies, this thesis makes regular reference to ethnic 
appeals and programmatic or substantive appeals made by candidates to voters. Ethnic 
appeals may be both symbolic and substantive: symbolic ethnic appeals include the use of 
ethnic symbols (dress, phrases, locations, cultural products) or campaign rhetoric that 
implicitly or explicitly alludes to ethnic identities, either positively or negatively; substantive 
ethnic appeals include concrete policy proposals targeted at specific ethnic groups, or that 
disproportionately benefit or disadvantage specific ethnic groups. Programmatic or 
substantive appeals refer to rhetoric and policy pledges that focus on broad ideological values 
and preferences (e.g., increasing state interventionism or reducing inequality), specific policy 
issues (e.g., the nationalisation of hydrocarbons), or that are directly linked to material 
interests (e.g., expanding social assistance programmes). 
                                                          
5
 This is the definition used in much of the ethnic politics literature (Van Cott 2005, 1; Madrid 2012, 6). 
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Traditional or conventional populism, neoliberal populism, and ethnopopulism refer 
to various forms of populist political actors, rhetoric, and substantive agendas. All three 
forms of populism include personalistic leadership, anti-establishment rhetoric, and a focus 
on non-elite social sectors. In addition to these common characteristics, traditional or 
conventional populism also includes advocacy of state interventionism; neoliberal populism 
includes advocacy free-market economics; and ethnopopulism includes the use of ethnic 
appeals (Madrid 2012, 6-8). 
This thesis follows Wolfinger in defining ethnic voting in broad terms as “situations 
in which ethnic group membership is an important independent variable in voting behaviour” 
(1974, 41). More specifically, it uses the term ethnic bias to refer to an observable bias in 
voting outcomes among members of a particular ethnic group that is not explained by other 
factors (e.g., other sociodemographic or political preference variables). The origin of such 
ethnic bias is conceived as some combination of psychological ethnic attachments that 
predispose voters towards an ethnically-proximate candidate (the result of expressive ethnic 
bias), and the effect of candidate evaluations influenced by ethnic stereotypes (the result of 
heuristic ethnic bias). Heuristic ethnic bias in voting results from the use of ethnic heuristics, 
which refer to voters’ use of a candidate’s perceived ethnic identity (the product of personal 
appearance, biography, cultural traits, and so forth, as well as the candidate’s use of ethnic 
appeals) as an information shortcut. Ethnic heuristics help voters make a range of 
assumptions about a candidate’s personal, social, and political background and preferences, 
including his or her likely stance on specific policy issues.  
Summary of the Argument 
 The existing scholarship on ethnic politics in Latin America has tended to focus on 
how and why ethnic movements and parties have formed since the return to democracy (Beck 
and Mijeski 2001, 2006; Durand Guevara 2006; Huber 2008; Laurent 2009; Madrid 2008; 
Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Rice 2006; Van Cott 2003, 
2005; Yashar 2005). Among those studies that have dealt explicitly with ethnic parties, some 
have also examined electoral performance, ranging from more qualitative accounts of the 
socioethnic imagery and associations that may shape candidate perceptions (Assies and 
Salman 2005; García and Lucero 2008; Rice 2011; Raymond and Arce 2013), to more 
quantitative analysis of individual-level survey data and aggregate voting outcomes (Madrid 
2005, 2011, 2012; Van Cott 2005; Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Moreno Morales 2015). 
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However, this scholarship has not fully explained the underlying processes that drive 
ethnic voting in the region, and thus key questions about the nature of ethnicity’s influence on 
electoral processes remain unanswered. What do ethnic voting patterns signify in terms of 
voters’ perceptions and calculations about their political circumstances and interests, and 
what are the primary motivations that shape electoral decision-making? What is the 
relationship between ethnic voting and other electoral considerations such as economic 
interests, ideological preferences, and views on specific public policy issues? And how do 
broader features of the electoral competition – the candidates who stand, the groups they 
purport to represent, the campaigns they run, and the social, economic, and political context 
in which the election takes place – influence the occurrence, and nature, of ethnic voting? 
In order to address these questions, the thesis develops and examines evidence for 
three conceptual models of ethnic voting.6 First, it proposes the expressive model. In societies 
marked by historical ethnic exclusions, contemporary ethnic inequalities, and pervasive 
discrimination, ethnic voting may function as an expressive act of identity affirmation. 
Achieving descriptive ethnic representation may afford psychological benefits to voters, a 
boost to community- and self-esteem achieved by elevating a co-ethnic to a position of power 
(Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1998, 155-8; Norris and Mattes 2003, 1; Fish 2008; Böhm et al. 
2013). Theory suggests this type of ethnic voting may be particularly prevalent among groups 
with low social status, where ethnic identity provides an alternative way of ‘measuring worth’ 
(Horowitz 1985, 186). In Latin America, voters with indigenous backgrounds tend to have 
lower social status compared to mestizos (‘mixed’) and whites; they are often poorer, less 
educated, under-represented in private and public organisations, and victims of discrimination 
(see discussion in Chapters Three, Four, and Five). Thus, we might expect expressive ethnic 
voting in Latin America to be most evident among voters with indigenous backgrounds. 
 Second, although this type of psychological ethnic bias may be part of the story, this 
thesis argues that ethnic voting in Latin America is often more instrumental in nature. Thus, it 
proposes the heuristic model, according to which voters seek descriptive ethnic representation 
with the aim of achieving substantive representation. In other words, voters seek out 
candidates who they perceive as most likely to represent their material, ideological, and 
policy-based interests. However, voters have only limited information and resources from 
which to determine a candidate’s actual substantive preferences, and so they rely on 
                                                          
6
 These three models develop from and adapt Ferree’s (2006) conceptual framework, although they draw on a 
wide range of scholarship across several disciplines. 
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information shortcuts to make a series of calculated assumptions (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; 
Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2006). In more 
established democracies, party identification provides a reliable information shortcut for 
many voters, with party cues signalling a wide range of characteristics about the candidate’s 
likely preferences. However, the inchoate party systems of the Andean democracies mean 
party cues are heuristically unreliable, and voters in these contexts must look for alternative 
decision-making tools. In multi-ethnic societies with unstable party identities, ethnicity may 
often serve such a heuristic purpose, helping voters to estimate a candidate’s personal and 
political preferences based on stereotypes about their perceived ethnic group (McDermott 
1998; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2007). This thesis argues that 
ethnicity serves such a heuristic role in Andean electoral behaviour, and that ethnic voting in 
the region reflects, at least in part, the influence of a heuristic ethnic bias. 
 However, neither expressive nor heuristic ethnic voting operates entirely 
independently of other potential vote determinants. Ethnic bias, of whatever form, may 
predispose voters towards certain candidates, but consideration of record, personal 
competencies, economic interests, values and ideology, as well as specific issue stands, are 
still important. Thus, this thesis complements its analysis of ethnic voting with consideration 
of a policy-as-usual explanation for voting outcomes (Ferree 2006, 804). In this case, vote 
choice is determined by substantive preferences and performance assessments in which 
ethnic heuristics play no role. This thesis argues that, in many cases, a combination of ethnic 
bias (expressive and heuristic) and policy-as-usual assessments shape vote choice in Latin 
America. The relative salience of each is determined by the specific electoral environment 
(e.g., the candidates who run, the issues on which they campaign, and the strategies by which 
they mobilise supporters), as well as the wider sociopolitical context (e.g., the salience of 
ethnic issues, the strength of ethnic identification, and wider social and political events).  
Examining how ethnic and non-ethnic criteria combine to shape electoral choices can 
shed light on the underlying nature of ethnic voting. For example, it can indicate the relative 
salience of both ethnicity and certain substantive preferences to voting behaviour across 
distinct ethnic groups, helping to determine the motivations behind support for particular 
candidates. It can also help demonstrate how particular combinations of ethnic and non-
ethnic voter characteristics combine to shape vote choice, telling us something about the 
nature of a candidate’s appeal to different groups. Indeed, this thesis argues that a candidate 
can win support among ethnically-proximate voters through inclusive ethnic appeals, 
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capitalising on expressive or heuristic biases, while appealing simultaneously to ethnically-
distant voters on purely substantive grounds. However, it also suggests that candidates will 
generally need to provide some concrete indication of substantive representation even to win 
support in ethnically-proximate groups, and that the use of exclusionary ethnic rhetoric may 
preclude support among ethnically-distant groups irrespective of substantive appeals (Madrid 
2012). 
Finally, this thesis also considers an alternative explanation for ethnic voting, one 
which posits a less direct role for ethnicity in vote choice. The indirect model proposes that 
ethnic voting is simply a reflection of homogenous conditions and preferences within ethnic 
groups and that ethnic bias plays no direct role in vote decisions (Hechter 1975; Mattes 1995; 
Sigelman et al. 1995; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Bratton and Mattes 2003). The theory 
runs that ethnicity, like other forms of social categorisation, places an individual in a 
particular social and cultural milieu that affects broad worldviews and perceptions of interests 
(Kinder 1983; Kinder and Sears 1985). These, in turn, influence voters’ electoral choices 
(Graves and Lee 2000). However, this thesis argues that such an indirect role for ethnicity in 
voting is supplementary to, rather than encompassing of, the more direct effects of expressive 
and heuristic ethnic bias. Homogenous preferences within ethnic groups do not fully account 
for ethnic voting patterns in Latin America.  
These three broad conceptual models of ethnic voting have distinct implications for 
assessing key aspects of electoral democracy in the region. Indeed, if voting is primarily an 
expressive act of group allegiance, then elections become mere ethnic headcounts. Voters 
lose control over the political agenda, while politicians can act at will, already assured of the 
unconditional support of co-ethnics. Furthermore, this scenario may contribute to ethnic 
polarisation because politicians have little incentive to be inclusive in their appeals, and they 
may seek to mobilise support by fomenting inter-ethnic resentment and prejudice. 
Alternatively, however, if voters use ethnicity as a shortcut to programmatic information, or 
common voting trends among co-ethnics simply reflect shared substantive interests, then 
these threats to democratic processes and stability are less severe. In both cases, substantive 
representation is the ultimate electoral goal, and ethnic voting is either a means for achieving 
such representation, or the result of ethnicity’s wider impact on sociopolitical attitudes and 
interests. Either way, although politicians may still manipulate ethnic differences and 
stereotypes for electoral benefit, they cannot rely on unconditional support if they fail on 
performance and programmatic assessments. 
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This thesis argues that all three forms of ethnic voting may occur in the Andes. The 
processes implied are not mutually exclusive, and in many cases they speak to different 
aspects of electoral behaviour. For example, both the expressive and heuristic voting models 
refer explicitly to processes involved in the vote choice itself – the criteria on which voters 
select candidates and the characteristics for which they seek representation. In contrast, 
according to the indirect voting model, the causal effect of ethnicity on voting relates to its 
role in shaping substantive preferences prior to vote choice.7 In this case, ethnic voting 
patterns are produced because voters then select candidates based on these (ethnically-
influenced) substantive preferences. Thus, the indirect model implies a vote decision along 
the lines of either the policy-as-usual or heuristic model – that is, one in which the vote 
motivation is fundamentally instrumental. Nevertheless, although vote choice may be shaped 
by a range of motivations and decision-making processes, determining the predominance of 
one or another form of ethnic voting is important given the wider political implications of 
each hypothesised model. 
Ethnic Politics in Latin America  
Traditionally, ethnic mobilisation has been conspicuously absent in Latin America. A 
long history of ethnic mixing, or mestizaje, has worked to weaken ethnic identification and 
reduce ethnic polarisation across much of the region. Partly as a result, there have been few 
ethnic parties in Latin America, and most non-ethnic parties have tended to avoid ethnic 
themes in their political rhetoric and platforms. Voters in Latin America, meanwhile, have 
not selected candidates along ethnic lines, and indigenous and non-indigenous sectors of the 
electorate have often voted in ways that are indistinguishable from one another (Madrid 2012, 
1; Madrid 2005; Van Cott 2005; Van Cott and Birnir 2007).8 
Nevertheless, more recently ethnicity has become increasingly politicised in Latin 
America. The new indigenous movements that emerged through the 1980s and 1990s helped 
raise ethnic consciousness among indigenous Latin Americans, drawing on enduring ethnic 
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 In fact, political socialisation is often thought to occur in early life (Hyman 1959; Campbell et al. 1960, 
chapter 7). 
8
 There have, of course, been some noteworthy historical cases of ethnic mobilisation and contemporary ethnic 
conflict in Latin America (see later discussion in this chapter). However, ethnicity has played a relatively less 
overt role Latin American politics, at least with regard to political mobilisation in the ‘formal’ political sphere 
(parties, social movements, and so forth), compared to many other regions of the world. Cases of ethnic conflict 
have also been comparatively rare in Latin America. By one estimate, there were just 35 cases of ethnic conflict 
across the entire Caribbean and Latin American region between 1946 and 2014 (almost all during Guatemala’s 
civil war), compared to 73 and 154 cases in Europe and Africa, respectively, over a similar period. (Due to some 
missing data, these counts should be taken as indicative of broad trends rather than precise figures). Author’s 
elaboration based on data from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (2015). 
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attachments and numerous grievances linked to ethnic inequalities that had persisted despite 
mestizaje. In several countries, these indigenous movements gave birth to indigenous political 
parties, which campaigned on an explicitly indigenous platform. More generally, a wide 
range of non-indigenous parties and candidates, particularly populists, have adopted 
indigenous demands, recruited indigenous leaders, and employed a variety of symbolic ethnic 
appeals in an effort to win support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters (Madrid 
2012, 1). A combination of these factors means ethnicity has become an important factor in 
the contemporary electoral politics of several Latin American countries, particularly in the 
Andean democracies of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
Ethnic Identification in Latin America 
Ethnic politics in Latin America has been shaped in important ways by the nature of 
ethnic identification and ethnic relations in the region. In particular, mestizaje, or ethnic 
mixing, has had a profound effect. Mestizaje refers to both biological mixing between 
European and indigenous (and sometimes African and Asian) individuals, and the cultural 
assimilation of indigenous peoples into a Eurocentric, mestizo national culture.  
Biological, and to some extent cultural, mestizaje was widespread throughout the 
colonial period, to the extent that mestizos comprised more than a quarter of the population of 
Spanish American by independence (Mörner 1967, 98; cited in Madrid 2012, 20). In the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the discourse of cultural mestizaje became a key driver of 
nation formation for the new Latin American states, although the precepts of such mestizaje 
were often antithetical. For example, one strand of the mestizaje discourse called for the 
celebration of indigenous ancestry as a dignified element of the new nations’ human and 
cultural heritage. This discourse made room for the acceptance of indigenous communities as 
distinct ethnic groups, albeit ones which were ill-suited to full participation in the political 
mechanisms of the ‘modern’ state (de la Cadena 2000, 20-8; Tilley 2005, 57-64).  
However, perhaps the more predominant version of the mestizaje discourse rejected 
‘Indians’ (or denied their existence), admitting indigenous people into the nation only on the 
condition of their assimilation into a Eurocentric, mestizo national culture (Tilley 2005, 60-
64).9 This latter discourse of mestizaje provided the rationale for numerous state-led 
educational and other ‘development’ projects in indigenous areas through the early twentieth 
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 The most prominent advocate of this latter discourse of mestizaje was José Vasconcelos with his promotion of 
the ‘cosmic race’ (Vasconcelos [1925] 1997). 
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century, projects that aimed to promote Spanish literacy and discourage indigenous cultural 
practices. In several countries, states made explicit efforts to ‘de-indianise’ indigenous 
populations by recasting them as peasants, which, in the class-based language of the mid-
twentieth century, replaced the ethnic label ‘Indian’ (de la Cadena 1998; Albro 2010; Yashar 
2005). However, whether indigenous communities were conceived as ‘ethnic relics’ to be 
preserved as part of the national patrimony (and whose cultural products and symbols were 
appropriated for nationalist purposes), or whether indigenous populations were ‘drags’ on 
national progress that required further assimilation into the mestizo mainstream, the discourse 
of mestizaje worked to subordinate, exclude, or deny indigenous presence in modern Latin 
American societies. 
In order to reflect the multiplicity and fluidity that underpins contemporary ethnic 
identities in Latin America – the combined result of both biological and cultural mestizaje – 
some scholars have argued that ethnic differences have come to resemble a continuum, rather 
than distinct ethnic categories (Wade 1993, 1997, Spitta 1996, 23; Howard 2005, 54, 192-8). 
Such a continuum is conceived as spanning indigenous at one end, through various mestizo 
identities in the middle, to a European (or at least Eurocentric) identity at the other. This 
sociocultural continuum is often perceptually conflated with a parallel pigmentocratic scale 
running from dark-skinned indigenous and Afro-descendent Latin Americans to fair-skinned 
European-descendants (Wade 1997). The continuum model is useful for highlighting the 
fluidity of ethnic identification in Latin America, the numerous intermediate categories, but 
also the underlying racial-ethnic hierarchy – from dark-skinned/indigenous to fair-
skinned/European – that underpins social conceptualisations about such ‘continuous’ ethnic 
identities (Wade 2003). However, the continuum model does not always fit well with how 
ethnic identities are perceived in many Latin American communities. Indeed, the existence of 
intermediary ethnic categories does not necessarily mitigate more binary perceptions of 
ethnic differences, which often revolve around dichotomies such indigenous and non-
indigenous, or white and non-white (Weismantel 2001, 39). In the context of mestizaje, 
however, even such binary identities may have ambiguous and conditional boundaries, 
allowing some flexibility in how individuals both self-identify and are identified by others.  
The fluidity of ethnic identities in Latin America is further enhanced by the 
multiplicity of markers that may indicate social and ethnic groups. Although descent-based 
attributes such as phenotype and language remain the primary markers of ethnicity, mestizaje 
has meant their significance is often ambiguous. As a result, a wide range of social and 
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cultural characteristics are often important determinants of ethnic identities, as well as 
markers of other social categories. Thus, ethnic identities may be ascribed from markers or 
knowledge of territorial origins, educational level, occupation, dress, and social 
comportment, in addition to physical appearance, language, and family names. These 
identities are still ethnic, rather than (only) cultural, class, or territorial, because they invoke 
notions of more or less innate, heritable characteristics associated with certain social ‘types’ 
(de la Cadena 2001, 140-1; Wade 2003, 274).10  
However, mestizaje and fluid notions of ethnic identities have not eliminated ethnic 
inequalities, psychological attachments to ethnic groups, or ethnic discrimination. First, 
ethnic background is still significantly linked to social and geographic location across much 
of the region. Chapters Three, Four, and Five present data showing that indigenous people in 
the Andes tend to be poorer, less educated, and have less access to health services than their 
non-indigenous counterparts. Moreover, the indigenous populations of Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru are concentrated geographically in the highland and Amazon regions of their respective 
countries, and particularly in more rural areas. Second, despite the ‘deindigenising’ effect of 
mestizaje, many indigenous people maintain some traditional customs and languages and 
identify with their indigenous communities. A far greater number retain personal, family, and 
cultural ties to an indigenous heritage, even if they would not consider themselves indigenous 
per se. Indeed, census and survey data presented in Chapters Three to Five show the number 
of Andeans who report some identification with an indigenous culture (rather than self-
identification as indigenous), or report growing up in a household where an indigenous 
language was spoken, greatly outnumber self-identified indigenous respondents. As indicated 
previously, this thesis employs the term indigenous-mestizo to describe these self-identified 
mestizos from more indigenous backgrounds. On the other hand, many self-identified 
mestizos may retain stronger psychological ties to non-indigenous family and cultural 
identities, often those of their European ancestors, with little if any attachment to an 
indigenous heritage. This thesis refers to these non-indigenous mestizos as white-mestizos. 
Thus, at least in some respects, the intermediate ethnic categories implied by the 
continuum model are somewhat compatible with more binary perceptions about ethnic 
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 On the other hand, the multiplicity and flexibility of such socioethnic markers also means indicators of a 
particular ethnic heritage (e.g., regional provenance or various cultural products such as dress, festivals, art, and 
so forth) may be adopted to express various socioethnic identities, including those dislocated from the 
contemporary human subjects associated with the ethnic group in question. Thus, prejudice towards ‘backward 
Indians’ is not incompatible with a broader cultural, regional, or national identity in which indigenous heritage 
is proudly claimed (de la Cadena 2000, 232; Poole 2004). 
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identities. For example, many indigenous-mestizos may identify with a broadly non-white 
social and political identity, if not with an explicitly indigenous one. Similarly, many white-
mestizos may identify themselves with a broad non-indigenous sociocultural group, but not 
necessarily with an ethnic label such as white. In terms of political behaviour, it seems likely 
that indigenous-mestizos may sympathise more with indigenous demands, and feel greater 
solidarity with an indigenous social or political identity, than would white-mestizo voters. 
Finally, regardless of how individuals self-identify, both visible descent-based and 
‘achieved’ social characteristics may signal particular ethnic identities to others. Moreover, in 
many cases they may do so in ways that reinforce dichotomous ethnic identities. For 
example, many mestizos may suffer the same discrimination as indigenous people, and, 
therefore, they may feel greater sympathy and solidarity with certain indigenous demands. In 
the survey data examined in Chapters Three to Five, respondents from an indigenous 
background were significantly more likely to report experience of discrimination, including 
discrimination based on physical appearance in particular. The same data demonstrate that a 
substantial minority of respondents hold prejudiced views against indigenous people, and 
these self-reported attitudes are likely to underestimate the extent of ethnic prejudice.11 
In summary, a long history of mestizaje has blurred boundaries between ethnic groups 
and produced ethnic identities that are fluid, multiple, and conditional on a wide range of 
physical, biographical, and social markers. In this ethnic landscape, ethnic identification at 
the individual level may be relatively weak, and ethnic polarisation is likely to remain low.  
Nevertheless, the assimilationist project of mestizaje was never complete. Ethnic inequalities 
remain a prominent feature of contemporary Latin American societies, many individuals feel 
lingering ethnic attachments, and ethnic discrimination continues to shape every-day inter-
personal relations and wider social and political opportunities. 
The Historical Absence of Ethnic Mobilisation in Latin America 
The nature of ethnic identification across much of Latin America may offer a partial 
explanation for the relative historical absence of ethnic political mobilisation in the region.12 
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 Several studies have shown how social desirability factors cause many people to suppress potentially 
unpopular attitudes – such as ethnic prejudices – when responding to survey interviewers (e.g., Fazio and 
Towles-Schwen 1999). 
12
 Ethnic mobilisation has not been entirely absent from Latin America’s political history, however. For 
example, there were several indigenous uprisings against Spanish imperial rule throughout the latter half of the 
eighteenth century (Crow 1992, 319-29; Bakewell 2004, 305-12). More generally, certain nineteenth-century 
political parties and caudillo political leaders drew on an ‘ethnic’ base of support (see, amongst others, 
Thomson 1991, on Mexico; and Walker 1999, on Peru), and some twentieth-century populist movements also 
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The type of fluid, conditional ethnic identification described above (where mestizaje has 
blurred the boundaries between ethnic groups and the precise ethnicity of individuals is often 
ambiguous) is likely to reduce ethnic polarisation significantly, and it is far less conducive to 
mobilisation around an ethnic cleavage. Individuals who have personal ties and social 
sympathies than transverse an ethnic cleavage (and who may also disagree on the nature and 
position of the cleavage in the first place) are less likely to respond favourably to 
mobilisation efforts aimed at stirring inter-ethnic distrust or resentment (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967; Chandra 2005; Dunning and Harrison 2010).  In addition, because mestizaje has not 
eliminated ethnic discrimination, particularly against indigenous and Afro-descendent groups 
(in fact, the discourse of mestizaje is explicitly discriminatory against these non-mestizo 
groups), many Latin Americans with non-white backgrounds may choose to identify socially 
in terms of a more ambiguous mestizo ethnicity. The relative weakness of ethnic 
identification as an explicit form of social categorisation further reduces the potential for 
ethnic political mobilisation. 
Aside from the peculiarities of ethnic identification and relations in Latin America, 
several political-institutional factors may also have contributed to the historical lack of ethnic 
mobilisation. First, the absence of such mobilisation may simply reflect the absence of 
opportunity. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Latin American countries 
were ruled by authoritarian regimes, and there was little opportunity for indigenous or other 
groups to mobilise electorally. Even in the brief interludes of civilian rule, indigenous people 
were often excluded from national politics because of prohibitive residency, income, and 
literacy restrictions on political participation. Second, when the corporatist states of the mid-
twentieth century co-opted indigenous communities into political structures, they did so as 
peasants, not as indigenous peoples. As a result, it was often more strategically useful for 
indigenous groups to organise as peasants, often through broad federations that included 
mestizo as well as indigenous organisations.13 Third, even when suffrage restrictions were 
removed in the 1980s, various institutional and societal factors may have discouraged the rise 
of indigenous parties in particular. Party-registration requirements were often unfavourable to 
new parties, including indigenous parties, while electoral rules tended not to provide 
legislative representation to smaller parties (Birnir 2004; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; 
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Stein 1980, on APRA in Peru). 
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 However, in many cases indigenous communities also appropriated and redeployed these institutional 




Rice 2006; Van Cott 2005). Pervasive anti-indigenous discrimination may also have limited 
indigenous access to mainstream political parties (Paredes 2007). It is not the intention of this 
thesis to adjudicate among the numerous explanations put forward to explain the relative lack 
of ethnic mobilisation historically in Latin America. However, a political environment that 
was generally restrictive, and unfavourable to indigenous mobilisation in particular, may well 
have been a contributing factor. 
The Rise of Indigenous Movements and Parties 
However, over the last two to three decades, ethnicity has become increasingly 
politicised in Latin America. The existing scholarship offers a range of explanations for the 
rise of ethnic politics in the region, focusing on both indigenous social movements and 
political parties engaged in local and national electoral competition. Concerning social 
movements, these explanations point to the introduction of neoliberal economic programmes, 
the wider impact of democratization in the 1980s, and the influence of an international 
indigenous rights movement; concerning political parties, explanations centre on institutional 
reforms in the 1990s, the collapse of traditional parties across much of the region, and the 
impact of newly-formed indigenous social movements. 
Studies focused on indigenous social movements have tended to explain their 
emergence in terms of the new threats faced by indigenous communities following 
democratisation. In particular, the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms removed key 
agricultural subsidies and the protection of land rights for many indigenous communities, 
while the demise of corporatist state structures (particularly state-controlled peasant 
federations) reduced access to state resources and channels of political influence (Lucero 
2008; Yashar 2005, 54-71). The ethnic dimension to these new protest movements arose from 
the potential loss of viability and autonomy for the local indigenous institutions these 
corporatist protections had allowed, particularly in terms of land and economic security 
(Yashar 2005, 68).14 International factors may also have contributed to the ethnic frame 
adopted by these new movements, particularly the supranational resources provided by 
international non-governmental organisations. These organisations helped domestic 
indigenous actors build new strategies and political vocabularies for mobilising ethnic 
groups, capitalising on international treaties and conventions that specifically advanced the 
                                                          
14
 Some scholars have also argued that the incorporation of indigenous groups by multiclass populist parties, 
rather than Marxist parties, favoured the subsequent mobilisation of indigenous communities as indigenous, 
rather than as peasants (e.g. Rice 2012). 
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notion of indigenous rights (Lucero 2008, 21; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brysk 2000).15 In 
general, the politicisation of ethnicity by indigenous movements through the 1980s and 1990s 
helped weaken the predominant discourse of mestizaje, rejecting the discursive denial of 
ethnic inequality and discrimination that mestizaje’s assertion of a ‘racial democracy’ had 
permitted (Tilley 2005, 63-4). 
The emergence of indigenous social movements had important effects on the 
subsequent development of indigenous parties, and the politicisation of ethnicity more 
generally. First, as the previous discussion has implied, indigenous social movements worked 
to raise ethnic consciousness in Latin America. Indigenous movements and their leaders 
encouraged Latin Americans from diverse backgrounds to embrace their indigenous heritage, 
however distant, by promoting indigenous pride and traditions, rejecting the assimilationist 
dimension to the discourse of mestizaje. This process of ‘reindigenisation’ helped subsequent 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo politicians extend the scope of their ethnic appeals to a 
wider population, as increasing numbers of urban mestizos, as well as rural indigenous, were 
encouraged to identify with the broader values, symbols, and demands of the indigenous 
movement. 
Second, indigenous movements also helped introduce an ethnic dimension to many 
wider political debates, patterns of association subsequently utilised and extended by various 
electoral candidates. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, indigenous movements played central 
roles in numerous multi-sector mobilisations, opposing the neoliberal reforms of a succession 
of national governments. The indigenous and mestizo leaders of the protests, as well as the 
many politicians who adopted their cause, emphasized the common values, interests, and 
demands of indigenous and many mestizo sectors: wealth redistribution; land protections; 
increased state control over natural resources; restrictions on imports; and an end to 
discrimination. They also highlighted their shared non-European heritage as a unifying factor 
linking the interests of diverse, non-elite social and ethnic groups. 
In this way, the political leaders of such protests helped superimpose a dichotomous 
ethnic ‘master frame’ on several key social and political controversies, linking ethnic 
identities to particular political agendas (Rice 2012). Specifically, it associated a broad 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo identity with nationalism, social justice, wealth 
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 Of particular significance were the International Labour Organisation’s Convention Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 1989) and the United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights on 
Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007). 
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redistribution, and opposition to neoliberalism.16 This was set against a political agenda 
characterised by continued neoliberalism, the promotion of business interests, and the 
excessive interference of the United States in Latin American countries’ domestic affairs. In 
the ethnic ‘master frame’, such a political agenda was associated with a white, Eurocentric 
identity embodied by the domestic elites and their ‘imperial’ backers in Europe, the United 
States, and the international financial institutions.17 This thesis argues that the increased 
salience of this ethnic ‘master frame’ played an important role in the subsequent electoral 
success of indigenous parties and indigenous or indigenous-mestizo candidates. 
Third, and more concretely, powerful indigenous movements, particularly in Bolivia 
and Ecuador, provided valuable human and material resources to support the development of 
indigenous parties (Andolina 1999; Van Cott 2005, 43-5). Indeed, an oft-cited explanation for 
the lack of a major indigenous party in Peru is the prior absence of a nationally relevant 
indigenous movement (Van Cott 2005; Paredes 2007). However, the wider politicisation of 
ethnicity in Peru may still have been influenced by indigenous movements in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, particularly in terms of ‘reindigenisation’ and the promotion of an ethnic ‘master 
frame’. Indeed, this thesis finds no evidence that ethnicity is any less significant in terms of 
shaping electoral behaviour in Peru than in either Bolivia or Ecuador. 
Aside from these social movement factors, two further explanations for the rise of 
indigenous parties specifically are worthy of brief note. First, perhaps the most common 
approach attributes the rise of indigenous parties to institutional reforms carried out during 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Birnir 2004; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Muñoz-
Pogossian 2008; Van Cott 2003c, 2005). These arguments focus on decentralisation, the 
relaxation of laws regulating party registration, and electoral reforms that granted legislative 
representation to smaller parties. These are all institutional changes that may favour the 
formation and electoral success of new parties, particularly those with a geographically 
concentrated base of support such as many ethnic parties (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; 
Horowitz 1991; Meguid 2014; Norris 2004; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Reilly 2001; 
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 Some Peruvian ethnopopulists, such as Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo, also endorsed neoliberal 
economic policies, and they cast themselves as emblematic of an emerging non-elite (and non-white) 
entrepreneurship (Lee 2010). Nevertheless, they still focused their campaigns on lower-class sectors, promised 
to reduce inequality and expand social programmes, and used popular nationalist rhetoric (see Chapter Five). 
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 Of course, the production of such an ethnic ‘master frame’ was not solely the doing of indigenous leaders and 
movements. In many cases, public figures associated with the white and white-mestizo elites implicitly or 
explicitly promoted a similar connection between ethnicity and sociopolitical ideology. Criticism of anti-
neoliberal protesters often reproduced long-standing ethnic epithets about indigenous ignorance and 
backwardness in terms of ‘modern’ economic policy (see discussion in Chapters Three to Six). 
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Sartori 1976; Sisk 1996). Second, a number of studies point to the severe fragmentation of 
Latin American party systems in the 1980s and 1990s, which created space for the emergence 
of indigenous parties. In the absence of stable party identities and the resultant lack of voter 
alignment, these new indigenous parties successfully appealed to voters disaffected with the 
traditional political actors, capitalising on the decline of leftist parties in particular (Rice 
2012, 4; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2011, 37).  
Ethnic Politics in the Electoral Arena 
The existing literature on ethnic politics in Latin America is quite helpful in 
explaining why indigenous movements and parties have formed. However, it is less useful in 
explaining the electoral performance of indigenous parties. Indeed, as Raúl Madrid points 
out, the explanations outlined above do not explain why, within the same country, some 
indigenous parties are successful while others are not, or why some have won the support of 
whites and mestizos as well as indigenous voters. Madrid (2012, 3) argues that, rather than 
institutional or social movement factors driving the success of indigenous parties, what 
matters most is their strategy of inclusive ethnopopulism. Madrid convincingly shows that 
indigenous parties have tended to succeed when they combined ethnic appeals with 
conventional populist appeals, recruited mestizo as well as indigenous candidates, and 
adopted an inclusive strategy that emphasized common interests, as well as common heritage, 
across non-elite indigenous and mestizo constituencies.18 
In this way, ethnopopulists both capitalised on and reinforced the nature and terms of 
ethnic politicisation as promoted by the indigenous movement. Increased ethnic 
consciousness undoubtedly contributed to the wider resonance of ethnopopulists’ ethnic 
appeals, while their prominence in national electoral campaigns helped raise the political 
salience of ethnicity further. However, perhaps more importantly, ethnopopulism both 
reinforced and further defined the substantive content of the ethnic ‘master frame’ initially 
introduced by the indigenous movement. Indeed, although ethnopopulists across the region 
have run on a wide range of substantive platforms, they have tended to promote nationalist, 
redistributive, and state-interventionist policies as prominent parts of their populist projects.19 
                                                          
18
 Ethnopopulists have not been the only political actors to employ ethnic appeals. Several smaller parties and 
individual politicians have adopted more exclusionary ethnic platforms, more along the lines of the conventional 
ethnic parties studied elsewhere (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1978). However, these have 
tended to have much more limited electoral appeal (Madrid 2012). 
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 Some ethnopopulists also adopted neoliberal economic policies, as indicated previously. However, their 
campaigns still focused on the poor, criticised the political and economic elites, and offered various populist 
initiatives such as direct assistance programmes, credit schemes, agricultural subsidies, and so forth. 
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Crucially, ethnopopulists have looked to link explicitly their own non-white, non-European 
backgrounds, or their broad affinity with indigenous communities and cultures more 
generally, to the ideological beliefs that underpin their substantive political agenda. Just as 
the indigenous movement was able to build multisector coalitions by foregrounding the 
common values and interests of indigenous and other lower-class social sectors, 
ethnopopulism proved to be a successful electoral strategy because it tied inclusive, broadly 
defined ethnic identities to a wider substantive political programme that extended well 
beyond indigenous issues.   
Madrid’s notion of ethnopopulism constitutes a considerable advance in terms of 
understanding the nature and implications of Latin American ethnic politics in the electoral 
arena. However, Madrid’s analysis, as with previous studies of ethnic voting in the region, 
provides little insight into the nature of ethnicity’s effect on vote choice (only that ethnicity 
does indeed appear to have some effect). For example, it offers little indication whether the 
ethnic component to ethnopopulist appeals reflects expressive or heuristic voting motivations, 
each of which would have a distinct set of wider implications, as discussed previously. 
Moreover, Madrid’s analysis does not examine in detail how voters’ ethnic and non-ethnic 
(sociodemographic and attitudinal) characteristics combine to shape voting outcomes, an 
interaction implied by ethnopopulism’s dual ethnic and populist appeal. This thesis seeks to 
expand the existing scholarship on ethnic politics in Latin America by addressing these types 
of questions about the underlying dynamics, and thus the wider political implications, of 
ethnic voting in the region. 
Theories of Ethnic Voting in Latin America  
 In general, studies of electoral behaviour seek to explain why citizens choose to vote, 
and, for those who do, why they decide to support one party over another. In most cases, 
therefore, the base unit for analysis is the individual voter, with macro-level outcomes such as 
turnout and party vote share conceived as the product of multiple individual acts (Elster 
1989).20 However, although most studies agree on the primacy of individual-level actions, 
there is considerable disagreement over what the individual level might look like (Arzheimer 
and Evans 2000, xx). In terms of ethnic voting behaviour specifically, the comparative 
literature offers several distinct conceptual explanations, each of which draws on various 
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 Other macro-level factors, such as unemployment, crime, the party system, and so forth, are likely to 
influence these individual-level acts. However, it is hard to conceive of a relationship between macro-level 
factors (e.g. unemployment) and macro-level outcomes (such as vote shares) that bypasses what happens at the 
individual-level (Arzheimer and Evans 2000, xix).  
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theoretical paradigms from the more general electoral behaviour scholarship. Thus, 
conceptual innovations related to ethnic voting both reflect, and can contribute to, many of 
the theoretical controversies in the wider literature.  
 Theories of ethnic voting are primarily concerned with explaining why, at the 
individual level, voters from the same ethnic group vote en masse for a particular candidate 
or party. In addition to explanations focused on such positive ethnicity-vote correlations, 
some studies also examine the role of ethnic prejudice or resentment in voters’ decision-
making. As the previous discussion has outlined, this thesis proposes three conceptual models 
of ethnic voting: the expressive model, which conceives of voting as an expressive act of 
identity affirmation that affords psychological benefits to voters; the heuristic model, in 
which voters use ethnic stereotypes as an information shortcut in their decision-making; and 
the indirect model, in which ethnicity shapes the political preferences and interests that 
determine vote choice. Each of these broad models conceives of ethnic voting as being driven 
by quite different underlying voter motivations, and, as a result, they have quite different 
implications for assessing the nature and implications of electoral processes. However, each 
of these models may also produce observationally-similar results – a correlation between 
ethnicity and vote choice – and thus many existing studies forego attempts to distinguish 
among the three sets of associated processes. This thesis aims to make an initial contribution 
towards this end. 
Expressive Ethnic Voting 
Many studies of ethnic voting attribute such behaviour, at least in part, to 
psychological attachments to a particular ethnic group and/or prejudice towards members of 
other ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1999; Snyder 2000; Dickson and Scheve 2006). 
This model considers voting to be a largely unconditional declaration of group allegiance, 
and that vote choice is not primarily driven by concerns about substantive costs and benefits. 
The theoretical underpinnings of this expressive explanation lie in social identity 
theory (e.g., Tajfel 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986), which suggests that the groups to which 
people belong are a key source of pride and self-esteem.21 Groups provide a sense of social 
identity, a sense of belonging to the social world. Thus, self-esteem is increased by enhancing 
the status of the group to which an individual belongs (the in-group), whether familiar, 
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 This builds on Tajfel’s (1970, 1974) ‘minimum group paradigm’, which examined the minimum requirements 
for individuals to develop in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination. 
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ethnic, territorial, or based on other social categories. Self-esteem is also enhanced by 
devaluing the status of other groups (the out-groups), and thus social identity theory predicts 
out-group discrimination and prejudice is a fundamental feature of social relations. In terms 
of political behaviour, citizens seek to increase self-esteem through elevating in-group 
members to positions of power. In democracies, the primary means of achieving political 
power is through elections, and thus, in societies where ethnic groups are important social 
categories, ethnic voting is likely to occur.  
According to this explanation, ethnic voting is not the product of a rational weighing-
up of electoral alternatives, but an expression of allegiance to a group. Thus, voters are not 
guided by self-interest – in fact, they may vote explicitly against their substantive interests – 
but rather by unconditional loyalty to the party or candidate who represents their group 
identity.22 Several studies of ethnic politics in Latin America suggest such expressive ethnic 
voting, although the precise causal processes hypothesised are not always tested empirically 
(Madrid 2011, 276; Moreno Morales 2015). Finally, in the Latin American popular press, 
ethnic voting patterns are often presented as evidence for a non-instrumental, expressive logic 
driving voting behaviour, particularly among indigenous people (e.g., Vargas Llosa 2006).  
Certainly, there are plenty of reasons to think expressive ethnic voting may occur in 
Latin America. A long history of ethnic inequality and discrimination is conducive to the 
construction of strong ethnic group identities and the conceptualisation of social and political 
differences in ethnic terms. The perpetuation of historically constructed ethnic hierarchies 
and discriminatory practices, at both the institutional and individual level, is likely to 
strengthen group allegiances and may foster inter-ethnic distrust, resentment, and prejudice. 
Moreover, the recent politicisation of ethnicity in the region is likely to increase ethnic 
consciousness and exacerbate perceptions of ethnic difference, processes that may be 
similarly conducive to expressive ethnic voting. Nevertheless, mestizaje is likely to mitigate 
the social and political salience of ethnic differences and reduce ethnic polarisation. In 
general, voters are less likely to mobilise around an ethnic cleavage if they have personal, 
cultural, and/or interest-based attachments on both sides of the cleavage. Indeed, these types 
of multiple and conditional ethnic identities and fluid ethnic relations are not particularly 
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 This explanation underlies several studies of voting in the United States, which highlight prejudice as a 
principal factor in white opposition to black candidates (Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996; 
Mendelberg 2001). It also emerges as an important factor in many comparative studies of ethnic voting 
(Horowitz 1985; Johnson and Schlemmer 1996; Chandra 2004; Friedman 2004, 2005). 
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conducive to the unconditional ethnic group attachments implied by the expressive voting 
model.23  
In summary, Latin America’s ethnic landscape does not suggest widespread 
expressive ethnic voting, although lingering feelings of ethnic solidarity or resentment may 
still exert some influence on voters’ choices. However, the existing scholarship on Latin 
American ethnic politics has not fully assessed the extent of expressive ethnic voting, and it 
has not sought to distinguish such forms of electoral behaviour from competing conceptual 
explanations. This thesis seeks to address this limitation in the current literature. 
Heuristic Ethnic Voting 
In contrast to the expressive model, other scholars have argued for a more 
instrumental explanation for ethnic voting. Drawing on general theories of decision-making 
developed in cognitive psychology, these scholars suggest that voters use ethnicity as a 
political heuristic, a decision-making tool rather than a vote determiner in itself. Thus, voters 
use a candidate’s perceived ethnic identity as an information shortcut to make a series of 
assumptions about likely personal, social, and political preferences and priorities (Chandra 
2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2009; Ichino and Nathan 2013). This approach 
assumes that voting is fundamentally rational and instrumental, but that ‘pure’ rational choice 
is unfeasible in a highly complex information environment such as an election campaign. In 
order to simplify such informational complexity, voters rely on various cues – easily acquired 
information that is perceived as a reliable indicator of other, unknown, characteristics – 
which help guide their evaluation of parties and candidates (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  
The use of heuristics in voting has been well documented in the literature. Studies 
have demonstrated particularly significant effects for partisan cues (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Conover and Feldman 1989; Hurwitz 1984; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Lodge and Hamill 
1986; Rahn 1993), but also for various descriptive characteristics such as gender (Mansbridge 
1999; Matland and King 2003; Jones 2011; Ditonto et al. 2013) and other aspects of physical 
appearance (Rosenberg and McCafferty 1987; Todorov et al. 2005; Lawson et al. 2010). 
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 However, to some extent fluid and multiple ethnic identities also mean more inclusive ethnic appeals have the 
potential to resonate much more widely. Ethnic appeal may speak not only to voters who strongly self-identify 
with the ethnic group in question, but also to those who consider the group to form part of their mixed ethnic 
heritage. Thus, certain indigenous ethnic appeals may not only resonate with self-identified indigenous voters, 
but also with many mestizos, who may feel some psychological and emotional attachments to a broad 
indigenous heritage, although they would not personally identify as indigenous. 
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Several studies have shown that ethnic identities and ethnic appeals (e.g., ethnic rhetoric, 
symbols, or endorsements from ethnic organisations) can also provide salient electoral cues, 
particularly in ‘newer’ democracies where party identities are often weak and unstable. 
However, although the role of ethnic heuristics in voting has been tested in various 
democratic regimes around the world – including in the United States (Dawson 1994; 
McDermott 1998; Philpot 2004; Barreto 2007), Eastern Europe (Birnir 2007), the Baltic 
republics (Hansen 2009), India (Chandra 2004), and several African countries (Brubaker et 
al. 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006) – it has received little attention with regard to Latin 
America. 
  Several factors make heuristic ethnic voting highly probable in several Latin 
American countries, particularly the three Andean democracies examined here. First, the 
political landscape of these countries is marked by inchoate party systems, a lack of 
ideological differentiation and consistency, multiple candidate races, and the prevalence of 
newcomers. These factors contribute to a low information environment for electoral decision-
making – that is, an environment in which the accessibility and intelligibility of political 
information is greatly reduced, but where the required scope of voters’ information search is 
greatly expanded. These are precisely the features of ‘new’ democracies that scholars have 
linked to increased heuristic use, including the use of ethnic heuristics (Birnir 2007, 605-6).  
Second, many parties and candidates in Latin America tend to be vague on 
programmatic issues. Most parties opt for broad catch-all appeals, presenting themselves as 
the representative of all citizens rather than specific social sectors or interests, and they tend 
to avoid taking strong stands on potentially divisive programmatic issues (Dix 1989; Cotler 
1995). Catch-all appeals tend to foreground the personal characteristics of candidates and 
focus on valence issues. For example, in most Latin American campaigns the issues of 
unemployment, crime, and poverty feature prominently; all parties and candidates want less 
of each. These features of Latin American campaigns work to reduce further the substantive 
differentiation among candidates, making it increasingly difficult for voters to identify the 
candidate who best represents their preferences. Moreover, such campaign strategies will 
tend to shift voters’ focus onto individual candidates and their personal values, priorities, 
networks, and capabilities. Programmatic ambiguity and candidate-centred campaigns are 
highly conducive to heuristic use, particularly to heuristics based on such personal candidate 
traits as ethnic identity. 
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 Finally, a long history of ethnic inequality and discrimination has taught Latin 
Americans to connect ethnic identity with social behaviour and treatment, political interests, 
and individual prospects. Just as racial segregation in the United States (Dawson 1994), or 
apartheid in South Africa, introduced racial heuristics to voters in those countries (Ferree 
2006; Mattes and Piombo 2001), so the social and political marginalisation of indigenous 
peoples has worked to socialise many Latin American electorates in the validity of ethnic 
heuristics. To some extent, the fluid and multiple ethnic identities that characterise Latin 
America’s ethnic landscape suggest similarly fluid and conditional ethnic stereotypes, and 
thus some ambiguity about the precise characteristics implied by an ethnic heuristic. 
However, the tendency towards more binary views of ethnic identities, outlined previously, is 
likely to apply to stereotypic constructions as well (in fact, such a tendency is, almost by 
definition, a process of stereotyping). Thus, although the precise set of characteristics 
ascribed to an individual candidate through stereotyping may be somewhat flexible, the 
perceived predictive value of broader ethnic stereotypes – non-indigenous or indigenous, 
non-white or white – is likely to remain high. Indeed, Chapter Six finds strong evidence that 
two broad ethnic stereotypes – indigenous-Andean (indigenous or indigenous-mestizo) and 
white-European (white or white-mestizo) – may shape perceptions of presidential candidates 
in significant ways. 
 In short, despite fluid and conditional ethnic identities, social and geographic ethnic 
divisions and widespread discrimination mean a political ethnic heuristic ‘makes sense’ for 
many Latin American voters. Once again, the more recent politicisation of ethnicity in the 
region is likely to have increased the perceived salience of an ethnic ‘master frame’ for 
assessing social and political issues and actors, fomenting the wider use of ethnic heuristics in 
electoral decision-making. In particular, the way in which indigenous and ethnopopulist 
actors have strategically linked an inclusive indigenous identity (defined as non-white and 
non-European) to a nationalist, redistributive, and anti-neoliberal substantive agenda has 
helped reinforce and further define the contours of the prevalent political ethnic heuristic. 
Crucially, and unlike the expressive model, ethnic heuristic voting does not require strong 
ethnic identification at the individual level (although it does require some perception of 
ethnic differences more generally). As a result, the heuristic model is quite compatible with a 
Latin American ethnic landscape in which ethnic identification is relatively weak and ethnic 




Indirect Ethnic Voting 
A final explanation for ethnic voting asserts that such behaviour can be explained by a 
conventional ‘policy-as-usual’ vote model, and that ethnicity plays no part in the vote 
decision directly. Rather than psychological attachments or prejudice, patterns of ethnic 
voting emerge because members of the same ethnic groups tend to have relatively 
homogenous preferences and interests. Thus, ethnicity may influence vote choice indirectly 
by helping to shape an individual’s political socialisation, but it is not a direct vote 
determinant. 
This indirect model draws on general sociological models of voting, which consider 
vote choice to be shaped by social environment (e.g., Berelson et al. 1954). In the general 
sociological voting models, the direct vote determinants are material interests, ideological 
preferences, and partisanship, but these are shaped by the individual’s social context – family, 
friends, and other social-group affiliations. Similarly, in terms of ethnic voting, the theory 
runs that ethnicity – like other forms of social categorisation – places the individual in a 
particular social context that influences values, worldviews, and perception of interests 
(Kinder and Sears 1985). These social, cultural, and political predispositions manifest 
themselves as specific policy preferences and general ideology, which are the direct vote 
determinants (Graves and Lee 2000). Thus, vote choice is driven by interests, not identity, 
and the correlation between ethnicity and vote reflects similar interests within an ethnic 
group, and different interests across ethnic groups. 
A number of studies in the comparative literature on ethnic politics adopt this basic 
perspective (Bates 1974; Bratton and Mattes 2003; Hechter 1975; Mattes 1995; Rabushka 
and Shepsle 1972). Similarly, a number of experimental and survey-based studies have found 
that ethnic voting preferences in the United States may be explained better in terms of policy 
and ideology than in terms of prejudice or psychological ties (Abrajano et. al. 2005; Sigelman 
et al. 1995; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Ultimately, if the indirect model is correct, then 
there is no need for a special theory of ethnic voting, at least in terms of vote choice itself; the 
spatial voting model (Downs 1957), or the performance model (Ferejohn 1986) should apply 
(Ferree 2006, 805).24  
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 Spatial voting models focus on the ideological proximities between voters and parties, with the assumption 
that voters will seek to elect the most proximate candidate. Ferejohn’s performance model argues that few voters 
can trust the promises of electoral challengers, and thus electoral choice is based solely on a retrospective 
performance assessment of the incumbent.  
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Several features of Latin America’s social and political context are conducive to the 
conditions implied by the indirect model. Territorial, social, economic, and cultural divides 
are often closely aligned with ethnicity, meaning voters from similar ethnic backgrounds may 
well share both material interests and broader sociopolitical predispositions. Yet mestizaje 
has meant that ethnic identification at the individual level is often weak and fluid, while 
ethnic polarisation at the group level tends to be low. Thus, despite ethnic inequalities, many 
voters may not feel the strong, unconditional psychological attachments necessary for 
expressive voting, and may give greater relative importance to substantive preferences in 
their decision-making.  
However, although previous studies of ethnic voting in Latin America have implied 
aspects of the indirect model, they have neither theorised explicitly nor tested empirically its 
specific mechanisms. For example, Madrid (2012, 26-30) refers to common interest among 
many indigenous and mestizo voters, which he suggests contribute to the broad appeal of 
ethnopopulism. Moreno Morales (2015, 127) finds that indigenous voters are more likely to 
vote for leftist candidates in several Latin American countries, implying an indirect role for 
ethnicity in shaping ideological preferences. However, neither study tests explicitly whether 
ethnic background has statistically significant indirect effects on vote choice, or through 
which particular non-ethnic voter characteristics such effects might be mediated. In contrast, 
the analysis in this thesis tests the influence of ethnicity on a range of substantive preferences, 
and the latter’s effect on vote choice, in a single mediation model. This analysis offers a more 
complete assessment of the indirect model of ethnic voting and its applicability to Latin 
American voting behaviour. 
Policy-as-usual 
 The ‘policy-as-usual’ model of voting is essentially the null hypothesis for the ethnic 
voting analysis. It proposes that voting behaviour can be explained in terms of voters’ 
substantive interests and preferences and their perceptions about candidate’s substantive 
performance. Ethnicity is not involved in the vote decision in any direct way: psychological 
attachments to ethnic group identities are not important electorally; and candidates’ 
substantive profiles are determined directly from available information, not by employing 
ethnic heuristics. Thus, the ‘policy-as-usual’ explanation is directly comparable, and to some 
extent competitive with, both the expressive and heuristic models because all three refer to 
the vote decision itself. 
37 
 
In contrast, the ‘policy-as-usual’ explanation is one of two possible constituent 
components of the indirect model, along with the heuristic explanation. The indirect model 
proposes that ethnicity shapes substantive preferences, which, in turn, influence vote choice. 
Thus, in order for the indirect model to produce ethnic voting patterns, voters must select 
candidates in line with their (ethnically-influenced) substantive preferences. They may do so 
with or without the use of ethnic heuristics, but in the latter case, the indirect model implies 
the ‘policy-as-usual’ explanation to account for vote decision itself.  
 However, this thesis also argues that ethnic bias – whether produced by expressive 
ethnic attachments or the use of ethnic heuristics – may combine with substantive preferences 
to shape vote decisions. In other words, ethnic voting, of whatever form, does not preclude a 
role for ‘policy-as-usual’ voting behaviour. Indeed, strong psychological ethnic attachments 
do not preclude consideration of other information about substantive interests. Such voters 
may still be influenced by the programmatic promises of new candidates, or the performance 
of an incumbent in office.25 Similarly, in considering a candidate’s substantive profile, voters 
may well employ ethnic heuristics to fill information gaps. However, this need not imply they 
will entirely ignore explicit information about candidates accessed more directly.  
In short, the identification of ‘policy-as-usual’ voting behaviour does not preclude a 
role for ethnicity in electoral behaviour, and voting preferences shaped by ethnic factors do 
not imply the absence of ‘policy-as-usual’ considerations. Rather, a variety of motivations 
and processes may influence voters’ choices, and the conceptual framework put forward in 
this thesis explicitly allows for such casual heterogeneity. 
Research Design 
This thesis examines ethnic voting in presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Peru. These countries were chosen because the rise of ethnic politics has been particularly 
pronounced in the Andean region, and there is strong evidence that ethnic voting has 
occurred in all three cases.26 The analysis focuses on presidential voting because presidential 
campaigns tend to be highly personalised, and thus candidate characteristics – including 
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 Other scholars have made similar claims with regard to ethnic voting elsewhere (e.g., Carlson 2015). 
26
 This does not constitute selection on the dependent variable because the primary aim of this analysis is to 
understand the nature, not the occurrence, of ethnic voting. Thus, selecting the cases where ethnic voting is most 
likely to occur is appropriate. 
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ethnicity – are often more important than in subnational or legislative elections.27 In the latter 
cases, capillary party organisation, specific local issues, clientelism, and interpersonal bonds 
tend to play a more prominent role (e.g., Blank 1974; Fornos et al. 2004, 930; Cancela and 
Geys 2016, 268), to the extent that they may override or mitigate the direct influence of 
ethnic bias in shaping electoral outcomes. Moreover, local demographic and political 
conditions may often make ethnic voting redundant or unobservable below the presidential 
level, as in cases where electorates and/or candidates are ethnically homogenous. Thus, 
presidential elections provide both an electoral context in which the effect of ethnicity on 
voting is potentially most salient, and where voter and candidate ethnicity varies sufficiently 
to distinguish ethnic voting from other forms of electoral behaviour.  
This thesis’s survey-based analysis covers the most recent presidential elections in 
each country for which detailed data are available. Thus, the analysis covers Bolivia in 2005 
and 2009 (Chapter Three), Ecuador in 2002, 2006 and 2009 (Chapter Four), and Peru in 2006 
and 2011 (Chapter Five). As well as their recency, these election cases have several further 
characteristics that make them appropriate choices for an examination of ethnic voting.  
First, in each election at least one prominent candidate publicly identified as 
indigenous, or made explicit appeals to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Similarly, 
at least one prominent candidate was widely perceived as the representative of the white, or at 
least non-indigenous, socioeconomic elite. In the context of ethnically-divided societies such 
as those in the Andes, these conditions are particularly conducive to ethnic voting. Second, 
these cases cover the first major electoral success of an indigenous party or ethnopopulist 
candidate in each country: Evo Morales in Bolivia 2005, Pachakutik in Ecuador 2002, and 
Ollanta Humala in Peru 2011.28 They also include cases in which an incumbent ethnopopulist 
sought re-election (Bolivia and Ecuador in 2009), offering an opportunity to examine the 
impact of incumbency on ethnic voting. Indeed, although each election case shares certain 
key characteristics, they also exhibit variation on several electorally important contextual 
factors. In addition to incumbency, there is considerable variation in the salience of ethnicity 
in the campaign (the strength of ethnic identification among voters, the involvement of ethnic 
social organisations, the degree of ethnic polarisation, and so forth); the number of viable 
candidates and their respective campaign strategies; and the strength and nature of electoral 
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 Ethnic voting may also occur where parties are the primary electoral units, but only where a clearly defined 
ethnic party exists, which is arguably not the case in Latin America. See Ferree (2006) on party-based ethnic 
voting in South Africa. 
28
 Humala also finished top of the first-round vote in Peru’s 2006 election. 
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cross-pressures on voters. Thus, the election cases selected offer a common set of core 
characteristics that are broadly conducive to ethnic voting, they cover key moments in the 
recent history of ethnic politics in each country, and they provide potentially informative 
variation on important contextual factors. 
Peru was chosen for the experimental study because its contemporary political 
landscape remains particularly inchoate (a condition conducive to heuristic use in general), 
and because it lacks a single, dominant, ‘real-world’ political personality. The aim of the 
experimental study was to examine the influence of a generalised ethnic heuristic on voting 
behaviour, for which the absence of a dominant ‘real-world’ figure such as Evo Morales (in 
Bolivia) or Rafael Correa (in Ecuador) was advantageous. The exceptional political 
dominance of such individual politicians will unavoidably influence perceptions about more 
general political ‘types’, and thus a context without such figures may produce results that are 
somewhat less contextually bound. 
The analysis in this thesis is structured around three broad aims. First, it looks to 
establish the case for ethnic voting in each country under investigation, focusing primarily on 
statistical analysis of nationally-representative survey data. It also examines the relationship 
between ethnic voting and other, non-ethnic, vote determiners, with a view to understanding 
how diverse voter characteristics and preferences combine to shape vote choice. Second, the 
analysis looks to determine the underlying nature of ethnic voting behaviour in the region, 
assessing evidence for each of the three ethnic voting models and the one non-ethnic voting 
model, outlined previously. Thus, it examines support for the expressive model, the heuristic 
model, the indirect model, and the ‘policy-as-usual’ model, as well as how processes linked 
with each conceptual explanation may overlap and interact. Third, the thesis offers some 
initial thoughts on how wider contextual factors may influence ethnic voting in the region. 
This includes examination of various contextual variables (e.g., the prominence of ethnic 
identification and organisation; the composition of the electoral field; the presence of known 
political personalities; campaign strategies; and the prevalence of clientelistic practices) and 
their impact of ethnic voting at the micro level. This last aspect of the analysis is not fully 
elaborated here, but some preliminary trends are outlined with a view to future research. 
Methods and Data 
 The thesis employs a range of methods and data in its analysis. These are discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two, but are outlined in broad terms here. First, it uses survey data from the 
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Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to test the relationship between voter 
ethnicity and vote choice across the seven presidential elections examined in Chapters Three 
to Five. This analysis includes both group-level assessment of general ethnic voting patterns 
and more detailed statistical examination of voter characteristics and vote choice at the 
individual level. The group-level analysis provides descriptive statistics on the overall vote 
distributions within ethnic groups, and the ethnic composition of each candidate’s vote share, 
for each election case study. These statistics provide an initial indication of ethnicity’s 
relative salience in different groups, as well as the ethnic scope of a party’s electoral appeal, 
and they provide a basic means of comparison across electoral cases. However, this group-
level analysis provides only a weak basis for causal inference because it does not account for 
the potential confounding influence of other factors. 
Thus, the analysis also includes a series of multinomial logistic regression models to 
test the effect of ethnicity on vote choice at the individual level. The statistical models 
incorporate both linguistic background and self-identification measures for ethnicity, and 
they include a wide range of potential confounders (e.g., other demographic indicators, 
economic perceptions, ideology, and policy preferences). The analysis also examines the 
interactions between voter ethnicity and substantive preferences, providing insight into how 
ethnic and non-ethnic vote determiners combine to shape electoral choices. Finally, the 
analysis tests how voters’ attitudes towards ethnic groups and issues (e.g., support for ethnic 
policy issues, perceptions of different ethnic groups, and so forth) might influence vote 
choice, offering indications about possible voter motivations.  
Second, the thesis uses data from a ‘mock election’ experiment in Peru to examine 
electoral decision-making at the micro level. The experiment took the form of an interactive 
mock election campaign simulated on a computer, in which subjects gathered and evaluated 
information about hypothetical candidates whose profiles were experimentally manipulated. 
The experimental data offer unique insights into how voters use ethnic information in making 
their electoral choices, and thus contribute to a deeper understanding of the motivations 
driving ethnic voting behaviour.  
Finally, the thesis makes use of various qualitative data to illustrate or contextualise 
findings from the survey and experimental analysis. These include campaign publicity items, 
local media content, reports from government agencies and non-governmental organisations, 
and other similar materials.  
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In summary, the research design developed in this thesis provides data on ethnic 
voting from various perspectives and at various analytical levels. Each component of the 
empirical analysis aims to contribute towards one or several of the principal research aims, 
yet the nature of the data available, and the type of research questions addressed, mean that 
different empirical tests at times address different conceptual propositions. In general, both 
survey and experimental data and analysis offer important insights into ethnic voting in the 
region, while the qualitative analysis can help illustrate, and link empirically, the principal 
findings. Thus, in their own way, each of these three broad strands of analysis addresses 
various aspects of the overarching aim of the thesis: to examine the occurrence and nature of 
ethnic voting in Latin America, and to assess the implications for the quality and stability of 
electoral democracy in the region.  
Organisation of the Thesis 
 Following this introduction, Chapter Two lays out the research design of the thesis in 
detail. It includes further discussion of the principal research aims, focusing on the specific 
contributions made by the survey, experimental, and qualitative analyses. It also includes in-
depth discussion of the research methods employed – the statistical analyses carried out, and 
the experimental procedures followed – as well as key characteristics of the data examined.  
 Chapters Three, Four, and Five are the election case studies covering Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and Peru, respectively. These chapters offer in-depth quantitative analysis of voting 
behaviour in the elections under investigation, as well as discussion of the wider 
sociopolitical context in which the elections took place. Chapter Six shifts the analytic focus 
to the decision-making of individual voters, drawing on data from the Peruvian experiment. 
The final chapter draws some broad conclusions regarding the principal findings of 
the thesis, and how these may contribute to our current understanding of ethnic politics and 
electoral behaviour in the Andes and beyond. It discusses the degree of generalisability of the 








 This chapter lays out the specific aims, data, and methods on which the analysis in the 
following chapters is based. Each component of the analysis aims to contribute to one or 
several of the principal research objectives of the thesis. However, the nature of the data 
available, and the type of research questions addressed, mean that different empirical tests at 
times address different conceptual propositions. Thus, the analysis of nationally 
representative survey data in Chapters Three, Four, and Five establishes the case for ethnic 
voting in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, respectively, focusing on presidential voting. This 
analysis also examines the relationship between ethnic voting and other potential vote 
determinants. However, the survey data do not permit detailed examination of the underlying 
processes that drive ethnic voting, and this analysis cannot easily distinguish between 
expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. As a result, most of the analysis in these three chapters 
focuses on the effects of a broadly defined ethnic bias on presidential vote choice, and the 
electoral consequences of the interplay between ethnic bias and substantive preferences. In 
this case, ethnic bias is considered to result from either psychological ethnic attachments and 
prejudice, or the instrumental use of ethnicity as an information shortcut, or both. 
In contrast, the Peruvian experiment discussed in Chapter Six was designed 
specifically to address questions about the precise role of ethnicity in electoral decision-
making. The experiment provides a wealth of data on the micro-level processes through 
which individual voters arrive at their vote decisions, and how differences in candidate 
profiles affect those processes and outcomes. The experiment data can clearly distinguish 
between expressive and heuristic ethnic voting – the impact of expressive or heuristic ethnic 
bias – and identify and trace the constituent processes involved in different forms of voting. 
However, the experimental sample is relatively small (N = 217), it is not nationally 
representative, and it was drawn from just a single country (Peru). As a result, findings from 
the experiment are far less generalisable to national or supranational populations than results 
from the survey-based analysis. 
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 In general, both types of data and analysis offer important insights into ethnic voting 
in the region, and although the findings from each cannot always be tested directly against 
one another, it is possible to establish their consistency with broad conceptual propositions. 
Similarly, qualitative analysis can help substantiate, and link empirically, the findings from 
the survey and experimental data. For example, key features of the macro context are 
discussed in relation to the survey-based findings in Chapters Three through Five, and data 
from open-ended post-experiment interviews help interpret data from the election 
simulations. Overall, the research design developed in this thesis provides data on ethnic 
voting from various perspectives and at various analytical levels. Although such diverse data 
do not always allow direct head-to-head tests for specific propositions, they do shed light on 
components of the same causal story and thus provide a more complete and nuanced 
assessment of ethnic voting and its implications for democratic politics in the Andes. 
 
OVERVIEW AND AIMS 
 The first half of this chapter provides an overview of the general research design, 
focused on the specific aims, concepts, limitations, and contributions of each component of 
the analysis. It outlines the seven case studies of presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Peru, and it discusses the various components of the statistical analyses applied. These 
analyses can contribute to several research aims of the thesis, but they also have certain 
intrinsic limitations. Next, the discussion turns to the key features of the Peruvian voting 
experiment and how these findings complement the survey-based analysis. In both cases, 
more detailed discussion of the specific research methods employed, and the key 
characteristics of the data examined, comes in the second half of this chapter. 
Case Studies of Presidential Elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru 
 Chapters Three, Four, and Five are case studies of national presidential elections in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, respectively. Each chapter includes a detailed examination of two 
to three consecutive elections occurring between 2002 and 2011. The analyses are primarily 
based on surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which 
provides data on political attitudes and vote choice since the early 2000s. However, a range 
of other data is used to construct the wider sociopolitical context in which the election cases 
take place and to offer qualitative substantiation for the findings of the survey-based analysis. 
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 The case studies in these chapters have three principal aims. First, they assess general 
voting patterns in each election, focusing on two broad measures of ethnic voting: group- and 
candidate-centred ethnicisation. Second, they aim to determine whether ethnicity has a direct 
causal relationship with vote choice and to explore the nature of that relationship. Finally, 
they seek to identify and measure potential indirect effects of ethnicity on voting outcomes, 
where the effect of voter ethnicity is mediated through substantive preferences and interests.  
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
Group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores provide a broad overview of ethnic 
voting in the election in question. Group-centred ethnicisation refers to the relative 
importance of ethnicity to voters, and it is measured by the level of consistency in vote choice 
among members of the same ethnic group. Thus high levels of group-centred ethnicisation 
would be a case in which the vast majority of voters within an ethnic group vote for the same 
candidate; low levels of group-centred ethnicisation would be a case in which members of the 
same ethnic group vote for different candidates. Candidate-centred ethnicisation refers to the 
composition of a candidate’s support base, and it is measured by the constitutive proportion 
of voters from each ethnic group in the candidate’s overall vote share. Thus, high levels of 
candidate-centred ethnicisation would be a case in which the vast majority of a candidate’s 
support came from just one ethnic group; low levels of candidate-centred ethnicisation would 
be a case in which the candidate wins votes across ethnic groups.29 The analysis of group- 
and candidate-centred ethnicisation is based on data from LAPOP surveys in each country. 
Together, these two broad measures can contribute to a general assessment of ethnic 
voting in the election in question, providing insight into the voting behaviour of particular 
ethnic groups and the appeal of particular candidates across ethnic groups. Group-centred 
ethnicisation can offer an indication of the likely salience of ethnicity to individual voters, 
and thus it can tell us something about voters’ electoral motivations. It seems reasonable to 
assume that when members of a group spread their votes across several candidates, the 
salience of ethnicity to vote choice is relatively low; ethnicity does not significantly shape 
individual voting behaviour. In contrast, when members of the same group support, en masse, 
the same candidate, we may assume that ethnicity plays a more prominent role in electoral 
choice. 
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Candidate-centred ethnicisation can tell us something about the appeal and electoral 
support base of candidates and parties across ethnic groups. Thus, candidate-centred 
ethnicisation can contribute to assessments about the likely behaviour of candidates and, 
ultimately, the prospects for ethnic polarisation. For example, high levels of candidate-
centred ethnicisation suggest the candidate wins little support outside their ‘base’ ethnic 
group. In this case, the candidate may have little incentive to adopt an inclusive political 
platform, and they may resort to electoral strategies aimed at priming ethnic cleavages and 
exacerbating ethnic tensions. This is likely to increase ethnic polarisation (Huber 2012, 988).  
Of course, group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation are linked. Voters respond to 
candidates’ political speech and behaviour, and candidates design their campaigns based on 
what they believe will appeal to target constituencies. Thus, a white candidate faced with 
high levels of group-centred ethnicisation may opt to focus his or her campaign on white and 
white-mestizo voters, believing indigenous and indigenous-mestizos to be out of reach. Such 
a campaign strategy may, in turn, lead to higher levels of candidate-centred ethnicisation, 
doing little to convince indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters that their interests will be 
represented. Thus, although group-centred ethnicisation does not necessarily imply risks to 
democratic stability, group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation may be mutually reinforcing, 
and latter is more conducive to ethnic polarisation and conflict. 
In some respects, then, group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation are two sides of the 
same ethnic politics coin. Yet despite their overlap, they are conceptually distinct, and each 
directs us towards different sets of questions and is indicative of characteristics linked to 
different aspects of ethnic voting. However, both group- and candidate-centred measures 
relate to ethnic voting at the group-level, and thus they do not take into account individual-
level voter characteristics beyond ethnic background. As a result, they provide only a weak 
basis for inferring a causal relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice, making it 
impossible to rule out potentially confounding factors (i.e., various non-ethnic voter 
characteristics) that may account for group-level outcomes. 
Ethnicity’s Direct Effect on Vote Choice 
Thus, the second aim of the analysis in Chapters Three, Four, and Five is to 
strengthen the empirical case for a causal relationship between voter ethnicity and vote 
choice and to explore the nature of that relationship. First, the analysis tests the significance 
of ethnicity as a vote predictor in each election while controlling for a wide range of potential 
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confounders, using both linguistic and self-identification measures of ethnicity. It also 
examines interactions between ethnicity and certain substantive preferences and interests in 
order to understand better the relationship between ethnic and non-ethnic vote determiners. A 
final component of the analysis tests the effect of variables measuring voter attitudes towards 
ethnic groups and issues (e.g., negative views of a particular group, or support for 
affirmative-action policies), which can help gain insight into voter motivations.  
First, in order to examine what types of ethnic identification are most important 
electorally, the analysis includes a linguistic and self-identification measure of ethnicity. The 
linguistic measure is based on the childhood language of the respondent or the respondent’s 
parents (Spanish or an indigenous language), while the self-identification measure is the 
respondent’s self-reported identification with predetermined ethnic categories (in most cases 
white, mestizo, or indigenous).30 Comparison between the effects of these two ethnicity 
measures may provide some initial insight into the nature of ethnicity’s role in voting. For 
example, the linguistic measure reflects a broader sociocultural background and may include 
individuals who self-identify with diverse ethnic categories. Indeed, in the three countries 
examined here, voters with an indigenous-language background include many self-identified 
mestizos – the overwhelming majority of respondents in all three countries – as well as 
indigenous voters. Thus, one useful feature of the linguistic measure is to distinguish between 
mestizos with a more proximate indigenous background (indigenous-mestizos), and those 
with more distant connections to indigenous heritage.  
In contrast, the self-identification measure may be more indicative of an individual’s 
explicit self-association with a particular ethnic group. As indicated previously, the majority 
of Andeans tend to self-identify as mestizo when this category is offered, but sizeable 
minorities also identify as white, indigenous, or black. For the purposes of the current study, 
the self-identification measure may help distinguish those voters with an indigenous-language 
background who feel a more immediate, and perhaps more socially and politically salient, 
attachment to indigenous identity. Such voters may be more likely to self-identify explicitly 
as indigenous, rather than as more ethnically ambiguous mestizos. Similarly, it can help 
distinguish voters who consider themselves entirely separate from indigenous culture from 
those who feel some (possibly distant) attachment to indigenous heritage. Many of the former 
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 Other response categories, such as ‘black’, ‘oriental’, or ‘other’ are included in the broad mestizo category. 
These groups typically constitute a small minority of respondents in the Andean surveys, and they tend to 
resemble mestizo voters in terms of electoral behaviour (the analysis tested vote models including both multiple 
and reduced (i.e., only white, mestizo, indigenous) ethnic categories and found little variation in results). 
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may choose to self-identify as white (or perhaps black), while many of the latter may signal 
their indigenous ties through a mestizo self-identification.31  
Second, in order to explore the relationship between ethnic and non-ethnic factors in 
shaping vote choice in each election, the analysis includes interactions between ethnicity, on 
the one hand, and several key substantive preferences and interests, on the other. The 
inclusion of interactions, and their decomposition into marginal effects (the effect of X on Y 
according to Z) and adjusted predictions (the predicted probability of Y given specific values 
of X and Z), allows us to compare behaviour across ethnic groups and examine how ethnicity 
and other factors combine to produce voting outcomes. These features of the analysis can 
contribute to our understanding of the underlying nature of ethnic voting. For example, 
marginal effects can tell us the relative importance of particular substantive issues and 
interests to different ethnic groups, which can help determine the motivations behind support 
for a certain candidate within those groups. Similarly, adjusted predictions based on 
particular combinations of ethnic and non-ethnic voter characteristics can help demonstrate 
how both sets of vote determiners shape electoral choices, telling us something about the 
nature of candidates’ appeal to different groups. Where these interactions are significant, their 
omission from the analysis may also bias estimates of main effects, as well as any predicted 
vote probabilities based on such models, leading to misplaced causal inferences.  
Finally, for all those elections where the data are available, the analysis includes 
several measures of voters’ attitudes towards specific ethnic groups and related policy issues. 
These include a number of variables that can be taken as proxies for ethnic prejudice, as well 
as support for ethnic policy issues and experience of discrimination. An examination of the 
relationship between these attitudinal measures and vote choice can contribute to an 
understanding of the underlying character of voters’ motivations, particularly in terms of 
building a case (or not) in favour of more expressive ethnic voting. 
Ethnicity’s Indirect Effects on Vote Choice 
The third aim of the analysis in Chapters Three through Five is to explore possible 
mediated effects of ethnicity on voting. Ethnicity might have mediated, or indirect, effects on 
vote choice because ethnic identity often helps shape certain sociopolitical attitudes and can 
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 In the Bolivian case, the analysis also includes an additional cultural identification measure. These data offer 
further insight into the types of ethnic identification that affect voting behaviour, and they allow comparison of 
voting trends across distinct cultural groups within a broadly-defined indigenous bloc. The significance of these 
cultural identification measures is discussed in Chapter Three. 
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determine material circumstances. These factors, in turn, may influence voting preferences. 
Mediated effects may occur in addition to, or even in the absence of, more direct effects of 
ethnicity on voting, such as those driven by psychological group allegiance or shaped by 
ethnic heuristics. The analysis in this thesis examines mediation effects of ethnicity via a 
wide range of sociopolitical attitudes, and it includes estimates of both total indirect effects 
and the specific pathways through which mediation may occur. 
The analysis of indirect ethnic effects can help us understand the formative 
relationship between ethnicity and key sociopolitical attitudes, introducing a possible ethnic 
component to the latter’s influence on vote choice. This is normally ignored by studies of 
ethnic voting, yet it is key to understanding the causes and consequences of ethnic voting 
patterns. This examination of indirect ethnic effects extends the thesis’s voting analysis 
beyond the immediate dynamics of the vote decision itself, taking into consideration the 
construction of electorally significant substantive preferences and the possible role of 
ethnicity in such processes. 
The Peruvian Voting Experiment 
Chapter Six discusses the results of the Peruvian voting experiment. The experiment 
took the form of an interactive mock election campaign simulated on a computer, in which 
subjects gathered and evaluated information about two hypothetical candidates running for 
president. Mini-questionnaires throughout the campaign recorded ‘live’ data on voters’ 
impressions and preferences, which were then compared across experimental groups exposed 
to distinct candidate profiles. A major advantage of the experiment was that voters could be 
observed up close while they were making their vote decisions, under conditions that could 
be experimentally controlled and manipulated. This provides unique insight into the 
underlying motivations that may drive ethnic voting (Lau and Redlawsk 2006, 17). The 
experiments were conducted in Peru in September and October of 2013, with participants 
from across the country taking part through the project’s website. Details of the experimental 
sample and software platform used to run the studies are included later in this chapter. The 
specific experimental design and procedures are outlined in Chapter Six. 
The voting experiment was specifically designed to examine the decision-making 
processes of voters at the micro level. In particular, it aimed to distinguish between processes 
indicative of expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. With regard to the latter, it tests two 
related mechanisms through which the use of ethnic heuristics might influence voting 
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behaviour, both informed by existing theory on decision-making from cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1991). The first mechanism involves the use of ethnic stereotypes as 
information shortcuts; the second refers to the resistance of stereotypes to change (Zaller 
1992; Rahn 1993). Thus, the analysis proposes that voters will not only make stereotype-
based assumptions about unknown candidates that go well beyond the actual information 
available, but that they will also tend to play down the significance of actual information that 
contradicts those stereotype-based expectations.32 
The analysis in Chapter Six tests voters’ assumptions about three aspects of candidate 
profile: programmatic positions, social-group associations, and personal characteristics. 
Programmatic profile refers not only to a candidate’s stand on specific policy issues (e.g. 
nationalisations or public spending), but also to his or her broader political ideology. Social-
group associations refer to voters’ general impressions about the social groups and interests 
that the candidate will favour and which will benefit most from the candidate’s election. 
These may well be linked to programmatic profile, but they exceed simple calculations about 
the utility of policy A or B for a certain group. They include assumptions about possible 
clientelistic benefits and a candidate’s wider sympathies, loyalties, networks, and personal as 
well as political priorities. The third aspect of candidate profile, personal characteristics, 
refers to the perceived personal traits of the candidate, including competency, 
trustworthiness, sophistication, responsibility, and so forth. Once again, programmatic profile 
is probably important for such candidate-trait ascriptions, although more deep-seated beliefs 
about ‘intrinsic’ ethnic types may exert more influence in this last case. 
By examining how voters use ethnic information in reaching their vote decision, the 
analysis in Chapter Six can provide insight into the ‘black box’ of voter decision-making that 
other methods of analysis cannot easily reach. Understanding voter decision-making at the 
micro level is crucial for understanding the motivations that drive voting behaviour, and thus 
the wider consequences of ethnic voting for the terms and quality of democratic 
representation and democratic stability. Empirically, the voting experiment provides the only 
direct test for distinguishing between expressive and heuristic ethnic voting, as well as the 
only means by which to trace the constituent processes involved in the latter. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
 The remainder of this chapter outlines the specific data and methods used in the 
subsequent chapters’ analysis. It discusses the key features of the seven election case studies 
and the most important characteristics of the LAPOP survey data. It then presents further 
details of the various types of statistical analyses applied to the LAPOP data. These include 
descriptive statistics of group-level voting patterns, a series of multinomial logistic regression 
models to examine individual-level vote characteristics, and mediation analysis to test the 
indirect ethnic voting model. The discussion then turns to the Peruvian voting experiment, 
laying out the basic experimental design and the methods used to analyse its data. Finally, 
this chapter concludes by briefly summarising some of the sources for more qualitative data 
used in the analysis. 
Election Case Studies 
The analysis in Chapters Three, Four, and Five covers a total of seven presidential 
elections, two in Bolivia, three in Ecuador, and two in Peru. In order to maintain a degree of 
comparability, the elections selected for analysis include the two (or three, in the case of 
Ecuador) most recent electoral cycles prior to 2013, and thus they cover Bolivia in 2005 and 
2009, Ecuador in 2002, 2006 and 2009, and Peru in 2006 and 2011.33 Aside from 
contemporaneity, these seven elections have a number of further points in common, 
including: (i) the presence of a prominent ethnopopulist candidate; (ii) the presence of a 
relatively prominent white or white-mestizo candidate; (iii) a programmatic debate that 
tended to focus on similar broad issues (such as wealth redistribution and nationalisations); 
and (iv) the electoral prominence of regional, economic, and ethnic divides. Variation in the 
exact data available for each election and country, as well as the lack of a common dependent 
variable (i.e. different candidates running across countries and electoral cycles), leads this 
chapter to forego explicit cross-country comparison in statistical terms. However, the 
common characteristics across these seven elections allow for some more qualitative 
comparative analysis.   
Indeed, despite broad similarities, these seven elections also exhibit variation on 
several important contextual factors. Where such variation is prominent, the discussion offers 
some tentative interpretations about the wider impact of country-level factors on voting 
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 The additional Ecuadorian case study, on the 2002 election, is included because it represents the most 
prominent electoral success of an indigenous party in Ecuador (Pachakutik, whose joint candidate won the 
presidency). Thus, it may constitute the clearest example of ethnic voting in the Ecuadorian case. 
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behaviour, although the focus remains primarily on individual-level variables. Among the 
contextual factors that vary across the seven election cases are: (i) the presence of an 
ethnopopulist newcomer (Bolivia 2005, Ecuador 2002 and 2006, Peru 2006); (ii) the presence 
of an incumbent seeking re-election (Bolivia 2009 and Ecuador 2009); (iii) the level of social 
and political unrest preceding the election (ranging from very high in Bolivia 2005 and 2009, 
to progressively lower in Ecuador and Peru); (iv) the role of social movements (highly 
involved in Bolivia, particularly in 2005, to some extent in Ecuador 2002 and 2006, but less 
so elsewhere); and (v) substantial variation in the political alignment of regional, economic, 
organisational, and ethnic blocs and, in some cases, associated clientelistic relations. The 
possible effects of such contextual factors are discussed as they arise in relation to the 
specific election case studies and in more general terms in the concluding chapter. 
Survey Data 
Most of the data for the election case studies come from LAPOP surveys conducted 
between 2004 and 2012. These surveys are nationally representative of voting-age adults, 
with a total sample size between 1,500 and over 3,000 respondents. Country samples are 
developed using a multi-stage probabilistic design, and they are stratified by major 
subnational region and by urban and rural areas within municipalities.34 These design 
features, as well as weighting schemes in both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, are 
incorporated into the statistical models presented in the following chapters.  
The data come mostly from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of surveys, which cover the 
elections in 2005 and 2006, and 2009, respectively. In addition, the analysis uses the 2004 
survey for Ecuador 2002, the 2008 survey for Ecuador 2006 (the 2006 survey was conducted 
prior to the election), and the 2012 survey for Peru 2011. For the principal vote models, then, 
data come from post-election surveys conducted within twelve months of the election, with 
the exception of Ecuador 2002 and 2006. Like most post-election surveys, the LAPOP data 
tend to overstate support for the eventual winner of the election in question, although they 
generally reflect the overall trend of the official results.  
Although the LAPOP surveys included a core set of questions across electoral cycles 
and countries, several measures of interest to the current analysis are absent in individual 
surveys. Where possible, alternative, related measures are substituted for missing variables, 
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 LAPOP has conducted comparable biennial public opinion surveys in most countries in North, Central, and 
South America since 2004. See LAPOP (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012) for full 
technical information on each survey design, and Appendix E for specific question wording. 
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although even where such alternatives exist, the lack of direct comparability makes 
quantitative cross-country and over-time analysis problematic. Details of the specific 
substitute measures used in each election case study are outlined in the relevant chapters. In 
general, however, all surveys except Ecuador 2002 and 2008 include comparable measures of 
voters’ linguistic background (Spanish or an indigenous language), and all seven relevant 
surveys include a ‘generic’ self-identification measure (in most cases, white, mestizo, or 
indigenous). In addition, the Bolivian cases include a measure of cultural identification 
(asking whether respondents identify with specific indigenous cultures – Aymara, Quechua, 
Camba, Guaraní, and so forth – or with no indigenous culture). All surveys also include 
measures of household income, region, urban/rural residence, age, gender, trust in political 
parties, perceptions of national and personal economic circumstances, and, of course, first-
round presidential vote choice.35  
Data Analysis and Statistical Models 
Most election case studies include four main empirical sections, although in some 
cases one or more sections is dropped or reduced due to data limitations. First, each case 
study presents an overview of group- and candidate-perspective ethnicisation in the election – 
that is, the proportion of each ethnic group that votes for each candidate, and the proportion 
of each candidate’s vote share that comes from each ethnic group. The second section 
presents the results from a multinomial logistic regression model that tests the basic 
relationship between voter ethnicity, sociodemographic factors, economic perceptions, and 
political attitudes affecting vote choice. In most cases, it also reports the results of a similar 
model that includes various interactions between ethnicity and other factors, presenting 
marginal effects and adjusted predictions. The next section adds ethnic attitudes to the model 
(where such data are available), and, once again, examines both main and marginal effects. 
Lastly, the final section in each case study presents the results of mediation analysis, where 
the effect of ethnicity on vote choice as mediated through political attitudes is estimated for 
the two major candidate pairs. 
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
Group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are calculated for each ethnic group 
and each major candidate for the seven elections studied. Both types of score are simple 
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 All three countries have electoral systems that require the president to win a clear majority in first-round 
voting to avoid a second-round runoff (in most cases, this means over fifty percent of valid vote). Where no 
candidate wins such a majority, the top two candidates proceed to a runoff election. 
53 
 
standard deviations (SD), with group-centred scores based on the distribution of votes to 
candidates within an ethnic group, and candidate-centred scores based on the ethnic 
composition of the candidate’s vote.  
There are two group-centred ethnicisation scores, SD1 and SD2, which are calculated 
based on different mean proportions. The first, SD1, is the standard deviation of vote 
proportions within each ethnic group from the overall vote proportions in the full survey 
sample, whereas SD2 is simply the standard deviation from an equal-vote-share mean 
(simply 100 percent divided by the number of voting outcomes). Thus, SD1 takes into 
account the overall performance of the candidates, helping to identify disproportionate 
preferences in particular groups. However, majority groups will always have lower SD1 
scores, even if their vote is highly concentrated, because their vote proportions will (by 
definition) be closer to the mean as set by the overall sample proportions. For its part, SD2 
does not take into account one or another candidate’s stronger overall performance, but it 
does allow more concentrated vote patterns in majority groups to be identified (unlike SD1). 
Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the standard deviations of each candidate’s 
ethnic vote proportions from the ethnic group proportions in the full sample. Candidate-
centred ethnicisation scores thus take into account the ethnic composition of the overall 
LAPOP sample when calculating candidate scores. 
Group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores give a broad overview of national 
voting patterns in the election under investigation, indicating both trends in the electoral 
behaviour of each ethnic group and the breadth of each candidate’s ethnic appeal. The 
ethnicisation scores also provide useful summary statistics that can aid some (qualified) 
cross-election comparisons. 
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Overview 
Much of the following chapters’ analysis is based on a series of multinomial logistic 
regression (mlogit) models with vote choice as the dependent variable. First, the analysis 
reports the results of a ‘base’ mlogit model for each election, which includes the following 
sets of explanatory variables: (i) ethnicity, including at least  linguistic and self-identification 
measures; (ii) sociodemographic indicators (income, age, gender, etc.); (iii) several measures 
of broad political and economic perceptions (perceived performance of the national economy, 
trust in political parties, etc.); and (iv) a range of political attitudes and preferences (ideology 
and support for specific programmatic proposals). To ease interpretation, the log-odds 
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produced by these models are converted to effects on overall predicted vote probabilities, 
with the original output reported in appendices.  
However, main effects of the type produced by the base mlogit models assume that 
voters’ sociodemographic background and political attitudes influence vote choice uniformly 
across ethnic groups. They also assume that the effect of ethnicity on vote choice is the same 
for voters with different sociodemographic backgrounds and who have quite different social 
and political attitudes. Although analysis of main effects can provide valuable insight, in 
many cases it seems likely that these two assumptions will not hold. Therefore, after 
presenting main effects for each election, this thesis proceeds to decompose these effects into 
average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group: the effect of X on Y according to Z. 
Furthermore, in order to assess the substantive impact of such effects on vote choice, the 
thesis also calculates and compares predictions based on various possible voter profiles: the 
predicted value of Y given set values of X and Z (or, indeed, set values of Xi, Xii, Xn and Z). 
These average marginal effects and adjusted predictions are calculated based on two-way 
interactions between ethnicity and political attitudes, and between ethnicity and income, 
added to the base mlogit model.36 Together, an examination of main effects, marginal effects, 
and substantive predictions provides a far more nuanced – and far more accurate – picture of 
the interplay among ethnicity, sociodemographic indicators, political attitudes, and vote 
choice in the Andes. 
Finally, where appropriate measures are available, ethnic attitude variables are added 
to the base mlogit model. The particular measures tested vary considerably across survey 
round and country, so detailed discussion of this aspect of the analysis is deferred to the 
individual chapters. In general, however, these measures include attitudes towards ethnic 
mixing, inter-ethnic marriage, the root of ethnic inequalities, the treatment of certain groups, 
and personal experience of discrimination. As well as main effects, the analysis also reports 
decomposed effects and predictions for two-way interactions between ethnicity and these 
ethnic attitude measures. 
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Marginal Effects and Predictions 
The analysis of decomposed effects in the following chapters consists of two principal 
components: Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and Adjusted Predictions at Representative 
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 Separate models are run for interactions with each ethnicity measure, with the other ethnicity measure 
included as a control. 
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Values (APRs). Average Marginal Effects represent the average effect of X on Y by Z, taking 
into account the values of any other variables under consideration across the full sample. For 
example, an AME can indicate the effect of political ideology (X) on vote choice (Y) in each 
ethnic group (Z), while controlling for sociodemographic and other factors. Adjusted 
Predictions at Representative Values are simply the predictions on the dependent variable 
associated with AMEs. Thus, APRs are the predicted outcome on Y according to X and Z at 
various set values of Xi, Xii, Xn, while controlling for other factors. For example, APRs could 
provide the predicted probability of voting for Candidate A for a voter who is white, low 
income, and supports the nationalisation of key industries.  
The analysis of these decomposed effects and predictions is generally restricted to 
ethnicity’s interactions with four key vote determiners: income, political ideology, support 
for state-led wealth redistribution, and support for nationalisations. These four non-ethnic 
explanatory variables are selected because they appear to play important roles in many of the 
elections examined in this thesis, and they represent four relatively broad, and consistently 
central, themes in political competition in the region. 
Mediation Analysis 
Mediation analysis can be used to determine whether the effect of X on Y is mediated 
through M and, if so, to what extent (so: X → M → Y). For the purposes of this study, 
mediation analysis is used to test the effect of voter ethnicity on vote choice, including 
mediation of ethnicity’s effect through political attitudes. Conceptually, the argument runs 
that ethnicity may influence a voter’s political attitudes (through determining both physical 
surroundings/material conditions and political socialization), and that these ethnically-
influenced political attitudes then help shape voting behaviour. Such effects are routinely 
hypothesised, but rarely explicitly tested. 
Mediation analysis has been the subject of considerable debate in the statistical 
literature (e.g. Baron and Kenny 1986; MacKinnon 2008; Imai et al. 2010; Linden and 
Karlson 2013; Kenny 2014), yet there is little consensus regarding the preferred method of 
calculation. This is particularly the case where the outcome and mediator variables include 
categorical as well as continuous measures, an unavoidable aspect of this thesis’s analysis 
(categorical ethnicity measures; categorical and continuous political attitude measures; 
categorical vote-choice outcomes). In such cases, the conventional methods for estimating 
mediation – the ‘product of coefficients’ approach (multiplying the coefficient of X → M by 
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the coefficient for M → Y), or the ‘difference in coefficients’ approach (subtracting the effect 
of X → Y controlling for M from the direct effect of X → Y) – are not easily applied. The 
problem arises from the need to combine coefficients and error terms from both linear and 
nonlinear models. 
Several approaches have been proposed to resolve this issue (see Imai et al. 2010 or 
Linden and Karlson 2013). The analysis presented in the following chapters opts for an 
adjusted version of the ‘product of coefficients’ approach, which uses Y-standardisation to 
combine coefficients from the linear and logit parts of the mediation model.37 This method, 
proposed by MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) and implemented in the user-written Stata 
command ‘binary_mediation’ (Ender, nd), uses Y-standardisation to rescale coefficients to be 
measured in standard deviations of the latent outcome variable that is assumed to underlie the 
binary outcome variable. The results are coefficients that can be interpreted in a similar way 
to standardised coefficients in linear models (e.g. Winship and Mare 1983).  
Although some studies have found this method to produce slightly biased results 
(Linden and Karlson 2013: 101), it has the major advantage of being able to estimate multiple 
specific mediation pathways (e.g. X → Mi → Y; X → Mii → Y; X → Miii → Y; etc.) while 
controlling for other mediators and direct predictors.38 Most alternative methods only provide 
an estimate of the overall mediation, or are limited to one mediator variable (Buis 2010; 
Karlson et al. 2012; Hicks and Tingley 2011).39 The decomposition of mediation effects into 
specific pathways has considerable conceptual utility for this thesis’s analysis, allowing us to 
identify the particular political attitudes through which ethnicity’s indirect effects might 
operate. The overall mediation effects are checked against estimates from two alternative 
methods (Karlson et al. 2012; Buis 2010), which are both based on the comparison between 
effects in ‘full’ and ‘reduced’ models (that is, between the model with mediators, and the 
model without mediators), rather than the ‘product of coefficients’ approach. These two 
alternative methods are referred to as KHB (Karlson) and LDE (Buis) in the following case 
studies. In general, the vote analyses in the following chapters show the three methods to 
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 More specifically, the method standardises the coefficients linking X → M and M → Y (a and b), and then 
applies the ‘product of coefficients’ method to these coefficients (ab). In cases where M is continuous, the X → 
M relationship constitutes the standardised coefficient of a linear model, while in cases where M is categorical, 
the coefficient is the standardised coefficient of a logit model (Linden and Karlson 2013: 89-90).  
38
 In fact, this method is shown to produce relatively accurate point estimates for direct, indirect, and total 
effects. However, it tends to overestimate the overall proportion of the effects mediated (Linden and Karlson 
2013: 92-102). 
39
 The method proposed by Buis (2010) is a generalisation of Erikson et al. (2005) and is implemented in the 
Stata command ‘ldecomp’. The methods proposed by Karlson et al. (2012) and Hicks and Tingley (2011) are 
implemented in the Stata commands ‘khb’ and ‘medeff’, respectively. 
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produce broadly comparable estimates for the proportion of the total effect that is mediated 
(typically, within ten percent of one another).40 At least for the purposes of the current 
analysis, these differences tend not to alter fundamentally interpretations about ethnicity’s 
indirect role in voting.  
Methodological limitations have also determined two other features of the following 
chapters’ mediation analysis. First, the requirement for a binary dependent variable has meant 
that the analysis focuses only on the top two candidates in each election, although some 
additional candidate pairs are included in separate models where the comparison has potential 
explanatory value. This has an obvious impact on sample size, as only voters for the 
candidate pair tested are included. Second, the requirement for binary or continuous 
independent variables means the ethnic self-identification measure is converted into head-to-
head comparisons, tested in separate models. Thus, one model tests the effect of self-
identification as white compared with mestizo (excluding all non-white and non-mestizo 
observations), while a second model tests the effect of self-identification as indigenous 
compared with mestizos (excluding all non-indigenous and non-mestizo observations). In 
some cases, a combination of these two methodologically imposed adjustments produces 
subpopulations that are too small for meaningful analysis, while the partially recoded 
variables (resulting in further sample reduction), as well as the process of standardisation 
required to produce the estimates, make direct comparisons with the ‘base’ mlogit models 
problematic.  
However, despite the methodological complications, the mediation analysis presented 
in the following chapters can offer some important insights into ethnicity’s direct and indirect 
role in voting. It can estimate the extent to which ethnicity exerts indirect influence on vote 
choice by prior conditioning of political and ethnic attitudes, it can identify which political 
attitudes might act as mediators, and it can suggest what the constituent parts of the mediated 
effect might look like. Statistical inaccuracies notwithstanding, these findings can contribute 
to our broad understanding of how ethnicity might shape vote choice indirectly, as well as 
directly, in contemporary Andean elections. 
Design and Data Analysis for the Voting Experiment 
For ease of reference, discussion of the specific procedures for the Peruvian voting 
experiment is deferred to Chapter Six. The following paragraphs include a more general 
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 Data limitations restrict the analysis in the Ecuadorian case (see discussion in Chapter Four). 
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discussion of participant recruitment, the basic operating platform for the experiment, and the 
principal methods of data analysis. 
Participants  
The experiment included a final sample of 217 participants (‘voters’) who were 
recruited from across Peru by 36 paid local research assistants. The author recruited these 
assistants via various universities, nongovernmental organisations, and online advertisements, 
and each assistant was asked to recruit up to 10 experiment participants from his or her 
extended family and social and professional networks. Although the resulting sample is not 
nationally representative, it does include substantial variation on key demographic variables 
(age, gender, income, occupation, ethnicity, and region of residence).41 Full descriptive 
statistics for the experiment sample are included in Table D1.  
Most participants took part online, via the project’s website, during September and 
October 2013. Although this online mode of participation implies some loss of control over 
the experimental environment compared to a laboratory setting, it significantly increases 
recruitment reach by removing prohibitive travel demands on participants. For participants 
without private access to internet, several research assistants were able to convene 
experiment sessions in their homes, in local internet cabinas (small internet cafes), or at their 
place of study. This helped expand sociodemographic variation among participants. 
The Basic Experimental Design 
The experiment was developed and run on the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment 
(DPTE) platform hosted at the University of Iowa. The DPTE platform provides a highly 
customisable software base for designing dynamic, interactive social experiments, and it is 
particularly suitable for studying voting behaviour (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2006).  
 On accessing the experiment platform, participants were randomly selected into one 
of three experimental groups, which determined the candidate profiles to which they would 
be exposed.42 After completing an initial questionnaire on demographic characteristics and 
political preferences, participants entered the first of three ‘active’ phases of the simulated 
campaign. During these ‘active’ phases, participants were tasked with searching and 
                                                          
41
 Research assistants were asked explicitly to include as much variation on demographic variables as possible 
among their recruits. 
42
 The DPTE software randomly assigns participants to groups according to set probability weights (in this case, 
33.3 percent, to achieve comparable group sizes). See discussion in Chapter Six on the composition of candidate 
profiles in each group. 
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evaluating information about the hypothetical candidates running for president, and mini-
questionnaires between phases recorded ‘live’ data on participants’ changing impressions and 
preferences. Each ‘active’ phase lasted five minutes, and participants were exposed to 
different types of information in each phase (see discussion in Chapter Six). 
Participants accessed information via a ‘dynamic information board’, which presented 
a range of ‘information titles’ on the computer screen concerning various aspects of the 
campaign. When clicked on, these ‘titles’ revealed more detailed information about the 
indicated topic. For example, clicking on a title such as ‘Olarte’s Economic Policy’ might 
reveal a short text setting out the economic programme of the candidate Olarte.43 The DPTE 
platform allows for a variety of different information inputs, and the Peruvian experiment 
used text, images, and audio. When the participant finishes reading a particular text (or 
viewing an image or listening to an audio recording), he or she closes the information 
window and returns to the list of ‘titles’. In general, information items were presented in a 
variety of forms, including simple factual items (‘Olarte’s Economic Policy’ or ‘Olarte: 
Family Background’); simulated news reports (‘Olarte denies plans to increase taxes’); third-
party endorsements (‘CONFIEP declares support for Romero’); direct candidate policy 
statements (‘Olarte: I will protect our natural resources’); and attack advertisements and 
rebuttals (‘Romero: Olarte’s plan for economic ruin’). The DPTE platform records what 
information participants look at, in what order they look at it, and for how long.  
In order to better simulate a real election campaign, there was a set time limit to each 
‘active’ phase of the campaign, and a clock at the top of the screen counted down to the end 
of the phase. When the phase ended, the information screen automatically closed and the 
participant was taken to the next post-phase task (usually a mini-questionnaire). Importantly, 
the information titles were not static; they constantly ‘scrolled’ down the screen so that every 
six seconds a new title appeared at the top of the screen, the last title disappeared from the 
bottom of the screen, and the remaining titles moved down one place. Participants were 
informed in advance that this ‘scrolling’ of titles would continue in the background while 
they were accessing specific information. Thus, participants missed new information titles 
while they were researching a specific topic. 
This feature simulated better the time and resource constraints of a real-world election 
campaign, forcing participants to be more selective and efficient in choosing what 
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 The hypothetical candidates in the simulated campaign were Guillermo Olarte, Luís Romero, Juán Sánchez, 
and Luís Rodríguez. See Chapter Six. 
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information to examine. This was a particularly crucial feature in terms of assessing heuristic 
use because it is precisely to simplify complex and overwhelming information environments 
that heuristics are employed in the first place. If participants were allowed the opportunity to 
access all the information available and to do so without time pressure, then heuristic use 
would be likely to be reduced considerably. However, in order to ensure that all participants 
received a common set of core information items (e.g., information on a candidate’s ethnic 
background), several items were introduced as ‘fixed’ features; the ‘active’ campaign phases 
paused and the screen was taken over by an ‘announcement’, ‘newsflash’, or ‘candidate spot’ 
containing the required information. 
Instructions to participants and the various within-experiment questionnaires were all 
conducted via the DPTE platform, which guides participants through the various stages. In 
addition to the experiment data, the DPTE platform records the IP addresses from which the 
experiment platform is accessed, helping to prevent repeat participation. 
Analysing the Experimental Data 
 For the most part, the experimental data are examined statistically, employing a range 
of different analyses. First, simple tests of association (T-tests and proportions tests) are used 
to examine the ascription of specific characteristics to candidates. For example, proportions 
tests are used to examine the ascription of different personal characteristics to each candidate, 
as well as the variation of such associations across experimental phases and groups. 
 Second, various regression analyses are employed to examine a wide range of 
relationships among voter characteristics, experimental conditions, and voter behaviour. The 
precise type of model employed depends on the nature of variables under consideration (e.g., 
whether the dependent variable is categorical or continuous) and the specific aims of the 
analysis. For example, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to test the relationship 
between voter ethnicity and ratings on candidate ‘feeling thermometers’, while logistic 
regression is employed to examine vote choice.  
Third, much of the analysis requires examination of interactions between various 
predictor variables of interest and the experimental group. These are decomposed into 
marginal effects and adjusted predictions. This is essential for the purpose of analysing the 
experimental data because a primary aim is to determine the influence of distinct group 
conditions on voting behaviour. Thus, in most cases, the relationships of interest relate to the 
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effects of different predictor variables across experimental groups (marginal effects) and the 
outcome of such relationships in each group (adjusted predictions). 
Fourth, a key feature of the experiment design was the separation of the mock 
campaign into three distinct phases in which voters were exposed to different types of 
information. Thus, an important task for the data analysis is to examine how the perceptions 
and preferences of individual voters change across experimental phases. For this type of 
analysis, the experiment dataset is converted to longitudinal panel data and mixed-effects 
models are applied to examine within-subject changes over time (i.e., over the three 
experimental phases).  
Finally, the experiment produced a vast amount of data (over 285,000 data points). In 
order to gain a broad overview of certain key trends, several composite measures are 
computed. In particular, two measures of voter-candidate proximity (how closely a voter’s 
profile resembles that of each candidate) are key components of the final vote-choice 
analysis. The calculation methods for these and other composite measures are outlined in the 
relevant discussion in Chapter Six. Chapter Six also includes some further elaboration of the 






This chapter examines ethnic voting in Bolivia’s 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. 
Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters supported Evo Morales and the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) in overwhelming numbers in both elections, while non-indigenous 
mestizos and whites tended to support opponents of the MAS disproportionately. Substantive 
preferences and other demographic indicators do not fully account for these voting patterns, 
and the analysis in this chapter strongly suggests ethnic preferences influenced vote choice in 
many cases. However, voting in the Bolivian 2005 and 2009 presidential elections was some 
way off the ‘ethnic census’ pattern associated with unconditional ethnic group allegiances. 
Indeed, all major candidates won support across ethnic lines, albeit to different extents, and 
substantive preferences and interests often appeared to influence such voting behaviour. 
Overall, the analysis in this chapter indicates that voting outcomes were shaped by a 
combination of bias towards an ethnically-proximate candidate and more instrumental 
concerns about substantive preferences and interests. Successful candidates and parties in 
Bolivia can, and do, appeal to voters on both ethnic and substantive grounds, although the 
wider context of the election may influence the relative salience of these two sets of criteria. 
For the purposes of this chapter’s analysis, the direct influence of ethnicity on voting 
in Bolivia is attributed to a broadly-defined ethnic bias. Such ethnic bias is conceived as some 
combination of psychological attachments to an ethnic group, and more instrumental 
assumptions about candidates’ personal and political characteristics based on ethnic 
stereotypes. In terms of the three models outlined in Chapter One, therefore, this ethnic bias 
includes processes associated with both expressive and heuristic ethnic voting.44 Although the 
analysis at times suggests the predominance of one form of ethnic voting over the other – for 
example, significant effects for certain attitudinal measures may indicate ethnic prejudice or 
resentment – the survey data provide no direct test to distinguish expressive from heuristic 
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 The three voting models in question are the expressive model, where voting constitutes an act of 
unconditional (psychological) ethnic group allegiance; the heuristic model, where voters’ rely on ethnic 
stereotypes to make candidate assessments; and the indirect model, where ethnicity shapes vote choice indirectly 
by its prior influence on political preferences and social circumstances. 
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motivations. Thus, for the most part, this chapter’s analysis (and that of Chapters Four and 
Five) refers only to this combined form of ethnic bias. Chapter Six deals explicitly with the 
underlying nature of such ethnic bias in relation to the Peruvian voting experiment. 
Ethnicity and Ethnic Voting in Bolivia 
Several features of Bolivia’s ethnic landscape and recent political history may explain 
the emergence and electoral significance of ethnic bias. In many cases, these relate to the 
general social, cultural, and political characteristics of Andean countries outlined in Chapter 
One. Indeed, many of the broad contextual factors outlined below are variously relevant to 
the Ecuadorian and Peruvian cases examined in subsequent chapters. However, the Bolivian 
case is also distinct from its regional neighbours in several respects, and ethnic voting has 
been notably more pronounced in recent Bolivian elections than elsewhere in the Andes. 
First, as in most Latin American countries, ethnic relations in Bolivia have been 
profoundly shaped by mestizaje. Mestizaje refers to both biological mixing and a 
sociocultural discourse promoting the assimilation of indigenous peoples into a Eurocentric, 
national mestizo culture. This ‘deindigenising’ dimension to mestizaje had been a prominent 
feature of Bolivian social and cultural history since the colonial period, but it accelerated in 
the latter half of the twentieth century both as a result of public policy and mass urban 
migration (Albro 2010; Halperin Donghi 1997; Sanjinés 2002, 2005). For example, in the 
wake of the 1952 revolution the ruling Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) moved 
to integrate indigenous Bolivians into the post-revolutionary state for the first time. Yet they 
did so through incorporating indigenous communities into mestizo peasant unions, and they 
explicitly discouraged organising along ethnic lines (Van Cott 2005, 158-9; Albro 2010, 150-
1 2010; Webber 2011, 67). Mass migration from the mid-twentieth century also hastened 
mestizaje. Increased inter-ethnic contact, including more frequent exposure to discrimination, 
led many indigenous migrants to the city to gradually abandon their indigenous cultural 
characteristics (language, dress, customs, and so forth), assimilating into an urban mestizo 
cultural class (Albó 2008, 32-3; Toranzo Roca 2008, 38-9; Klein 2011, 285-6). 
In part because of mestizaje (both biological and cultural), ethnic identities in 
contemporary Bolivia are marked by exceptional fluidity and multiplicity. When asked by 
census and survey interviewers, many Bolivians opt for an ethnically ambiguous mestizo 
self-identification (‘7 de cada 10 bolivianos se ven mestizos’ 2009; cited in Madrid 2012, 38). 
Overall, this ethnic landscape is not particularly conducive to the type of inflexible, binary, 
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and antagonistic ethnic-group identification typically associated with expressive ethnic 
voting. 
Nevertheless, the assimilationist effect of mestizaje on ethnic identification has been 
notably less pronounced in Bolivia than in either Ecuador or Peru. Indeed, according to 
LAPOP’s 2010 survey, 19.0 percent of Bolivians consider themselves indigenous, compared 
to 72.7 percent mestizo and 7.2 percent white.45 In contrast, just 2.0 percent of Ecuadorians 
and 3.3 percent of Peruvians self-identified as indigenous in the same round of LAPOP 
surveys. Moreover, when Bolivian respondents were asked about their cultural identification 
(as opposed to self-identification per se) a total of 73.1 percent reported identification with an 
indigenous culture, while 23.9 percent reported speaking an indigenous language as a child 
(compared to 1.6 percent of Ecuadorians, and 14.3 percent of Peruvians).46 These data 
suggest many Bolivians still identify to some extent with an indigenous identity and heritage 
(and in greater numbers than voters in Ecuador and Peru), and we might expect such 
psychological ethnic attachments to play some role in voting behaviour. 
Furthermore, ethnic inequalities and discrimination are pervasive in contemporary 
Bolivian society. Bolivians from an indigenous background tend to be poorer, less educated, 
and have less access to health facilities compared with non-indigenous Bolivians (Jiménez 
Pozo et al. 2006, 48-9; cited in Madrid 2012, 38). People with an indigenous background are 
also far more likely to have experienced discrimination. Indeed, according to the 2010 
LAPOP survey, 63.8 percent of indigenous Bolivians reported experiencing some form of 
discrimination in the previous year, compared to just 44.7 percent of mestizos and 33.2 
percent of whites. Moreover, 24.6 percent of indigenous respondents reported several 
instances of discrimination explicitly on the grounds of physical appearance in the last year, 
compared to 11.4 percent of mestizos and 4.6 percent of whites.47 In this context, it seems 
likely that psychological ethnic ties and prejudice may influence voters’ evaluation of their 
electoral alternatives in ways that are separate from calculations based on purely substantive 
preferences and interests.  
Finally, in this context of ethnic inequality and discrimination, ethnic differences 
become a prominent part of everyday social experiences. As a result, ethnic identities are 
likely to have some perceived explanatory value as a means of predicting social and political 
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 Unless stated otherwise, all figures from LAPOP data are the author’s elaboration. 
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 The Ecuador and Peru surveys did not include a question on cultural identification. 
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 Based on respondents who reported discrimination as a result of physical appearance “many times” or 
“several times” in the last 12 months. 
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background, preferences, and behaviour, even if the precise boundaries between ethnic 
groups are blurred. Indeed, this chapter argues that voters may use the perceived ethnic 
identity of electoral candidates as cues from which to make assumptions about personal 
background, social networks, and wider sociopolitical preferences. This use of an ethnic 
heuristic may well contribute to an observable ethnic bias in voting outcomes. 
Both these potential causes of ethnic bias – lingering ethnic attachments and ethnic 
heuristic use – are likely to increase when ethnicity becomes politicised. As noted in Chapter 
One, the politicisation of ethnicity has been a noteworthy feature of recent Andean political 
history, but it has been particularly pronounced in Bolivia. In fact, unlike in Ecuador and 
Peru, Bolivia’s indigenous population has been electorally significant as early as the mid-
twentieth century, when the MNR’s removal of literacy restrictions on suffrage effectively 
enfranchised the largely illiterate indigenous population. Through the late 1950s and 1960s, 
the MNR achieved strong support among the newly expanded indigenous electorate. The 
MNR government incorporated indigenous communities into peasant federations that it 
controlled, enacted land reform, and expanded education and health services in rural 
indigenous communities (Madrid 2012, 40).48  
In the 1970s, a new wave of indigenous parties emerged from the Aymara-based 
Katarista movement.49 Although they varied somewhat in terms of leadership and ideology, 
the Katarista parties all sought to increase ethnic consciousness among Aymara communities 
and to promote the political and economic advancement of Aymara Bolivians (Madrid 2012, 
40-1). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s various populist parties also used ethnic appeals to 
win support among indigenous voters, running indigenous candidates, adopting some 
indigenous demands, and using indigenous symbols in their campaigns (San Martín Arzabe 
1991; Alenda Mary 2002; Romero 2003). Finally, in addition to these political parties, a wide 
range of indigenous organisations and leaders were actively involved in prominent national 
peasant federations such as the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos 
de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB and similar organisations became increasingly 
influential through the late 1980s, spearheading opposition to the neoliberal reforms of 
successive governments. Moreover, they helped propel indigenous actors and issues into the 
centre of national politics. 
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 The MNR also relied on fraud and clientelistic incentives to win votes (Ticono Alejo et. al 1995).  
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 The Katarista movement is named after Tupak Katari, who led an indigenous uprising in the eighteenth 
century in the area that is modern-day Bolivia. See Rivera Cusicanqui (1986), Ticona Alejo et al. (1995), Van 
Cott (2005), and Yashar (2006) on the Kataristas. 
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 In the mid-1990s, the CSUTCB and its social movement allies began to explore the 
possibility of creating a political branch through which the social movements could 
participate in elections. In 1995, a joint-congress of the CSUTCB and several other 
indigenous organisations approved the formation of the Asamblea de la Soberanía de los 
Pueblos (ASP) to compete in upcoming local and national elections. Initially, Morales served 
as deputy leader of the ASP, but, following a leadership dispute, he split from the movement 
in 1998 and formed an independent political party, the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía 
de los Pueblos (ISPS). In order to participate in the 1999 elections, Morales and ISPS adopted 
the official registration of the MAS, a small leftist party, a title the party subsequently opted 
to retain. The MAS reached out to indigenous, peasant, and urban working-class 
organisations across the country, and it adopted an inclusive ethnopopulist electoral strategy. 
The MAS and its leaders also played a prominent role in the anti-government protests that 
marked the late 1990s and early 2000s, events that provided the party with a national 
platform to establish its credentials as a broadly-based protest movement. In supporting the 
protests, the MAS and its leaders sought to link the demands, interests, and sociocultural 
values of the indigenous movement to a broader political agenda that emphasised economic 
and political reform, nationalism, anti-imperialism, and an end to ethnic and social 
‘apartheid’ (García Linera 2005, 456-7; Harten 2011, 126; Madrid 2012, 58-68; Vales 2005). 
Thus, throughout the late twentieth century, a succession of indigenous social 
movements and political parties worked to strengthen ethnic consciousness and politicise 
ethnic differences in Bolivia. In doing so, they not only increased the salience of ethnic 
identification at the individual level, but they also helped to introduce an ethnic frame to 
many controversial political issues. Indigenous organisations and politicians were often at the 
forefront of multisector political protests, and their rhetoric sought to connect broadly defined 
indigenous values and demands to the wider interests of non-elite sectors across Bolivian 
society. A central argument in this chapter, and elsewhere in this thesis, is that this context of 
ethnic politicisation helped link an inclusive indigenous ethnic identity to a much more 
general anti-establishment, anti-neoliberal political agenda. This, in turn, contributed to the 
formation of an ethnic heuristic that associated indigenous and non-indigenous politicians 
with a particular substantive platform. 
In summary, this chapter argues that ethnic bias in Bolivian voting arises as a result of 
both psychological attachments to ethnic groups and the heuristic use of ethnic stereotypes. 
The relative influence of each constituent aspect of such ethnic bias is likely to vary 
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according to the characteristics of the individual voter and certain macro-level contextual 
factors (e.g., the types of ethnic appeals employed by politicians, or specific events that 
polarise or unify ethnic groups in the lead-up to an election). Nevertheless, although Bolivian 
voting patterns strongly suggest ethnic bias, this chapter also argues that most voters are 
concerned with more than simple ethnic descriptive representation. Indeed, in many cases the 
statistical analysis estimates vote probabilities that vary considerably within ethnic groups, 
and this variation tends to reflect voters’ ideological and policy-based preferences. Similarly, 
in the 2009 election, voters’ perceptions of both national and personal economic trends were 
important vote predictors, suggesting that the record of the MAS government in office 
featured significantly in voters’ calculations. In short, ethnic voting patterns in Bolivia’s 2005 
and 2009 election suggest that substantive interests and ethnic bias combined to shape 
electoral outcomes. 
Finally, this chapter argues that ethnicity’s influence on material conditions and 
political socialisation can also contribute to an explanation of ethnic voting patterns. The 
societal conditions outlined above – distinct ethnic communities, ethnic inequality, and 
widespread discrimination – are likely to result in members of the same ethnic group sharing 
certain substantive interests and preferences. Ethnic inequalities mean many co-ethnics will 
often share material interests because of similar social positions (e.g., indigenous Bolivians 
are disproportionately poor, they comprise a majority of agricultural workers, and so forth). 
In addition, the persistence of social and cultural differences across ethnic groups means 
individual voters may be socialised in diverse environments, leading to broader ideological 
preferences and values that are similar within – and distinct across – ethnic groups.  
As a result, it is conceivable that ethnic voting patterns may simply reflect the 
substantive preferences and interests of Bolivians whose social circumstances and 
experiences have been shaped by ethnic background. Ethnicity may not directly enter voters’ 
electoral considerations at all. However, the analysis presented in this chapter finds only 
partial evidence for this indirect model of ethnic voting. Ethnicity appears to have some 
influence on substantive preferences, but the effect of ethnicity on vote choice is not captured 
fully by voters’ non-ethnic characteristics. 
Overview of the 2005 and 2009 Presidential Elections 
 Several features of the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections were conducive to ethnic 
voting along the lines described above. In both cases, voters faced an electoral environment 
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that presented distinct ethnic, as well as substantive, alternatives. In 2005, the only two viable 
candidates for the presidency, at least by the latter stages of the campaign, were Morales and 
Jorge Quiroga. Morales was an Aymara indigenous leader who had been a vocal critic of the 
neoliberal policies of the political establishment, and both he and the MAS had been 
prominently involved in anti-government protests through the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
MAS was highly critical of neoliberalism, promised to defend coca production, and decried 
the interference of the United States and international financial institutions in Bolivia’s 
affairs. It also pledged to rewrite the national constitution to reflect Bolivia’s multicultural 
character and to enshrine indigenous values, beliefs, and specific rights in the country’s 
political and legal framework (MAS 2005, 64-70). The MAS was also closely allied with 
numerous indigenous organisations, and its supporters were particularly active in the mostly 
indigenous western provinces.  
Quiroga, in contrast, came from a privileged, white family background. He was 
educated in the United States, had an American wife, and had worked for IBM, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund before returning to Bolivia to join the right-
leaning Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN) party. He served as vice president to Hugo 
Banzer (1997-2001), and as president (2001-2002) following Banzer’s resignation. In 2005, 
Quiroga ran as the candidate of the centre-right coalition Poder Democrático y Social 
(PODEMOS), which included the ADN and several other rightist parties. Quiroga and 
PODEMOS offered neoliberal continuity, including the expansion of free-trade agreements 
and a ‘zero coca’ policy of eradicating coca production in Bolivia. Quiroga drew his principal 
support from the upper and middle classes in the wealthier, less indigenous eastern provinces. 
 This basic pattern was repeated in 2009, although both the specific electoral 
environment and the wider sociopolitical context were even more polarised. Following his 
success in 2005, Morales ran for re-election in 2009 as the incumbent, promising to continue 
and expand the MAS’s 2004-2009 programme. This is included further nationalisations in the 
hydrocarbons sector, the extension of social programmes, and continued defiance of the 
United States, particularly on the coca issue (MAS 2009, 55, 115, 120-1).50 His principal 
opponent this time around was Manfred Reyes Villa, who represented the coalition Plan 
Progreso para Bolivia-Convergencia Nacional (PPB-CN), a loose alliance of moderate and 
more extreme right-wing parties and citizen organisations (Aguilar 2013). In the two years 
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 Morales had expelled both the United States’ ambassador and the US Drug Enforcement Agency from Bolivia 
in 2008, accusing both of conspiring with the MAS’s political opponents (Paredes 2013).  
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prior to the 2009 election, Bolivia had been gripped by widespread protest and violent 
conflict driven by demands from the resource-rich eastern provinces for greater autonomy. 
The pro-autonomy movement included both many prominent local and national politicians 
and civil society organisations, many of which became important actors in the PPB-CN. The 
confrontation between the MAS government and the pro-autonomy movement took on a 
distinct ethnic, as well as regional, dimension. Pro-autonomy leaders attacked Morales and 
his supporters with racial epithets, and factions of the pro-autonomy movement engaged in 
quasi-paramilitary activities, including bomb attacks on government installations and 
racially-motivated physical attacks on indigenous MAS supporters (Dangl 2007; Harten 
2011, 182-3; Postero, 2010, 63-4; Sivak 2010, 221-22; Webber 2011, 133-40). 
 Thus, in both 2005 and 2009 Bolivian voters faced an electoral and a wider political 
environment that was highly polarised. A combination of the candidates who ran and the 
broader context and events surrounding the election worked to dichotomise the electoral 
alternatives along ethnic, regional, ideological, and partisan lines.51 Moreover, at least in 
2005, the two major contenders reflected a clear divide between the political establishment 
and a populist outsider promising the re-foundation of the Bolivian nation. 
Ethnic and Substantive Appeals  
In advancing their ethnopopulist appeals, Morales and the MAS were able to take 
advantage of both these specific electoral contexts and the longer-term sociopolitical trends 
outlined previously. Morales and the MAS won indigenous support in part because they 
appealed to voters on ethnic terms. But the MAS also campaigned on a range of substantive 
issues, and their electoral success cannot be attributed to ethnic appeals alone (Madrid 2012, 
38-40). Similarly, ethnic bias and prejudice may well have contributed to the disproportionate 
support for opponents of the MAS among sectors of the non-indigenous population. Yet here, 
too, substantive preferences played a role, and both indigenous and non-indigenous voters 
who chose not to support the MAS appear to have done so in part as a result of disagreement 
on substantive issues. 
A range of ethnic appeals helped the MAS win support among indigenous voters. The 
party established close ties to indigenous organisations, ran indigenous candidates, adopted 
key indigenous demands, and made a broadly-conceived indigenous identity a key frame for 
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their political project. Indigenous organisations not only provided the MAS with valuable 
material and human resources, but they also contributed voters by publicly endorsing the 
MAS’s candidates and issuing electoral instruction to members (Madrid 2012, 54-5). 
Indigenous candidates occupied numerous key positions on the MAS’s electoral lists, from its 
presidential candidate to the many candidates it put forward for the national Congress and 
various subnational authorities. It its campaign, the MAS regularly employed various 
symbolic ethnic appeals. Its candidates used indigenous dress, spoke in indigenous languages, 
took part in indigenous ceremonies, and extolled the virtues of Bolivia’s indigenous cultures 
and peoples. Finally, the MAS made concrete indigenous demands central to its platform. 
These included the defence of the coca leaf (an issue that was important both economically 
and symbolically), the promotion of indigenous land and water rights, and bilingual education 
(MAS 2005, 20-23, 48, 53; MAS 2009, 26-7, 35, 115). 
However, the MAS also campaigned on the basis of several broader substantive 
pledges. In both 2005 and 2009, Morales promised to reduce inequality, increase spending on 
social programmes, combat discrimination, and nationalise leading sectors of the economy 
(MAS 2005, 12, 14-19, 40; MAS 2009, 37-8, 55, 142). Such proposals appealed particularly 
to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters who were likely to benefit disproportionately 
from such policies, but they were popular well beyond indigenous constituencies. The 
analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the MAS won support in both elections based 
in part on these specific substantive pledges.  
In short, through its political rhetoric the MAS sought to position itself as the electoral 
embodiment of Bolivia’s non-European heritage and people, an inclusive sociocultural 
identity that explicitly included mestizos. In its use of ethnic appeals, the party sought to 
construct a broadly-defined, inclusive indigenous frame for its political project, one that 
worked to link indigenous identity with a redistributive, nationalist, and anti-imperialist 
political agenda open to all. Such a substantive programme, the MAS rhetoric implied, was 
the political expression of the wider values, traditions, and worldviews of Bolivia’s 
indigenous peoples. Moreover, it was deliberately juxtaposed to the social injustice and 
exploitation inherent in the hegemonic Western ideology that, the MAS argued, had provided 
the framework for colonialism and neo-colonial dependence (MAS 2009, 146).  
In both 2005 and 2009, the principal political opposition fit easily into this perceptual 
frame. Quiroga was a white, wealthy former president who preached neoliberal continuity 
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and was intimately linked, both personally and politically, with the United States; Reyes Villa 
emerged as the leader of a right-wing coalition that included radical – and often racist – pro-
autonomy activists from the wealthier, and largely non-indigenous, eastern provinces. This 
opposition had far less success in winning support across ethnic lines based on substantive 
appeals, and its support was limited to non-indigenous constituencies, mostly in these eastern 
provinces. 
This context is conducive to both expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. On the one 
hand, the polarisation of Bolivia’s political landscape along ethnic lines, particularly in 2009 
but also throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, worked to raise ethnic consciousness and 
increase ethnic group attachments and prejudice. On the other hand, longer-term ethnic 
inequalities and discrimination helped construct an experientially validated ethnic heuristic. 
The more recent politicisation of ethnicity helped to reinforce such a heuristic, specifically 
associating a broad indigenous identity with a redistributive, anti-neoliberal, nationalist (i.e., 
anti-imperialist) agenda. Finally, in both 2005 and 2009, the major electoral alternatives 
offered quite distinct programmatic platforms, in addition to their diverse descriptive profiles. 
Thus, quite aside from any possible influence of ethnic bias, we might expect group-level 
ethnic voting patterns to emerge as a result of non-ethnic vote determiners.  
 
The 2005 Election 
The 2005 Bolivian election followed a period of exceptional political turmoil. The 
coalition government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003) had collapsed after just a 
year in power, amid a series of violent protests. These protests marked the apex of long-
running opposition to the neoliberal reforms implemented by successive regimes throughout 
the 1990s. Protests continued during the subsequent tenure of Carlos Mesa (2003-2005), 
particularly around the issue of privatisation and exports in the natural gas industry. Mesa 
himself resigned in early 2005 following renewed protests, and his successor, Eduardo 
Rodríguez (2005), called an early general election for December 2005. The principal 
candidates in the 2005 race included Morales and the MAS, Quiroga and PODEMOS, 
businessman Samuel Doria and his Unidad Nacional party (UN), and the MNR’s Michiaki 
Nagatani. However, from early in the campaign, Morales and Quiroga emerged as the only 
two candidates with a realistic chance of winning the presidency.  
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The 2005 campaign reflected many of the ruptures underlying the social and political 
conflict of the previous years. Morales and the MAS campaigned as the party of protest in 
2005, positioning themselves as the only electoral alternative to continued neoliberalism. In 
the context of widespread disenchantment with the economic and political status quo, the 
MAS’s ethnopopulist appeals resonated widely. They won support among indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo voters on both ethnic descriptive and more substantive grounds, while 
they also appealed to many whites and mestizos based on their wider substantive and populist 
appeals. The presence of Quiroga and PODEMOS enhanced the MAS’s outsider image. 
Personally and politically, Quiroga embodied the political establishment and the continuity of 
neoliberalism, an economic model that was widely perceived as serving the interests of 
domestic and international elites. Quiroga also based his campaign in the resource-rich 
eastern departments, whose population was on average wealthier and less indigenous than the 
western highland departments were the MAS were strongest. Thus, as indicated previously, 
the profiles and platforms of the two principal candidates in 2005 reflected, to a large extent, 
the contours of converging ethnic, regional, socioeconomic, and ideological cleavage lines 
across the Bolivian electorate. 
Official Results and LAPOP Data 
According to the Corte Nacional Electoral, Morales won 53.7 percent of the valid 
first-round vote in 2005, giving him an outright majority and avoiding the need for a second-
round runoff (see Table 3.1).52 Quiroga came in a distant second with 26.6 percent, and Doria 
and Nagatani followed with 7.8 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. Although LAPOP’s 
2006 survey was conducted several months after the December 2005 election, the vote 
estimates are relatively accurate, with limited variation from the official results. The 
following discussion focuses mostly on the vote for Morales and Quiroga – who together won 
over 75 percent of the LAPOP vote – with only occasional reference to Doria and Nagatani. 
Unlike later survey rounds, the 2006 survey did not include questions on voters’ 
support for state-led wealth redistribution or nationalisations – key preferences in several of 
the vote models examined elsewhere in this thesis. However, the 2006 Bolivia survey did 
include a question on nationalisation in the natural gas industry specifically, and this measure 
serves as a partial substitute for the more general measure. Similarly, the 2006 Bolivia survey 
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 In Bolivian presidential elections, a candidate must win 50 percent of the valid vote plus one, or 40 percent 
and 10 percent more than the second-placed candidate, to be elected. If no candidate meets these criteria, then a 
second round vote is held between the first- and second-placed candidates from the first round. 
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did not collect data on the language(s) spoken by respondents’ parents, the linguistic measure 
used in the Ecuadorian and Peruvian studies, so the Bolivia 2005 models are run with a 
measure of respondents’ own maternal language(s). The Bolivian analysis also makes use of 
two self-identification measures. In addition to the generic self-identification measure (white, 
mestizo, indigenous) used for Ecuador and Peru, the Bolivian study includes a wider measure 
of respondents’ cultural identification with a specific indigenous heritage (none, Quechua, 
Aymara, Other Indigenous).   
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the ethnic breakdown of reported vote choice in Bolivia’s 
2005 election. Sub-table A shows the overall distribution of votes in the LAPOP sample and 
official results (last column); sub-table B shows the proportions of each candidate’s 
supporters within each ethnic group; sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s 
vote derived from each ethnic group; and sub-table D shows the group- and candidate-centred 
ethnicisation scores (the standard deviations of the proportions in sub-tables B and C from the 
relevant overall proportions in the full LAPOP sample).53 Table 3.1 includes voters’ linguistic 
background (Spanish or indigenous language) and the generic self-identification measure, 
while Table 3.2 includes the more specific measure of indigenous cultural identification 
(none, Quechua, Aymara, Other indigenous). 
Overall, the pattern of vote choice in 2005 shows a clear preference for Morales 
among indigenous voters (according to self-identification and linguistic measures). It also 
shows a disproportionate preference among self-identified white voters for Morales’s 
principal opponent, Quiroga. Thus, the general pattern of voting in 2005 suggests a role for 
ethnicity in determining vote choice. These group-level patterns are elaborated briefly below. 
Group-Centred Ethnicisation 
The group-centred ethnicisation scores in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate considerable 
variation in the vote concentrations of different ethnic groups. On the linguistic measure, 
higher scores in the indigenous-language group (.104) indicate a higher vote 
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 There are two group-centred scores, SD1 and SD2. SD1 is the standard deviation of vote shares within each 
group compared to the overall candidate shares, while SD2 is the standard deviation from an equal-share mean 




TABLE 3.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification) 
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP Total 
LAPOP 
Total 









Evo Morales 30.9 22.3 3.7 33.8 15.6 53.1 53.7 
Jorge Quiroga 22.9 2.0 4.8 17.6 2.4 24.9 28.6 
Samuel Doria 6.2 1.0 1.2 5.1 0.9 7.2 7.8 
Michiaki Nagatani 4.8 1.0 1.3 3.1 1.4 5.8 6.5 
Other/Null 7.1 2.0 0.8 6.7 1.5 9.0 3.4 










        
Evo Morales 43.0 79.1 31.5 50.9 71.8 53.1  
Jorge Quiroga 31.9 7.0 40.8 26.6 10.9 24.9  
Samuel Doria 8.6 3.6 10.3 7.7 6.3 7.2  
Michiaki Nagatani 6.7 3.5 10.7 4.7 4.0 5.8  
Other/Null 9.9 6.9 6.7 10.1 7.0 9.0  












        
Evo Morales 58.1 41.9 7.0 63.5 29.4 53.1  
Jorge Quiroga 92.1 7.9 19.4 71.0 9.6 24.9  
Samuel Doria 86.0 14.0 17.0 71.0 23.8 7.2  
Michiaki Nagatani 83.1 16.9 21.9 54.3 12.1 5.8  
Other/Null 78.4 21.6 8.7 74.4 16.8 9.0  















        
Group-Centred        
SD1 .041 .104 .096 .013 .077   
SD2 .147 .296 .136 .172 .260   
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   
Evo Morales  .137   .051   
Jorge Quiroga  .203   .081   
Samuel Doria  .142   .065   
Michiaki Nagatani  .113   .080   
Other/Null  .066   .054   
        
N = 1771 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) in 
LAPOP’s 2006 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that 
voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share received from 
each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-
centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the ethnic 
group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote 
outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-
identified, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  





TABLE 3.2: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification) 
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP INDIGENOUS CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION Total 









Evo Morales 30.8 22.1 8.3 24.1 19.1 2.5 53.9 
Jorge Quiroga 22.1 2.0 11.2 6.3 2.4 4.3 24.1 
Samuel Doria 6.1 1.0 3.0 2.1 1.3 0.8 7.1 
Michiaki Nagatani 4.7 1.0 2.9 0.7 0.5 1.6 5.7 
Other/Null 7.3 2.0 2.7 2.8 2.2 1.5 9.2 










        
Evo Morales 43.4 79.5 29.6 66.8 75.1 23.2 53.9 
Jorge Quiroga 31.1 6.9 39.8 17.5 9.3 40.4 24.1 
Samuel Doria 8.6 3.5 10.6 5.9 5.0 7.1 7.1 
Michiaki Nagatani 6.7 3.4 10.4 1.9 1.9 15.3 5.7 
Other/Null 10.2 6.7 9.7 7.8 8.7 14.0 9.2 












        
Evo Morales 57.1 42.9 15.4 44.7 35.3 4.5 53.9 
Jorge Quiroga 91.7 8.3 46.3 26.2 9.8 17.7 24.1 
Samuel Doria 85.8 14.2 41.5 30.0 18.0 10.5 7.1 
Michiaki Nagatani 82.9 17.1 51.2 12.1 8.3 28.5 5.7 
Other/Null 78.7 21.3 29.5 30.5 24.0 16.0 9.2 















        
Group-Centred        
SD1 .042 .103 .097 .052 .085 .123  
SD2 .147 .298 .124 .240 .277 .114  
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   
Evo Morales  .138   .093   
Jorge Quiroga  .207   .264   
Samuel Doria  .149   .168   
Michiaki Nagatani  .120   .379   
Other/Null  .078   .045   
        
N = 1778 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read 
separately) in LAPOP’s 2006 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic 
group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share 
received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and 
candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the 
ethnic group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote 
outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural 
identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  





concentration compared with non-indigenous language speakers (.041).54 These scores reflect 
the relatively high proportion of indigenous-language speakers who voted for Morales (79.1 
percent, compared to Morales’s overall LAPOP vote share of 53.1 percent), and the 
disproportionately low number of indigenous-language speakers who voted for Morales’s 
opponents as a result (e.g., just 7.0 percent voted for Quiroga, well below his 24.9 percent of 
the total LAPOP vote). Similarly, Morales won a disproportionate share of the self-identified 
indigenous group as well (71.8 percent), contributing to similarly high ethnicisation scores in 
that group (.077).  
As by far the largest group, the mestizo group approximates the vote proportions in 
the full sample, resulting in a low SD1 score (.013). However, an overall preference for 
Morales among mestizos (50.9 percent voted for the MAS) produces an SD2 score (.172) that 
is notably higher than the white group (.136). Finally, the white group showed a 
disproportionate preference for opponents of Morales, particularly Quiroga (who won 40.8 
percent, well above his overall share of 24.9 percent), although the MAS still won a sizeable 
minority (31.9 percent). This pattern of vote distribution confirms the MAS’s capacity to win 
votes beyond its indigenous and mestizo base, and, for the white group, it results in a 
combination of high SD1 scores (reflecting disproportionate opposition to Morales) and low 
SD2 scores (reflecting a fragmented vote).  
Table 3.2 shows the distributions of votes according to the more specific cultural 
identification measure. In many respects, these confirm the general tendencies identified in 
Table 3.1. However, there are some additional indications worthy of note. First, Table 3.2b 
shows disproportionate support for Morales from both Quechua and Aymara voters, the two 
largest highland indigenous groups (66.8 percent of Quechuas and 75.1 percent of Aymaras 
voted for Morales, compared to his overall share of 53.9 percent).55 However, voters from the 
Other Indigenous category, which includes mostly lowland indigenous groups, show 
disproportionate support for the MAS’s principal rivals, both Quiroga and the MNR’s 
Nagatani (40.4 percent support Quiroga and 15.3 percent Nagatani, compared to their 
respective overall vote shares of 24.1 percent and 5.7 percent).56 Similarly, voters who 
                                                          
54
 Unless stated otherwise, group-centred scores refer to SD1. 
55
 Variation in the total vote shares between Tables 3.1 and 3.2 result from slightly different samples according 
to missing data patterns on the two self-identification measures. 
56
 Respondents who reported identification with a lowland indigenous group were a mix of self-identified 
mestizos (the majority) and self-identified indigenous. It is worth noting that (a) most of the latter sub-group 
were Morales supporters; and (b) the majority of the former sub-group were Spanish-only speakers. This 
suggests that a proportion of the lowland indigenous group that supported Quiroga and Nagatani were reporting 
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explicitly reported no identification with any indigenous culture – a group comprised of self-
identified whites and mestizos – also showed disproportionate support for opponents of 
Morales, particularly Quiroga (Morales won just 29.6 percent of this group, while Quiroga 
won 39.8 percent). These vote distributions produce relatively high ethnicisation scores for 
the Quechua (.052) and Aymara (.085) groups, but even higher scores for the non-indigenous 
(.097) and lowland indigenous (.123) groups.  
These scores not only underline the considerable polarisation of the 2005 vote along 
ethnic lines, they also highlight two key trends within the indigenous and mestizo vote: first, 
the strong highland indigenous base behind Morales and the MAS, particularly in Aymara 
constituencies; and second, the marked divide between highland indigenous groups (Quechua 
and Aymara) that supported Morales, and the lowland indigenous groups that tended to prefer 
other candidates. However, although the proportional distribution of both non-indigenous 
and lowland indigenous groups was skewed against Morales, the relatively low SD2 scores 
for both groups reflect the broad spread of their vote overall, including substantial minorities 
that continued to back the MAS (see Table 3.2b).  
Overall, the analysis of group-level patterns in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggests ethnicity is 
relatively salient to vote choice for voters with an indigenous background. Both the self-
identified and linguistic indigenous groups supported Morales in proportions well in 
excessive of the candidate’s overall LAPOP vote share, as did voters who identified with an 
Aymara or, to a lesser extent, a Quechuan cultural background. Ethnicity also appears 
somewhat salient to vote choice for non-indigenous voters, particularly those who self-
identified as white or explicitly stated their non-indigenous cultural background. Both these 
groups tended to support Quiroga disproportionately. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
Morales also won substantial support among non-indigenous voters, and even Quiroga won a 
limited number of votes from indigenous respondents, particularly from lowland indigenous 
groups. Thus, despite a clear tendency for voters to support more ethnically-proximate 
candidates in 2005, many voters still crossed ethnic lines, and voting outcomes were some 
way off an ‘ethnic census’ pattern. Ethnicity, it seems, was not the only criterion for vote 
choice.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
more ‘distant’ identification with a family-ancestral or regional background, rather than a strongly-felt 
contemporary sociocultural identity. Nevertheless, distrust of the MAS among certain lowland indigenous 




The candidate-centred ethnicisation scores in Table 3.1d and Table 3.2d highlight 
both the broad appeal of Morales (producing relatively low scores) and the more ethnically-
concentrated vote received by Quiroga (reflected in higher scores). Examination of the MAS 
vote reveals considerable support across all ethnic groups, while the PODEMOS vote was 
concentrated among non-indigenous language speakers and self-identified whites (Table 
3.1c). Indeed, only 7.9 percent of Quiroga’s vote came from indigenous-language speakers 
and just 9.6 percent from self-identified indigenous (compared to full-sample proportions of 
28.2 percent and 21.8 percent, respectively). Meanwhile, 19.4 percent came from self-
identified whites, well above the 11.8 percent proportion of whites in the full survey sample. 
Like Quiroga, both Doria and Nagatani tended to rely disproportionately on non-indigenous 
language speakers and self-identified whites, although self-identified indigenous voters were 
proportionally represented in the MNR vote (23.8 percent, compared to a sample proportion 
of 21.8 percent).57  
However, despite its comparable heterogeneity, the MAS vote remained 
disproportionately reliant on indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. A total of 29.4 
percent were self-identified indigenous and 41.9 percent were indigenous-language speakers 
(compared with sample proportions of 21.8 and 28.2 percent, respectively). Self-identified 
whites, in contrast, were under-represented proportionally, accounting for just 7.0 percent of 
the MAS vote, although whites made up 11.8 percent of the total LAPOP sample.  
When the candidates’ vote shares are decomposed by the cultural identification 
measure, Morales’s support among highland indigenous groups is once again apparent, with 
both Quechua and Aymara voters over-represented in the MAS’s share (accounting for 44.7 
and 35.3 percent, respectively), while lowland indigenous voters comprised a 
disproportionate share of Quiroga’s and Nagatani’s supporters (17.7 and 28.5 percent, 
respectively). Finally, those voters who did not identify with any indigenous group, a sector 
of the electorate that included many self-identified white voters, made up a disproportionate 
share of Quiroga’s (46.3 percent), Doria’s (41.5 percent), and Nagatani’s (51.2 percent) vote. 
However, they were under-represented among MAS voters (just 15.4 percent).  
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 In the light of the statistics reported in Table 3.2c, it would appear most of these voters identified with 
lowland indigenous groups (the Other Indigenous category). 
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Overall, all four major candidates in Bolivia’s 2005 election received support across 
several ethnic groups, suggesting they were able to win votes based on a variety of appeals 
(partisan, regional, substantive, charismatic, and so forth, in addition to ethnic). In particular, 
it is worth re-emphasising the considerable breadth of support for the MAS, reflected in the 
comparatively low candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Morales compared to those of 
his principal rival, Quiroga.58 The MAS’s concerted efforts to present its political project as 
both of the indigenous movement and broadly inclusive appears to have paid off in 2005, 
both consolidating its support among highland indigenous Bolivians and attracting significant 
minorities of non-indigenous mestizos and whites. Many of the latter, we might assume, were 
attracted by the MAS’s wider populist and substantive appeals. For Quiroga, his personal 
ethnic and family background, the regional concentration of his campaign, and the 
substantive content of his political programme, all appear to have put off many indigenous 
and indigenous-mestizo voters, concentrating support for PODEMOS among non-indigenous 
mestizos and whites. 
However, although none of these candidates appears to have relied on, or directed 
their campaigns solely towards, a single ethnic electoral base, the candidate-centred 
ethnicisation scores remain relatively high. Indeed, the average candidate-centred score for 
Bolivia’s 2005 election (.69) is exceeded only by Bolivia’s 2009 election across all seven 
case studies examined in this thesis.59 These overall patterns suggest some potential for 
further ethnic polarisation if candidates and parties choose to forego inclusive appeals, opting 
to consolidate their ethnic base rather than reach out to groups in which they have little 
support.60 Indeed, in the 2009 election, which took place in the context of heightened political 
and ethnic tensions, Reyes Villa received an even smaller proportion of indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo voters than Quiroga in 2005. However, the presence of highly 
controversial (and some extremist) figures in the PPB-CN worked to alienate many whites 
and mestizos as well as indigenous voters, thus reducing the potential ethnic dimension to 
political polarisation. 
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 Morales’s scores are .137, .051, and .093, on the linguistic, self-identification, and cultural identification 
measures, respectively, compared to .203, .081, and .264 for Quiroga. 
59
 Based on candidate-centred ethnicisation scores according to self-identified groups. However, such cross-
country comparisons should be taken only as a rough guide. The ethnicisation scores are relatively 
unsophisticated and quite sensitive to underlying ethnic-group distributions in the survey samples. 
60
 For example, Quiroga and PODEMOS might interpret the statistics in c, showing just 7.9 percent of their vote 
coming from indigenous-language speakers, as a reason to focus their campaign on shoring up support among 
non-indigenous constituencies.  
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Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
Table 3.3 shows results from a multinomial logistic regression (mlogit) model that 
tests the characteristics of voters for each of the major candidates in 2005. All three ethnicity 
measures are tested (linguistic, generic self-identification, and cultural identification), 
although the two latter variables are included in separate models.61 The parameter estimates 
represent the marginal effect of each variable on the overall predicted probability of voting 
for the candidate in question, elaborated from the two base mlogit models (see Appendix A). 
The analysis generates a number of noteworthy findings. It finds statistically 
significant effects for both linguistic and self-identification measures while controlling for 
potential confounders. This strengthens inferences of a causal relationship between voter 
ethnicity and vote choice as implied by the group-level patterns reported in Tables 3.1 and 
3.2. However, it also finds significant effects for several key substantive preferences and non-
ethnic demographic characteristics, thus confirming that vote choice in the 2005 election 
cannot be explained solely in terms of ethnic vote determinants.  
Ethnicity Variables 
First, the analysis predicts that indigenous-language speakers, self-identified 
indigenous voters, and those who self-identified with a highland indigenous culture (Quechua 
or Aymara) were significantly more likely than their non-indigenous counterparts to vote for 
Morales. The overall predicted probability of voting for Morales increased by 18.6 
percentage points for indigenous-language speakers compared to Spanish-only speakers and 
by 17.4 percentage points for self-identified indigenous voters compared to whites. Self-
identification as Quechua or Aymara produced an increase of 10.2 and 17.1 percentage 
points, respectively, compared with those who identified with no indigenous culture. 
Morales’s predicted vote probability also increased by 13.6 percentage points among self-
identified mestizos compared to whites and by 20.4 percentage points when Aymara voters 
are compared with lowland indigenous groups. The differences between self-identified 
indigenous and mestizo voters, and between those who identified with no indigenous culture 
and with a lowland indigenous culture, are not statistically significant. As we might expect, 
the effects on Quiroga’s vote probability are almost exact inverse copies of the Morales
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 The parameter estimates for all other variables are those from the generic self-identification model. However, 
estimates do not change appreciably between models.  
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TABLE 3.3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 
 
 MORALES QUIROGA DORIA NAGATANI 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Speaks an indigenous language .186** .047 -.165** .038 -.038^ .022 .029 .033 
White (Mestizo) -.136* .058 .141* .058 -.012 .029 .036^ .022 
Indigenous (Mestizo) .037 .045 -.066 .049 -.007 .030 .015 .024 
Indigenous (White) .174** .065 -.207** .070 .005 .041 -.021 .033 
Quechua (None) .102* .045 -.066 .045 .027 .023 -.076** .022 
Aymara (None) .171** .056 -.164** .054 .045 .044 -.088** .023 
Other Indigenous (None) -.033 .073 -.010 .071 -.011 .024 .021 .037 
Quechua (Aymara) -.069 .046 .098* .048 -.018 .041 .012 .009 
Other Indigenous (Aymara) -.204** .078 .153* .078 -.055 .048 .108** .037 
Income -.028* .013 .018 .012 .003 .007 -.003 .006 
Female .000 .028 -.023 .032 -.002 .018 -.004 .013 
Age .001 .001 -.001 .001 -.001 .001 .002** .000 
Trust in parties .009 .012 .004 .010 -.003 .006 .001 .005 
Participation in protests .055^ .032 .002 .031 -.023 .026 -.014 .016 
National economy improved .046 .033 -.066^ .034 .009 .024 .006 .016 
Personal finances improved -.035 .037 .059 .039 .006 .021 -.026 .017 
Resides in media luna -.241** .027 .084** .030 .056* .022 .067** .017 
Resides in rural area -.004 .016 .008 .014 -.012 .011 -.003 .006 
Rightist ideology -.047** .007 .041** .007 -.002 .003 .011** .003 
Support for gas nationalisation .026** .006 -.012* .006 -.004 .005 -.004 .003 
‘Strongman’ populist leader -.030 .026 .012 .024 .008 .012 .007 .009 
Direct democracy .054 .047 .016 .045 -.051^ .032 -.040 .027 
Minorities to follow majority .029 .041 .035 .043 .015 .025 -.045^ .024 
N= 1079. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Notes: Coefficients are the effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix A. The 
effects for ethnic self-identification and cultural identification are compared to the base category in parentheses. Generic self-identification 
and cultural identification variables were included in separate models; parameter estimates for all other variables are those from the generic 
identification model. Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2006. 
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effects. An indigenous-language background also decreased the predicted probability of 
voting for Doria (by 3.8 percentage points) and self-identification as white significantly 
increased Nagatani’s vote probability by 3.6 percentage points compared to mestizos. 
Thus, the results of regression analysis provide a strongly suggest a causal role for 
ethnicity in the 2005 election, as suggested by the vote distributions presented previously. 
The disproportionate support for Morales among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, 
the concentration of Quiroga’s support among non-indigenous mestizos and whites, and the 
marked divide between highland and lowland indigenous groups, is not explained fully by 
sociodemographic factors, economic perceptions, or a series of ideological and policy 
preferences.  
Moreover, the analysis finds that both linguistic and self-identification measures of 
ethnicity had statistically significant effects. Significant effects for the linguistic measure, 
even once self-identification has been taken into account, may indicate that wider 
sociocultural background influenced vote choice, including among voters who self-identified 
with a more ambiguous mestizo identity. A combination of lingering ethnic attachments, 
common social experiences, and, perhaps, the use of an ethnic heuristic – which connects 
ethnic background with a broad range of likely preferences, priorities, and characteristics 
beyond those tested explicitly in the model – may help shape voting preferences across a 
wide demographic. The significance of the linguistic measure suggests a role for ethnic bias, 
but a role that is not entirely derived from strong psychological group attachments. The latter, 
we might presume, will be captured in part by the self-identification measures. 
However, significant effects for the self-identification measures, even when 
controlling for linguistic background, suggest that explicit identification with an ethnic group 
also affected voting behaviour. For example, choosing to self-identify as white, or declaring 
no identification with any indigenous culture, may have indicated a particular subgroup 
among non-indigenous language speakers whose members considered themselves especially 
detached from indigenous culture, values, and interests. This analysis cannot easily determine 
the underlying nature of this particular ethnic bias – that is, whether it derived from 
allegiance to an ethnic group or the use of an ethnic heuristic. However, the facts that self-
identification differentiates behaviour among voters who shared similar ethnic backgrounds 
(at least in terms of linguistic group), and that the analysis includes controls for a wide range 
83 
 
of demographic indicators and political preferences, suggest some role for more 
psychological ethnic attachments and/or prejudice. 
Non-Ethnic Variables 
In addition to ethnicity variables, the mlogit reported in Table 3.3 also reports 
statistically significant effects for several non-ethnic voter characteristics, including income, 
political ideology, and support for the nationalisation of Bolivia’s gas industry. Participation 
in protests, perceptions of the national economy, and region of residence are also significant 
predictors of vote choice in 2005.  
First, a one-unit increase in income, measured on a 10-point scale from low to high 
(‘Income’), is associated with a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the overall probability of 
voting for Morales.62 The coefficient is positive, but not statistically significant, for Quiroga. 
This suggests the MAS appealed particularly to poorer voters, even when ethnicity and other 
factors are taken into account. Second, political ideology seems to have played an important 
role in voters’ electoral considerations. A one-unit move from left to right on the 10-point 
ideology scale (‘Rightist ideology’) is associated with a 4.7 percentage point decrease in the 
predicted probability of voting for Morales, a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability 
of voting for Quiroga, and a 1.1 percentage point increase for Nagatani. Support for all three 
candidates, it seems, was influenced by ideological preferences, with leftist voters across 
ethnic groups showing a preference for Morales, while rightists were more inclined towards 
Quiroga. Finally, a one-unit increase in support for gas nationalisation (‘Nationalise the gas 
industry’, measured on a 1-7 scale) is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in the 
probability of voting for Morales and a 1.2 percentage point decrease for Quiroga. 
Unsurprisingly, Morales’s promise to nationalise the gas industry, and Quiroga’s pledge to 
encourage further private investment in the sector, appears to have influenced voters’ 
electoral choices. The remaining political attitude measures, all relating to various non-
programmatic aspects of populism, are not significant. 
In addition to ethnicity and these various substantive preferences, a number of other 
variables are worthy of note. Participation in protests is positively associated with a Morales 
vote, confirming the MAS’s position as the party of protest in 2005. Region is also highly 
significant, with a clear split between residents of the highland western departments, the base 
                                                          
62
 Where the discussion refers explicitly to a variable in the statistical model, the variable name is capitalised 
and placed between single quotation marks. 
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of MAS support, and inhabitants of the lowland media luna. The latter were 24.1 percentage 
points less likely to vote for the MAS, all else being equal. However, the media luna vote 
appears to have been split among the three remaining candidates, with no significant 
probability increase according to region for any of the three. Perhaps surprisingly, 
perceptions of economic performance and rural residence seem to have had little noteworthy 
effect in 2005, with any influence on vote choice presumably captured by other variables.63 In 
the latter case, the lack of a significant effect for rural residence may also reflect the support 
won by the MAS in urban, as well as rural, areas.  
In sum, ethnicity seems to have played quite a prominent role in the 2005 elections, 
with Morales winning an overwhelming majority of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo 
voters. However, this initial analysis suggests that non-ethnic factors, including region, 
income, political ideology, and views on gas nationalisation – a key issue of the day – are 
also important parts of the causal story. Overall, these results largely confirm previous 
findings (Madrid 2012, 69; Moreno Morales 2015). However, the following paragraphs, 
which examine the decomposition of ethnicity’s interaction with several other factors, 
provide a more detailed and nuanced picture of the interplay among ethnic and non-ethnic 
vote determinants. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Decomposed Effects 
 In addition to the main-effects analysis in Table 3.3, the 2005 vote also examined the 
interaction of different ethnicity variables with several non-ethnic voter characteristics. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the predicted probability of voting for Morales or Quiroga by ethnic 
group (linguistic and generic self-identification, respectively) and at representative values of 
several non-ethnic voter characteristics (APRs). They also show the average marginal effects 
(AMEs) of the non-ethnic voter characteristics on overall vote probabilities, by ethnic group. 
These decompositions help us compare behaviour across ethnic groups and examine how 
ethnicity and other factors combine to produce voting outcomes. Both these aspects of the 
analysis can contribute to a better understanding of voters’ electoral motivations. The full 
results of the decomposition analysis are included in Appendix A, but some of the most 
noteworthy findings are summarised here.  
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 The interpretation of economic perceptions measures is somewhat dubious in any case, given that these 
questions explicitly referred to “the last 12 months”. This period would have covered both the previous 
Mesa/Rodríguez interim government and the initial months of the MAS government. 
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N = 1079; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to 
ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects 
(AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression 










































































































N = 1079; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated 
according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal 
effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic 
regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix A 































































































According to Table 3.3, higher income was associated with a decrease in the predicted 
probability of voting for Morales and an increase for Quiroga. The decomposition of 
ethnicity’s interaction with voter income largely confirms these general findings. However, 
Figure 3.2 suggests this trend may have been reversed among self-identified whites. In fact, 
poorer whites showed a clear preference for Quiroga over Morales (APRs of sixty percent 
compared to twenty percent).64 Thus, although the MAS’s substantive appeals to lower-
income interests appear to have won Morales broad support, poorer white voters were clearly 
unconvinced. This suggests an effect for ethnic bias among white voters, either based on 
prejudice towards Morales and other indigenous leaders of the MAS (expressive bias) or 
based on fears that a Morales government would prioritise indigenous interests to their 
material detriment (heuristic bias). 
More generally, the decomposition analysis shows that APRs of voting for both 
Morales and Quiroga varied significantly within, as well as across, ethnic groups according to 
income. For example, Figure 3.1 suggests a poor voter from an indigenous-language 
background had an eighty percent probability of voting for Morales and just a ten percent 
probability of voting for Quiroga. This compared to sixty percent (for Morales) and more 
than twenty-five percent (for Quiroga) for a poor non-indigenous voter. Meanwhile, a 
wealthy voter from an indigenous background was equally likely to vote for Morales and 
Quiroga, as was a wealthy non-indigenous voter (around forty percent for all four 
combinations). This pattern of interaction is indicative of a conditional relationship between 
ethnicity and income in which both sets of criteria combine to shape vote choice. 
Political Ideology 
 The decomposed effects and predictions of ethnicity’s interaction with political 
ideology provide little further insight to complement the main-effects analysis in Table 3.3. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate more leftist ideology was associated with increased support for 
Morales, while more rightist ideology tended to increase the probability of a Quiroga vote, 
across ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the extent of each candidate’s ideological appeals was 
also significantly affected by ethnic bias. For example, Figure 3.1 indicates that although 
                                                          
64
 Predicted probabilities are rounded to the nearest five percent. Confidence intervals are relatively large in 
some cases (particularly at levels of the covariate with fewer observations, often towards the extremes), and 
more precise estimates are therefore less appropriate. In general, the decomposition analysis aims to 
demonstrate broad trends rather than provide exact point estimates. 
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Quiroga clearly appealed more to right-of-centre voters across ethnic groups, a centre-right 
voter from an indigenous-language background has a comparable APR to a centre-left voter 
from a non-indigenous background (both around twenty percent). Similarly, Figure 3.2 shows 
how a white voter who identified with an extreme left-wing ideology was more likely to vote 
for the MAS than a right-wing white voter (fifty percent compared to twenty percent), but 
also that the APR for the left-wing white voter is comparable to a centre-right mestizo or 
indigenous voter (also around fifty percent). Finally, Figure 3.2 also suggests the APRs of 
voting for Quiroga were quite high among self-identified white voters irrespective of 
ideological position (around forty percent). Thus, although political ideology clearly affected 
vote choice in significant ways (the AMEs are statistically significant in most ethnic groups), 
ethnic bias that inclined indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters towards Morales, and non-
indigenous and white voters towards Quiroga, continued to influence substantive voting 
outcomes. 
Gas nationalisation 
The main effects in Table 3.3 indicate support for gas nationalisation was broadly 
associated with increased electoral support for Morales and lower support for Quiroga, which 
is the trend we might expect given each candidate’s stand on the issue. Once again, the 
decomposed analysis does little to alter this general interpretation.  
The MAS’s promise to strengthen state control over the gas industry increased its 
APRs among non-indigenous voters from around twenty to thirty percent for opponents of 
nationalisation to above forty percent – and as high as sixty percent – for the policy’s 
supporters (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In contrast, Quiroga’s opposition to excessive state 
interventionism won him support among opponents of nationalisation (APRs around forty 
percent for most non-indigenous voters, and as high as seventy percent among whites). The 
indigenous groups – both linguistic and self-identified – are somewhat distinct, with non-
significant AMEs in both cases. However, it would be misleading to infer indigenous voters 
were unconcerned about gas nationalisation. Rather, the absence of statistically significant 
AMEs probably has more to do with the minimal variation of reported issue-positions for 
voters in these groups; most indigenous voters strongly supported gas nationalisation. Thus, 
agreement with the MAS on this substantive issue may well have contributed to indigenous 
and indigenous-mestizo support for Morales, even if the lack of response variation precludes 
statistically significant marginal effects. 
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In short, the issue of gas nationalisation appears to have played a role in voters’ 
preferences in 2005, particularly among non-indigenous groups where there was greater 
diversity of opinion. However, comparison of APRs across self-identified ethnic groups 
suggests some influence for ethnic bias, particularly with regard to white voters. Indeed, 
Figure 3.2 indicates that a white voter who strongly supported nationalisations has a near-
identical APR of voting for Morales (around forty percent) and a higher APR of voting for 
Quiroga (around forty-five percent), compared with a mestizo voter who strongly opposed 
nationalisation (forty percent for Morales, and thirty-five percent for Quiroga). Once again, 
these patterns of vote probabilities suggest the combination of ethnic bias and substantive 
preferences in shaping vote choice. 
Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups and Issues 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the effects of voters’ attitudes towards ethnic groups and 
issues on vote choice in 2005. The tables show the main effect of each ethnic attitude 
measure on the overall predicted probability of voting for Morales or Quiroga, as well as the 
marginal effects by ethnic group. Results are based on analyses that added all seven ethnic 
attitude variables to the base mlogit model reported in Table 3.3 (main effects), and a further 
model that also included two-way interactions between ethnicity and each ethnic attitude 
measure (average marginal effects, AMEs).65 Table 3.4 reports the main and marginal effects 
of a preference for descriptive ethnic representation (‘Prefer leader of…’), a belief that the 
country should have a single national culture (‘One national culture’), and the frequency of 
discrimination experienced by respondents (‘Experience of discrimination’). Table 3.5 
reports the main and marginal effects of negative views about certain ethnic groups 
(‘Negative views of…’).66 
                                                          
65
 In general, the estimates for other variables (voter ethnicity, other demographic indicators, and 
ideology/policy preferences) are largely comparable between the original mlogit model reported in Table 3.3 
and the ethnic attitude models (see Appendix A). Notable exceptions are the measures of identification with 
Aymara or Quechua culture, which become non-significant when the specific ethnic attitude variables are 
included. This is unsurprising, given the high degree of correlation between self-identification with Aymara or 
Quechua culture and positive/negative views of these groups. 
66
 The principal ethnic groups mentioned are white, mestizo (not included here), Aymara, Quechua, and Camba. 
Camba is a somewhat ambiguous socioethnic label. It was originally a generic (and derogatory) term for 
‘lowland indigenous’, but through the twentieth century it was appropriate by middle- and upper-class residents 
of the media luna (mostly white and white-mestizo) as both a self-appellation and a shorthand for a special kind 
of mestizaje. This unique mixing ostensibly explains the perceived lowland exceptionalism within Andean-
indigenous Bolivia, and Camba is often juxtaposed with the Collas (a pejorative term for highland indigenous 
Bolivians) of the western highland departments (Lowrey 2006, 66; Webber 2011, 90-92). In both Bolivian 
LAPOP samples (2006 and 2010), this latter non-indigenous understanding of the term appears to have been 
more prevalent: many self-identified Cambas also identify as white, and very few identify as indigenous or have 
any indigenous-language background. 
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 TABLE 3.4: General Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 
 
  MORALES QUIROGA DORIA NAGATANI 
Voter Attitude/Experience  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Prefers same ethnicity leader  -.004 .045 -.036 .044 .043 .039 -.011 .017 
Spanish language  -.051 .052 -.025 .053 .058 .043 .008 .019 
Indigenous language  .217** .070 -.099^ .053 -.002 .002 -.166** .017 
White  -.042 .096 -.050 .100 .164* .066 -.010 .042 
Mestizo  -.078 .053 -.016 .053 .077 .057 .000 .021 
Indigenous  .282** .086 -.021 .064 -.105** .033 -.138** .045 
None (no indigenous culture)  -.129 .083 -.037 .074 .046 .056 .077^ .042 
Quechua  -.064 .090 -.086 .084 .091^ .053 -.028** .008 
Aymara  .047 .072 .013 .082 -.035 .056 -.019 .015 
Other Indigenous  -.005 .135 .019 .129 .007 .050 -.022 .059 
Prefers one national culture  .038 .052 .054 .048 -.061* .024 .003 .022 
Spanish language  .030 .062 .061 .055 -.068* .028 .005 .023 
Indigenous language  .134** .051 -.093* .046 .000 .000 .031** .008 
White  -.054 .126 .246* .107 -.146** .047 .048 .040 
Mestizo  .087 .062 -.012 .056 -.058^ .033 -.004 .025 
Indigenous  -.105 .081 .150^ .089 .032 .040 .056 .054 
None (no indigenous culture)  .061 .079 .026 .072 -.086** .022 .038 .052 
Quechua  .245* .112 .087 .100 -.132** .030 -.037** .010 
Aymara  -.070 .077 .036 .081 .000 .053 .014 .028 
Other Indigenous  .037 .093 .023 .103 -.038 .024 .106 .088 
Experience of discrimination  .018 .013 -.002 .012 -.008 .009 -.021* .008 
Spanish language  .012 .016 -.006 .015 -.006 .010 -.011^ .007 
Indigenous language  .040 .058 .015 .028 -.001 .002 -.072 .077 
White  .024 .026 -.014 .035 .048* .024 -.068^ .035 
Mestizo  .012 .016 -.001 .014 -.011 .011 -.014^ .007 
Indigenous  .019 .019 -.012 .021 -.014 .010 .005 .016 
None (no indigenous culture)  .018 .028 -.021 .022 .008 .014 -.026^ .016 
Quechua  .014 .027 -.003 .024 -.024 .023 -.017 .011 
Aymara  .020 .022 .012 .024 -.026 .020 -.024 .016 
Other Indigenous  .111** .036 .054 .054 .004 .016 .006 .025 
N = 787. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .001 
Notes: Coefficients are main effects (first line of each sub-section) and average marginal effects by linguistic, generic self-identified, or self-
identified cultural group of the indicated ethnic attitude variable on the overall predicted probability of voting for each candidate. Results 
are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression models (one for each ethnicity measure), first with no interactions (main effects) 
and then with two-way interactions between each ethnicity and ethnic-attitude variable (marginal effects). Full output is included in 
Appendix A. 





TABLE 3.5: Attitudes Towards Specific Ethnic Groups and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 
 
  MORALES QUIROGA DORIA NAGATANI 
Voter Attitude  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Negative view of Quechua  -.036 .045 -.013 .047 .036 .034 .012 .018 
Spanish language  -.040 .054 .012 .056 .041 .044 -.003 .018 
Indigenous language  -.009 .062 -.131** .048 .004 .004 .095** .014 
White  .088 .105 .080 .102 -.114* .044 .072^ .041 
Mestizo  -.066 .054 .023 .056 .061 .055 .009 .020 
Indigenous  .008 .084 -.076 .098 -.057^ .032 -.023 .074 
None (no ind. culture)  .077 .104 -.027 .083 -.057 .049 .004 .033 
Quechua  -.281** .081 .077 .084 .037 .052 -.011 .008 
Aymara  -.101 .076 -.129 .079 .215** .052 .017 .021 
Other Indigenous  .344** .086 -.323** .088 -.023 .023 .041 .088 
Negative view of Aymara  -.141** .042 .127** .047 -.005 .027 .012 .018 
Spanish language  -.143* .053 .124* .057 -.008 .034 .021 .021 
Indigenous language  -.113 .079 .143* .065 .006* .003 -.075** .014 
White  -.129 .110 .029 .101 .038 .083 -.026 .035 
Mestizo  -.106* .053 .104^ .062 -.022 .050 .008 .024 
Indigenous  -.383** .068 .187^ .102 .117 .073 .116 .089 
None (no ind. culture)  -.273* .111 .199* .086 .110* .051 .009 .039 
Quechua  -.033 .074 .041 .063 -.077** .027 .000 .003 
Aymara  -.077 .073 .104 .089 -.082 .065 -.013 .015 
Other Indigenous  -.382** .098 .349** .089 .025 .040 -.008 .082 
Negative view of Camba  .031 .039 -.053 .038 -.008 .023 .002 .017 
Spanish language  .048 .053 -.062 .045 -.007 .027 -.004 .018 
Indigenous language  -.079 .060 .102* .051 -.004 .003 -.062** .011 
White  .173* .071 -.326** .077 .019 .048 .025 .033 
Mestizo  -.011 .053 -.029 .048 .012 .028 .008 .018 
Indigenous  .040 .101 .057 .072 .009 .028 -.062 .056 
None (no ind. culture)  .080 .058 -.101^ .052 -.007 .029 -.018 .041 
Quechua  -.045 .083 -.050 .082 .011 .060 .006 .005 
Aymara  .097 .091 .001 .083 -.070 .069 .022 .039 
Other Indigenous  -.018 .092 .028 .114 -.082* .036 .013 .053 
Negative view of Whites  .076* .039 -.066^ .039 .006 .026 -.019 .016 
Spanish language  .073^ .046 -.075^ .045 .005 .029 -.005 .017 
Indigenous language  .226** .064 -.012 .058 .000 .002 -.253** .018 
White  -.017 .084 -.129 .085 .051 .054 .019 .042 
Mestizo  .088* .044 -.052 .045 -.017 .028 -.022 .020 
Indigenous  .207* .093 -.138 .092 -.022 .026 -.150* .058 
None (no ind. culture)  -.094 .069 .043 .063 .004 .034 -.006 .029 
Quechua  .223** .076 -.076 .069 .002 .042 -.025** .009 
Aymara  .077 .080 -.056 .078 .017 .065 -.038 .056 
Other Indigenous  .135 .098 -.058 .112 .030 .032 -.083^ .048 
N = 787. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .001 
Notes: Coefficients are main effects (first line of each sub-section) and average marginal effects by linguistic, generic self-
identified, or self-identified cultural group of the indicated ethnic attitude variable on the overall predicted probability of 
voting for each candidate. Results are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression models (one for each ethnicity 
measure), first with no interactions (main effects) and then with two-way interactions between each ethnicity and ethnic-
attitude variable (marginal effects). Full output is included in Appendix A. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from LAPOP 2006. 
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The analysis produces some noteworthy results. First, Table 3.4 reports non-
significant main effects for the binary-response variable measuring a preference for a co-
ethnic leader. However, when the effects are decomposed by ethnic group, the AMEs indicate 
a statistically significant positive relationship between such preferences and a vote for 
Morales among indigenous voters (an increase of 21.7 and 28.2 percentage points for 
indigenous-language speakers and self-identified indigenous voters, respectively). Second, 
support for a single national culture (‘One national culture’) is similarly non-significant in 
terms of main effects, but is associated with statistically significant AMEs among 
indigenous-language speakers (an increase in Morales’s vote probability of 13.4 percentage 
points) and voters who identity with Quechua culture (an increase in favour of Morales of 
24.5 percentage points). This may reflect a sector of the MAS’s indigenous base that aspired 
to a single (presumably indigenous-based) national culture, although this measure may also 
capture a broader nationalist sentiment among many MAS supporters. For Quiroga, the 
effects of both these variables tend to be comparable inverse copies, at least for the 
indigenous-language group. Finally, the variable measuring experiences of racial or ethnic 
discrimination does not seem to have significant effects on vote probabilities, even when 
effects are decomposed by ethnic group. Although the coefficients are positive in all groups 
with regard to Morales’s vote probability, and negative in most groups regarding Quiroga, 
only among lowland indigenous groups does the AME reach statistical significance. 
The analysis of inter-ethnic perceptions reported in Table 3.5 is also informative. 
Negative views of the Aymara group are associated with quite substantial decreases in the 
predicted probability of voting for Morales – an Aymara himself – and corresponding 
positive effects on Quiroga’s vote probabilities. The main effect indicates an overall decrease 
in the probability of voting for Morales of 14.1 percentage points, but the AMEs reveal 
considerably larger effects among voters who explicitly stated their non-indigenous 
background (27.3 percentage points) or identified with a lowland indigenous culture (38.2 
percentage points). These are in addition to somewhat lesser effects in the self-identified 
mestizo group (10.6 percentage points) and non-significant effects for highland indigenous 
groups and whites. Similarly, the main effect indicates an increase in the probability of voting 
for Quiroga of 12.7 percentage points, but the effects are 19.9 percentage points for those 
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who identified with no indigenous culture and as high as 34.9 percentage points among 
lowland indigenous groups.67  
Negative views of whites also have significant main effects for both Morales and 
Quiroga, an increase of 7.6 percentage points in the former case and a decrease of 6.6 
percentage points in the latter. However, once again the AMEs reveal considerably larger 
effects in certain groups, with negative views of whites producing an increase of over twenty 
percentage points in Morales’s vote probability among indigenous-language speakers, self-
identified indigenous, and Quechuas. The AMEs are more or less in line with the main effect 
in Quiroga’s case, although they only reach statistical significance in the non-indigenous 
language group. The marginal effects related to views about Quechua or Camba groups are 
mostly non-significant, and the few significant effects are typically based on relatively few 
observations.  
In summary, the analysis reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggests that ethnic attitudes 
may have important effects on voters’ electoral decisions. A preference for descriptive ethnic 
representation may have contributed to support for Morales among indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo voters and reduced support for Quiroga, although the analysis cannot 
determine the motivations behind such preferences (i.e., expressive or heuristic). Negative 
views of whites may also have increased support for Morales and the MAS, particularly 
among voters with some indigenous background. Meanwhile, negative views of Aymaras 
reduced support for Morales among lowland indigenous and non-indigenous voters and 
increased support for Quiroga. Although this analysis cannot easily determine whether such 
effects reflect psychological attachments and prejudice, or heuristic assumptions about group-
related interests, it is clear that several direct measures of ethnic bias – whether expressive, 
heuristic, or both – had significant effects on vote choice in Bolivia’s 2005 election.  
Finally, this analysis does not detect any noteworthy effects of ethnic discrimination 
on vote choice. This is perhaps surprising given that experience of discrimination is often 
cited as a contributing factor to ethnic voting among subaltern groups. However, self-reported 
measures of discrimination such as those employed by the LAPOP surveys are likely to 
underestimate the frequency of such experiences (Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999).68 
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 The AMEs for both Morales and Quiroga in the self-identified indigenous group are probably heavily 
influenced by this effect in the lowland indigenous group. 
68
 Indeed, more general questions about ethnic discrimination in Bolivian society (rather than personal 
experience) had produced considerably higher affirmative response rates in previous LAPOP surveys. 
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Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
Table 3.6 reports a summary of ethnicity’s indirect effects on the log-odds of voting 
for Morales over Quiroga in 2005, with full results provided in Appendix A. The mediation 
analysis shows total indirect effects that are significant for the indigenous-language measure 
and for self-identification with both Quechua and Aymara cultures. In each case, the effects 
indicate a positive association with a vote for Morales over Quiroga. Depending on the 
calculation methods used, these indirect effects comprise between 19.4 and 44.4 percent of 
the total effect in the case of the linguistic measure, and between 43.6 and 58.2 percent, and 
between 41.4 and 52.5 percent, in the Aymara and Quechua cases respectively. In line with 
the results reported in Table 3.3, in both the latter cases the direct effect is non-significant, 
and it is only with the addition of quite substantial indirect effects that the total effect reaches 
statistical significance. Moreover, the analysis also uncovers several specific mediation paths 
that produce significant indirect effects, even when the total indirect effects are not 
significant (see final column of Table 3.6). This applies to the case of indigenous self-
identification, white self-identification, and identification with a lowland indigenous culture. 
These indirect effects are positively associated with a Morales vote in the first case, but are 
negative in the two other cases.  
Decomposition of the total indirect effects reveals that a substantial proportion of the 
mediation occurs through political ideology and voters’ attitudes towards specific ethnic 
groups or identities. In the case of linguistic group, an indigenous-language background is 
significantly associated with more leftist ideology, which in turn is associated with a vote for 
Morales over Quiroga. Self-identification as indigenous (compared to white) and 
identification with Quechua culture both have comparable indirect effects in favour of 
Morales that operate through very similar mediation pathways.  
In addition to political ideology, voters’ views about certain ethnic groups appear to 
have played important mediator roles in several cases. Indigenous-language speakers were 
more likely to have negative views of the Camba ethno-regional group, attitudes which were 
associated with a vote for Morales over Quiroga. Attitudes towards the Camba group also 
mediated the effects of identifying with a lowland indigenous group, although in this case 
lowland indigenous identity decreased negative perceptions of Cambas and produced an 
indirect effect in favour of Quiroga. Self-identification as white and identification with the 
Aymara culture both showed indirect effects mediated through perceptions of the Aymara 
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 TABLE 3.6: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Bolivia 2005 
 
  Coeff. SE Significant Mediation Pathways Total N 
Speaks an indigenous language     624 
Total indirect effects  .086^* .029 Rightist ideology (.034; -.692** / -.272**)  
Direct effects  .222^* .068 Negative view of Camba (.020; .619* / .644*)  
Total effect  .309^* .063   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .280    
KHB  .194    
LDE  .441    
White (mestizo)      
Total indirect effects  -.068 .029 Negative view of Aymara (-.019; .513^ / -.186**) 513 
Direct effects  -.146 .062   
Total effect  -.214 .059   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .316    
KHB  .097    
LDE  .421    
Indigenous (mestizo)     557 
Total indirect effects  .049 .033 Negative view of whites (.015; .556* / .534^)  
Direct effects  .047 .062   
Total effect  .096 .068   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .599    
KHB  .424    
LDE  .956    
Indigenous (white)      
Total indirect effects  .138 .095 Rightist ideology (.038; -.846^ / -.253*) 178 
Direct effects  .297^* .097   
Total effect  .435^* .100   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .318    
KHB  .091    
LDE  .478    
Aymara (no indigenous culture)     310 
Total indirect effects  .184^* .070 Negative view of Aymara (.047; -.887* / -.924*)  
Direct effects  .132 .114   
Total effect  .316^* .110   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .582    
KHB  .436    
LDE  .537    
Quechua (no indigenous culture)     426 
Total indirect effects  .111^* .043 Rightist ideology (.037; -.521* / -.297**)  
Direct effects  .111 .076   
Total effect  .222^* .072   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .500    
KHB  .415    
LDE  .525    
Other Ind. (no indigenous culture)     261 
Total indirect effects  -.008 .058 Negative view of Camba (-.034; -.724* / .849*)  
Direct effects  .093 .086   
Total effect  .085 .085   
Proportion of total effect mediated  -.099    
KHB  .380    
LDE  .290    
Notes: Table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of output can be found in Appendix A. Coefficients are 
standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Morales over Quiroga. ^ and * indicated 
indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to confidence intervals calculated through the percentile and bias-correction 
methods, respectively. ‘Proportion of total effect mediated’ is based on the product of coefficients/Y-standardisation method. KHB and 
LDE show estimates for the same proportions based on two alternative calculation methods (see Chapter Two for further discussion on 
methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity 
measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear regression 
coefficients or log-odds from logistic regression, depending on the mediator. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2006. 
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group. Whites were more likely than mestizos to hold negative views of Aymaras, which 
contributed to an indirect effect in favour of Quiroga; Aymaras were more likely to have 
positive views of their own group (compared to non-indigenous), which produced an overall 
indirect effect in favour of Morales. Finally, indigenous voters tended to perceive white 
Bolivians less favourably than mestizos, an attitude which was associated with a positive 
effect on the likelihood of voting for Morales.69 
In summary, mediation analysis for the effects of ethnicity on vote choice in Bolivia’s 
2005 election reveals a number of significant indirect effects. In some cases, these combine to 
produce significant total indirect effects, although the lack of such overall statistical 
significance should not alter the interpretation of individual mediation pathways. The indirect 
effects identified would not be detected through direct-effects models, and thus mediation 
analysis reveals a crucial aspect of ethnicity’s broader impact on vote choice. For example, 
the direct effects might suggest that the distinction between Aymara or Quechua 
identification, on the one hand, and non-indigenous identification, on the other, is not 
electorally important once other factors – particularly ethnic attitudes – are taken into 
account. The mediation analysis indicates differently, however, suggesting that distinct ethnic 
backgrounds may, in this case, have helped shape political ideology as well as perceptions of 
other ethnic groups (Aymaras in particular) in ways that inclined many Aymara and Quechua 
voters to favour Morales over Quiroga.  
Still, even in these cases, the proportion of the total effect that is mediated remains 
well below one hundred percent, which would indicate full mediation. Non-complete 
mediation, combined with the persistence of significant direct effects (at least in the case of 
the linguistic measure), suggests that ethnicity’s effect on voting cannot be explained fully in 
terms of the indirect model of ethnic voting. Rather, persisting direct effects suggest that 
ethnic bias, whether expressive or heuristic, was still an important factor in determining 
voting outcomes in Bolivia’s 2005 election. 
 
BOLIVIA 2009 
 The 2009 general elections in Bolivia took place in a highly polarised political 
environment. Following his electoral victory in 2005, Morales had pushed ahead with a 
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 These specific mediation pathways do not account for the full overall indirect effect, which constitutes the 
sum of all such pathways (not just those that are individually significant). 
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pledge to rewrite the country’s constitution, convening a constitutional assembly within his 
first year in office. Controversy surrounding constitutional reform exacerbated, and became a 
focus for, wider political conflicts rooted in long-standing regional, ethnic, and class divides. 
In particular, opposition towards the MAS in the wealthier, less indigenous media luna region 
found voice in a reinvigorated autonomy movement, which demanded near or complete 
independence from the MAS-controlled central government. Pro-autonomy advocates 
included a number of high-profile politicians from the political right, including the prefects of 
Santa Cruz, Pando, Tarija, and Beni. Defeat in a 2006 referendum that explicitly addressed 
the autonomy issue did little to subdue pro-autonomy activism. Indeed, violent confrontations 
between pro-autonomy protesters and supports of the central government became 
increasingly frequent through 2007 and 2008.  
In September 2007, violent clashes on the streets of Cochabamba left several dead and 
hundreds injured when supporters of the MAS government, mostly indigenous, were attacked 
by a group of rival protesters, mostly youths from the city’s wealthier, white neighbourhoods 
(Espósito 2011, 8). The events in Cochabamba highlighted the ethnic underside of the 
autonomy issue, a dimension to the political confrontation that was repeatedly in evidence in 
the series of protests and counter-protests that had engulfed the media luna by early 2008. 
The explicitly racist rhetoric that marked much of the political debate was often mirrored by 
openly racist, physical attacks on (perceived) supporters of rival political groups, particularly 
targeting indigenous supporters of the MAS. Sections of the pro-autonomy movement 
engaged not only in strikes, blockades, and civil disobedience, but also in quasi-paramilitary 
activities, including armed attacks on indigenous communities and even bombings of state 
companies, indigenous NGOs, and human rights organisations (Dangl 2007; Kolzloff, 2008; 
Chávez 2009; Webber 2009, 93-6; Postero, 2010, 63-4; Sivak 2010, 221-22; Harten 2011, 
182-3; Webber 2011, 133-40; Farthing and Kohl 2014, 47-9). The violence reached its apex 
in September 2008, when an ambush of a group of MAS activists on its way to Cobija, the 
provincial capital of Pando department, left 19 dead. The Prefect of Pando, Leopoldo 
Fernández, was subsequently arrested and charged with ordering the killings (Chávez, 2008), 
although to date there has been no verdict in his trial. 
A degree of stability was achieved by early 2009 when the MAS government agreed 
to a series of amendments to the new constitution proposed by the parliamentary opposition, 
although the central government stopped well short of acceding to the full demands of the 
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pro-autonomy activists. The new constitution was subsequently ratified by popular 
referendum in January 2009, triggering a general election the following December.  
Unsurprisingly, the electoral landscape in the 2009 campaign reflected the polarised 
divisions of the contemporary political environment. Morales lined up against Manfred Reyes 
Villa, who headed the right-wing PPB-CN coalition. The PPB-CN included Reyes Villa’s 
Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), a number of centre-right parties including the MNR, and 
several prominent pro-autonomy party-movements and politicians (the imprisoned Leopoldo 
Fernández, for example, was Reyes Villa’s running mate). The only other candidate of note 
was Samuel Doria, who ran again on his Unidad Nacional (UN) ticket, positioning himself as 
the moderate option in a polarised field. Doria’s support was restricted to certain middle-
class, urban areas, and his polling figures never reached double digits (Bustillos 2013).  
Overall, this electoral environment and the wider political context were conducive to 
both heuristic and expressive ethnic voting, but perhaps particularly the latter. Not only did 
several key substantive controversies fall along ethnic lines, but both politicians and their 
popular supporters evoked ethnicity explicitly in their political rhetoric. Moreover, attacks on 
political opponents were often couched in ethnocentrist or openly racist sentiments. 
Combined with ethnically-motivated physical violence against supporters of rival political 
forces, such conditions were likely to raise significantly the political salience of ethnicity, 
strengthen feelings of ethnic solidarity, and stir ethnic prejudice. 
Official Results and LAPOP Data 
The results of the election gave Morales and the MAS a resounding victory, with the 
former winning 64.2 percent of the valid presidential vote. Reyes Villa came a distant second 
26.5 percent, and Doria third with 5.7 percent. The 2009 election, then, firmly cemented the 
MAS’s position as the dominant party in Bolivian politics, albeit in a context of severe 
political polarisation particularly characterised by sharp regional and ethnic divides. 
LAPOP’s 2010 survey, conducted some months after the election, only slightly 
overestimated Morales’s vote, giving the MAS candidate a 66.7 percent share. However, it 
severely underestimated Reyes Villa’s support, with only 17.3 percent of LAPOP 
respondents reporting a vote for the PPB-CN’s candidate. One possible explanation for this 
bias in the LAPOP data is that opposition supporters were uneasy about revealing their 
electoral preferences in a political environment that was still highly polarised. Indeed, a total 
1,047 of respondents in LAPOP’s 2010 survey declined to report their vote choice, and it 
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seems likely some of these were Reyes Villa supporters. However, despite this bias in 
reported vote choice, the LAPOP data do at least reflect the general trend in official results, 
and sample still includes a sufficient number of Reyes Villa supporters to conduct meaningful 
analysis (N = 375).  
With regard to specific measures, the 2009 analysis continues to use personal 
language knowledge as the linguistic measure of ethnicity for comparability with 2005 
(although the 2010 survey also included the parental linguistic measure used in Ecuador and 
Peru). As in 2005, the 2009 analysis also employs both generic ethnic self-identification 
(white, mestizo, indigenous) and cultural identification measures. Further details of the 
additional variables used are included in the relevant subsections, below. 
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the ethnic breakdown of reported vote choice in Bolivia’s 
2009 election, as well as group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores (sub-tables D). 
Table 3.7 reports results based on the generic ethnic self-identification measure, while Table 
3.8 reports results from the cultural identification measure. 
Group-Centred Ethnicisation 
The group-centred ethnicisation scores in Tables 3.7d and 3.8d show similar relative 
patterns to 2005, but with a marked increase across all groups. In the case of SD2 scores, this 
partly reflects the overall higher vote share won by Morales in 2009 (66.7 percent compared 
to 53.4 percent in 2005). However, the fact that SD1 scores are also higher in 2009 indicates 
that vote concentrations within ethnic groups, even relative to overall vote proportions, were 
also notably higher. This reflects the increased polarisation of Bolivian politics in 2009, and 
particularly the ethnic dimension to such polarisation. Indeed, SD1 scores are higher in 
Bolivia 2009 than in any other election studied in this thesis. 
The principal aim of the group-centred analysis is to provide an indication of the 
likely salience of ethnicity to vote choice across ethnic groups. As in 2005, the SD2 scores 
from 2009 shows the highest overall vote concentrations in the indigenous-language and self-
identified indigenous groups (.376 in both cases), as well as the two highland indigenous 
groups, Quechua (.290) and Aymara (.375). These indigenous groups voted overwhelmingly 
for the MAS in 2009, with Morales winning 74.8 percent of the Quechua vote and 90.0 
percent in the other three groups (Tables 3.7b and 3.8b). However, the SD1 scores show that 
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TABLE 3.7: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification) 
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP Total 
LAPOP 
Total 









Evo Morales 41.6 25.1 2.3 44.4 20.1 66.7 64.2 
Manfred Reyes Villa 16.2 1.2 2.2 14.5 0.6 17.3 26.5 
Samuel Doria 3.9 0.2 0.4 3.5 0.1 4.0 5.7 
Other/Null 10.5 1.5 0.8 9.6 1.5 12.0 3.6 










        
Evo Morales 57.7 90.0 40.0 61.6 90.0 66.7  
Manfred Reyes Villa 22.4 4.1 38.7 20.1 2.7 17.3  
Samuel Doria 5.3 0.6 7.0 4.9 0.4 4.0  
Other/Null 14.5 5.3 14.3 13.3 6.9 12.0  












        
Evo Morales 62.4 37.6 3.4 66.5 30.1 66.7  
Manfred Reyes Villa 93.4 6.6 12.8 83.7 3.5 17.3  
Samuel Doria 96.0 4.0 10.0 87.8 2.2 4.0  
Other/Null 87.7 12.3 6.9 80.4 12.8 12.0  















        
Group-Centred        
SD1 .045 .117 .134 .025 .117   
SD2 .198 .376 .146 .218 .376   
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP      SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   
Evo Morales  .097  .052   
Manfred Reyes Villa  .212  .125   
Samuel Doria  .239  .134   
Other/Null  .156  .063   
       
N = 1918. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) 
in LAPOP’s 2010 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that 
voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share received from 
each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-
centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the ethnic 
group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .25 (100 percent divided by four vote 
outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-
identified, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  





TABLE 3.8: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification) 
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP Total 









Evo Morales 41.8 25.7 9.3 26.8 26.5 4.9 67.5 
Manfred Reyes Villa 15.4 1.1 6.9 3.6 0.4 5.7 16.5 
Samuel Doria 3.8 0.2 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 4.0 
Other/Null 10.5 1.5 3.2 4.6 2.0 2.2 12.0 










        
Evo Morales 58.5 90.2 44.2 74.8 89.9 36.0 67.5 
Manfred Reyes Villa 21.5 4.0 32.9 10.0 1.2 41.7 16.5 
Samuel Doria 5.3 0.6 7.6 2.3 2.2 6.3 4.0 
Other/Null 14.7 5.2 15.3 12.9 6.6 15.9 12.0 












        
Evo Morales 61.9 38.1 13.7 39.7 39.3 7.3 67.5 
Manfred Reyes Villa 93.1 6.9 41.8 21.6 2.2 34.4 16.5 
Samuel Doria 96.0 4.0 40.4 21.2 16.4 22.0 4.0 
Other/Null 87.6 12.4 26.8 38.7 16.4 18.1 12.0 















        
Group-Centred        
SD1 .045 .114 .117 .041 .112 .158  
SD2 .202 .377 .144 .290 .375 .144  
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP  
Evo Morales .096   .068  
Manfred Reyes Villa .216   .364  
Samuel Doria .244   .284  
Other/Null .161   .109  
       
N = 1915. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read 
separately) in LAPOP’s 2010 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic 
group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share 
received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and 
candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within 
the ethnic group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .25 (100 percent divided by 
four vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic 
and cultural identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010 and Tribunal Supremo Electoral (http://www.oep.org.bo/). 
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the white group (.134), self-identified non-indigenous group (.117), and the lowland 
indigenous group (.158) had vote distributions that were equally – or more – disproportionate 
in their distribution relative to overall vote shares (Tables 3.7d and 3.8d). This pattern of low 
SD2 and high SD1 scores indicates ethnic groups in which the vote is more fragmented (and 
thus closer to the equal-share mean proportion of 25 percent), but where group-level voting 
trends diverge from the rest of the electorate (thus larger standard deviations from the overall 
sample proportions). 
Indeed, the breakdown of the vote in these non-indigenous groups – and in the 
lowland indigenous group – serves to highlight both the MAS’s broad appeal beyond its 
highland indigenous and mestizo base and the concentration of opposition support in non-
indigenous constituencies. Although Morales won 40.0 percent of white and 44.2 percent of 
self-identified non-indigenous voters (figures that reflect more or less the same set of 
individual voters), as well as 36.0 percent of lowland indigenous voters, these proportions 
were well below the levels of support enjoyed by the MAS in other groups. These were, 
accordingly, the groups that offered most support to Reyes Villa, although only in the 
lowland indigenous group did the PPB-CN receive a greater vote share than the MAS (41.7 
percent compared to 36 percent).70 
Overall, analysis of group-centred voting patterns from 2009 suggests that ethnicity 
was highly salient to vote choice across most groups, with the partial exception of the 
heterogeneous self-identified mestizo and Spanish-language groups. Substantively, the group-
centred analysis indicates the MAS made gains across all ethnic groups between 2005 and 
2009, reconfirming the breadth of the party’s appeal. However, it also highlights the 
increased polarisation of Bolivian politics in 2009, with group-centred ethnicisation scores 
consistently higher for all groups (compare Tables 3.1d and 3.2d with 3.7d and 3.8d). 
Moreover, the breakdown of each ethnic group’s vote distributions identifies the nature of 
this ethnic polarisation. Continuing but amplifying the electoral trends of 2005, Morales and 
the MAS won overwhelming majorities among highland indigenous and indigenous-mestizo 
voters in 2009, while support for the opposition was restricted to whites and non-indigenous 
mestizos, as well as voters who identified with lowland indigenous groups. 
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 It should be re-emphasised that these proportions are based on the LAPOP respondents who reported their 




 Like the group-centred statistics, the candidate-centred ethnicisation scores tend to 
increase for opponents of the MAS from 2005 to 2009 (compare Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, and 
3.8). For example, Reyes Villa’s candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are .212 for the 
linguistic measure (compared to .203 for Quiroga in 2005) and .125 and .364 for the two self-
identification measures (compared to .081 and .264 for Quiroga four years earlier). Doria’s 
scores are also substantially higher on all three measures in 2009 compared to 2005. In fact, 
the average candidate-centred ethnicisation score is .122 in Bolivia 2009, the highest score 
across all seven election case studies.  
However, in contrast to Reyes Villa and Doria, the candidate-centred scores for 
Morales are comparable between 2005 and 2009 or even decrease in value. Thus, while the 
principal opponents of the MAS saw their vote become more ethnically concentrated in 2009, 
Morales maintained and even expanded the MAS’s support across ethnic groups. Overall, 
these candidate-centred ethnicisation scores confirm the general trend implied by the group-
centred scores: the consolidation of the MAS’s base in indigenous constituencies, while 
maintaining broad support across other ethnic groups; and the concentration of support for 
the principal opposition in non-indigenous and lowland indigenous constituencies. 
 Nevertheless, Morales’s support was still concentrated among indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo sectors in 2009, with 37.6 percent coming from indigenous-language 
speakers (compared to a sample proportion of 27.9 percent) and 30.1 percent coming from 
self-identified indigenous voters (compared to a sample proportion of just 22.3 percent). Just 
3.4 percent of Morales’s vote came from self-identified whites, although the overall 
proportion of whites in the sample was also lower in 2009 than in 2005 (just 5.7 percent, 
compared with 11.8 percent).71 In terms of the wider cultural identification measure, a total of 
80.0 percent of Morales’s vote came from voters who identified with either Quechua or 
Aymara culture, with just 13.7 percent coming from non-indigenous voters (although the 
latter comprised 21.0 percent of the sample). Just 7.3 percent of Morales’s vote came from 
voters who reported identification with lowland indigenous cultures (about half the 13.6 
percent sample proportion).  
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 This reduction in the size of the self-identified white group cannot be explained by white unease about 
reporting opposition vote choice. The full sample, including non-responses to the vote question, included just 
6.8 percent whites, much lower than the 12.0 percent in 2005 and not substantially higher than the 5.7 percent of 
whites who did report vote choice in 2009. 
104 
 
The concentration of support for Reyes Villa among non-indigenous voters is 
highlighted by the 93.4 percent of the PPB-CN vote that came from non-indigenous language 
speakers (compared to a sample proportion of 72.1 percent), the 12.8 percent from whites 
(twice the sample proportion), and just 3.5 percent from indigenous (well below the 22.0 
percent sample proportion). Among those indigenous voters were some of the 34.4 percent of 
lowland indigenous respondents who reported voting for Reyes Villa (well above the 13.6 
percent in the sample), while the remainder of the PPB-CN vote was comprised of non-
indigenous voters (41.8 percent, comprising whites and non-indigenous mestizos), 21.6 
percent Quechua, and just 2.2 percent Aymara (compared to sample proportions of 21.0, 
35.9, and 29.5 percent, respectively).72 
Overall, the ethnic composition of candidates’ vote shares reflected the polarised 
political environment in 2009. Support for Reyes Villa was considerably more ethnically-
concentrated than Quiroga’s vote in 2005, with minimal support among highland indigenous 
or indigenous-mestizo voters. This reflected PPB-CN’s choice of political personnel, its 
campaign rhetoric, and its programmatic platform, which all worked to associate the coalition 
with the interests of wealthier, less indigenous residents of the media luna, including the 
interests and views of more radical factions of the pro-autonomy movement (Chávez 2009). 
The candidate-centred analysis suggests that these characteristics of the PPB-CN electoral 
platform severely restricted the scope of its descriptive and substantive appeals, even 
alienating many whites and mestizos. In contrast, and despite the severe political 
confrontations in the years preceding the 2009 election, the MAS actually increased its vote 
share across all groups, although it still drew disproportionate support from indigenous 
voters, at least in the highlands. In part, the MAS’s consolidation of its highland indigenous 
base may have reflected heightened expressions of ethnic solidarity within these 
constituencies in the context of a more polarised ethnic environment and, particularly, the 
more aggressive anti-indigenous posturing of sections within the main political opposition. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
Table 3.9 shows the effects of voter characteristics on the overall predicted 
probability of voting for Morales and Reyes Villa in 2009. The analysis does not include 
discussion of Doria’s vote, given the relatively few LAPOP respondents who reported voting
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TABLE 3.9: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 
 
  MORALES REYES VILLA DORIA 
Voter Characteristic  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Speaks an indigenous language  .147** .041 -.054 .045 -.015 .019 
White (Mestizo)  -.243** .046 .157** .057 .040 .038 
Indigenous (Mestizo)  .047 .051 -.095* .041 -.028* .013 
Indigenous (White)  .290** .071 -.252** .076 -.068^ .038 
Quechua (None)  .011 .038 -.059^ .037 .001 .016 
Aymara (None)  .134** .043 -.181** .038 .020 .026 
Other Indigenous (None)  -.037 .055 .029 .046 .021 .019 
Quechua (Aymara)  -.123** .035 .122** .026 -.019 .022 
Other Indigenous (Aymara)  -.170* .069 .210** .048 .000 .032 
Income  -.011 .007 .016^ .010 .005 .005 
Female  .004 .022 -.015 .023 .020 .014 
Age  .002* .001 .000 .001 -.001 .001 
Trust in parties  .013^ .007 -.002 .006 -.002 .005 
Participation in protests  -.099** .035 .082* .038 .035 .027 
National economy has improved  .140** .030 -.071* .029 -.008 .018 
Personal finances have improved  .021 .028 -.058* .029 .018 .018 
Resides in media luna  -.213** .039 .148** .031 .005 .014 
Resides in rural area  .006 .013 -.003 .018 -.001 .006 
Rightist ideology  -.043** .008 .029** .007 .002 .003 
Wealth redistribution  .016^ .010 .004 .011 .004 .006 
Social Security  .009 .012 -.005 .012 -.008 .007 
Nationalisations  .016* .007 -.017* .007 -.010** .003 
Free trade  -.001 .010 .012 .009 .000 .006 
Limit opposition voice  .038** .009 -.019* .009 -.004 .004 
Direct democracy  .021** .008 -.014* .007 -.002 .004 
Minorities are a threat  .001 .008 .006 .010 -.002 .005 
N= 1151. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Notes: Coefficients are the effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix A. 
The effects for ethnic self-identification and cultural identification are compared to base category in parentheses. Generic self-
identification and cultural identification variables were included in separate models; parameter estimates for all other variables are those 
from the generic identification model.  





for the UN. The full results of the base mlogit model, reported in Appendix A, include 
parameter estimates for Doria.  
Ethnicity Variables 
First, the model predicts that voters from a non-indigenous language background were 
14.7 percentage points more likely to support Morales than non-indigenous language 
speakers. Similarly, both self-identified mestizos and indigenous voters were significantly 
more likely to vote for Morales than whites (by 24.3 and 29.0 percentage points, 
respectively). Voters who identified with an Aymara cultural background were also more 
likely to support Morales than those who reported no indigenous cultural identification (by 
13.4 percentage points), or those who identified with Quechua or a lowland indigenous 
culture (by 12.3 and 17.0 percentage points, respectively).  
For the most part, these patterns are inversely mirrored in terms of Reyes Villa’s vote 
probabilities, indicating increased support among whites and non-indigenous voters, and 
near-total rejection by Aymara voters, in particular. In addition, the results indicate that 
Quechua cultural identification (compared to non-indigenous) was also associated with a 5.9 
percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa. However, linguistic 
background did not appear to influence Reyes Villa’s vote, at least once both self-
identification measures were taken into account. 
Overall, the results outlined above strongly suggest a causal relationship between 
voter ethnicity and vote choice in Bolivia’s 2009 election. However, a comparison of effects 
linked to the linguistic and self-identification measures may also provide more specific 
insight into the nature of ethnicity’s role in voting behaviour. As discussed previously, the 
linguistic measures can be taken as indicative of a broader sociocultural background, 
compared to the more conscious, expressive character of the self-identification measures. 
Results from the 2009 vote analysis show that voters from an indigenous-language 
background were more likely to vote for Morales than Spanish-only speakers, indicative of 
the MAS’s broad appeal among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. This point is 
reinforced by the absence of a significant difference between self-identified indigenous and 
mestizo voters, who, as Tables 3.7 and 3.8 made clear, supported Morales in overwhelming 
numbers. However, in Reyes Villa’s case, the linguistic measure is non-significant, while 
self-identification with explicitly non-indigenous identities (white or non-indigenous culture) 
is significant and positive. Taken together, these effects might indicate that more expressive 
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(i.e., conscious or politicised) ethnic identifications – particularly with groups and cultural 
identities that are explicitly distinguished from highland indigenous Bolivia – may have 
played an important role in support for Reyes Villa.73 
In summary, the results of regression analysis appear to confirm a causal role for 
ethnicity in the 2009 election, as suggested by the vote distributions presented previously. 
The disproportionate support for Morales among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters 
(and particularly among Aymara voters), and the concentration of Reyes Villa’s support 
among whites and non-indigenous mestizos (as well as, and including, voters who identified 
with a lowland indigenous culture), is not explained fully by sociodemographic factors, 
economic perceptions, or political attitudes. Once again, these findings suggest an important 
effect of ethnic bias on Bolivian voting outcomes. Moreover, the relative significance of 
linguistic and self-identification measures may indicate a more expressive form of bias 
among supporters of Reyes Villa in particular, although in the wider context of ethnic and 
political polarisation it seems likely that ethnic solidarity and prejudice may have played an 
increased role across all groups. 
Non-Ethnic Variables 
However, even when ethnic variables are taken into account, substantive issue 
preferences and ideology, economic assessments, and several other demographic variables all 
contributed to vote choice. First, as in 2005, political ideology (‘Rightist ideology’) had 
highly significant effects on the predicted vote probabilities for both major candidates in 
2009. A one-unit move from left to right on the ideology scale was associated with a 4.3 
percentage point increase in the probability of voting for the MAS, and a 2.9 percentage point 
decrease in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa. These effects reconfirm the ideological, 
as well as the ethnic and regional, divisions in contemporary Bolivian politics.  
The 2010 surveys also introduced several more specific measures of programmatic 
preferences linked to political ideology: support for state-led wealth redistribution (‘Wealth 
redistribution’); support for greater social security (‘Social security’); and support for some 
nationalisations (‘Nationalisations’). Although most voters supported an increase in social 
security, meaning it has little predictive value in voting analysis, both the wealth 
redistribution and nationalisation preferences had significant effects. A one-unit increase in 
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 It is worth re-emphasising, however, that the ethnic effects identified are all relative (i.e., they reflect support 
within one ethnic group relative to another), and that Morales’s performance in terms of actual vote share was 
rarely inferior to Reyes Villa. 
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support for both programmatic measures is associated with a 1.6 percentage point rise in the 
predicted probability of voting for Morales, and, in the case of the nationalisation measure, a 
comparable drop in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa. Thus, the MAS’s substantive 
agenda, which made wealth redistribution and nationalisations key components of its political 
project, seems to have appealed to many voters along ideological and programmatic lines 
even when ethnic bias is taken into account. 
However, unlike in 2005, voter income appears to have had little effect on voting in 
2009. This might indicate some increase in support for the MAS among wealthier voters 
during Morales’s first term, although in fact there was little change in the mean income of 
MAS voters between 2005 and 2009, and the latter remained considerably poorer on average 
than supporters of other candidates.74 Thus, the lack of statistical significance for voter 
income may have more to do with the increased salience of other factors, which partially 
confounded the effect of income. 
One such factor may have been the perceived performance of the national economy 
(‘National economy has improved’), generally a reliable predictor of incumbent support. 
Indeed, Table 3.9 indicates that voters who considered the national economy to have 
improved in the previous twelve months were 14.0 percentage points more likely to vote for 
the MAS than voters who perceived no change or a decrease in economic performance. 
Voters who reported an improvement in their personal finances (‘Personal finances have 
improved’) were also 5.8 percentage points less likely to vote for Reyes Villa compared with 
voters who reported no improvement. It seems reasonable to conclude that some of the effect 
of income may have been reflected in these sociotropic and ‘pocket-book’ economic 
evaluations – in addition to the effects of substantive preferences and demographic factors – 
with the perceived trend in economic performance (rather than the specific income level) the 
most salient variable in voters’ economic voting behaviour. 
Finally, in addition to the effects of ethnicity, political attitudes, and economic 
assessments, a number of other effects are worthy of note. In contrast to 2005, participation in 
protests (‘Participation in protests’) was positively associated with a vote for Reyes Villa, 
possibly a reflection of support for the PPB-CN among voters involved in the anti-
government, pro-autonomy protests of 2008-2009. Divisions over the autonomy issue are 
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 For example, the mean income band of MAS supporters in 2009 was 4.1 (out of bands ranging from zero to 
10), compared to 5.0 for supporters of Reyes Villa and Doria. The equivalent means from 2005 were 3.9 and 4.4 
for supporters of Morales and Quiroga, respectively.  
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also reflected in the significant effect for region on vote probabilities, with residents of the 
media luna departments 21.3 percentage points less likely to vote for Morales compared with 
voters outside the region. However, the effect of region was not particularly different from 
2005, suggesting that the 2008 unrest did not noticeably increase the already-substantial 
electoral significance of region. As with 2005, rural residence was not a significant vote 
predictor, again indicating the MAS’s broad appeal across the urban-rural divide. Any 
residual effects for rural residence were presumably captured by ethnicity, region, income, or 
programmatic preferences. The remaining measures of political attitudes indicate increased 
support for Morales among voters who approved of limiting the voice of the opposition ‘in 
order for the country to progress’ (‘Limit voice of opposition’) and among those who 
preferred a direct, rather than representative, form of democracy (‘Direct democracy’).75 
Attitudes towards free trade (‘Free trade’) and whether minorities pose a threat to the 
majority (‘Minorities are a threat’) were both non-significant. 
In sum, ethnicity appears to have played a particularly prominent role in the polarised 
election of 2009. In particular, Morales appears to have consolidated his base among 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, a pattern of support that is not fully explained by 
political attitudes, region, or any other sociodemographic indicators. Similarly, such factors 
do not explain the extent of support for Reyes Villa among whites and voters who explicitly 
identified as non-indigenous, or the near-total rejection of the PPB-CN by highland 
indigenous voters.  However, despite the substantial influence of ethnicity on voting, this 
initial analysis also suggests that non-ethnic factors played an important role. In particular, 
voters’ perception of the national economy, their region of residence, their ideological 
attitudes, and their support for state-interventionist social and economic policies are all 
significant factors in explaining vote choice. The following paragraphs, which examine the 
decomposition of ethnicity’s interaction with several of these factors, can offer further insight 
into the interaction of ethnic and non-ethnic vote determinants. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Decomposed Effects 
 As in 2005, the 2009 vote analysis also examined the interaction of different ethnicity 
variables with several non-ethnic voter characteristics, including voter income, political 
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 Despite its generalised wording, it is hard to see how the question about the president’s capacity to limit the 
voice of the political opposition would not be viewed by many survey respondents in reference to the 
contemporary Bolivian case. Thus, it seems likely that support for such presidential powers specifically 
reflected support for the Morales government to limit the voice of PBB-CN opposition and associated groups. It 
should not, then, be taken as a measure of general political predispositions. 
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ideology, support for wealth redistribution, and support for nationalisations. The analysis 
generated predicted probabilities (APRs) and average marginal effects (AMEs) for set 
combinations of voter characteristics. These are reported in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.76 Analysis of 
these decomposed effects can help identify variation in the effects of ethnic and non-ethnic 
vote determiners across ethnic groups, as well as the ways in which such factors combine to 
shape voting outcomes. Once again, following paragraphs do not attempt an extensive review 
of the full results from the decomposition analysis, but rather focus on some illustrative 
trends and examples.  
Income 
According to the main effects, income had a limited impact on vote probabilities in 
2009, and the decomposed effects do little to alter this interpretation. However, the analysis 
does generate some significant marginal effects for income in certain groups, effects that are 
not picked up in the main-effects model. For example, an increase in income is associated 
with a 2.3 percentage point rise in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa among mestizo 
voters, by far the largest group numerically. The 2009 analysis also replicates the findings of 
the 2005 model, which indicates opposition to the MAS is strongest among poorer white 
voters. Indeed, according to the model, a poor white vote has over fifty percent probability of 
voting for Reyes Villa and less than twenty percent probability of voting for Morales, while 
poorer mestizo and indigenous voters are far more likely to vote for Morales (APRs over 
sixty percent).77  
Thus, income appears to have had some effect on vote probabilities in 2009 – the 
MAS seems to have performed somewhat better among poorer non-white voters, while 
poorer whites were a key constituency of the PPB-CN opposition. However, the evidence for 
ethnic bias is much stronger. Indeed, the decomposed analysis suggests the divide between 
mestizos and indigenous voters on the one hand, and whites on the other, was electorally 
significant across most income bands.  
Political Ideology 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that ideology had comparable effects on vote probabilities 
across most ethnic groups in 2009, with leftist ideology associated with support for Morales 
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 See Appendix A for full results. 
77
 The drop in support for Reyes Villa among wealthier whites is exacerbated by Doria’s stronger performance 
in this constituency, with APRs over twenty percent for the UN candidate among wealthy whites (not reported 
here). See Bustillo (2013), amongst others, on Doria’s appeal among wealthier middle-class voters. 
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and rightist ideology associated with support for Reyes Villa. This is broadly in line with the 
main effects reported in Table 3.9. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the AMEs are non-
significant for the indigenous-language group, the self-identified indigenous group, and the 
Aymara group (not reported here), the principal bases of MAS support. Indeed, the APRs of 
voting for Morales in all three groups remain relatively constant (between seventy and eighty 
percent) across ideology levels. This is in marked contrast to the pattern of predicted 
probabilities in the non-indigenous groups (as well as the Quechua and lowland indigenous 
groups), where the APRs drop from a similar high of seventy to eighty percent among leftists, 
to around forty percent for rightist mestizos and non-indigenous language speakers, to below 
ten percent for rightist whites. The trend in the APRs for Reyes Villa is the near-identical 
inverse copy of Morales’s case. 
Significant marginal effects in the non-indigenous groups, combined with consistently 
high APRs in the indigenous groups, underline a key feature of the MAS’s electoral success. 
Not only did Morales win overwhelming support among indigenous and non-indigenous 
voters, who appeared willing to put aside ideological differences to back the MAS (evidence 
of ethnic bias), but Morales also won substantial proportions of non-indigenous mestizos and 
whites, apparently on the basis of ideological appeals. Perhaps more than any other case, 
then, the interaction between ethnicity and political ideology in Bolivia’s 2009 election 
clearly demonstrates the substantive electoral contours of a two-track appeal for inclusive 
ethnopopulism, as proposed by Madrid (2008, 2012): strong support, apparently on ethnic 
grounds, among ethnically-proximate voters, combined with support from ethnically more 
distant voters on substantive (ideological) grounds. 
Wealth Redistribution 
The main effects suggested a positive relationship between support for state-led 
efforts at inequality reduction and the probability of voting for Morales. The decomposed 
analysis confirms this general trend, finding positive effects for Morales and negative effect 
for Reyes Villa in most groups, although only the non-indigenous language group has a 
statistically significant AME (and only with regard to Morales’s vote). The pattern of the 
linguistic interaction thus resembles the case of political ideology – that is, largely consistent 
support for the MAS among indigenous-language voters across the programmatic covariate 
(seventy to eighty percent), and a positive trend in the non-indigenous group (from around 
fifty percent among those opposed to the policy, to a comparable seventy percent among 
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supporters). Once again, this pattern of interaction suggests ethnic bias among indigenous-
language speakers in favour of Morales and programmatic support for the MAS among many 
non-indigenous voters.78 
It is perhaps surprising that ‘Wealth redistribution’ does not produce more significant 
electoral effects; after all, a promise to reduce inequality has been a key feature of the MAS’s 
political platform (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 4-5). However, in terms of a general 
sociopolitical goal, inequality reduction appears to be supported by most Bolivians (mean 
positions are > 5, on a 1-7 scale, in all groups), and the LAPOP question did not refer to 
specific means of achieving such a goal (beyond a vague reference to legislation), which 
might provoke more disagreement.79 There may also be considerable confounding effects by 
the political ideology and income variables, and indeed the p-values for wealth redistribution 
decrease notably when these variables are dropped from the model.80 
Nationalisations 
 As in 2005, the main effects indicated an association between support for 
nationalisations and a vote for MAS, a trend that is broadly borne out by the decomposed 
effects. Indeed, the pattern once again resembles that of the ideology and wealth 
redistribution interactions. Programmatic preferences seem to have had relatively limited 
impact on Morales’s vote probability for both indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters and 
for whites, but a significant effect among non-indigenous mestizos. Support for Morales 
remained high among indigenous-language speakers (seventy to eighty percent) across the 
policy covariate, while the APRs increased in the non-indigenous language group from 
around fifty-five percent among opponents to seventy percent among supporters. Although 
the APRs are comparable for self-identified indigenous and mestizo voters, the AME is only 
significant in the latter case, indicating that the position on the nationalisation may have had 
little influence on self-identified indigenous voters.  
Morales, then, won strong support among voters with some indigenous background, 
even among those who may have disagreed with the MAS on the specific policy issue, a 
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 There is relatively little variation in Reyes Villa’s APRs, either between linguistic groups or across policy 
levels. 
79
 The lack of variation in voter positions on this programmatic measure also accounts for the relative lack of 
variation of APRs. With the majority of voters reporting similar positions, the APRs come to reflect the overall 
vote distributions in the full sample. 
80
 For example, the AME in the mestizo group increases to .024 (from .014), with p < .005 (from p < .10), with 
regard to Morales’s vote probability. 
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possible indication of ethnic bias.81 However, the MAS also won support from non-
indigenous voters on substantive grounds, performing significantly better among voters who 
supported the party’s policy position than those who opposed it. The exception was the white 
group, for whom the nationalisation issue had no statistically significant effects. In fact, 
whites were significantly more likely to support Reyes Villa across almost all policy levels 
compared to mestizos, further evidence for an ethnic bias. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups and Issues 
Table 3.10 shows a summary of the main and marginal effects of ethnic attitudes on 
the overall predicted probability of voting for Morales and Reyes Villa, including the generic 
self-identification and cultural identification measures, respectively. As with the 2005 
analysis, the parameter estimates come from two mlogit models that introduce ethnic attitude 
variables (and two-interactions between ethnicity and ethnic attitude variables) to the base 
mlogit model reported in Table 3.9. 
The analysis suggests certain ethnic attitudes may have played some role in shaping 
voters’ electoral preferences, although the effects varied substantially across groups. First, 
voters who approved of a hypothetical marriage between their son/daughter and an 
indigenous person (‘Approves of inter-racial marriage’) were significantly more likely to vote 
for the MAS, and less likely to vote for Reyes Villa, than those who disapproved. A one-unit 
change on the 1-7 approval scale resulted in a 1.8 percentage point increase in the predicted 
probability of a Morales vote, and a 2.2 percentage point decrease in Reyes Villa’s vote 
probability. Decomposition of these main effects suggests this attitudinal measure had most 
impact among mestizos and non-indigenous language speakers, including voters who 
explicitly reported no identification with an indigenous culture.82  
Second, voters who considered indigenous poverty to result from innate biological or 
cultural deficiencies (‘Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural’) were significantly less likely to 
support the MAS, and more likely to vote for Reyes Villa, than those who attributed 
indigenous poverty to unfair treatment. The former attitude produced a main effect equivalent  
                                                          
81
 Again, strong overall support for nationalisations among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters may 
contribute to the lack of variation in APRs in this group. However, there were still considerable minorities in 
each group who opposed nationalisations (e.g., over twenty percent of self-identified indigenous voters reported 
some degree of opposition, with response < 4 on the 1-7 scale), preference variations that are not reflected in a 
significant decrease in support for Morales. 
82
 The AMEs in the self-identified indigenous group can be ignored; unsurprisingly, very few self-identified 
indigenous voters reported disapproval of a son/daughter marrying an indigenous person. 
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TABLE 3.10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 
 
 MORALES REYES VILLA 
Voter Attitude  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Mix of races ‘good’ .004 .009 .003 .009 
Spanish language .007 .010 .003 .009 
Indigenous language -.022 .021 .012 .016 
White .064^ .033 -.048^ .029 
Mestizo .008 .009 .000 .010 
Indigenous -.003 .038 -.004 .008 
None (no indigenous culture) .003 .017 .006 .015 
Quechua -.007 .018 .005 .016 
Aymara -.008 .020 -.029** .008 
Other Indigenous .045** .019 -.020 .018 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .018* .007 -.022^ .012 
Spanish language .020* .008 -.025^ .013 
Indigenous language .010 .020 .001 .019 
White -.025 .024 .022 .022 
Mestizo .021* .008 -.026* .012 
Indigenous .103^ .057 .135* .054 
None (no indigenous culture) .028^ .015 -.033^ .019 
Quechua .009 .012 -.016 .013 
Aymara .060** .018 .016* .007 
Other Indigenous .008 .014 -.044* .022 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural cause -.065* .031 .091** .028 
Spanish language -.071^ .037 .094** .030 
Indigenous language -.168* .073 .174* .074 
White -.259* .101 .108 .118 
Mestizo -.031 .034 .075** .027 
Indigenous -.213* .101 .066** .023 
None (no indigenous culture) -.072 .075 .125* .061 
Quechua -.129* .052 .113* .055 
Aymara -.080 .073 .115** .034 
Other Indigenous .082 .111 .041 .083 
Indigenous treated worse .013 .029 -.000 .028 
No significant marginal effects in any group 
Indigenous political influence .043 .031 -.029 .021 
Spanish language .055 .038 -.034 .023 
Indigenous language -.028 .050 .005 .054 
White .382** .098 -.125 .091 
Mestizo .028 .037 -.031 .023 
Indigenous .025 .069 .030** .010 
None (no indigenous culture) .024 .054 -.003 .043 
Quechua .036 .057 -.027 .044 
Aymara -.019 .057 -.061* .030 
Other Indigenous .078 .136 -.042 .078 
Experience of discrimination -.005 .016 -.007 .015 
Spanish language -.013 .019 .007 .016 
Indigenous language .056 .037 -.068^ .044 
White .521** .138 .072 .103 
Mestizo -.012 .016 .006 .015 
Indigenous .142^ .090 -.097* .045 
None (no indigenous culture) -.048 .035 .031 .030 
Quechua -.021 .034 -.002 .030 
Aymara .048^ .030 -.107* .037 
Other Indigenous .251** .071 .203** .084 
N = 2018. 
Notes: Notes: Coefficients are main effects (first line of each sub-section) and average marginal effects by linguistic, generic self-identified, 
or self-identified cultural group of the indicated ethnic attitude variable on the overall predicted probability of voting for each candidate. 
Results are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression models (one for each ethnicity measure), first with no interactions (main 
effects) and then with two-way interactions between each ethnicity and ethnic-attitude variable (marginal effects). Full output is included 
in Appendix A. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from LAPOP 2010. 
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to a 6.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for Morales and a 
9.1percentage point increase in Reyes Villa’s vote probability. Decomposition shows 
significant negative AMEs across most groups in Morales’s case and comparable positive 
AMEs in the case of Reyes Villa. The effect was particularly pronounced in the white group, 
where this attitudinal position was associated with a 25.9 percentage point decrease in 
support for Morales. 
Both these measures can be seen as proxies for broad anti-indigenous prejudice, and 
their significant relationship to vote choice, both in terms of main and marginal effects, 
indicates an important role for such prejudice in voting behaviour. Similarly, more positive 
views of ethnic mixing (‘Mix of races ‘good’’) among whites was linked to an increase in 
Morales’s vote probability, an effect that also implies the reverse – that whites opposed to 
inter-ethnic mixing were more likely to vote against Morales. This effect, although only 
significant at the .10 level, may provide some further evidence for ethnic prejudice in voting, 
particularly in terms of white opposition to Morales. 
Third, the two measures that might reflect more interest-based resentment towards 
either whites or indigenous groups both produce mostly non-significant main and marginal 
effects. Agreement with the statement that indigenous Bolivians are treated worse than whites 
(‘Indigenous treated worse’), or the impression that indigenous groups have influenced recent 
legislation (‘Indigenous political influence’), does not appear to have affected voting 
preferences significantly.83  
Finally, the variable measuring experience of discrimination (‘Experience of 
discrimination’) has a non-significant main effect, although the analysis generates significant 
AMEs in both the indigenous-language and self-identified indigenous groups.84 At least for 
indigenous voters, then, experience of discrimination may have increased support for the 
MAS, which offered both explicit legislative initiatives to combat discrimination and 
descriptive representation for the most discriminated-against groups. It seems likely that the 
experience of discrimination may also have contributed to resentment among indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo voters towards the white/white-mestizo leadership of the PPB-CN. Such 
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 In fact, the only significant AME is in the white group and indicates that whites who believed that indigenous 
groups had influenced recent legislation were more likely to vote for Morales. Clearly, this does not suggest 
white resentment at the perceived undue influence of indigenous groups on government. Rather, it may reflect 
positive assessments of the MAS government’s record among white supporters of the MAS. 
84
 The effect in the white group is not particularly informative, given that only 5 out of 61 white voters reported 
experience of discrimination. Affirmative responses to the discrimination question were also very low in the 
Other Indigenous group. 
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resentment may have been especially pronounced in the context of the polarised 2009 
campaign, in which factions of the PPB-CN and allied civil society organisations promoted 
openly racist anti-indigenous views.  
 In summary, the analysis reported in Table 3.10 suggests ethnic attitudes may have 
some influence on vote choice. The significance of two variables that are proxies for anti-
indigenous racism – rather than, for example, semi-rationalised resentment based on 
perceived inequalities in social and political treatment – suggests that more expressive ethnic 
bias, driven by ethnocentrism and prejudice, may best characterise such effects. Unlike in the 
case of the 2005 election, this analysis of Bolivia 2009 also finds significant effects for ethnic 
discrimination on vote choice, particularly among voters with an indigenous background. 
Experience of racism, then, may have contributed to voters’ preference for descriptive 
representation, as well as increasing their resentment towards the groups associated with such 
discriminatory experiences and the political candidates perceived to represent them. 
Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
Table 3.11 reports a summary of ethnicity’s indirect effects on the log-odds of voting 
for Morales over Reyes Villa in 2009. Full statistical output from the mediation analysis is 
included in Appendix A.  
Despite a more polarised political environment in 2009, which may have been more 
conducive to direct effects of ethnicity on vote choice (expressive or heuristic ethnic voting), 
voters were also faced with distinct programmatic alternatives. Indeed, the preceding analysis 
has indicated significant effects for a series of substantive preference variables, and thus there 
are grounds to believe that indirect ethnic voting may also have played a role in 2009. In fact, 
the mediation analysis shows significant total indirect effects for most ethnicity measures; 
only linguistic group, and the head-to-head comparison of Quechua and lowland indigenous 
identification, do not produce significant indirect effects. In general, self-identification as 
indigenous or with any specific indigenous culture (Aymara, Quechua, or lowland indigenous 
cultures) had a positive indirect effect in favour of Morales and the MAS, while self-
identification as white (compared with mestizo or indigenous) had a positive indirect effect in 
favour of Reyes Villa. In many (but not all) cases, these indirect effects are in addition to, not 
instead of, ethnicity’s direct effect on vote choice. However, the proportion of the total effect 
mediated, as well as the ratio between direct and indirect effects, varies considerably by 
ethnicity measure. The analysis also uncovers a number of mediation pathways through
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TABLE 3.11: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Bolivia 2009 
 
  Coeff. SE Significant Mediation Pathways Total N 
Speaks an indigenous language     847 
Total indirect effects  .014 .037 Limit opp. voice (.020; .343* / .348**)  
Direct effects  .185^* .074   
Total effect  .209^* .076   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .066    
KHB  .198    
LDE  .570    
White (mestizo)     704 
Total indirect effects  -.098^* .030 Rightist ideology (-.045; .845** / -.550**)  
Direct effects  -.121^* .042 Nationalisatiions (-.10; -.679** / .161*)  
Total effect  -.219^* .042 Income (-.004; .292 / -.146^)  
Proportion of total effect mediated  .448  Direct democracy (-.006; -.415^ / .151^)  
KHB  .378  Indigenous poverty: cult (-.008; .619* / -.533*)  
LDE  .460  Approves inter-racial marr. (-.018; -.931**/ .203*)  
Indigenous (mestizo)     799 
Total indirect effects  .104^* .029 Income (.007; -.338*/-.154^)   
Direct effects  .196^* .089 Nationalisations (.007; .294^/.165*)   
Total effect  .300^* .084 Lim opp. voice (.031; .637**/.343**)   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .346  Direct democracy (.021; .657**/.224*)  
KHB  .448  Approves inter-racial marriage (.009; .308*/.193*)  
LDE  .640    
Indigenous (white)     191 
Total indirect effects  .357^* .123 Rightist ideology (.090; -1.311**/-3.575)   
Direct effects  .281^* .144 Wealth redist. (-.018; .114/-8.114)  
Total effect  .638^* .102 Minorities threaten maj. (.045; .919**/2.567)  
Proportion of total effect mediated  .560    
KHB  ------    
LDE  .543    
Aymara (no indigenous culture)     409 
Total indirect effects  .295^* .076 Income (.047; -1.126**/-.327*)   
Direct effects  .161 .131 Rightist ideology (.084; -.765**/-.849**)  
Total effect  .456^* .088 Nationalisations (.053; -.765**/-.849**)   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .647  Limit opp. voice (.024; .616**/.296^)  
KHB  .549  Indigenous poverty: cult (.014; -.532^/-.796^)  
LDE  .678    
Quechua (no indigenous culture)     557 
Total indirect effects  .127^* .056 Limit opp. voice (.024; .529**/.249*)   
Direct effects  .060 .077 Approve inter-racial marriage (.025; .753**/.181^)  
Total effect  .187^* .069   
Proportion of total effect mediated  .680    
KHB  .678    
LDE  .699    
Other Indigenous (no indigenous)     325 
Total indirect effects  .091^ .050 Limit opp. voice (.038; .502*/.474**)   
Direct effects  -.141 .083 Approve inter-racial marriage (.024; .511*/.296*)  
Total effect  -.050 .080   
Proportion of total effect mediated  -1.830    
KHB  6.599    
LDE  6.689    
Aymara (Other indigenous)     292 
Total indirect effects  .181^* .059 Rightist ideology (.122; -1.601**/-.668**)   
Direct effects  .346^* .107 Indigenous influence (.028; .794; 1.452^)  
Total effect  .545^* .104 Wealth redist. (.015; .381/.368)  
Proportion of total effect mediated  .332    
KHB  .245    
LDE  .267    
Notes: The table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of the output can be found in Appendix A. 
Coefficients are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Morales over Reyes Villa. 
^ and * indicated indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to the percentile and bias-correction methods, 
respectively. ‘Proportion of total effect mediated’ is based on the product of coefficients/Y-standardisation method. KHB and LDE show 
estimates for the same proportions (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways 
are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of 
mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear or non-linear, depending on the mediator. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2006. 
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ethnicity may exert electoral influence, with political ideology, support for nationalisations, 
approval of limits on the political opposition, and attitudes toward indigenous Bolivians 
being the most prominent.85  
First, linguistic group did not have significant indirect effects on vote choice in 2009. 
However, the mediation analysis confirms a significant direct effect, with an indigenous-
language background linked to an increase in the likelihood of voting for Morales. The lack 
of an indirect effect is surprising, although it is noteworthy that both the alternative methods 
for calculation overall mediation, the KHB and LDE methods, estimate considerably larger 
mediation (19.8 and 57.0 percent respectively). We might expect linguistic background, 
compared to self-identification, to be a better measure of a voter’s formative social and 
cultural environment in which political socialisation takes place, and, therefore, that linguistic 
group would be significantly linked to vote-determining political attitudes. However, 
linguistic background may also be a sufficiently broad measure to include voters with diverse 
characteristics on both sides of the linguistic divide, and thus the indirect effects of linguistic 
background on vote choice are ambiguous.  
Second, unlike the linguistic measure, most measures of self-identified ethnic and/or 
cultural group produce significant total indirect effects, with the exception of the 
Quechua/lowland indigenous comparison (not reported in Table 3.11). Self-identification 
with the generic indigenous group or with any of the more specific indigenous cultures 
(Aymara, Quechua, and lowland indigenous) was associated with indirect effects in favour of 
Morales, although the proportion of the total effect mediated varies considerably. In most 
cases, the mediation occurred variously through political ideology, views on nationalisations, 
support for wealth redistribution, anti-indigenous racism, a preference for more ‘direct’ 
democracy, and income, as well as the ‘Limit opposition voice’ variable (see penultimate 
column in Table 3.11). For example, compared with whites, both self-identified indigenous 
and mestizo voters reported more leftist ideological positions, as did Aymara compared to 
non-indigenous voters and both Aymara and Quechua compared to lowland indigenous 
voters. More leftist ideological positions were, in turn, significantly associated with a vote for 
Morales over Reyes Villa. Similarly, support for nationalisations and state-led wealth 
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 As noted previously in the discussion of the main effects model, it seems likely that voters’ reported support 
for the President limiting the voice of the political opposition captured general backing for Morales (and distrust 
or concerns about the specific political opposition of 2009), rather than more normative views about populist, 
‘strongman’ leaders. For this reason, its effects are unlikely to reflect socialised political predispositions, and 
thus the discussion in this section makes only limited reference to this particular measure. 
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redistribution was positively associated with a vote for the MAS, and the same groups tended 
to be more in favour of these two political agendas.  
In contrast, anti-indigenous racism, measured through the proxy of attitudes towards 
marriage to an indigenous person, was associated with a vote for Reyes Villa over Morales.86 
Both white and mestizo voters, as well as voters who identified with a non-indigenous 
cultural background (mostly whites and mestizos), were significantly more likely to hold 
such anti-indigenous attitudes than all self-identified indigenous groups. This resulted in a 
significant indirect effect on voting preferences. Voters who identified with a non-indigenous 
cultural background were also more likely to attribute indigenous poverty to innate or cultural 
deficiencies (compared with Aymara), an attitude that was similarly linked with a vote for 
Reyes Villa over Morales.  
Aymara voters also appeared more supportive of direct forms of democracy, and they 
were generally poorer than non-indigenous groups, both of which were factors associated 
with a MAS vote. In specific comparison with lowland indigenous voters, Aymara also 
considered indigenous groups to have had greater influence on legislation during Morales’s 
first term, a perception that was similarly associated with an indirect effect in favour of the 
MAS. This divide may be indicative of a perception among lowland indigenous groups that 
the MAS government prioritised highland indigenous demands over their own interests. 
In summary, the mediation analysis indicates a series of significant indirect effects for 
ethnicity on vote choice in 2009. These findings suggest many non-ethnic vote determinants 
were shaped in important ways by ethnic background, particularly in the cases of political 
ideology, support for greater state intervention in the economy, and negative views of 
indigenous Bolivians. Many of these non-ethnic mediators were also identified as key 
variables in the 2005 analysis. However, the persistence of significant direct effects for 
ethnicity indicates that many voters were also influenced by ethnic bias, either heuristic or 
expressive. Indeed, we might expect both forms of ethnic bias to have been particularly 
prominent in the polarised environment of the 2009 campaign, in which ethnic identities and 
issues were particularly salient. The significant mediating role of variables measuring anti-
indigenous racism (combined with the direct effects of these variables reported in Table 3.9) 
suggests that more expressive ethnic bias was an important part of this causal story.  
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 The variable is coded so that higher values indicate approval of inter-racial marriage, so the coefficients are 
positive for Morales. 
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Thus, as in the 2005 case, the mediation analysis in 2009 provides only partial support 
for the indirect model of ethnic voting. Although voters’ ethnic background clearly played a 
role in shaping electorally significant political preferences and attitudes, ethnicity also had 









This chapter examines ethnic voting in Ecuador, focusing on the 2002, 2006, and 
2009 presidential elections. In several respects, these three election cases include a number of 
comparable characteristics to the Bolivian elections examined in Chapter Three. Aside from 
broad contextual similarities, both sets of elections cover key events in the recent political 
history of each country: they cover the first major success of an indigenous party backed by 
powerful indigenous movements (the Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS, in Bolivia 2005, and 
Pachakutik in Ecuador 2002); the election of a prominent ethnopopulist newcomer (Evo 
Morales in Bolivia 2005, Rafael Correa in Ecuador 2006) at the expense of the traditional 
parties and/or candidates associated with the white, socioeconomic elites; and the subsequent 
re-election of a president who enjoyed widespread support among indigenous voters (Morales 
and Correa again, both in 2009).87 However, despite some similarities, Ecuador also diverges 
from the Bolivian case in important ways. Indeed, this chapter argues that several contextual 
differences have significant implications for both the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting 
in Ecuador. The chapter begins by exploring some of these country-level similarities and 
differences, which are then subsequently developed to interpret the more specific vote 
analyses from 2002, 2006, and 2009.  
At first glance, the politicisation of ethnicity in Ecuador has followed a somewhat 
similar trajectory to the Bolivian case. Like Bolivia, Ecuador witnessed the emergence of a 
powerful national indigenous movement in the 1980s, which came to play an important role 
in mobilising multisector opposition to government-led neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. In 
fact, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement was arguably more influential politically than its 
Bolivian counterpart, particularly during the early 1990s. Under the leadership of the 
Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), the indigenous 
movement won a number of highly significant policy concessions from a succession of 
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 In both 2006 and 2009 Correa’s appeal was primarily populist (personalistic, anti-establishment, and focused 
on the lower classes). However, he also included some ethnic appeals in both campaigns, and thus Correa’s 
candidacy fits within a broad definition of ethnopopulism (see discussion later in this chapter). 
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governments, demonstrating an impressive capacity to coordinate nationwide mobilisations in 
pursuit of its political goals. As an indication of the movement’s political influence, CONAIE 
was instrumental in orchestrating the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad in 2000, and its 
leader served in the brief three-man junta that comprised the post-coup government.  
Moreover, as in Bolivia, the indigenous movement in Ecuador also produced a 
political party. The Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP, or Pachakutik) 
competed successfully in both local and national elections throughout the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The candidate it supported, former army colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, even won the 
presidency in 2002. Although ethnic appeals were an important part of Pachakutik’s electoral 
strategy, the party also recruited many non-indigenous candidates, allied itself with non-
indigenous organisations, and offered a broad substantive platform that went well beyond 
indigenous issues. In particular, Pachakutik was a vocal critic of neoliberalism, foreign 
intervention in Ecuador’s affairs, and the traditional political classes. Thus, Pachakutik, like 
the MAS in Bolivia, fits easily into Raúl Madrid’s (2008, 2012) definition of 
ethnopopulism.88 
However, unlike the MAS, Pachakutik never became a dominant party. In part, this 
was because Pachakutik faced increasing electoral competition from other populists and 
ethnopopulists after 2002. For example, Gutiérrez’s Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP) and 
particularly Correa’s Alianza País (AP) movement won large shares of the indigenous vote in 
both 2006 and 2009, as well as the support of many lower-class non-indigenous voters who 
had previously backed Pachakutik. Although Gutiérrez and Correa were primarily populists 
(and neither candidate claimed an indigenous background), both of them made some 
symbolic and substantive ethnic appeals to indigenous constituencies. Thus, at least to some 
extent, both Correa and Gutiérrez can be seen as employing ethnopopulist electoral strategies, 
in direct competition with Pachakutik. 
 In each of the three presidential campaigns examined in this chapter, at least two of 
Pachakutik, Correa, and the PSP are among the principal contestants. Given the profile and 
electoral strategies of these parties and candidates, we might consider the 2002, 2006, and 
2009 elections to constitute likely cases for ethnic voting in Ecuador. Yet this chapter’s vote 
analyses find only limited evidence that ethnicity influenced electoral outcomes across these 
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electoral cycles. In 2002, self-identified indigenous voters were somewhat more likely to vote 
for Gutiérrez, although the majority of the PSP-Pachakutik’s votes still came from non-
indigenous sectors. However, in 2006 and 2009, the effect of ethnicity on vote choice appears 
to have been almost negligible.  
This chapter argues that a combination of factors may account for the apparent low 
salience of ethnicity in recent Ecuadorian elections. First, at least two major candidates (and 
in some cases, more) actively appealed to indigenous voters in each election, which had the 
effect of splitting the indigenous vote. Second, the Ecuadorian political-electoral landscape 
has subjected voters to particularly acute and contradictory cross-pressures, which has 
resulted in highly unpredictable voting patterns. Such cross-pressure have arisen not only 
because of the candidate profiles outlined above, but also as a result of prominent 
organisational, regional, religious, and clientelistic attachments that cut across, rather than 
align with, ethnic differences.89 Finally, this chapter’s analysis and most of the available data 
suggest that ethnic identification is relatively weak across Ecuadorian society. Few 
Ecuadorians self-identify as indigenous or retain knowledge of an indigenous language, and 
thus it is perhaps unsurprising that ethnicity has little observable influence on voting 
preferences.  
This last feature regarding Ecuador’s ethnic demographics presents some significant 
methodological issues for this chapter’s analysis. Most surveys find very little response 
variation on conventional measures of ethnicity such as linguistic background and self-
identification. Indeed, in the surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion 
Project (LAPOP), which form the basis on this chapter’s analysis, most Ecuadorians report 
both a Spanish-language background and self-identification as mestizo.90 Moreover, 
LAPOP’s Ecuador surveys tend not to include many questions on respondents’ attitudes 
towards ethnic groups or issues, and where such measures are included, responses once again 
show very limited variation. As a result of these data limitations, the vote analyses presented 
in this chapter are considerably less developed than their equivalents in Chapter Three (on 
Bolivia) and Chapter Five (on Peru). Decomposed effects and the analysis of voters’ ethnic 
attitudes are not included in any of the Ecuadorian election case studies, and the mediation 
analyses are discussed only briefly.  
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 See Coppedge (1998), Van Cott (2000), and Beck and Mijeski (2006), amongst others, on these aspects of 
Ecuador’s national politics. 
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 The Ecuador surveys, unlike those conducted in Bolivia, have not asked respondents about their identification 
with particular indigenous cultures or the strength of ethnic identification. 
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However, data limitations notwithstanding, the analysis in this chapter provides some 
important insight into ethnicity’s role in recent Ecuadorian presidential elections. It finds 
some evidence for ethnic bias in voting outcomes when the specific electoral context is 
conducive to such behaviour, such as the 2002 election.91 Moreover, this chapter’s wider 
discussion of the relationship between electoral context and ethnic voting can add to the our 
understanding of electoral behaviour in Bolivia and Peru, as well as offering a possible 
explanation for the relative lack of ethnic voting in Ecuador. This comparative dimension of 
the analysis can contribute in important ways to our broader understanding of ethnicity’s role 
in voting, and how both specific electoral conditions and wider sociopolitical factors may 
shape the occurrence and nature of such political behaviour. 
Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Ecuador 
 As elsewhere in Latin America, a long history of mestizaje has fundamentally shaped 
ethnic relations in Ecuador. Mestizaje refers not only to biological ethnic mixing, but also to a 
process of cultural assimilation in which indigenous people gradually abandon their 
traditional customs and ethnic identities and become mestizos. Although both biological 
mixing and cultural assimilation have occurred since the early colonial period, rapid 
urbanisation through the latter half of the twentieth century accelerated these processes. 
Many indigenous migrants to urban areas chose to assimilate into mestizo culture in part to 
avoid the pervasive anti-indigenous discrimination to which they were subjected. Several 
scholars have argued that fundamental beliefs in indigenous inferiority contributed to public 
policies that explicitly aimed to hasten mestizaje, especially through rural education 
programmes. Many of these programmes promoted Spanish literacy, delegitimised traditional 
knowledge and customs, and sought to instil belief in a single mestizo national culture. In 
doing so, these policies sought to drive forward mestizaje as a process of ‘deindigenisation’.92 
 By most measures, the ‘deindigenising’ effect of mestizaje was considerably more 
pronounced in Ecuador than in Bolivia. Indeed, as early as 1950, the national census 
estimated that just 14 percent of Ecuador’s population spoke an indigenous language 
(Sánchez-Parga 1996; cited in Madrid 2012, 78), substantially less than the 63.5 percent of 
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 As in Chapter Three, the survey-based vote analysis presented in this chapter aims only to identify the 
presence of ethnic bias in voting behaviour, which is conceived as some combination of expressive and heuristic 
ethnic voting motivations. The data available do not allow the analysis to distinguish definitively between 
expressive and heuristic bias. This is a primary aim of Chapter Six’s analysis. 
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 Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, the army general who ruled Ecuador from 1972-1976, reportedly summed up this 
rationale for state policy towards the indigenous population by declaring, “There is no indigenous problem. We 
all become white men when we accept the goals of the national culture” (cited in Yashar 2005, 95). 
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Bolivians who reported speaking an indigenous language in the same year (Dirección General 
de Estadística y Censos 1950; cited in Madrid 2012, 39). By 2001, the proportion of 
Ecuadorians who spoke an indigenous language had dropped to just 4.6 percent according to 
official census data, while the same census showed just 6.1 percent of Ecuadorians self-
identified as indigenous. This compared to 77.7 percent who identified as mestizo, 10.8 
percent as white, and 5.0 percent as black (León Guzmán 2003, 118).93 Estimates from the 
LAPOP surveys indicate an even smaller indigenous population. According to the 2004 
survey, less than one percent of Ecuadorians spoke an indigenous language and just 3.3 
percent self-identified as indigenous.94 Similarly, the 2010 survey estimated that 1.6 percent 
of Ecuadorians spoke an indigenous language and 2.0 percent self-identified as indigenous. 
By comparison, in the equivalent Bolivian surveys, 27.5 and 23.9 percent reported speaking 
an indigenous language in 2004 and 2010, respectively, while 9.3 and 19.0 percent self-
identified as indigenous. In short, a wide range of data indicates that indigenous ethnic 
identification is considerably weaker in Ecuador than Bolivia.95 
 Nevertheless, mestizaje has not entirely eliminated ethnic differences in Ecuador. 
Many mestizos still have roots in indigenous communities and identify with both a family 
and cultural indigenous heritage. Indeed, according to LAPOP’s 2006 survey, 28.5 percent of 
Ecuadorians identify with an indigenous cultural identity, although only 2.6 percent of 
respondents in the same survey self-identified as indigenous.96 These proportions are still 
considerably lower than comparable estimates for Bolivia (see Chapter Three), but they do 
suggest some degree of indigenous identification across a sizeable minority of the Ecuadorian 
population. 
Irrespective of ethnic self-identification, however, there is little doubt that ethnic 
inequalities and anti-indigenous discrimination are prominent features of contemporary 
Ecuadorian social relations. First, indigenous Ecuadorians tend to be considerably poorer 
than their non-indigenous counterparts. According to the Ecuadorian national census bureau’s 
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 Prior to 2001, the census did not include questions on self-identification. Other survey data from the same 
period show similar patterns (see León Guzmán 2003, 118-20).  
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 Unless stated otherwise, all calculations based on LAPOP data are the author’s. 
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 The indigenous movement and some scholars have estimated that indigenous people represent more than forty 
percent of Ecuador’s population (Pacari 2002). The data do not support this claim, however. To some extent, the 
low estimates from census and survey data may reflect a preference among respondents to report mestizo 
identification to avoid the stigma still associated with indigeneity (León and Rappaport 1995, 32). Yet it seems 
unlikely that such an explanation can fully account for the discrepancy in estimations. 
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 The question asked respondents the extent to which they identified with the Quichua culture, the largest 
indigenous group in Ecuador, on a scale of one to seven (not at all – very strongly). The 28.5 percent proportion 
refers to respondents who reported identification at level four or above. 
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2006 Survey of Living Conditions, more than seventy percent of indigenous people lived 
below the poverty line, compared to 35 percent of mestizos and 33 percent of whites (Sistema 
Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador 2007, 8). Second, indigenous people are far 
more likely to experience discrimination. In the 2010 LAPOP survey, more than half (53.8 
percent) of self-identified indigenous respondents had experienced some form of 
discrimination in the previous year, compared to 30.9 percent of mestizos and just 19.8 
percent of whites. Moreover, 35.4 percent of indigenous respondents reported discrimination 
based on skin colour or other aspects of physical appearance, compared to 16.0 percent for 
mestizos and 6.0 percent for whites. More generally, a total of 21.5 percent of respondents to 
LAPOP’s 2006 survey reported being concerned that the country’s next president could be an 
indigenous person, and several indigenous leaders have questioned whether the country is 
ready for an indigenous president (interviews cited in Madrid 2012, 80).  
Finally, Ecuador’s indigenous population is also geographically divided from the non-
indigenous population. Most indigenous people live either in rural areas in the highlands and 
in the Amazon or on the outskirts of major cities. In contrast, whites and non-indigenous 
mestizos make up the majority of the population in coastal provinces and in the major city 
centres. 
In summary, Ecuador’s socioethnic landscape suggests some possible role for 
ethnicity in voting behaviour, although its influence is likely to be more limited than in 
Bolivia. Ethnic identities still retain some personal and social salience for many Ecuadorians, 
ethnic background remains an important predictor of social and geographic location, and 
ethnic hierarchies and discrimination continue to shape aspects of every-day social relations. 
Such conditions suggest ethnic differences may influence wider social attitudes and interests 
that are electorally significant. Nevertheless, ethnic identification is noticeably weaker in 
Ecuador compared with Bolivia, and the low levels of indigenous language knowledge 
suggest the assimilationist dimension of mestizaje may have been particularly far-reaching. 
These ethnic demographics are considerably less conducive to ethnic voting compared to 
Bolivia’s. 
The Indigenous Movement and Ethnopopulism in Ecuador 
 The relatively low levels of ethnic identification in Ecuador are somewhat surprising 
given the prominence of the country’s indigenous movement. Indeed, the Ecuadorian 
indigenous movement has traditionally been the strongest in the region (Pallares 2002; 
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Zibechi, 2004). Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, both the Roman Catholic Church and 
leftist parties helped create several important indigenous organisations, although a unified 
national movement did not emerge until the 1980s. CONAIE was formed in 1986, when the 
main highland indigenous federation, Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI), 
came together with the principal federation from the Amazon region, the Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENAIE). By some estimates, 
CONAIE represented more than eighty percent of the indigenous population in the 1980s and 
1990s (Madrid 2012, 85), although several important indigenous organisations remained 
outside CONAIE. These included most of the evangelical indigenous organisations affiliated 
with the Federación Ecuatoriana de Iglesias Evangélicas (FEINE), and the Federación 
Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN), a leftist 
organisation based in the coastal provinces (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005).  
 CONAIE had an immediate impact on Ecuador’s national political scene. As early as 
1988, CONAIE successfully lobbied the government to create the Dirección Nacional de 
Educación Intercultural (DINEIB) to manage the state-funded bilingual education programme 
(Van Cott 2005, 110; Conejo Arellano 2008, 68). CONAIE was also granted the power to 
appoint directors of DINEIB, and the government at the time officially recognised CONAIE 
as the mouthpiece of the indigenous movement (Selverston 1994, 146). The DINEIB not only 
constituted a breakthrough policy achievement for CONAIE, but it also became an important 
organising tool, an institutional structure through which CONAIE coordinated many of its 
affiliate organisations (León 2001, 5). In 1990, CONAIE orchestrated its first major national 
mobilisation against the government of Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992), coordinating protests, 
blockades, occupations, strikes, and sit-ins across the country in alliance with numerous non-
indigenous organisations. The weeks-long mobilisation forced Borja to negotiate with 
CONAIE on a long list of grievances, during which the CONAIE delegation won major 
policy concessions (Zamosc 1994; Selverston 2002, chapter 2). Further protests occurred 
throughout the following years, including a 1994 mobilisation that successfully blocked an 
agrarian development law proposed by President Sixto Durán Ballén, which CONAIE 
considered unfavourable to small-scale indigenous farmers. Later the same year, CONAIE 
mobilised multisector opposition to defeat the government in a national referendum on a set 
of further neoliberal reforms (Andolina 1994, 19-20; Van Cott 2005, 112; Madrid 2012, 85).  
The nationwide mobilisations of the early 1990s gained the indigenous movement 
numerous allies among non-indigenous popular movements and centre-left political parties. 
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CONAIE’s leadership of these protests not only significantly raised its national profile, but it 
also helped the indigenous movement position itself as a key political vehicle for popular 
opposition to neoliberalism (Andolina 1999, 215). Within CONAIE, the movement’s success 
also helped shift opinion towards electoral participation. Before the mid-1990s, the 
indigenous movement had tended to remain independent from political parties, declining to 
run candidates in elections or endorse candidates from other parties. However, CONAIE’s 
growing influence in the early 1990s convinced some indigenous leaders that the time was 
right to enter electoral politics. Despite misgivings from several highland organisations 
within CONAIE, the executive committee voted to create an independent electoral 
movement, Pachakutik, to compete in the 1996 general elections. 
The Traditional Political Parties, Pachakutik, and Ethnopopulism 
Pachakutik was notably distinct from the traditional political parties that preceded it. 
The party recruited numerous indigenous candidates, remained closely allied to the 
indigenous movement, and ran on a substantive platform that included several key indigenous 
demands (Madrid 2012, 86-88). Unsurprisingly, Pachakutik won large shares of the 
indigenous vote in its first three national elections (in 1996, 1998, and 2002), and it elected 
numerous candidates to municipal and other subnational positions throughout the country.  
Before Pachakutik, indigenous people had traditionally played little role in Ecuador’s 
electoral politics. It was not until 1978 that a new constitution lifted literacy restrictions on 
suffrage, restrictions that had disproportionally affected indigenous people.97 Even with an 
expanded indigenous electorate, however, most traditional political parties eschewed ethnic 
appeals in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although these parties often expressed their opposition 
to ethnic discrimination and decried the social and economic conditions in which many 
indigenous people lived, they offered few policies to address these concerns. In fact, several 
parties explicitly rejected ethnic policies such as quotas, bilingual education, and territorial 
autonomy for indigenous communities, arguing that state policies should not encourage 
ethnic divisions.98 Moreover, very few traditional parties recruited indigenous candidates or 
forged alliances with indigenous organisations. For example, just one indigenous 
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 As in other countries in the region, illiteracy rates were considerably higher among rural indigenous 
Ecuadorians than among non-indigenous citizens (Quintero López 1978, 281; Collins 2001, 6). 
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 For example, the declaration of principles of the centre-right Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) stated that 
policies towards indigenous people should not ‘foment ethnic differences’; instead, they should provide 
‘equality of possibilities’ (Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1981, 156-7; cited in Madrid 2012, 82). 
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congressman, Manuel Naula, served in the national legislature during the 1980s (Madrid 
2012, 81). 
 Some leftist parties sought to build somewhat closer electoral ties with indigenous 
voters in the 1980s. Many smaller leftist parties had a long history of organising in 
indigenous areas, and they adopted many of the demands of the indigenous movement 
(Andolina 1999, 195-97; Van Cott 2005; Becker 2008, 104-5; Madrid 2012, 82-83).99 Larger 
leftist parties, such as Izquierda Democrática (ID), also reached out to indigenous voters to 
some extent. For example, during his presidency ID leader Rodrigo Borja implemented 
several long-standing demands of the indigenous movement, including land reform and 
bilingual education. However, although leftist parties generally won substantial shares of the 
indigenous vote through the 1980s, they failed to build lasting ties with indigenous voters. 
The indigenous movement frequently expressed its frustration with the traditional parties, 
complaining that the latter used indigenous organisations to win elections but offered little in 
the way of substantive or descriptive representation (Becker 2008, 182-4). Indeed, the 
leadership of these traditional parties was dominated by whites and mestizos, and the interests 
of these sectors, rather than the concerns of indigenous voters, drove the parties’ substantive 
agendas. The widespread disenchantment with traditional parties, together with CONAIE’s 
growing political presence in the 1990s, combined to convince indigenous leaders to launch 
Pachakutik in 1996 (Madrid 2012, 83).  
From the outset, Pachakutik was heavily reliant on the indigenous movement from 
which it emerged. Many of Pachakutik’s most important leaders came from CONAIE, and 
almost half the party’s executive committee was comprised of CONAIE members 
(Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001). Pachakutik also relied on CONAIE’s extensive networks 
of grassroots organisations to mobilise voters in its campaigns, and the party performed 
particularly well in those indigenous areas where CONAIE was influential (Beck and Mijeski 
2001; Van Cott 2005, 110; Madrid 2012, 85-6). Thus, CONAIE played a central role in the 
formation of Pachakutik, and it helped the party win strong support in indigenous areas. 
However, Pachakutik’s electoral success also relied on the party winning support beyond 
indigenous constituencies, and from its inception the party actively sought to win support 
from both whites and mestizos. It avoided exclusionary rhetoric, recruited many white and 
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 Some populist parties, such as the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP), also made symbolic ethnic 
appeals to indigenous voters. Jaime Roldós, the CFP’s leader and president from 1979 to 1984, advocated 
improving support for indigenous communities (e.g., with adult education programmes), and he spoke in 
Quichua to indigenous voters (Grefa 1996, 55; cited in Madrid 2012, 82). 
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mestizo candidates, sought alliances with non-indigenous organisations, and offered a broad 
substantive programme centred on non-elite interests and opposition to neoliberalism. 
This inclusive electoral strategy paid off. In 1996, Pachakutik allied with the 
Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo País (MCNP) led by Freddy Elhers, a white television 
personality who was the coalition’s presidential candidate. With the support of Pachakutik 
and the endorsement of a wide range of social movements and leftist parties, Elhers won an 
average of 34 percent of the presidential vote in majority indigenous districts and 21 percent 
in minority indigenous districts.100 Although Elhers and Pachakutik performed better 
proportionally in indigenous areas, the much larger population in non-indigenous areas meant 
that approximately three-quarters of Elhers’s vote came from non-indigenous constituencies 
(Madrid 2012, 87). In 2002, Pachakutik allied with another non-indigenous party, the PSP, 
and supported the PSP’s Lucio Gutiérrez for president. Gutiérrez finished at the top of the 
first-round voting with 20.6 percent, and he won the subsequent runoff with a comfortable 
54.8 percent of the valid vote (Madrid 2012, 100). Several Pachakutik leaders initially served 
in the Gutiérrez government, taking up a number of prominent ministerial and other positions 
(Beck and Mijeski 2006, 12). However, after his election, Gutiérrez largely abandoned the 
anti-neoliberal platform on which he had run, and the Gutiérrez-Pachakutik coalition lasted 
only a few months (Zamosc 1994; Beck and Mijeski 2006). 
One consequence of Pachakutik’s alliance with Gutiérrez was its decision to run its 
own candidate in 2006. Initially, Pachakutik considered an alliance with Correa, who had 
actively sought the support of Pachakutik and CONAIE (‘Pachakutik rechaza propuesta de 
Rafael Correa’ 2006). However, disagreement over who should be the presidential candidate 
ultimately prevented any alliance, and Pachakutik nominated Luis Macas as its candidate 
instead (‘Pachakutik va con Macas y deja fuera a Rafael Correa’ 2006). Despite failing to win 
the backing of Pachakutik and CONAIE, Correa still sought to appeal to indigenous voters by 
adopting a broad ethnopopulist electoral strategy. Not only did Correa employ symbolic 
ethnic appeals in his campaign (speaking Quichua at rallies, describing himself as an 
indigenista, and so forth), but he also secured the support of both several important social 
organisations that had previously supported Pachakutik and a number of defectors from 
Pachakutik’s previous congressional lists (Zeas 2006, 225; Becker 2008, 177). Moreover, 
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including multisector trade union federations such as the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (CMS). 
Several leftist parties, including ID, also backed Elhers for president, while running their own congressional 
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Correa adopted many of the substantive positions of the indigenous movement championed 
by Pachakutik, including the nationalisation of natural resources, opposition to free-trade 
agreements, and a promise to rewrite the national constitution (Conaghan 2011, 266; Madrid 
2012, 104-5). 
In addition to Correa and Macas, the PSP also competed for the indigenous and 
lower-class indigenous-mestizo vote in 2006. Gilmar Gutiérrez, brother of Lucio Gutiérrez, 
was the PSP’s presidential candidate, and he looked to capitalise on the party’s strong ties to 
numerous indigenous leaders and organisations established during Lucio’s presidency. 
Indeed, despite his rightward turn, Lucio Gutiérrez had also invested significantly in social 
programmes and public infrastructure projects in some poorer areas, and, following the 
collapse of his coalition with Pachakutik, he had established a new indigenous organisation to 
compete with CONAIE (Beck and Mijeski 2006). Gutiérrez’s efforts to develop his own ties 
with indigenous organisations outside CONAIE had exacerbated existing divisions within the 
indigenous movement, particularly along regional and religious lines; most highland 
indigenous organisations opposed Gutiérrez and supported Pachakutik, while many 
Amazonian and evangelical organisations remained loyal to Gutiérrez (Zamosc 2004, 149-50; 
Beck and Mijeski 2006, 178-9). Gilmar Gutiérrez drew on lingering loyalties to his brother 
among many indigenous and poor indigenous-mestizo voters affiliated with the latter 
organisations, many of which mobilised to support the PSP’s campaign in 2006. Gutiérrez 
ultimately finished third, just six percentage points behind Correa, who defeated Álvaro 
Noboa in the second round. 
In 2009, the electoral landscape bore some resemblance to 2006, with the important 
distinctions that Correa now ran as the incumbent and Lucio Gutiérrez returned as the PSP’s 
candidate. The 2009 campaign was generally low-key, mostly because a Correa victory was 
largely seen as inevitable. Pachakutik chose not to nominate a presidential candidate, and it 
won just four seats in the legislature (Madrid 2012, 107), confirming the party’s sharp decline 
since its high point at the start of the decade.  
Finally, in both 2006 and 2009, the principal candidate for the right was Álvaro 
Noboa, who headed his own electoral vehicle, the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción 
Nacional (PRIAN).101 Noboa was a white, wealthy businessman from the coast whose 
electoral platform combined a strong defence of neoliberalism with a range of direct populist 
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 Other important candidates included León Roldós, who was the early front-runner in 2006 but finished fourth 
in the first-round vote, and his niece Martha Roldós, who also finished fourth in 2009. 
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appeals. Noboa pursued an aggressive clientelistic campaign, offering credit, computers, and 
construction materials to poor communities and using his own charitable foundation, the 
Cruzada Nueva Humanidad, to distribute goods and medical treatments to potential voters 
(Freidenberg 2014, 117-9). These direct populist appeals won him some support among 
poorer voters, including some indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors, although his 
principal base of support was in the urban middle class. 
Ethnic Voting in Ecuador 
Ecuador’s overall ethnic landscape and the ways in which ethnicity has been 
politicised have several implications for ethnic voting. Ecuador’s various similarities with 
Bolivia – a large and marginalised indigenous population, the emergence of a prominent 
national indigenous movement, and the rise of ethnopopulism – mean we might expect some 
common trends in electoral behaviour across the two countries. However, this chapter argues 
that Ecuador’s divergence from the Bolivian case – comparatively weak ethnic identification, 
greater competition for the indigenous vote, and more contradictory electoral cross-pressures 
in general – is equally important for explaining the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting in 
Ecuador. 
First, the data presented above suggest that many Ecuadorians, like their Bolivian 
counterparts, identify to some extent with an indigenous culture and heritage, despite 
centuries of biological and cultural mestizaje. The same data indicate socioeconomic 
inequalities and geographic divides that continue to run along ethnic lines, and they suggest 
ethnic prejudice and discrimination remain important parts of contemporary Ecuadorian 
social relations. These features of Ecuador’s ethnic demographics are generally conducive to 
ethnic voting. Ethnic identification implies some degree of psychological attachment to 
ethnic group identities, which may contribute to electoral decisions driven by in-group 
solidarity and/or out-group resentment or prejudice (i.e., expressive ethnic voting). Moreover, 
even if voters do not strongly self-identify in ethnic terms, ethnic inequalities and 
discrimination are likely to increase the social and political salience of ethnicity. In addition 
to strengthening in-group loyalties and out-group resentment, these conditions are likely to 
increase the perceived explanatory value of ethnic heuristics. Social experience teaches many 
voters to treat ethnic background as an indicator of likely social and political characteristics, 
which may contribute to voters’ evaluation of electoral candidates (i.e., heuristic ethnic 
voting). Meanwhile, the spatial and social proximity of ethnically similar communities may 
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lead to political preferences that tend to align with ethnic divisions, the combined result of 
shared material circumstances and political socialisation within a particular socioethnic 
environment. If voters subsequently elect candidates based on such political preference, they 
engage in indirect ethnic voting. 
Second, both Bolivia and Ecuador saw the emergence of a powerful indigenous 
movement in the 1980s and the subsequent rise of ethnopopulism as a prevalent electoral 
strategy.102 The indigenous movement in Ecuador, like its counterpart in Bolivia, helped raise 
ethnic consciousness among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo citizens, and it encouraged 
Ecuadorians to take pride in their indigenous heritage. The ethnic appeals of ethnopopulist 
political actors looked to take advantage of, and further contributed to, both these processes. 
Increased ethnic consciousness and pride in ethnic group identities are likely to strengthen 
ethnic group allegiances, and they are thus conducive to expressive ethnic voting.  
Moreover, the political rhetoric and activities of Ecuador’s indigenous movement and 
ethnopopulist candidates helped introduce an ethnic ‘master frame’ to wider political 
controversies (Rice 2012). Both the indigenous movement and ethnopopulist politicians 
forged alliances with non-indigenous social movements and leftist parties to oppose the 
perceived imperialism of the United States, the international financial institutions, and the 
neoliberal economic policies they both promoted. In doing so, they helped link a broadly 
defined indigenous ethnic identity to a substantive political agenda characterised by popular 
nationalism and state-interventionism. In many cases, the appeal of ethnopopulists was aided 
by the profile of their domestic political opponents, who tended to be members of the 
political establishment (e.g., Borja or Roldós) or neoliberal outsiders (e.g., Noboa or 
Guayaquil’s controversial mayor and former presidential candidate Jaime Nebot). These 
latter candidates were not only white (as was Correa), but they also belonged to the national 
political and/or economic elites. As such, they were often perceived as representatives of 
associated elite interests and linked with the political and economic status quo that many 
Ecuadorians, particularly indigenous voters, had become increasingly disillusioned with. In 
these respects, then, the way in which ethnicity was politicised in Ecuador is likely to have 
resulted not only in heightened ethnic consciousness among Ecuadorian voters, but also the 
reinforcement and further definition of a political ethnic heuristic. 
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 This chapter includes populists such as Correa and the Gutiérrez brothers within the ethnopopulist category. 
Although neither Correa nor Gutiérrez could, strictly speaking, offer ethnic descriptive representation to 
indigenous constituents, their use of both symbolic and substantive ethnic appeals signalled some recognition of 
– and even an affinity with – indigenous and indigenous-mestizo social sectors. 
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In these respects, Ecuador’s ethnic, social, and political landscape bears some 
resemblance to the Bolivian case, and, like in Bolivia, it is broadly conducive to expressive, 
heuristic, and indirect ethnic voting.  However, this chapter argues that Ecuador’s points of 
divergence (not only convergence) with the Bolivian case are important for understanding 
contemporary electoral behaviour.  
First, even if ethnic background retains some psychological and social relevance for 
many Ecuadorians, most of the data presented previously suggest ethnic identification is 
considerably weaker in Ecuador than in Bolivia. If voters’ place less importance on ethnic 
group identities, then we might expect expressive ethnic voting to be relatively less 
prevalent.103 
Second, there has tended to be considerably greater competition for the indigenous 
vote in Ecuador compared with Bolivia. Whereas only a few very small parties challenged 
the MAS for the indigenous vote in Bolivia, several prominent parties and candidates have 
actively wooed indigenous voters in Ecuador. Since the early 1990s, Pachakutik, the 
Gutiérrez brothers, Correa, and several leftist parties (e.g., Borja and the ID) have all 
campaigned in these constituencies. Many of these candidates have pursued alliances with 
indigenous and social organisations, employed direct ethnic appeals to indigenous voters, and 
adopted conventional populist and clientelistic electoral strategies. In this context, we might 
expect ethnic voting in general to be more limited, with multiple candidates offering 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters some combination of descriptive, substantive, and 
clientelistic incentives. 
Third, Ecuadorian voters are often subjected to considerably more contradictory 
electoral cross-pressures than their Bolivian counterparts. Such cross-pressures – the presence 
of diverse interests and loyalties that direct voters to different electoral alternatives – are 
certainly not unique to the Ecuadorian case; they affect most voters in most democracies 
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954, 188-27; Scheufele et al. 2006). However, the 
electoral ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’ of partisan or organisational loyalties, associated clientelistic 
benefits, regional identities, religious affiliations, and programmatic preferences may be 
particularly contradictory in Ecuador. Moreover, these pressures often cross-cut ethnic 
divides, in contrast to the Bolivian case where such pressures have to a greater extent tended 
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 Moreover, from a methodological perspective, the lack of response variation on ethnicity measures means 
this chapter’s vote models may not easily identify a statistically significant relationship between voter ethnicity 
and vote choice. In fact, this data-imposed limitation affects analysis of all three voting models in this chapter. 
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to align with ethnic cleavages. The presence of such cross-pressures, then, is likely to reduce 
further the observable relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice in Ecuador. 
One frequent source of electoral cross-pressures is personal and organisational 
affiliations or loyalties, and these may have particular influence in Ecuadorian electoral 
behaviour. Voters often look to prominent social or political personalities or organisations for 
electoral cues, either because they have some formal affiliation (e.g., members of an 
indigenous organisation or trade union) or because an endorsement signals something about 
the likely characteristics of the candidate (e.g., voters may infer that a candidate endorsed by 
CONAIE is favourable to indigenous interests). In both cases, voters may follow such 
electoral cues out of ‘partisan’ or personal loyalty or more instrumental motivations based on 
perceived group interests (Berelson et al. 1954; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Furthermore, in 
many cases formal organisational affiliations may be directly linked to patronage networks 
and clientelistic privileges, adding a clear material incentive to organisational loyalties 
(Becker 2008, 172-3, 178).104 However, when a voter has some form of affinity with 
organisational or individual actors who offer contradictory electoral cues, the resulting cross-
pressures may lead to unpredictable vote choices. 
We might reasonably assume this has been the case for many voters in recent 
Ecuadorian presidential elections, and perhaps particularly among indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo voters. For example, although CONAIE has been the dominant 
indigenous federation since the late 1980s, several smaller organisations (e.g., FEINE and 
FENOCIN) have also established important grassroots networks and spheres of influence. 
Even within CONAIE, different factions have often pursued quite distinct political agendas, 
including issuing public endorsements in favour of opposing presidential candidates. For 
example, in 2002 several smaller Amazonian organisations supported former CONAIE 
president Antonio Vargas, while the CONAIE leadership and highland organisations backed 
Gutiérrez. Outside the indigenous movement, non-indigenous social organisations (including 
various unions, professional associations, and religious organisations), some political parties, 
and individual political personalities, all exert some influence in indigenous areas. In this 
context, when various Pachakutik politicians, non-indigenous social movements, and smaller 
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 For example, strong ties between Lucio Gutiérrez’s and factions within the Amazonian and Evangelical 
indigenous movement often revolved around personal and institutional channels for distributing goods and 
favours to affiliated organisations. These networks were influential in mobilising votes for the PSP in both 2006 
and 2009 (Madrid 2012, 105). 
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leftist parties defected from Pachakutik/CONAIE to Correa in 2006, they may well have 
persuaded many indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters to do the same. 
Finally, as the preceding discussion has implied, both geographical region and 
religious affiliations are important dimensions of the organisational networks and loyalties 
outlined above. The two principal federations within CONAIE, ECUARUNARI and 
CONFENAIE, reflect a distinct regional divide between the highlands and the Amazon. At 
several key political junctures, these two regional factions have disagreed over the political 
candidates and alliances that CONAIE should pursue, and have directed their grassroots 
organisations to back different candidates. Once again, the split between pro- and anti-
Gutiérrez factions in the Amazon and highlands, respectively, is a notable case in point.105 
Religious affiliations have also added to the mix, with the PSP in particular building strong 
ties with evangelical indigenous organisations. These organisations saw their membership 
increase significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, and they have provided an important base of 
grassroots activism and electoral support for the PSP (Becker 2008, 178).  
In summary, this chapter argues that lingering ethnic attachments, long-standing 
ethnic inequalities, and pervasive discrimination all indicate a likely role for ethnicity in 
electoral behaviour. Moreover, the way in which ethnicity has been politicised (first by the 
indigenous movement and then by a series of ethnopopulist parties and candidates), is likely 
to have strengthened ethnic consciousness and reinforced an ethnic heuristic among 
Ecuadorian voters. Thus, we might reasonably expect ethnic bias, both expressive and 
heuristic, to have some influence in Ecuadorian voting behaviour.106 The sociogeographic 
concentration of individuals from similar ethnic backgrounds is also conducive to indirect 
ethnic voting.  
However, this chapter also argues that a combination of weak ethnic identification 
and especially acute and contradictory cross-pressures (linked to organisational loyalties, 
clientelistic politics, region, and religion) may have significantly reduced the prevalence of 
ethnic voting in recent Ecuadorian elections. In the case of 2009, the presence of a single 
dominant incumbent is likely to have further reduced the electoral salience of ethnicity, with 
vote choice focused on assessments of Correa’s first term. Overall, a combination of these 
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 Descriptive regional preferences may also have played a role in support for Gutiérrez in his native Amazon 
region. However, the LAPOP data provide no measure of regional identification. 
106
 As discussed in the Bolivian case, the survey-based analysis cannot determine definitively whether an 
observable ethnic bias in voting results from expressive or heuristic voting. This distinction is the subject of 
Chapter Six’s analysis. 
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contextual factors is likely to weaken the observable relationship between voter ethnicity and 
vote choice, although ethnicity is still expected to play some role in voting behaviour. 
 
ECUADOR 2002 
In the years immediately preceding the 2002 election, Ecuadorian politics had been 
marked by exceptional instability. Following the short-lived presidency of Abdalá Bucaram 
(1996-1997), five different presidents governed Ecuador in just five years, with several being 
forced from office by mass street protests and the intervention of the armed forces. Of 
particular significance was the removal of President Jamil Mahuad, who was forced from 
office in 2000 in a coup d’état orchestrated by CONAIE and junior military officers. The 
coup had broad popular support, and it followed weeks of nationwide protests coordinated by 
CONAIE and its non-indigenous social movement allies. Among the junior army officers 
who stood aside to allow the coup to develop was Lucio Gutiérrez, who, after being 
discharged from the army for his role in the uprising, ran for president in the subsequent 
elections. 
In the 2002 campaign, Gutiérrez ran as the joint candidate of his newly formed PSP 
and Pachakutik, and he received the official backing of CONAIE. Although Gutiérrez himself 
was primarily a populist, his alliance with Pachakutik and his close ties to the indigenous 
movement (dating from the 2000 uprising) place his 2002 candidacy in the broad category of 
ethnopopulism. Indeed, aside from his indigenous coalitional partners, Gutiérrez’s electoral 
platform included many key demands of the indigenous movement, including constitutional 
reform, the reversal of neoliberal policies, the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state, 
and opposition to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, many of 
these policies appealed well beyond indigenous constituencies, and Gutiérrez sought to win 
votes from whites and mestizos (as well as indigenous voters) based on his strong anti-
establishment credentials and anti-neoliberal programmatic agenda. 
Gutiérrez’s principal rivals in the 2002 election included the neopopulist Álvaro 
Noboa and three well-known personalities from traditional political parties: León Roldós, 
Rodrigo Borja, and Jacobo Bucaram. Thus, the 2002 election was somewhat distinct from 
those in 2006 and 2009 in that a single candidate, Gutiérrez, emerged as the principal 
representative for indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors. Certainly Roldós, Borja, and 
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Bucaram could expect to gain some limited support from indigenous voters thanks to 
established party, movement, and kinship networks that all fed into long-running clientelistic 
relations. Yet the coalescence behind Gutiérrez of Pachakutik, CONAIE, and many smaller 
leftist parties and social organisations with influence in indigenous areas made him the clear 
favourite to win the majority of indigenous votes in 2002.  
In the first round of voting, Gutiérrez finished first with 20.6 percent of the valid vote, 
and proceeded to a second round runoff against Noboa, the second-placed candidate. Roldós, 
Borja, Bucaram, and the PSC’s Antioni Neira all won more than ten percent of the first-round 
vote, underlining the severe fragmentation of Ecuadorian politics in the early 2000s. 
Ultimately, Gutiérrez won the presidency in the second round, defeating Noboa by winning 
54.8 percent of the valid vote. 
LAPOP Data 
 Data for the 2002 vote analysis come from LAPOP’s 2004 survey. The LAPOP data 
considerably overestimate the vote share of the top two candidates in the first round, 
Gutiérrez and Noboa, suggesting that some respondents may have reported their second-
round choice to interviewers (see Table 4.1a). However, the LAPOP data broadly reflect the 
trend, if not the actual proportions, in the official voting results: Gutiérrez won 28.6 percent 
in the LAPOP sample (compared to 20.6 percent in the official count), Noboa 21.7 percent 
(compared to 17.4 percent), Roldós 5.9 percent (compared to 15.4 percent), and Borja 6.1 
percent (compared to 14.0 percent).107 
 LAPOP’s 2004 survey did not include any measure of respondents’ linguistic 
background, so the 2002 vote analysis employs only a measure of self-identification. 
Similarly, the 2004 survey did not include any specific measures of voters’ support for state-
led wealth redistribution or nationalisations, two variables that are important vote predictors 
in several of the other election case studies examined in this thesis. Finally, the 2004 data did 
not include measures of voter attitudes towards ethnic groups and issues, and so this aspect of 
the 2002 analysis is not developed. In general, it is worth re-emphasising the low overall 
response variation on the ethnicity measures in all the Ecuadorian surveys. In 2004, just 112 
respondents reported self-identification as indigenous, 174 as black, 322 as white, and 2,319 
as mestizo. These low overall counts for non-mestizo categories (which are reduced further 
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 A total of 37.6 percent of the LAPOP sample reported voting for a candidate outside the top four, or 
submitting a blank or void ballot. This compares to 32.6 percent who fell within the equivalent category in the 
official results (Table 4.1a). 
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by the exclusion of cases with missing data for the regression analysis) should be borne in 
mind when interpreting the following results. 
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
 Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of the 2002 vote according to ethnic group and 
candidates’ ethnic vote shares. In addition to basic vote-share proportions, Table 4.1d reports 
group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores. These are calculated as the standard 
deviation of the proportions within each ethnic group that vote for each candidate (group-
centred) and the standard deviation of the proportion of each candidate’s vote share received 
from each ethnic group (candidate-centred).108  
 The group-centred ethnicisation statistics show low SD1 scores but relatively high 
SD2 scores. Higher SD2 scores reflect the larger standard deviation from the equal-share 
mean (20 percent) in most groups, which is mostly the result of the low reported vote for the 
third- and fourth -place candidates, and the large number of voters who selected candidates 
outside the top four. The SD1 scores are generally low, however, indicating that voters from 
all ethnic groups supported a range of candidates. For comparison, the average SD1 in 
Bolivia’s 2005 election was .062, while Ecuador’s 2002 average was just .043, suggesting 
that members of the same ethnic groups spread their vote considerably more widely in the 
Ecuadorian case. Nevertheless, the SD1 score for the indigenous group is noticeably higher 
than other groups in Ecuador 2002, reflecting the disproportionate support for Gutiérrez 
among indigenous voters (48.6 percent voted for Gutiérrez, well above his overall LAPOP 
vote share of 28.6 percent; see Table 4.1b).109 
 An examination of each candidate’s ethnic vote share (Table 4.1c) confirms 
disproportionate indigenous support for Gutiérrez. In total, 5.6 percent of the PSP-
Pachakutik’s vote came from indigenous voters even though they constituted just 3.3 percent 
of the LAPOP sample. However, as these proportions make clear, Gutiérrez appealed well 
beyond an indigenous constituency, winning the majority of his vote among mestizos and 
whites (78.7 and 11.1 percent, respectively). The ethnic breakdown of other candidates’ vote 
shares reveals relatively proportional distributions, although Noboa’s vote contained just half 
the sample proportion of indigenous voters (1.7 percent compared to 3.3 percent). 
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 The higher score in the black group results from disproportionate rejection of Gutiérrez and disproportionate 




TABLE 4.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002 
  
  SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   









Lucio Gutiérrez 3.2 22.6 1.6 1.3 28.6 20.6 
Álvaro Noboa 2.7 16.4 0.4 2.3 21.7 17.4 
León Roldós 0.8 4.6 0.2 0.4 5.9 15.4 
Rodrigo Borja 0.5 5.4 0.0 0.0 6.1 14.0 
Other/Null 4.6 28.5 0.1 3.5 37.6 32.6 










       
Lucio Gutiérrez 27.2 29.1 48.6 17.4 28.6  
Álvaro Noboa 22.9 21.2 11.0 30.4 21.7  
León Roldós 6.5 5.9 6.4 5.2 5.9  
Rodrigo Borja 4.6 7.0 2.8 0.0 6.1  
Other/Null 38.8 36.8 31.2 47.0 37.6  












       
Lucio Gutiérrez 11.1 78.7 5.6 4.6 28.6  
Álvaro Noboa 12.3 75.5 1.7 10.5 21.7  
León Roldós 12.8 77.1 3.5 6.6 5.9  
Rodrigo Borja 8.9 89.6 1.5 0.0 6.1  
Other/Null 12.1 75.8 2.7 9.4 37.6  















       
Group-Centred       
SD1 .012 .006 .082 .072   
SD2 .129 .121 .174 .171   
Candidate-Centred  SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP  
Lucio Gutiérrez .    .018  
Álvaro Noboa     .022  
León Roldós     .014  
Rodrigo Borja     .082  
Other/Null     .014  
       
N = 2927. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group in LAPOP’s 2004 survey sample, as well as official election 
results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). 
Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-
table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. 
SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the ethnic group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is 
the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores 
are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2004 and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (http://cne.gob.ec/es/). 
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Overall, the low candidate-centred ethnicisation scores in Table 4.1d confirm the relatively 
proportional ethnic composition of most candidates’ vote.110 
 In short, an examination of overall ethnic vote distributions in 2002 confirms that 
Gutiérrez and his PSP-Pachakutik coalition received disproportionate support from 
indigenous voters. However, it also underlines Gutiérrez’s wider appeal among both whites 
and mestizos, a prerequisite for electoral success given Ecuador’s ethnic demographics.  In 
general, this pattern of vote distributions does not indicate voting preferences that are 
significantly determined by ethnicity (at least not based on the limited measures in the 
LAPOP survey), and voters across ethnic groups clearly supported a range of candidates in 
the 2002 election.       
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
 Table 4.2 reports the effects of voter characteristics on the overall probability of 
voting for each major candidate in Ecuador’s 2002 election. The results are based on a 
multinomial logit (mlogit) model applied to data from LAPOP’s 2004 survey. Full results can 
be found in Appendix B.  
The analysis generates statistically significant positive effects for self-identification as 
indigenous on the predicted probability of voting for Gutiérrez in the 2002 first-round vote. 
According to the model, indigenous voters were 12.9 percentage points more likely to vote 
for Gutiérrez compared to mestizos (and 17.3 percentage points more likely than whites) even 
when other factors were controlled for. However, ethnicity did not have statistically 
significant effects on the vote probabilities of any other candidate. These results strongly 
suggest that Gutiérrez and his Pachakutik allies befitted from a positive ethnic bias among 
indigenous voters in 2002, as the overall vote distributions in Table 4.1indicated. 
 Aside from ethnicity, the model identifies significant effects of several other voter 
characteristics on first-round vote choice. Voter income (‘Income’) is negatively associated 
with Gutiérrez’s vote (a 1.0 percentage point decrease in probability for a one-unit increase in 
income band), confirming the PSP-Pachakutik’s broad appeal to poorer voters.111 Despite his 
personal wealth, Noboa’s populist platform and clientelistic politics appear to have won him 
some support across socioeconomic classes, while support for both of the ‘establishment’ 
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 The high score for Borja results from the very low number of both white and indigenous votes for the ID 
candidate (Table 4.1c).  
111
 Variable names are capitalised and enclosed in single quotations marks. 
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TABLE 4.2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002 
 
 GUTIÉRREZ NOBOA ROLDÓS BORJA 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
White (Mestizo) -.044 .042 .046 .038 .007 .023 -.016 .022 
Indigenous (Mestizo) .129^ .079 -.070 .072 -.002 .037 -.025 .036 
Black (Mestizo) -.053 .057 .021 .045 -.005 .028 n/a n/a 
Indigenous (White) .173* .088 -.116 .079 -.009 .023 -.009 .040 
Income -.010^ .006 -.006 .005 .009** .003 .013** .004 
Female .008 .027 -.027 .023 .009 .014 .005 .015 
Age .003** .001 -.001 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Trust in parties -.002 .009 -.012 .008 -.001 .004 .010* .004 
National economy improved .054 .044 .006 .041 -.011 .027 .002 .025 
Personal finances improved -.017 .037 -.001 .034 -.013 .021 .010 .021 
Resides in highlands (coast) .083** .031 -.187** .026 -.004 .015 .090** .014 
Resides in Amazon (coast) .234** .041 -.170 .032 -.023 .018 .017 .016 
Resides in rural area .100** .030 -.039 .029 -.036^ .021 .005 .020 
Rightist ideology -.006 .006 .013* .005 -.005 .003 -.012** .004 
‘Strongman’ populist leader -.026 .029 -.019 .026 -.006 .015 .023 .017 
President can bypass Congress -.006 .027 -.002 .023 -.016 .014 .013 .015 
N= 1079. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in 
Appendix B. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2004. 
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candidates (Roldós and Borja) increased with voter income (by 0.9 and 1.3 percentage points, 
respectively).  
Region was also a highly significant vote predictor in 2002 (‘Resides in highlands’; 
‘Resides in Amazon’). Voters in the highlands and particularly voters residing in Gutiérrez’s 
native Amazon were much more likely to vote for PSP-Pachakutik than were those living on 
the coast (by 8.3 and 23.4 percentage points, respectively). Borja also appears to have 
performed better in the highlands than on the coast, indicating that the ID’s historical strength 
in the highlands was partially preserved in 2002. Noboa, for his part, drew greater support 
from voters in the coastal provinces, particularly compared to highland residents (ceteris 
paribus, the former were 18.7 percentage points more likely to support PRIAN). Finally, 
Gutiérrez also won greater support among rural voters, who were on average 10.0 percentage 
points more likely to vote for his PSP-Pachakutik ticket than their urban compatriots. 
Political ideology (‘Rightist ideology’) does not appear to have affected Gutiérrez’s 
support significantly, underlining the broadly non-ideological character of his populist 
appeals despite the presence of leftist parties in his coalition. In contrast, leftist ideology had 
a statistically significant effect on support for Borja and ID, one of Ecuador’s traditional 
centre-left parties (a one-unit move from left-right on the 10-point ideology scale produced a 
1.2 percentage point increase in Borja’s predicted vote probability). Noboa’s strong defence 
of neoliberalism and his conservative social views appear to have won him greater support 
among self-declared rightists (equivalent to a 1.3 percentage point increase for a one-unit 
rightward move). The final two measures in Table 4.2, both concerned with characteristic 
aspects of populism (the perceived need for a ‘Strong populist leader’ and agreement that a 
‘President can bypass Congress’ to speed up policy implementation), did not have 
statistically significant effects in 2002. This is perhaps unsurprising given the personalistic 
nature of electoral competition in contemporary Ecuador. 
 In summary, the 2002 vote analysis suggests indigenous ethnic bias may have played 
some role in bolstering support for Gutiérrez, although ethnicity did not appear to affect 
voting preferences for any other candidates. Indeed, in general the analysis indicates that 
other, non-ethnic factors – especially income, region, and perhaps political ideology – were 
more important in shaping voters’ electoral choices in 2002. Although the LAPOP data did 
not provide any direct measures for organisational affiliations and associated clientelistic 
relations, such factors were almost certainly important in Ecuador’s factionalised political 
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environment. This chapter would argue that both region and urban/rural residence are likely 
to correlate with organisational affiliations and personal networks that directly link to such 
clientelistic relations. Thus, it seems plausible that the large effects for region and urban/rural 
residence identified in Table 4.2 may reflect some latent association between clientelistic 
networks and vote choice. Moreover, this chapter hypothesises that some regional and 
rural/urban measures may pick up dimensions of Gutiérrez’s support based on wider ethnic 
preferences. Most indigenous-mestizo voters – who may have reported mestizo self-
identification to LAPOP interviewers – reside in the smaller towns and rural areas of the 
highlands and Amazon, a regional background that is significantly linked statistically to a 
Gutiérrez vote. However, in both these cases, LAPOP data provide no direct measures to test 
such hypotheses, and thus any inferences remain conjectural.  
Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
 As part of the 2002 vote analysis, this chapter also tested ethnicity’s indirect effect on 
vote choice.112 Ethnic background may influence material circumstances and political 
attitudes, which in turn may affect vote choice. However, the mediation analysis for the 2002 
vote finds no evidence for such indirect ethnic voting (that is, ethnicity → political attitudes 
→ vote choice), although it does confirm a statistically significant direct effect for indigenous 
self-identification on Gutiérrez’s vote. Thus, at least based on the data available, this chapter 
rejects the indirect model of ethnic voting as an explanation for voting outcomes in Ecuador’s 
2002 election.113  
 
ECUADOR 2006 
The 2006 campaign marked the emergence of a new ethnopopulist candidate, Rafael 
Correa, who would come to dominate Ecuadorian politics for more than a decade. Although 
Correa was primarily a populist, promising to reverse neoliberal reforms and attacking the 
traditional political and economic elites, he also sought to win indigenous votes through 
ethnic appeals. He declared his ‘natural affinity’ with the indigenous movement, donned a 
poncho at political rallies, sought the blessing of indigenous leaders at traditional ceremonies, 
and addressed crowds in Quichua (Zeas 2006, 225; Conaghan 2011, 260, 279; Madrid 2012, 
                                                          
112
 Full results can be found in Appendix B. 
113
 This rejection comes, however, with a considerable caveat. As discussed previously in this chapter, both the 
low number of non-mestizo respondents and the lack of a linguistic measure of ethnicity severely restrict the 
scope of the mediation analysis.  
147 
 
104-5). Correa also adopted many of the broader anti-establishment, anti-neoliberal demands 
of the indigenous movement, and he won important endorsements from indigenous and social 
organisations that defected from Pachakutik and CONAIE (Conaghan 2011, 270; Madrid 
2012, 102). 
 Lucio Gutiérrez, who had been forced from office a year earlier in a largely middle-
class coup, also announced his intention to run again in 2006. When the electoral authorities 
upheld a ban on his holding public office, the PSP put forward his brother, Gilmar Gutiérrez, 
as its presidential candidate. Although Gutiérrez, like Correa, was primarily a populist, he 
also capitalised on the PSP’s ties to Amazonian indigenous organisations and Evangelical 
groups. The endorsement and grassroots mobilisation of these networks helped boost the 
PSP’s vote in indigenous and lower-class constituencies.114  
Thus, through associations with indigenous organisations and leaders, as well as a 
combination of symbolic acts and rhetoric, both Correa and Gutiérrez attempted to signal 
their affinity with indigenous voters and interests. In this respect, the 2006 campaign was 
notably distinct from 2002. Whereas the Gutiérrez-Pachakutik ticket was widely perceived as 
providing the clearest representation of indigenous interests in the earlier case, several 
candidates and parties – Correa, Gilmar Gutiérrez, Pachakutik’s Luis Macas, and leftist 
parties such as ID – all competed for the indigenous and lower-class vote in 2006. This 
electoral context exerted numerous cross-pressures on voters, exacerbating contradictions 
among personal and organisational loyalties, regional cleavages, ethnicity, religion, and 
ideology. The result was a far more fragmented vote in 2006, perhaps particularly in the case 
of indigenous voters. 
However, the winner in the first round was neither Correa nor Gutiérrez (who finished 
second and third, respectively), but perennial presidential candidate Noboa. Once again, the 
PRIAN candidate used his personal wealth to run a highly populist campaign marked by 
conspicuous acts of generosity. At many campaign rallies, PRIAN officials would hand out 
free food, household supplies, medical treatments, and even cash in exchange for voting 
commitments (Conaghan 2011, 270; Freidenberg 2014, 117-19). More generally, Noboa’s 
manifesto emphasised a wide range of direct assistance programmes, ranging from subsidised 
housing, to microcredit initiatives, to increased welfare payments. However, unlike his 
                                                          
114
 Indeed, many PSP supporters from these constituencies considered the charges against Gutiérrez and his 
eventual overthrow to be a conspiracy within Ecuador’s wealthy establishment, whose interests were threatened 
by Gutiérrez’s defence of the poor (Olmos 2006).  
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populist rivals, Noboa was not a critic of neoliberalism, and he played on his position as a 
successful businessman to frame himself as the ‘can-do’ candidate. He attacked Correa as 
‘the Communist comrade of Hugo Chávez’, and he told supporters that he was ‘God’s hero’ 
on a mission to save Ecuador (Conaghan 2011, 270). Nevertheless, in the eventual runoff 
with Correa, Noboa was unable to expand his vote beyond the urban coastal constituencies 
that had backed him in the first round, while Correa swept areas that had previously backed 
the PSP and ID. Ultimately, Correa won the second round with a comfortable 56.7 percent of 
the valid vote. 
LAPOP Data 
LAPOP’s 2006 Ecuador survey was conducted some months before the October 
election, and thus the analysis in this chapter must make use of the 2008 data. These data 
substantially overestimate support for Correa, indicating a first-round vote share of 67.9 
percent, compared to the 22.8 percent of the vote that Correa actually won (see Table 4.3a). 
Accordingly, the LAPOP vote shares of Correa’s opponents are significantly underestimated 
compared to official results: just 12.6 percent for Noboa (compared to an official vote of 26.8 
percent), and less than five percent for both Gutiérrez and fourth-placed León Roldós (who 
both won over fifteen percent according to official figures). Such large discrepancies mean 
that considerable caution is required in drawing wider inferences based on the 2006 vote 
analysis.115  
In addition to the overestimation of Correa’s vote share, there are several other 
features of the 2008 data that are problematic for this thesis’s analysis. First, the 2008 survey 
did not ask respondents about their linguistic background, leaving the generic ethnic self-
identification variable as the only measure of ethnicity. Furthermore, as in previous survey 
rounds, the majority of respondents in 2008 reported self-identification as mestizo, providing 
very little variation on the only available ethnicity measure. Finally, the 2008 Ecuador survey 
included no measures of ethnic attitudes or experience of discrimination, and therefore this 
aspect of the analysis is similarly missing from the 2006 case study. 
 
                                                          
115
 Indeed, Correa’s LAPOP vote share constitutes a much larger overestimation than the normal ‘bump’ given 
to winners in most post-election surveys. In part, these discrepancies may result from confusion or forgetfulness 
among respondents. In fact, by the time of the 2008 survey, Ecuadorians had voted in both the first and second 
rounds of the 2006 presidential elections and in the 2007 constituent assembly elections. With the exception of 
the first-round presidential vote, Correa and AP won absolute majorities in each of these cases. 
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TABLE 4.3: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006  
 
  SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   









Álvara Noboa 1.6 10.0 2.4 2.6 12.6 26.8 
Rafael Correa 6.4 56.5 2.4 2.6 67.9 22.8 
Gilmar Gutiérrez 0.2 2.9 0.3 0.1 3.5 17.4 
León Roldós 0.3 4.3 0.0 0.1 4.8 14.8 
Other/Null 1.7 8.2 0.2 1.2 11.3 18.2 










       
Álvara Noboa 15.5 12.2 11.6 13.9 12.6  
Rafael Correa 63.3 69.0 70.7 55.9 67.9  
Gilmar Gutiérrez 1.5 3.6 9.6 3.0 3.5  
León Roldós 2.9 5.3 1.4 2.4 4.8  
Other/Null 16.8 10.0 6.7 14.8 11.3  












       
Álvara Noboa 12.4 79.3 3.2 5.2 12.6  
Rafael Correa 9.4 83.2 3.6 3.8 67.9  
Gilmar Gutiérrez 4.2 82.4 9.3 4.0 3.5  
León Roldós 6.1 90.7 1.0 2.3 4.8  
Other/Null 15.0 72.6 2.0 10.3 11.3  















       
Group-Centred       
SD1 .034 .007 .036 .060   
SD2 .225 .247 .256 .197   
Candidate-Centred  SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP  
Álvara Noboa .   .032   
Rafael Correa    .007   
Gilmar Gutiérrez    .076   
León Roldós    .074   
Other/Null    .090   
       
N = 2550. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group in LAPOP’s 2008 survey sample, as well as official election 
results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). 
Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-
table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. 
SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the ethnic group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is 
the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores 
are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2008 and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (http://cne.gob.ec/es/). 
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Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
 Table 4.3 shows the breakdown of the 2006 Ecuador vote by ethnic group and 
candidates’ ethnic vote share, as well as the associated group- and candidate-centred 
ethnicisation scores. Like in 2002, the group-centred ethnicisation statistics show relatively 
low SD1 scores but higher SD2 scores. High SD2 scores are unsurprising given Correa’s 
large share of the LAPOP vote, which produces similarly large standard deviations from the 
equal-share mean of 20 percent. However, the lower SD1 scores indicate a considerable 
degree of variation in vote choice within ethnic groups, at least proportional to overall vote 
shares.116 Examination of vote choice within each ethnic group (Table 4.3b) indicates that 
indigenous voters supported Correa, and particularly Gutiérrez, somewhat disproportionally: 
70.7 reported voting for Correa, and 9.6 percent for Gutiérrez, compared to respective overall 
vote shares of 67.9 and 3.5 percent. Whites also showed a slightly disproportionate 
preference for Noboa, with 15.5 percent reporting a vote for PRIAN compared to Noboa’s 
overall LAPOP vote share of 12.6 percent. Overall, however, the group-centred analysis does 
not suggest severe ethnic bias in Ecuador’s 2006 election, and given the considerable skew in 
the LAPOP data compared to official results, we should probably not read too much into any 
minor disproportionality in vote distributions. 
 The candidate-centred ethnicisation scores in Table 4.3d scores are notably low for all 
four major candidates in 2006. Correa’s score is the lowest, and the ethnic breakdown of the 
AP vote show proportions that are largely comparable with the overall sample proportions 
(Table 4.3c). Though higher than Correa’s, Noboa’s score is also relatively low, although 
whites were slightly over-represented in Noboa’s LAPOP vote share (12.4 percent of 
Noboa’s vote came from whites, although whites comprised just 10.1 percent of the sample). 
Gutiérrez and Roldós both have somewhat higher (though not high) ethnicisation scores, the 
result of fewer whites in both candidates’ constituencies and a disproportionately high 
indigenous vote in Gutiérrez’s case. Once again, however, given the low number of 
observations for these last two candidates, we should be cautious about reading too much into 
the relative ethnic appeals of Gutiérrez and Roldós. 
In short, analysis of the ethnic breakdown of Ecuador’s 2006 vote suggests relatively 
low levels of ethnicisation, despite slightly disproportionate support for Correa and Gutiérrez 
                                                          
116
 By way of comparison, the SD2 scores in Bolivia’s 2005 election are higher than Ecuador’s scores in some 
groups and lower in others, suggesting a much higher degree of ethnic polarisation in Bolivia. This is also 
reflected in Ecuador’s SD1 scores, which are much lower than those for the Bolivian elections and somewhat 
lower than, or comparable to, the Peruvian cases (see Chapter Five).  
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among indigenous voters and for Noboa among whites. However, although some ethnic vote 
distributions are proportionally skewed (albeit not severely), Correa still won clear majorities 
across all ethnic groups in absolute terms, at least as far as LAPOP’s 2008 sample is 
concerned. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
Table 4.4 shows the effects of voter characteristics on the overall probability of voting 
for each major candidate in Ecuador’s 2006 election, based on a multinomial logit model (see 
Appendix B for full output). The analysis generates few significant effects for the ethnicity 
measures available, reflecting the apparent low levels of ethnicisation identified in the 
preceding vote-share analysis. Indeed, the regression analysis generates only one statistically 
significant effect for the ethnic self-identification measures, suggesting a positive association 
between indigenous self-identification and a vote for Gutiérrez. This effect equates to an 
increase in predicted vote probability of 7.2 percentage points compared to mestizos and 8.0 
percentage points compared to whites.117 This finding appears to confirm the persisting base 
of support for the Gutiérrez brothers and the PSP in certain indigenous constituencies. 
However, with this one exception, the vote analysis finds little evidence for ethnic voting of 
any kind in Ecuador’s 2006 election. 
The vote analysis also included a range of sociodemographic and political attitude 
measures, several of which produce statistically significant marginal effects. First, both 
Correa and Gutiérrez appear to have benefited from their broad populist appeals to poorer 
voters, with an increase in voter income (‘Income’) producing a 2.2 percentage point 
decrease in Correa’s predicted vote probability and a 0.8 percentage point decrease for 
Gutiérrez.118 Second, as in most elections studied in this thesis, political ideology (‘Rightist 
ideology’) appears to play a significant role in voters’ electoral considerations. Correa’s anti-
neoliberal populist platform appears to have appealed to leftist voters (a one-unit change from 
left to right on the ideology scale produces a 2.1 percentage point decrease in predicted vote 
probability), while Noboa’s personal and programmatic profile as a wealthy businessman and 
defender of neoliberalism attracted voters who considered themselves rightists (a 1.7 
percentage point increase in predicted vote probability for a one-unit change on the ideology 
scale).  
                                                          
117
 The same variable has a significant negative effect on Roldós’s vote, although in this case the low cell count 
for the relevant cross-tabulation means we should be cautious about any inferences drawn.   
118
 Higher income also increased the probability of voting for Roldós, but this variable had little effect on the 
vote for Noboa. 
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TABLE 4.4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006 
 
 NOBOA CORREA GUTIÉRREZ ROLDÓS 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
White (Mestizo) .011 .030 .002 .052 -.008 .019 -.019 .026 
Indigenous (Mestizo) .027 .058 -.026 .074 .072^ .038 -.056** .012 
Black (Mestizo) -.006 .035 -.078 .070 .074 .059 -.026 .033 
Indigenous (White) .016 .060 -.028 .078 .080^ .043 -.037^ .022 
Income .006 .006 -.022** .008 -.008* .003 .011* .004 
Female .002 .021 .024 .028 -.027* .011 -.030^ .015 
Age -.001 .001 -.001 .001 .000 .000 .001^ .001 
Trust in parties -.008 .006 .015 .010 .004 .003 -.009 .006 
Resides in highlands (coast) -.086** .020 .061^ .038 .033** .011 .056** .018 
Resides in Amazon (coast) -.100** .023 .041 .056 .155** .043 .002 .013 
Resides in rural area -.044* .019 .103** .037 -.013 .011 -.006 .020 
Rightist ideology .017** .004 -.021** .006 -.001 .003 .006^ .004 
Wealth redistribution -.008 .005 .006 .009 -.006^ .003 .000 .004 
Nationalisations -.002 .005 .010 .009 .000 .004 -.008 .005 
Free trade .000 .006 .002 .008 -.004 .004 .002 .005 
Limit opposition voice -.003 .005 .024** .009 -.004 .004 .002 .004 
Direct democracy -.009^ .005 .014^ .008 .000 .003 .000 .004 
Minorities are a threat -.009^ .005 .019* .008 .003 .004 -.009* .004 
N= 1449. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in 
Appendix B The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2008. 
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However, unlike the Bolivian case, neither support for wealth redistribution (‘Wealth 
redistribution’) nor support for nationalisations (‘Nationalisations’) had statistically 
significant effects on Ecuador’s 2006 vote. Given that reducing inequality was a prominent 
rhetorical component of all four candidates’ platforms, and given that most Ecuadorians 
tended to support such policy aims (as in Bolivia), the lack of significant effects for this 
variable is perhaps less surprising. However, the candidates differed markedly in their 
positions on nationalisations, particularly Correa and Noboa. While Correa promised to 
nationalise Ecuador’s natural resources and regain sovereignty from foreign multinationals, 
Noboa railed against Correa’s ‘communist’ state-interventionism, which he charged would 
make Ecuador the next Venezuela. We must presume, therefore, that any effect for this 
particular attitudinal measure is captured by the general ideology measure or by other 
sociodemographic factors.  
As in 2002, both region and rural/urban residence also had significant effects on vote 
choice in 2006. Residence in the highlands, compared to the coast, was associated with an 
increase in the probability of voting for Correa, Gutiérrez, and Roldós but a decrease for 
Noboa, while the PSP received comparatively greater support in its eastern Amazon 
stronghold. These effects underline the various regional influences outlined in this chapter’s 
preceding discussion of organisational loyalties and clientelistic politics. Finally, rural 
residence significantly increased the predicted probability of voting for Correa (by 10.3 
percentage points) and decreased Noboa’s vote by 4.4 percentage points. Correa’s substantive 
policy proposals (price controls, agricultural import protections, and a microcredit scheme for 
small-scale farmers), as well as alliances with several rural-based social movements and 
leftist parties, appear to have won Correa considerable support in rural constituencies.119 
In summary, the analysis finds only limited evidence that ethnic bias influenced vote 
choice in Ecuador’s 2006 presidential election. Although self-identified indigenous voters 
were relatively more likely to vote for Gilmar Gutiérrez than were mestizos or whites 
(indicating the PSP’s persisting support in certain indigenous constituencies loyal to Lucio 
Gutiérrez), it is worth re-emphasising Correa’s strong overall performance, including among 
indigenous voters. Indeed, the 2006 vote analysis predicts that self-identification as 
indigenous was associated with an overall probability of voting for Correa of 69.3 percent, 
                                                          
119
 The rural/urban variable had no statistically significant effect on Gutiérrez’s vote. However, this may be the 
result of limited sample size and the distorted vote distributions in the LAPOP data. Indeed, by most accounts 
Gutiérrez and the PSP performed particularly well in more rural areas, where Lucio Gutiérrez’s agricultural 
subsidies and prices controls had been most beneficial (Olmos 2006). 
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compared to just 10.2 percent for Gutiérrez. Thus, although Gutiérrez may have performed 
better among indigenous voters relative to other groups, Correa still won the majority of 
indigenous voters in 2006. The latter’s symbolic and substantive ethnic appeals, broad 
populist platform, and alliances with key social organisations linked to the indigenous 
movement, all appear to have extended Correa’s appeal to both indigenous and non-
indigenous constituencies.  
Overall, however, voter ethnicity played a relatively minor role compared to other 
factors in 2006. Voters’ concerns linked to income, political ideology, and particularly 
sociogeographic location (region and urban/rural residence), all appear to have mattered more 
than ethnicity in terms of vote choice.  Thus, in broad terms, the vote analysis supports the 
general propositions laid out in this chapter’s introduction: a combination of weak ethnic 
identification, multiple candidates appealing across ethnic lines, and important non-ethnic 
voting preferences cross-cutting ethnic divisions significantly reduces the electoral salience 
of ethnicity. In Ecuador’s 2006 election, this appears to have been the case. 
Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
 As in 2002, this chapter’s analysis of the indirect effects of ethnicity in Ecuador’s 
2006 election fails to identify any statistically significant results.120 Based on the data 
available, there does not appear to be a noteworthy relationship between voters’ ethnic 
background and the political attitudes that subsequently influenced vote choice. Thus, once 
again, this chapter rejects the explanatory value of the indirect model of ethnic voting, at least 
in the case of the 2006 presidential vote. However, as was the case in the 2002 election, this 
conclusion comes with a number of caveats related to the various data limitations discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter. In particular, the low number of non-mestizo survey respondents 
and the lack alternative measures for ethnicity (including a linguistic measure) severely 
restrict this and other aspects of the 2006 vote analysis. 
 
ECUADOR 2009 
 The 2009 elections were triggered by the ratification of Ecuador’s new constitution by 
popular referendum in late 2008. The list of names on the 2009 presidential ballot was 
                                                          
120
 Comparison of the Correa and the Gutiérrez votes, however, does confirm a significant direct effect for 
indigenous self-identification in favour of the PSP. Full results are reported in Appendix B. 
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remarkably similar to 2006 – Correa, Noboa, Gutiérrez, and Roldós – although in this case 
Lucio Gutiérrez resumed his official leadership of the PSP and Martha Roldós replaced her 
uncle, León Roldós, as the candidate for the Red Ética y Democrática (RED).  
However, in contrast to 2006, the 2009 contest was widely perceived as a formality. 
Since finishing second in the 2006 first-round vote, Correa had won resounding victories in 
three subsequent national elections: the 2006 runoff, the 2007 constituent assembly elections, 
and the 2008 constitutional referendum. There was little indication that the results of the 2009 
election were to produce anything other than another resounding Correa victory. Perhaps 
because of the perceived lack of genuine competition, the presidential campaign was 
relatively low-key, with little public or media interest in any of the presidential candidates 
other than Correa and, to some extent, Lucio Gutiérrez (EU-EOM 2009, 5, 21). 
 As expected, Correa won an absolute majority in the first-round vote (52.0 percent of 
the valid vote) and thus avoided a runoff. This was the first time an Ecuadorian president had 
been re-elected since 1875, and it signalled the consolidation of Correa and AP as the 
dominant political force in the country. Gutiérrez came a distant second with 28.2 percent of 
the vote, although once again the PSP performed well in the Amazon region and Gutiérrez 
ran second to Correa in many highland provinces. Noboa came in third with just 11.4 percent 
of the vote. As in previous elections, his support was concentrated in the coastal provinces, 
particularly around the city of Guayaquil, whose influential mayor, Jaime Nebot, endorsed 
Noboa’s candidacy. Finally, Martha Roldós won a disappointing 4.3 percent of the valid vote, 
and RED failed to win any seats in the national Congress (CNE 2014, 50-54, 76). 
LAPOP Data 
 The data for the 2009 vote analysis come from LAPOP’s 2010 survey. As in 2006, the 
LAPOP data substantially overestimate support for Correa and underestimate support for his 
principal challengers (see Table 4.5a). A total of 65.7 percent of LAPOP respondents 
reported voting for Correa (well over the 52.0 percent he actually won) and just 10.3 percent 
reported backing Gutiérrez (though the PSP candidate won 28.2 percent of the official vote). 
The LAPOP sample is somewhat more accurate with Noboa’s vote, estimating a 7.5 percent 
share compared to the official figure of 11.4 percent. Although these discrepancies are not as 
severe as 2006, the underestimation of Gutiérrez’s vote is particularly noteworthy. It is 
unclear whether PSP voters were more hesitant about reporting their vote to interviewers, or 
whether the concentration of Gutiérrez’s vote in more remote rural and Amazonian areas 
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resulted in its under-representation. Either way, these discrepancies mean any inferences 
based on LAPOP’s 2010 data must be extremely cautious. 
 The ethnicity measures from the 2010 survey are once again problematic. Although 
the 2010 questionnaire included a measure of respondents’ linguistic background, only 3.2 
percent of the model sample reported having a parent who spoke an indigenous language (N 
= 65).121 Similarly, just 2.2 percent of the model sample reported self-identification as 
indigenous (N = 46), only 3.7 percent as black (N = 51), and 10.4 percent as white (N = 
139).122 Once again, the Ecuador survey did not include a measure of cultural identification, 
which might have produced more variation in responses. Thus, the vast majority of 
respondents in the 2010 sample are classified as Spanish-speaking mestizos, a data feature 
that substantially limits the scope of any analysis of ethnic voting. 
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
 Table 4.5 shows both the breakdown of vote shares by candidate and ethnic group and 
the group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Ecuador’s 2009 election. As in 
2006, the overall success of Correa (especially according to respondents in the LAPOP 
sample) means that the SD2 group-centred scores are relatively high; the proportion of each 
group’s vote that went to Correa was well above the equal-share mean of 25 percent, while 
the share going to other candidates was below 25 percent (Table 4.5d).123 However, the SD1 
scores are low, indicating that most groups included some supporters of all three major 
candidates. The scores are highest in the indigenous groups (both linguistic and self-
identified), reflecting the near-total rejection of Noboa’s candidacy in these constituencies 
and the disproportionate support for Gutiérrez in the indigenous-language group. Indeed, 
Table 4.5b shows that Gutiérrez won 20.7 percent of the vote among indigenous-language 
speakers (compared to just 10.3 percent overall), while Noboa won just 2.4 percent 
(compared to PRIAN’s overall share of 7.5 percent).124 Finally, the white group resembled 
the sample proportions for both Correa and Noboa but showed a slightly disproportionate 
preference for Gutiérrez (12.6 percent compared to 10.3 percent). 
                                                          
121
 ‘Model sample’ refers to the full sample once cases with missing data are excluded. 
122
 Frequencies and percentages appear somewhat discrepant because percentages take into account LAPOP’s 
multilevel survey design. 
123
 Elsewhere, the equal-share has been 20 percent. However, due to very limited support for candidates outside 
the top three, the 2009 analysis is based on just four outcome categories (Correa, Noboa, Gutiérrez, and other). 
Thus, the equal-share mean is 25 percent.  
124
 However, given the low number of respondents who reported an indigenous-language background in the 
2010 sample, these proportions translate into just 12 and two voters, respectively, casting serious doubt on any 
inferences about wider electoral tendencies. 
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TABLE 4.5: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009  
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP  Total  
LAPOP 
Total 









Rafael Correa 63.4 2.3 6.6 54.8 1.5 2.8 65.7 52.0 
Lucio Gutiérrez 9.6 0.7 1.3 8.6 0.2 0.3 10.3 28.2 
Álvaro Noboa 7.4 0.1 0.7 6.3 0.1 0.5 7.5 11.4 
Other/Null 16.1 0.4 1.4 13.9 0.3 0.8 16.5 8.4 










         
Rafael Correa 65.7 66.7 66.1 65.6 74.2 63.9 65.7  
Lucio Gutiérrez 9.9 20.7 12.6 10.3 7.6 6.8 10.3  
Álvaro Noboa 7.7 2.4 7.0 7.5 4.3 10.7 7.5  
Other/Null 16.7 10.2 14.3 16.7 13.9 18.6 16.5  












         
Rafael Correa 96.4 3.6 10.1 83.4 2.2 4.3 65.7  
Lucio Gutiérrez 92.9 7.1 12.3 83.3 1.5 2.9 10.3  
Álvaro Noboa 98.9 1.1 9.3 93.3 1.1 6.2 7.5  
Other/Null 96.5 3.5 10.1 83.6 2.0 4.4 16.5  















         
Group-Centred         
SD1 .002 .057 .014        .001       .042 .027   
SD2 .237 .249 .239        .237       .286 .228   
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP  
Rafael Correa    .001           .002    
Lucio Gutiérrez .036           .028    
Álvaro Noboa .024           .015    
Other/Null .013           .018    
 
N = 2619. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) 
in LAPOP’s 2010 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that 
voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share received from 
each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-
centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the ethnic 
group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .25 (100 percent divided by four vote 
outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-
identified, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010 and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (http://cne.gob.ec/es/). 
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The breakdown of each candidate’s vote share by ethnic group confirms the trend 
implied by the group-centred analysis. Correa’s appeal appears to have been more or less 
proportionately distributed across all ethnic groups (Table 4.5c), and this is reflected in an 
extremely low candidate-centred ethnicisation score of just .002 (Table 4.5d). Gutiérrez’s 
score is slightly higher, reflecting the disproportionate support for the PSP among 
indigenous-language speakers (who comprised 7.1 percent of Gutiérrez’s vote, but just 3.5 
percent of the full sample) and whites (12.3 percent of Gutiérrez’s share, compared to a 
sample proportion of 10.1 percent). Noboa’s score is similar to Gutiérrez’s although the 
Noboa’s disproportionately poor performance among indigenous groups produces a slightly 
higher standard deviation from the sample proportions. 
In summary, the analysis of vote distributions in the 2009 election indicates relatively 
low levels of ethnicisation. Correa, in particular, appears to have appealed widely across 
ethnic groups, winning clear majorities in each case. Relatively speaking, Gutiérrez did 
slightly better among indigenous-language speakers, and Noboa was particularly weak 
among indigenous voters (according to both linguistic and self-identification measures). Yet, 
in general, the examination of group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation in 2009 suggests 
ethnicity had only a very limited impact on vote choice. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
Table 4.6 shows the marginal effects of various voter characteristics on the predicted 
probability of voting for each major candidate in Ecuador’s 2009 election. Full results from 
the base mlogit model are included in Appendix B. 
First, as in 2006, the regression analysis only generates significant marginal effects 
for one candidate in 2009. An indigenous-language background is associated with a 10.7 
percentage point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Gutiérrez. However, self-
identification as indigenous is also linked to an 8.8 percentage point decrease compared with 
mestizos, while self-identification as white is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase. 
These somewhat contradictory findings result from the peculiar relationship between the two 
ethnicity measures with regard to Correa’s and Gutiérrez’s vote. In general, it is probably not 
useful to interpret either ethnicity variable in this case. The effect for the linguistic measure is 
highly dependent on ethnic self-identification (the former is nowhere near statistical 
significant if self-identification is excluded from the model), and the effects of both variables 
are based on relative few observations (just 12 indigenous-language speakers, and four self-
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TABLE 4.6: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009 
 
 CORREA GUTIÉRREZ NOBOA 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Parents speak indigenous language .026 .090 [.107*] .045 [-.062] .061 
White (Mestizo) .022 .040 .043^ .025 -.035 .035 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -.019 .099 [-.088**] .015 [.000] .073 
Indigenous (White) -.041 .114 [-.131**] .027 [.136^] .073 
Income .011 .011 .003 .005 .000 .007 
Female -.016 .034 -.002 .017 .025 .027 
Age .002 .001 .000 .001 -.001 .001 
Trust in parties .017^ .010 .002 .007 -.017* .007 
Participation in protests -.070* .028 .016 .024 .008 .022 
National economy has improved .111** .042 -.031 .021 -.050* .025 
Personal finances have improved .064^ .038 .003 .023 -.045^ .024 
Resides in highlands (coast) .063* .026 .020 .020 .002 .026 
Resides in Amazon (coast) -.053 .051 .074* .029 .021 .039 
Resides in rural area .085* .040 .046^ .025 -.083** .029 
Rightist ideology -.017** .005 .008* .003 .005 .004 
Wealth redistribution .007 .011 -.018** .006 .014 .010 
Social security .000 .011 .016 .010 -.014 .010 
Nationalisations .026** .007 -.008* .004 -.011* .005 
Free trade .008 .007 -.006 .005 -.017** .006 
Limit opposition voice .028** .008 -.015** .004 -.004 .006 
Direct democracy -.017^ .009 .010* .005 .003 .007 
Minorities are a threat .013 .009 -.001 .005 -.008 .008 
N= 1410. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in 
Appendix B. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses. Square brackets “[x]” 
indicate parameter estimates that are especially questionable; see discussion in main text. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2010. 
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identified indigenous respondents, report voting for Gutiérrez in the model sample). For the 
purposes of the current discussion, then, it is probably sufficient to note the overwhelming 
support among indigenous voters in general for Correa – in the model sample, 67.4 percent of 
self-identified indigenous voters supporter Correa (31 out of 46), and 63.1 percent of 
indigenous-language speakers (41 out of 65) – and to avoid straining the interpretation of 
coefficients that are both highly sensitive to other variables and reliant on few observations.  
Aside from the ethnicity variables, the analysis generates several statistically 
significant effects for other voter characteristics. With regard to political attitudes, Correa’s 
state-interventionist agenda appears to have won him support among leftists (‘Rightist 
ideology’) and those who favoured further nationalisations (‘Nationalisations’). However, all 
things being equal, voters’ attitudes towards state-led wealth redistribution (‘Wealth 
redistribution’) had no statistically significant effect on Correa’s vote.125 In contrast, 
Gutiérrez’s record of neoliberal adjustment during his 2002-2005 presidency may help 
explain the increased support for the PSP among rightist voters and among those opposed to 
state interventionism (in this case, both in terms of opposition to state-led wealth 
redistribution and nationalisations). Opposition to nationalisations also increased Noboa’s 
vote probabilities. This is the effect we might expect given Noboa’s personal background as a 
wealthy private businessman, his frequent criticism of state interventionism in Ecuador and 
elsewhere, and PRIAN’s neoliberal programmatic agenda. Finally, the analysis finds no 
statistically significant effects for income (‘Income’), suggesting that no single candidate 
drew disproportionate support from any particular socioeconomic sector in 2009.  
A key feature of the 2009 elections was that Correa ran as the incumbent. As a result, 
we might expect voters’ broad assessment of Correa’s first-term performance to influence 
voting preferences, and the analysis provides some indication that this was in fact the case. 
Positive, compared to negative, views of the national economy (‘National economy has 
improved’) are associated with an 11.1 percentage point increase in Correa’s predicted vote 
probability, while higher levels of trust in political parties (‘Trust in parties’) is associated 
with a 1.7 percentage point increase for a one-unit change on the 1-7 scale. Voters who had 
not taken part in political protests in the preceding year (‘Participation in protests’) were also 
more likely to have supported Correa (by 7.0 percentage points). Both the latter two measures 
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 As indicated with regard to previous vote models, the lack of significance for this measure may result from a 
lack of variation in voter attitudes (most voters support the policy goal), as well as most candidates declaring 
their commitment to reducing inequality. 
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can be read as partial proxies for broader voter satisfaction with the political status quo and 
with the currently dominant political actors. In general, these measures had the reverse 
associations for Correa’s principal challengers, particularly in Noboa’s case. Negative 
economic assessments, participation in protests, and low levels of trust in political parties 
were all positively associated with a vote for PRIAN.  
As in 2006, region was also a significant vote predictor in 2009, with Correa 
significantly more popular in the highlands (compared to coastal areas) and Gutiérrez gaining 
greater support in the PSP’s Amazon stronghold. Both Correa and Gutiérrez also won support 
among rural voters (increased vote probabilities of 8.5 and 4.6 percentage points, 
respectively, compared with urban voters). Meanwhile, urban residence was associated with 
an 8.3 percentage point increase in Noboa’s vote probability. As indicated in the discussion 
of the 2002 and 2006 results, this chapter would argue that both region and urban/rural 
residence may capture a latent effect for community and organisational loyalties linked to 
clientelistic relations. However, as in 2002 and 2006, the LAPOP data provide no means of 
testing these hypotheses directly, and thus any inferences remain speculative.126  
In summary, this chapter suggests that the largely negligible effect of ethnicity on 
vote choice in 2009, at least in statistical terms, is the combined result of Correa’s 
overwhelming support among indigenous voters, the relative lack of variation in survey 
responses to ethnicity measures, and wider factors linked to Ecuador’s social and political 
context. With regard to the latter, this chapter argues that weak ethnic identification 
(compounded by limited survey measures), numerous electoral cross-pressures, and the 
presence of a dominant incumbent all contributed to a lack of observable ethnic voting in 
2009. Indeed, several of the non-ethnic voter characteristics that produce statistically 
significant effects in the 2009 analysis – ideology and associated issue stands, region, 
rural/urban residence, and assessments of the incumbent – would appear to support such 
hypotheses. However, data limitations severely limit the scope of the 2009 vote analysis, and 
thus the interpretation of these findings remains dubious. 
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 Support for a president’s general right to limit the voice of the political opposition (‘Limit opposition voice’) 
was, unsurprisingly, associated with a vote for the incumbent Correa. As discussed in relation to Bolivia’s 2009 
election, this measure is probably best read as support for the specific incumbent to limit the voice of the 
specific political opposition of the time, rather than more normative voter preferences about executive powers. 
162 
 
Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
 As in previous cases, the analysis of indirect effects in Ecuador’s 2009 election 
generated no statistically significant results.127 Once again, however, the low number of 
survey respondents who either self-identified as indigenous or reported family knowledge of 
an indigenous language severely restricts the mediation analysis. Thus, this chapter’s findings 
of negligible indirect effects of ethnicity in the 2009 presidential elections come with the 
same caveats concerning data limitations that applied to previous vote analyses. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter’s analysis of ethnic voting in Ecuador’s recent presidential elections has 
been significantly restricted by limitations in the available data. The exceptionally low 
number of survey respondents who report non-mestizo identities or family knowledge of an 
indigenous language results in very little variation on these key independent variables, and 
thus the potential for identifying meaningful statistical relationships between ethnicity and 
vote choice is sharply reduced.  
However, this chapter has also argued that several features of Ecuador’s specific 
electoral and wider sociopolitical context may also have contributed to the limited evidence 
of ethnic voting. Comparatively weak ethnic identification across much of Ecuadorian 
society, the presence of multiple candidates whose appeals cross-cut ethnic divides, and the 
especially contradictory set electoral cross-pressures faced by many Ecuadorian voters (and 
perhaps particularly indigenous voters), may have combined to reduce the prevalence of 
observable ethnic voting. Data limitations, particularly the lack of wider measures of 
ethnicity such as cultural identification, have precluded the exploration of more subtle 
potential effects for ethnicity on voting. Nevertheless, where these contextual conditions were 
arguably most conducive to ethnic voting in the 2002 election – with more limited 
competition for the indigenous vote, where support from indigenous and social movements 
coalesced behind a single candidate (reducing the prevalence of cross-pressures based on 
organisational loyalties and interests), and where no incumbent sought re-election – the 
analysis did find some evidence that ethnicity shaped electoral preferences. This lends some 
weight to the propositions regarding contextual influences outlined above.  
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 Results from the mediation analysis are included in Appendix B. 
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In sum, further research is needed to assess better the ways in which ethnicity shapes 
electoral behaviour in Ecuadorian elections. This chapter has offered some tentative (and 
partial) explanations for the pattern of electoral behaviour observed in three recent 
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 This chapter examines ethnic voting in Peru’s 2006 and 2011 presidential elections. In 
many respects, Peru is an anomalous case as far as ethnic politics in the Andes is concerned. 
Despite demographic and societal features that are comparable with its regional neighbours – 
a large and marginalised indigenous population, substantial ethnic inequalities, and pervasive 
discrimination – ethnic movements and parties have been conspicuously absent in Peru. A 
number of factors may account for such exceptionalism, and these are briefly outlined below. 
Nevertheless, this chapter argues that, despite the absence of a major indigenous movement 
or party, ethnicity still plays an important role in contemporary Peruvian politics and in 
electoral behaviour particularly. Prominent presidential candidates have employed ethnic 
appeals in their campaigns since the 1990s, and voting outcomes at both the group and 
individual level are shaped in important ways by ethnicity. Indeed, this chapter’s analysis 
outlines trends in Peruvian voting behaviour, and in wider sociopolitical and specific 
electoral contexts, that are in many ways comparable with the Bolivian case examined in 
Chapter Three. However, the chapter also concludes that Peruvian electoral politics is 
considerably more inchoate, and ethnicity’s role in shaping voters’ preferences is 
considerably more volatile and conditional than in Bolivia. Compared to Ecuador, the 
evidence for ethnic voting is considerably stronger in both Peruvian electoral cases. 
As in the preceding chapters, the Peruvian analysis is framed in terms of three 
conceptual models of ethnic voting: the expressive model, in which voting constitutes a 
largely unconditional expression of psychological ethnic group allegiance or prejudice; the 
heuristic model, where voters’ employ ethnic stereotypes to aid candidate evaluations; and 
the indirect model, where ethnic background shapes electorally significant political attitudes. 
However, the available survey data preclude a direct test to distinguish expressive from 
heuristic motivations, although the analysis may at times suggest the predominance of one or 
the other form of ethnic voting (for example, significant electoral effects for ethnocentrist or 
racist-attitude variables might suggest expressive voting). Thus, as in Chapters Three and 
Four, the analysis in this chapter tends to attribute the direct impact of ethnicity on voting 
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outcomes to a broadly defined ethnic bias, conceived as some combination of expressive and 
heuristic ethnic voting. Chapter Six offers further insight into the micro-level nature of ethnic 
voting along these lines through the examination of experimental data from Peru. 
Peruvian Exceptionalism 
In terms of ethnic politics, Peru has often been considered an outlier among the 
central Andean countries. Unlike Bolivia and Ecuador, Peru has not produced a nationally 
relevant indigenous movement, or an indigenous political party that has been able to compete 
successfully in national elections (Albó 1991; Degregori 1993; Paredes 2008; Van Cott 
2005). Several indigenous organisations have formed at the local or regional level in Peru 
(Degregori 1993; Green 2006; Cánepa 2008; Paredes 2008), and some indigenous-based 
electoral movements have also performed well in subnational elections. However, neither 
these electoral movements, nor the indigenous organisations from which they have emerged, 
have been able to translate their local success to the national level (Madrid 2012, 109-12). As 
a result, the Peruvian indigenous movement remains weak and fragmented at the national 
level, and no indigenous parties have emerged to compete in national elections. The 
following paragraphs discuss the causes of this surprising omission and outline the 
implications for electoral behaviour. 
 First, some scholars have argued that pervasive anti-indigenous discrimination may 
help explain the relative lack of indigenous mobilisation in Peru. Such discrimination has not 
only discouraged indigenous individuals from identifying publicly as indigenous, but the 
underlying discriminatory discourse of indigenous inferiority has also shaped important 
aspects of government policy. In particular, scholars have argued that such discriminatory 
beliefs underpinned the state-led development policies of the mid-twentieth century, which 
equated rural development with cultural ‘deindigenisation’. Such deindigenisation was to be 
achieved through education projects to promote Spanish literacy and discourage traditional 
practices, and through the co-option of indigenous communities into class-based peasant 
organisations (Paredes 2008, 14-25; Davies 1974; Manrique and Flores Galindo 1986; 
Degregori 1990, 1998; Mallon 1995; de la Cadena 1998, 2000, 2008; Manrique 2002; 
Reñique 2004). Such ‘deindigenisation’ was aided by the mass migration of rural indigenous 
Peruvians to the major cities, particularly Lima, from the 1960s onward. This sociopolitical 
context not only led many indigenous Peruvians to abandon their cultural markers and 
practices (as a result of migration and/or to avoid social stigma), but in many cases it also 
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made it strategically more useful to organise along non-ethnic lines. Peasant organisations 
and class-based urban interest groups typically had greater access to state resources and 
channels of political influence than did indigenous communities (Paredes 2008, 14-15; 
Yashar 2005).    
A second explanation for the lack ethnic mobilisation in Peru focuses on the historical 
strength of leftist parties. For example, Roberta Rice (2012, 29) argues that strong and 
cohesive indigenous movements tend to emerge in countries where indigenous people have 
been incorporated by multiclass, populist parties, rather than in countries with a historic 
pattern of class-based peasant mobilisation. According to Rice, the political left had only 
limited success historically in establishing class-based organisations in Bolivia and Ecuador. 
As a result, both indigenous traditional forms of association (e.g., ayllus and comunas) and 
ethnic identities persisted alongside the class-based identities promoted by leftist parties. In 
contrast, the Peruvian left was far more successful in fostering forms of popular political 
incorporation in which class-based identities and organising predominated. Ultimately, these 
ended up overshadowing ethnic identification in Peru (Rice 2012; Rovira 2014). 
A third explanation for the lack of an indigenous movement in Peru emphasizes the 
more recent internal conflict of the 1980s and early 1990s. The political opening created by 
democratisation in the early 1980s was precisely the context in which indigenous movements 
emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador. However, despite a similar return to civilian government, 
internal conflict severely inhibited any form of political organising in Peru, particularly in the 
highlands where the majority of indigenous people reside. Indeed, the Shining Path 
insurgency targeted many incipient indigenous and peasant leaders and organisations in the 
highlands, pre-empting the development of a national indigenous movement in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, even when the security situation improved in the early 1990s, the authoritarian 
and centralising government of Alberto Fujimori continued to restrict political associational 
space. Lack of political opportunity, then, may partly explain the absence of a national 
indigenous movement (Van Cott 2005, 163-66; Yashar 2005; Rice 2006).129  
A combination of these factors is likely to have contributed to the absence of a 
national Peruvian indigenous movement, and it is not the intention of the current discussion 
to adjudicate the relative worth of alternative explanations. However, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the lack of a national indigenous movement in Peru is a primary cause of the 
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 Other scholars have partially contested this argument, pointing to Amazonian indigenous organisations that 
continued to develop and mobilise throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Greene 2006; Cánepa 2008). 
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subsequent absence of an indigenous political party. Indeed, although institutional factors 
may also have played some role (e.g., exceptionally prohibitive party-registration 
requirements), this chapter argues that such social movement factors were probably more 
influential (Madrid 2012, 112-8; Blancas Bustamente 2005; Van Cott 2005). As a number of 
studies have shown, the indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador provided crucial 
material and human resources to facilitate the formation of subsequent political parties (Van 
Cott 2003). The indigenous movements also played a wider, but no less important, role in 
raising ethnic consciousness among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo groups and in 
politicising ethnic identities in ways that linked ethnicity to broader substantive issues (Van 
Cott 2003, 2005; Yashar 2005; see also discussion in Chapters Three and Four). These social 
movement factors were key to the development of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Ecuador, 
and thus the absence of a comparable social movement in Peru may have contributed to the 
absence of a Peruvian indigenous party. 
Peru’s exceptionalism in this regard has certain implications for voting behaviour. 
First, and most generally, it underlines the relatively low salience of ethnicity in national 
politics; ethnic identity is not a banner around which Peruvians have traditionally mobilised. 
For example, unlike in Bolivia where the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) 
extended suffrage to indigenous citizens in the 1950s, literacy restrictions on voting remained 
in place in Peru until 1980. These restrictions de facto excluded many indigenous Peruvians 
from electoral participation, even in the brief interludes of democratic rule that allowed for 
competitive elections. Even once such restrictions were lifted, the principal parties that 
contested the 1980 and 1985 elections – the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 
(APRA), Acción Popular (AP), and the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) – largely avoided 
ethnic appeals in their campaigns, preferring to focus on class-based, clientelistic, and 
personalistic appeals (Madrid 2012, 121; Cotler 1995). Moreover, few of these Lima-based 
parties recruited indigenous candidates; just five percent of congressional candidates had 
indigenous names between 1980 and 1990 (Paredes 2008, 12). Although leftist parties in the 
1980s directed some policy proposals towards Peru’s indigenous population (e.g., demands 
for the recognition of indigenous land rights, bilingual education, and the protection of 
natural resources), their appeals were primarily class-based, and they did not seek to mobilise 
voters around ethnic identities explicitly (Madrid 2012, 122). Thus, judging from Peru’s 
twentieth-century political history, we might not expect ethnic appeals to be a conspicuous 
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element in most parties’ electoral strategies, and we might not expect ethnicity to feature 
prominently in voters’ electoral considerations. 
Second, the previous discussion of Peru’s exceptionalism suggests that the lack of 
ethnic mobilisation is not simply the result of institutional barriers or the electoral strategies 
of political elites, as outlined above. Rather, the lack of ethnic mobilisation may in part 
reflect weak ethnic identification and consciousness in Peruvian society more broadly. 
Indeed, according to the 2010 survey from the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), just 3.3 percent of Peruvians self-identified as indigenous, compared to 19.0 
percent of Bolivians.130 Furthermore, national census data indicate that the proportion of 
Peruvians who speak an indigenous language has dropped steadily throughout the latter half 
of the twentieth century, from over fifty percent in 1940 to just fifteen percent in 2007 
(Pajuelo Teves 2006, 43; Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 2007, 94-7). This 
decline would appear to corroborate the ‘deindigenising’ effects of mestizaje and mass 
migration as outlined previously. In terms of contemporary voting behaviour, if fewer 
Peruvians identify socially in ethnic terms, then ethnic appeals reliant on psychological 
attachments to ethnic group identities are unlikely to resonate widely. Similarly, ethnic 
prejudice is likely to be somewhat less widespread and less politically salient. Overall, weak 
ethnic identification and limited ethnic consciousness are likely to reduce the occurrence of 
ethnic voting, particularly along the lines of the expressive model. 
Third, weak ethnic identification and limited ethnic politicisation cast doubts on the 
electoral relevance of ethnic heuristics in Peru. Without an indigenous movement to connect 
wider substantive issues with certain ethnic identities in voters’ political perceptions, 
Peruvian voters may not attribute particular explanatory value to ethnic heuristics. If an 
ethnic perceptual frame is not considered useful as a means to assess and understand political 
actors and issues, then heuristic ethnic voting is likely to be extremely limited.  
Finally, if indigenous candidates have limited opportunities to compete in national 
elections, then voters may often face a ballot paper without a major indigenous candidate on 
it. The lack of an indigenous movement may deprive indigenous leaders of the organisational 
resources to launch a national campaign, while anti-indigenous discrimination may limit 
indigenous opportunities in mainstream parties (Paredes 2008). If there is no indigenous 
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candidate on the ballot, then indigenous voters – irrespective of their electoral priorities – are 
unable to engage in ethnic voting.  
Ethnic Voting without Ethnic Movements or Parties 
However, despite its partial exceptionalism along the lines outlined above, Peru also 
shares key social, cultural, and political characteristics with its Andean neighbours. In many 
cases, these similarities relate to sociopolitical factors that are conducive to ethnic voting in 
Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, in Ecuador. First, and most generally, although Peru lacks a 
national indigenous movement or party, prominent mestizo and indigenous-mestizo 
candidates have employed various electoral appeals in their campaigns, and the empirical 
evidence is indicative of widespread ethnic voting. Indeed, Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), and Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) have all pursued electoral 
strategies that, at least in broad terms, fall within Raúl Madrid’s definition of ethnopopulism, 
and they have all won disproportionate support among indigenous voters.131 This chapter’s 
analysis finds strong statistical evidence for ethnic voting in Peru’s 2006 and 2011 elections 
specifically, and Chapter Six presents experimental data from Peru that are clearly indicative 
of ethnic voting behaviour. Thus, despite the relative absence of explicit ethnic mobilisation 
in recent Peruvian political history (and the continued absence of a national indigenous 
movement or party), ethnicity has nevertheless emerged as an important component of 
contemporary electoral politics.  
Second, although the electoral context outlined above is not necessarily indicative of 
individuals who identify strongly in ethnic terms, it does suggest some degree of ethnic 
consciousness. Indeed, this chapter argues that although ethnic identification is generally 
weaker in Peru, and ethnic polarisation is lower, at least compared with Bolivia, ethnic 
identities are still socially salient in several respects. For example, many Peruvians retain a 
sense of indigenous identity, even if some opt to identify in public as mestizos. Indeed, 
although just 7.4 percent of respondents to LAPOP’s 2012 survey reported self-identification 
with a ‘generic’ indigenous ethnic category (and 79.7 percent self-identified as mestizo), 
other surveys that include a wider range of ethnicity measures (cultural identification, non-
mutually exclusive or continuous measures, linguistic background, and so forth) typically 
produce considerably higher estimates. According to one recent review, most surveys tend to 
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 Although Fujimori is of Japanese descent, as an ethnic minority from a poor Lima neighbourhood, Fujimori 
had far more in common with indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors than many of his electoral opponents 
from the traditional social and political elites (Roberts 1995). 
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put Peru’s indigenous population anywhere between twenty and fifty percent of the national 
population (Sulmont Haak 2010, 11-17). In fact, the LAPOP 2012 data produces somewhat 
comparable estimates itself according to linguistic measures, finding 13.3 percent of 
respondents had knowledge of an indigenous language, and 30.5 percent had at least one 
parent who spoke an indigenous language. In short, most data seem to suggest that a 
substantial minority of Peruvians identify to some extent with an indigenous identity or 
background, conditions that are potentially conducive to expressive ethnic voting.   
More concretely, individuals from an indigenous background, irrespective of how 
they self-identify, are more likely to experience discrimination based on physiological, 
linguistic, and other descent-based attributes (Sulmont 2011). In addition, as in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, Peruvians from an indigenous background tend to be poorer, less educated, and 
have less access to health care than their non-indigenous counterparts (e.g., Hall and Patrinos 
2004, chapter 7; UNICEF 2011, 34-35, 44-49, 62-67). These trends are reflected in the 
LAPOP data examined in this chapter: Peruvians from an indigenous background have an 
average income that is almost thirty percent lower than their non-indigenous counterparts; 
they are less likely to have completed secondary education; and they are twice as likely to 
have experienced discrimination in the year prior to the survey.132 Thus, it seems likely that 
many indigenous and indigenous-mestizo Peruvians may have numerous grievances based on 
persisting ethnic inequalities and discrimination. Such grievances may contribute further to 
expressive ethnic voting by increasing resentment towards privileged or discriminatory 
groups. 
However, ethnic voting in Peru need not be limited to indigenous and indigenous-
mestizo voters. Many white and white-mestizo Peruvians may also have psychological 
attachments to non-indigenous cultures and backgrounds, or a particular antipathy towards 
indigenous groups and identities. As in previous chapters, the analysis presented here uses the 
term white-mestizo to refer to self-identified mestizos who identify more with their European 
family roots (or at least a Peruvian national identity based more on European ancestry and 
culture) and who feel little or no connection to an indigenous cultural or personal 
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 According to LAPOP’s 2012 survey, respondents who had at least one parent who spoke an indigenous 
language had an average monthly household income of $190 (US dollars) compared to $265 for respondents 
with two Spanish-speaking parents. Using the same ethnicity measure, 63 percent of indigenous Peruvians 
reported having completed secondary education, compared to 73 percent of non-indigenous respondents. 
According to LAPOP’s 2010 survey, 32 percent of indigenous respondents reported having experienced 
discrimination based on physical appearance in the preceding year, compared to just 15 percent among non-
indigenous respondents (the 2012 survey did not include questions on discrimination).    
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background.133 Although such white-mestizo backgrounds by no means imply ethnic 
prejudice, there is little doubt that anti-indigenous prejudice is widespread across Peruvian 
society.  Broader ethnic attachments to non-indigenous identities, whether or not combined 
with ethnic prejudice, may well affect the electoral (as well as social) behaviour of non-
indigenous voters along the lines of the expressive model of ethnic voting. 
Third, this chapter argues that ethnic heuristics may still be electorally relevant 
despite ethnicity’s relatively low social and political salience in Peru. Although no 
indigenous movement or party has had the national profile to reinforce a political ethnic 
heuristic in the same way as in Bolivia or Ecuador, a series of Peruvian ethnopopulist 
candidates have performed a similar function, at least in some respects. Although Fujimori, 
Toledo, and Humala campaigned on somewhat distinct programmatic platforms – both 
compared with each other, and compared with the explicitly leftist ethnopopulist candidates 
in Bolivia and Ecuador – all three of these Peruvian candidates focused their attention on the 
lower socioeconomic classes, promised increased social spending, and were critical of, if not 
hostile to, political and economic elites.134 Moreover, their campaigns explicitly linked a non-
elite substantive agenda to their non-elite and non-white (if not indigenous) personal 
backgrounds, while seeking to reinforce popular perceptions about the elite interests and 
political priorities of their white or white-mestizo opponents. 
Indeed, in many cases, Peruvian ethnopopulists have run against candidates from the 
traditional political establishment, or those who are members of social and economic national 
elites: Mario Vargas Llosa was Fujimori’s primary competitor in 1990; Alan García and 
Lourdes Flores comprised the principal opposition to Toledo in 2001 and again to Humala in 
2006; and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was one of three candidates to contest the 2011 election 
with Humala. As well as their personal ties to the political and socioeconomic oligarchy, 
these opposing candidates tended to run on platforms widely perceived as favourable to elite 
interests; they promoted neoliberal reform and foreign investment; and they were harsh critics 
of leftist movements and governments elsewhere in the region. They are also fair-skinned, 
Spanish-speakers, and from middle- and upper-class families from Peru’s major coastal 
                                                          
133
 In fact, 72.2 percent of self-identified mestizos from LAPOP’s 2012 survey sample came from families in 
which neither parent spoke an indigenous language. This compares to 36.2 percent in Bolivia. Although a non-
indigenous language background does not equate to a more European, rather than an indigenous, cultural 
identity, it seems reasonable to infer that at least some of these Spanish-speaking Peruvian mestizos may feel 
little connection to an indigenous identity. Furthermore, more Peruvians than Bolivians self-identified as white 
in the 2010 surveys: 12.8 percent compared to 7.2 percent. 
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 Although all three candidates campaigned initially on these platforms, they all pursued more orthodox 
neoliberal policies once in office.  
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cities. Most travel regularly to the United States and Europe, where many of them were 
educated, have worked extended periods of their professional lives, and have close family 
ties. In these respects, the way in which recent political actors and processes have politicised 
ethnicity in Peru is somewhat comparable to Bolivia and Ecuador, and it seems likely that 
such ethnic politicisation may well have contributed to the construction of a comparable 
ethnic heuristic in Peru. 
In addition to the recent campaign activities of Peruvian ethnopopulists, it seems 
likely that many voters in Peru have also paid attention to the rhetoric and behaviour of 
Bolivian and Ecuador indigenous parties and movements; indeed, the nature and merit of 
leaders and political movements in other Latin American countries have been prominent 
themes in several recent Peruvian campaigns.135 Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that 
Peruvian popular perceptions about the types of substantive agendas linked to certain ethnic 
identities (i.e., ethnic heuristics) may also have been influenced by political discourses and 
developments elsewhere in the region.  
Moreover, even if ethnic identities have only limited salience politically in Peru, there 
is little doubt that Peruvian social relations – everyday social experiences and interactions – 
are shaped significantly by ethnicity. Ethnic background remains an important determiner of 
social and economic status and sociocultural values and preferences, and ethnic 
discrimination is pervasive throughout society. Thus, outside the political sphere, social 
experiences in the context of ethnic inequalities may have taught many Peruvian voters the 
relevance of an ethnic heuristic for understanding and predicting the broad values, interests, 
and behaviour of social others. In short, even without strong ethnic identification, and in the 
absence of a national indigenous movement or party, there are ample reasons to believe that 
Peruvian voters may make use of ethnic heuristics in their electoral decision-making. 
However, it is also likely that heuristically derived assessments of electoral candidates may 
be comparatively more fragile in Peru and subject to substantial re-evaluation in the context 
of new information. With regards to this chapter’s analysis, the use of ethnic heuristics may 
contribute to an observable ethnic bias in voting outcomes, although the survey data cannot 
easily determine whether such bias results from expressive or heuristic voting. However, the 
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experimental data examined in Chapter Six strongly suggest the latter, providing evidence for 
widespread ethnic heuristic use in the decision-making of Peruvian voters.  
Fourth, the lack of indigenous candidates or parties need not preclude ethnic voting, 
even along expressive lines. As Madrid has argued, voters may still prefer an ethnically 
proximate candidate to an ethnically distant alternative in cases where no co-ethnic candidate 
stands (2011, 275-6). As discussed, many mestizo and indigenous-mestizo candidates have 
employed ethnic appeals in recent Peruvian elections, and these candidates may provide some 
degree of descriptive representation for indigenous, as well as indigenous-mestizo, Peruvians. 
In fact, given the weakness of ethnic identification in Peru, many voters may identify more 
closely with such indigenous-mestizo candidates in descriptive terms than with an indigenous 
candidate running on an explicitly indigenous platform. The ethnic voting patterns identified 
in this chapter’s analysis indicate a clear preference for ethnically proximate candidates, 
corroborating (in 2006) and extending (to 2011) Madrid’s analysis in this respect. More 
generally, this thesis argues that ethnic voting should not be restricted conceptually to cases 
of strict co-ethnic support, particularly in societies such as those in the Andes where ethnic 
identities are multiple and fluid. 
Finally, the societal conditions outlined above, in which individuals from distinct 
ethnic backgrounds tend to be divided spatially, socially, and economically, are likely to 
produce similar substantive interests and preferences within ethnic groups. On the one hand, 
such ethnic divisions mean many co-ethnics will often share material interests because of 
similar social circumstances (e.g., indigenous Peruvians are disproportionately poor, they 
make up a majority of agricultural workers, and so forth). On the other hand, such divisions 
mean individual voters may be socialized in diverse cultural environments, leading to broad 
ideological preferences and values that are similar within, and distinct across, ethnic groups. 
In this context, it is quite conceivable that ethnic voting patterns at the group level may 
simply reflect substantive preferences and interests shaped by ethnic background. However, 
although the analysis in this chapter finds some evidence for this indirect form of ethnic 
voting, it also suggests a more direct effect for ethnic background on vote choice indicative of 
ethnic bias. 
In summary, despite weak ethnic identification, low ethnic polarisation, and the 
absence of a national indigenous movement or party, Peru exhibits certain broad 
sociopolitical conditions that are conducive to ethnic voting. In these respects, Peru is 
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comparable with its regional neighbours, Bolivia and Ecuador. Although the ethnic 
dimension to Peruvian ethnopopulism has been notably less prominent, at least compared to 
Bolivia, Peru’s post-1980 political landscape both helped raise ethnic consciousness and 
reinforced an ethnic heuristic. Increased ethnic consciousness, combined with long-standing 
ethnic inequalities and discrimination, may help strengthen (and itself implies) feelings of 
ethnic solidarity, resentment, or prejudice. Thus, there is some reason to believe that 
expressive ethnic voting may occur in Peru. With regard to ethnic heuristics, both long-term 
sociocultural experience and more recent political developments (both within Peru and 
elsewhere in the region) may have worked to connect an indigenous (or non-white) ethnic 
background with a political agenda that promotes inequality reduction, poverty assistance, 
public works, and non-elite nationalism. In contrast, a white or white-mestizo identity may 
have become linked to orthodox neoliberalism, an institutionalised and/or technocratic style 
of government and, for some voters, the promotion of national and international elite interests 
to the detriment of social equality. 
However, if Peruvian voters identify less strongly with ethnic group identities, and 
ethnic relations are relatively less polarised, then we might expect ethnic voting patterns to be 
more volatile and conditional. In particular, we might expect ethnic allegiances to be 
considerably weaker than in either Bolivia or Ecuador and, therefore, expressive ethnic 
voting to be less predominant. More generally, we might expect the effect of ethnic bias – 
both expressive and heuristic – to be more easily countered by other, non-ethnic voting 
criteria. Nevertheless, at least as far as electoral politics is concerned, this chapter argues that 
Peruvian exceptionalism may often be overstated. Ethnicity has emerged as an important 
component of contemporary electoral processes in Peru, and voters’ perceptions of ethnic 
identities and issues are likely to influence electoral behaviour in ways that are variously 
comparable with Bolivia and Ecuador. 
The Emergence and Significance of the Indigenous Vote in Peru 
 Although the politicisation of ethnicity in Peru has occurred later and in some respects 
to a lesser degree than in Bolivia and Ecuador, several prominent electoral candidates have 
successfully exploited Peru’s ethnic differences for electoral benefit. In many ways, these 
Peruvian ethnopopulists have adopted electoral strategies and achieved patterns of electoral 
results similar to their Bolivian and Ecuadorian counterparts. In some other respects, 
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however, Peruvian ethnopopulism has diverged from both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian 
experiences. 
The first notable use of ethnic appeals in a recent presidential campaign was by 
Alberto Fujimori in 1990.136 Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, emerged as the 
surprise winner in 1990, defeating the renowned Peruvian novelist – and electoral frontrunner 
– Mario Vargas Llosa. Although Fujimori’s appeal was more populist than ethnic, his 
campaign also capitalised on Peru’s ethnic divides and inequalities (Degregori 1991; 
Levitsky 1992; Carrión 1997, 286-7). Fujimori concentrated his campaign in poorer areas, 
offered a range of concrete policy proposals aimed at poorer voters, and criticised traditional 
parties and elites (Degregori 1991; Roberts 1995; Graham and Kane 1998; Taylor 2001, 6-7). 
Although he remained vague about his own economic policies, he explicitly criticised Vargas 
Llosa’s prescription of neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ to tackle Peru’s economic crisis (Roberts 
1995, 100).137  
However, Fujimori also framed his electoral contest with Vargas Llosa in ethnic 
terms, and he employed a range of symbolic ethnic appeals. At one point, he described the 
campaign as ‘one chino and four cholos against the whites’, contrasting his own background 
as a non-white immigrant and the indigenous-mestizo (cholo) background of his four vice 
presidential candidates to the white, upper-class background of Vargas Llosa (Carrión 1997, 
287).138  In fact, Fujimori and his co-candidates had far more in common with Peru’s 
highland indigenous and urban cholo voters than did the aristocratic Vargas Llosa (Roberts 
1995, 94), and Fujimori used these loose descriptive ties – including ethnic ties – to reinforce 
the claim that he would be ‘a President like you’ (Cambio 90 1990, np). In the 1990 election, 
then, Fujimori combined ethnic, personalist, anti-establishment, and substantive policy 
appeals to win clear majorities in highland indigenous constituencies, as well as strong 
support among Peru’s lower class, indigenous-mestizo urban voters (Madrid 2012, 123-4, 
132-4). 
In the 2001 elections, Alejandro Toledo employed even more explicit ethnic appeals 
in his campaign and won similarly impressive vote shares in indigenous areas (Madrid 2012, 
126-7). However, like Fujimori, Toledo also relied heavily on populist and personalist 
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 Fernando Belaúnde, founder of Acción Popular, also included ethnic appeals as a component of his broader 
nationalist-populist project in the 1960s (Belaúnde Terry 1959 [1994], 26-40). 
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 Once in office, however, Fujimori enacted neoliberal reforms that went far beyond those originally proposed 
by Vargas Llosa. 
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 Despite his Japanese origins, Fujimori was often referred to as el chino.  
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appeals. He made a range of substantive policy pledges (e.g., to extend public health 
insurance, introduce an agricultural bank, and develop water and sanitation infrastructure) 
and declared himself ‘the President for the poor’. Toledo foregrounded his own humble 
origins as a shoe-shiner, and he emphasised his outsider status – in this case, in relation to the 
corrupt Fujimori regime (Madrid 2012 134-5; Lee 2010). Yet Toledo also made much of his 
ethnic background as an indigenous Peruvian. He publicly identified himself, and was widely 
referred to, as El Cholo, and his campaign employed numerous symbolic ethnic appeals: 
Toledo compared himself to the Incan emperor Pachacútec; he adopted an Incan cross as the 
party’s logo; and he regularly appeared at campaign rallies in indigenous dress (Madrid 2012, 
125-7; Barr 2003, 1164; García and Lucero 2008; Lee 2011).139 Moreover, Toledo forged 
alliances with several indigenous organisations, and he recruited numerous indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo candidates to his party lists (Paredes 2008, 10; Madrid 2012, 126).  
Like Fujimori in 1990, then, Toledo offered both substantive and descriptive 
representation to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo Peruvians. Although his promise to be a 
president for the poor was key to Toledo’s appeal, so too were the ethnic descriptive ties 
between Toledo and many non-white voters. As Toledo’s wife, Eliane Karp, observed in 
reference to the 2000 campaign, Toledo established an ‘irrepressible chemistry’ with many 
lower-class, non-white Peruvians, for whom ‘an ethnic factor, a brutal identification’ played a 
key role (Relea 2000, 8). In the 2001 election, Toledo won more than fifty percent of the vote 
in most indigenous-majority provinces, comfortably out-performing his principal rivals, 
APRA’s Alan García, and the PPC’s Lourdes Flores (Madrid 2012, 126-7).  
 Finally, Ollanta Humala emerged as the prominent ethnopopulist candidate in 2006.  
Humala was a dark-skinned former army colonel with a Quechua name, whose family 
originated from Peru’s southern highlands. Like Fujimori and Toledo before him, Humala’s 
appeal was primarily populist, yet ethnic appeals were also important to his electoral 
platform. Indeed, the analysis in this chapter finds a significant association between a voter’s 
ethnic background and a vote for Humala in the 2006 presidential elections, an association 
replicated in 2011 when Humala ran again. In both cases, Humala performed 
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disproportionately well in indigenous areas (Madrid 2012, 129), just as Fujimori and Toledo 
had done in 1990 and 2000, respectively.140 
In summary, three out of Peru’s last four presidents have been elected in campaigns 
that employed some form of ethnic appeal. Fujimori (1990), Toledo (2001), and Humala 
(2011) all won disproportionate shares of the indigenous vote and, with it, the presidency.141 
Humala also topped the 2006 first-round vote and won a clear majority of indigenous votes in 
the process. These candidates both physically and biographically resembled Peru’s non-elite, 
non-white majority to a far greater extent than their principal electoral opponents, who were 
typically drawn from the traditional political and economic elites. Such descriptive 
representation, combined with explicit ethnic appeals that encourage pride in Peru’s 
indigenous heritage, may well have contributed to increased ethnic consciousness among 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Like in Bolivia and Ecuador, pride in Peru’s 
indigenous culture and heritage has also been linked to patriotism and a popular nationalism. 
For example, in 2006 Humala spoke of the ‘real Peruvians’ he had met in the national police 
and armed forces, before citing a list of indigenous surnames (Caballero Rojas 2006; cited in 
Madrid 2012, 128).  
Moreover, all three of these candidates also presented themselves as political 
outsiders, foregrounded their own humble origins and closeness to the people, and made 
substantive programmatic appeals aimed at non-elite sectors and interests (e.g., poverty 
subvention programmes, public investment in key infrastructure projects in poorer areas, a 
higher minimum wage, and so forth). Thus, these Peruvian ethnopopulists appealed to 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters on both substantive and ethnic grounds. This 
chapter’s analysis indicates that, at least with regard to the 2006 and 2011 elections, both 
types of appeal were central to Humala’s electoral success. 
Overview of the 2005 and 2009 Presidential Elections 
Several features of the Peruvian 2006 and 2011 presidential elections were conducive 
to ethnic voting along the lines outlined above. Most importantly, both elections included at 
least one major candidate who made explicit ethnic appeals to voters, as well as a prominent 
opponent who was popularly linked to a white, elite, Lima electoral base. All things being 
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 The 1995 election was fought more on Fujimori’s record, and the 2000 election was plagued by allegations 
of fraud (Toledo still won a majority of indigenous voters in first-round voting in 2000, before withdrawing 
from the second round in protest). 
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equal, such electoral conditions are conducive to both expressive and heuristic ethnic voting, 
and they constitute a point of convergence with the Bolivian cases examined in Chapter 
Three.  
However, unlike Bolivia, where only two candidates were viable contenders, in the 
two Peruvian elections three or four candidates had a realistic chance of winning the 
presidency. Moreover, in both these cases, the major candidates represented various (and 
inconsistent) combinations of descriptive and substantive traits, including at least two 
candidates who made some appeals to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo constituencies. For 
example, Bolivia’s 2005 and 2009 elections were two-way contests between an indigenous 
candidate at the head of a leftist, redistributive, nationalist party with strong support in 
highland regions (Evo Morales), and a white, wealthy businessman and career politician from 
the lowlands, who led a centre-right coalition promising neoliberal orthodoxy (Jorge Quiroga 
and Manfred Reyes Villa, respectively). In Peru’s 2006 and 2011 elections, in contrast, 
Humala’s nationalist, ethnopopulist platform faced competition for the indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo vote from several candidates. In 2006, García won support among many 
lower-class voters, including some indigenous voters, based on his centre-left, populist 
appeals. In 2011, Keiko Fujimori combined neoliberal macroeconomic policy with wide-
ranging pledges to expand social programmes, and she capitalised on clientelistic networks 
and ‘partisan’ loyalties among many poor and indigenous voters dating from her father’s 
presidency (Sánchez-Sibony 2012, 113). Former president Alejandro Toledo also generated 
some support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in 2011, drawing both on 
ethnic descriptive ties and his personal ‘rags-to-riches’ story as an emblem of cholo 
aspirationalism.  
In some of these latter respects – competition for the indigenous vote, candidates who 
appeal across regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic divides, and the resulting electoral cross-
pressures on voters – the Peruvian cases bear some resemblance to the Ecuadorian campaigns 
examined in Chapter Four. However, despite such cross-cutting electoral appeals, Humala 
remained the clearest perceived representative of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo 
constituencies in both the 2006 and 2011 Peruvian elections, and he received the endorsement 
of most indigenous and peasant organisations. Indeed, the electoral environment in Peru 
resulted in a considerably less fragmented indigenous vote compared with Ecuador, where 
Pachakutik, Rafael Correa, Lucio Gutiérrez, and several traditional leftist parties all claimed 
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sectors of the indigenous electorate and won support from diverse factions across influential 
indigenous and social movements.  
Nevertheless, polling during the 2006 and 2011 Peruvian campaigns indicated 
electoral preferences that were extremely volatile, and the likely outcome of the first-round 
vote remained highly uncertain even on election day (Ipsos 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Thomson 
Reuters 2011). In terms of ethnic voting, such volatile electoral preferences suggest weak and 
conditional voter-candidate ties. Combined with weak ethnic identification at the individual 
level and low ethnic polarisation at the group level, such voter-candidate linkages are not 
indicative of expressive ethnic voting. However, this type of inchoate electoral environment 
may be particularly conducive to the use of heuristics, including ethnic heuristics. In this 
respect, the Peruvian case diverges from the Ecuadorian examples. Organisational affiliations 
– to indigenous organisations, social movements, church groups, as well as political parties 
and candidates – and associated clientelistic relations are arguably less developed and/or less 
political influential in Peru compared with Ecuador, with the result that the Peruvian 
electorate is perhaps especially inchoate and non-aligned electorally. Thus, although lingering 
ethnic attachments and prejudice may play a role in Peruvian voting behaviour, this chapter 
argues that heuristic ethnic voting is more consistent with Peru’s contemporary electoral 
context in both 2006 and 2011.  
 
PERU 2006 
The ballot for the first round of the 2006 Peruvian general elections included twenty 
presidential candidates, with polls indicating that at least five candidates were viable 
contenders in the weeks before polling day (Ipsos 2006). Unsurprisingly given the wide 
electoral field, no single candidate won an absolute majority in the first round of voting, 
leading to a runoff election between the first- and second-placed candidates: Ollanta Humala 
(Unión por el Perú, UPP) and former president Alan García (APRA). García ultimately won 
the second round with 52.6 percent of the valid vote, gaining the majority of those voters who 
had supported the third-placed candidate, Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional, UN). In addition 
to Humala, García, and Flores, the principal first-round challengers included Martha Chávez, 
the candidate for ex-president Alberto Fujimori’s party-movement Alianza por el Futuro 
(AF), and former interim president Valentín Paniagua (Frente de Centro, FC). The ruling 
party, Perú Posible (PP), withdrew its presidential candidate because of party in-fighting over 
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congressional lists and extremely low approval ratings for the out-going incumbent, 
Alejandro Toledo.142 
The three leading candidates for most of the campaign – Humala, García, and Flores – 
drew their base of support from quite distinct constituencies. Humala and the UPP relied on 
the support of poorer indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters from Peru’s southern 
highlands, and their campaign centred on these constituencies. Although Humala never 
presented himself as an indigenous candidate, his name, appearance, and family background 
all conveyed his Andean origins and contrasted him to the other two candidates in 2006, 
García and Flores, who are both light-skinned Limeños. Furthermore, throughout his 
campaign Humala frequently employed symbolic ethnic appeals, just as Alberto Fujimori and 
particularly Toledo had done in 1990 and 2001. Humala reminded voters in interviews that he 
had been named after an Incan general (Fregosi 2007, 8); he chose an Inca clay pot as his 
party’s logo; he used the rainbow flag of the Incas for campaign rallies and materials; and he 
periodically dressed in indigenous clothing and used Quechua phrases (Madrid 2012, 127).  
In addition to these symbolic appeals, Humala included numerous indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo candidates on the UPP’s congressional lists (Paredes 2008, 11), and he 
forged some alliances with peasant and indigenous organisations (Madrid 2012, 127-8). The 
UPP’s governing plan also embraced several indigenous demands, including the redefinition 
of Peru as a multicultural country, support for multicultural education and the wider use of 
indigenous languages, and the recognition of indigenous customs and medicine (Humala 
Tasso 2006, 70-1; cited in Madrid 2012, 128). Humala also frequently denounced the ethnic 
discrimination suffered by Peru’s indigenous and indigenous-mestizo communities, and he 
emphasized the indigenous heritage of all ‘real Peruvians’ (Caballero Rojas 2006). 
However, Humala fell very much within Madrid’s definition of an ethnopopulist. 
Indeed, arguably more important than his ethnic appeals was Humala’s use of conventional 
populist appeals. His campaign was highly personalised; it focused primarily on poorer 
Peruvians; and it regularly attacked the political establishment and perceived US imperialism 
(Madrid 2012, 136-44). Humala’s populist credentials also led to parallels being drawn 
between him and left-populist leaders elsewhere in the region, particularly Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia – associations that ultimately damaged Humala’s 
candidacy (Pimental 2011, 26). Indeed, Humala’s meetings with both Chávez and Morales in 
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early 2006, as well as Chávez’s public endorsement of Humala and repeated criticism of 
García and Flores, fuelled repeated attacks on Humala by his domestic opponents. Both 
García and Flores used such associations to stoke fear among centre-right voters about the 
influence of Humala’s ‘friends in Cuba and Venezuela’ and to exaggerate the radicalism of 
Humala’s political project (Martín and García 2006). 
 In contrast to Humala’s indigenous and indigenous-mestizo highland base, Flores 
drew her support almost exclusively from Lima’s wealthier white and white-mestizo classes. 
Through her personal background, appearance, and political affiliation (the PPC is the 
principal traditional party of the centre-right), Flores was firmly associated with Lima’s 
middle and upper classes (Cameron 2006, np). The UN’s programme offered neoliberal 
continuity and social conservatism, and it was well supported among Lima’s business 
community. Between the two poles of Humala and Flores, García sought to position himself 
as a centre-left moderate who offered the path of ‘responsible change’ (APRA 2006). He 
distanced himself from the more radical aspects of his 1985-1990 presidency, and he attacked 
Humala as a demagogue and a puppet of Chávez. Yet García also echoed Chávez in his 
criticism of Flores, condemning her as ‘the candidate of the rich’ who, against the wishes of 
the electorate, wanted to take Peru down ‘the path to the Right’ (Chávez 2006, 14; 
Chuquizuta 2006). Ultimately, García’s strategy paid off as the APRA candidate narrowly 
beat Flores to win second place, and then, with the reluctant support of many UN voters, 
defeated Humala more comfortably in the second round. 
In summary, although the extent of polarisation in Peru’s 2006 electoral campaign 
does not compare to the Bolivian cases discussed in Chapter Three, the former constituted a 
somewhat comparable, though more fragmented, electoral landscape. In Humala and Flores, 
Peruvian voters were faced with two candidates who proposed quite distinct political agendas 
and reflected quite different sectors of Peruvian society. On the one hand, Humala was a 
mestizo with Andean origins who combined ethnic and populist appeals to mobilise support 
among poorer indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Most of these voters lived in Peru’s 
highland and Amazon regions, they had been historically excluded from national politics, and 
they had experienced few of the benefits of recent economic growth. On the other hand, 
Flores was a career politician from the white Lima elite who led a well-established 
conservative party of the centre-right. Both the UN’s political programme and Flores 
personally were widely perceived as sympathetic to the interests of the same wealthy, white, 
Limeño classes.  
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Thus, the 2006 Peruvian presidential election included many of the same ingredients 
conducive to ethnic voting that marked the Bolivian campaigns examined in Chapter Three: 
an electorate in which regional and ethnic divides were often aligned with economic and class 
inequalities, and an electoral field that included two prominent candidates who drew much of 
their support from different sides of these correlated cleavage lines. Unlike Bolivia, however, 
Peru’s 2006 campaign also included a viable third candidate in García, who, under Peru’s 
electoral rules, was able to win the presidency by ensuring he was at least the second-choice 
candidate for a majority of voters. 
Official Results and LAPOP Data 
This chapter focuses on the first-round vote and primarily on the top three candidates 
(Humala, García, and Flores), although it includes brief mention of the fourth-placed Chávez. 
Together, these top three candidates won almost eighty percent of the valid votes. Humala 
topped the first-round count (30.6 percent), García (24.3 percent) finished just marginally 
ahead of Flores (23.8 percent), and Chávez finished fourth with 7.4 percent.  
The 2006 LAPOP survey was conducted some months after the first-round vote and 
estimated the official results with a good degree of accuracy (see Table 5.1a). The Peru 
survey included the standard LAPOP questions on generic ethnic self-identification (white, 
mestizo, indigenous) and family linguistic background (one or both parents had knowledge of 
an indigenous language). It also included the same measures as other LAPOP surveys for 
income and political ideology. However, there were no direct measures of respondents’ 
support for wealth redistribution or nationalisations in Peru 2006, and this analysis only tests 
a measure of support for a free-trade agreement with the United States. Although this is not 
directly comparable to the wealth redistribution or nationalisation questions employed in 
other LAPOP surveys, it may capture some broader attitudes towards state interventionism 
and macroeconomic policy. Finally, the 2006 survey did not include direct questions about 
ethnic attitudes, although it asked respondents about their experience of ethnic 
discrimination. In addition to the discrimination measure, this chapter tests the effects of 
respondents’ level of trust in Peruvian indigenous organisations as a partial proxy for broader 
attitudes to indigenous groups. 
Group- and Candidate-centred Ethnicisation 
 Table 5.1 shows breakdown of the 2006 presidential vote according to ethnic group, 
including both group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores. Group-centred scores offer 
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TABLE 5.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Peru 2006  
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP Total  
LAPOP 
Total 









Ollanta Humala 15.4 17.0 3.0 26.2 3.3 32.4 30.6 
Alan García 19.3 7.1 4.2 20.9 1.3 26.5 24.3 
Lourdes Flores 15.8 5.1 3.8 16.6 0.5 20.9 23.8 
Martha Chávez 2.2 0.7 0.2 2.3 0.2 2.9 7.4 
Other/Null 12.0 5.3 2.0 14.6 0.7 17.3 13.9 










        
Ollanta Humala 24.7 48.4 22.4 32.4 53.8 32.4  
Alan García 29.9 20.2 31.7 25.9 21.8 26.5  
Lourdes Flores 24.5 14.4 28.8 20.5 9.0 20.9  
Martha Chávez 3.4 2.0 1.8 3.0 3.8 2.9  
Other/Null 18.6 15.1 15.3 18.1 11.6 17.3  












        
Ollanta Humala 47.5 52.5 9.2 80.7 10.1 32.4  
Alan García 73.2 26.8 15.9 79.1 5.0 26.5  
Lourdes Flores 75.7 24.3 18.3 79.1 2.6 20.9  
Martha Chávez 75.8 24.2 8.2 83.8 8.0 2.9  
Other/Null 69.4 30.6 11.7 84.2 4.1 17.3  















        
Group-Centred        
SD1 .035 .064 .053 .004 .089   
SD2 .091 .154 .107 .098 .179   
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   
Ollanta Humala  .173   .027   
Alan García  .084   .018   
Lourdes Flores  .109   .034   
Martha Chávez  .110   .033   
Other/Null  .046   .024   
        
N = 1281. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read 
separately) in LAPOP’s 2006 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic 
group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share 
received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and 
candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within the 
ethnic group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote 
outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural 
identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2006 and the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (www.onpe.gob.pe). 
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a general measure of the distribution of votes across candidates within each ethnic group, and 
they give some indication of the relative salience of ethnicity to different groups. Candidate-
centred scores reflect the proportion of a candidate’s total vote share received from each 
ethnic group and thus provide insight into the electoral base and appeal of different 
candidates. 
 Overall, both group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are somewhat lower 
for Peru’s 2006 election than for the two Bolivian cases. This is what one might expect given 
the Peruvian socioethnic context described above. Nevertheless, Table 5.1 also shows some 
disproportionality in vote distributions across ethnic groups and in the ethnic composition of 
candidate vote shares in this Peruvian case.143  
Group-Centred Ethnicisation 
The group-centred scores Table 5.1d indicate slightly lower levels of vote 
concentration within ethnic groups compared with the Bolivian cases (lower SD1 scores in 
the Peruvian case), but considerably high concentrations compared with Ecuador (compare 
with Tables 3.1d, 3.8d, 4.1d, 4.3d, 4.5d). The SD2 scores are considerably lower than Bolivia 
and both the later Ecuadorian cases (2006 and 2009), although they are broadly comparable 
with Ecuador 2002. Higher SD2 scores underline the overall fragmentation of the vote in 
Peru and, as a result, the smaller standard deviations from the equal-share mean (in this case 
20 percent). 
Nevertheless, the pattern of group-centred ethnicisation scores follows a similar trend 
to that in Bolivia and Ecuador (although less pronounced than the former), with the highest 
scores in the linguistic and self-identified indigenous groups, mid-level scores in the self-
identified white group, and the lowest scores among mestizos. In terms of specific candidate 
preferences, Table 5.1b shows both indigenous groups disproportionately favoured Humala in 
their vote choice, with the UPP candidate winning 48.4 percent of voters with an indigenous-
language background and 53.8 percent of self-identified indigenous voters (compared to 
Humala’s overall LAPOP vote share of 32.4 percent). As a result, García and particularly 
Flores won disproportionately low proportions of the indigenous vote; indeed, Flores carried 
just 9.0 percent of self-identified indigenous voters. However, she performed particularly 
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 Given the data limitations outlined in Chapter Four, comparison between Peru and Ecuador is less useful. In 
general, Peru’s group-centred scores are higher (indicating more homogeneous voting preferences within ethnic 
groups), while candidate-centred scores are roughly comparable (although the Ecuadorian equivalents vary 
considerably across candidates and electoral cycles).  
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well among self-identified white voters, winning a 28.8 percent share of that group compared 
to her overall LAPOP share of 20.9 percent. García also did well among self-identified 
whites, winning a 31.7 percent share (compared to his overall proportion of 26.5 percent), 
while Humala won a respectable 22.4 percent (but still 10.0 percentage points below his 
overall share).  
Overall, the decomposition of vote distributions within ethnic groups suggests some 
degree of ethnic bias, with a clear indigenous preference for Humala and a more modest 
preference among white and non-indigenous mestizos for García and Flores. Of the latter 
two, García appears to have won the broadest cross-section of support, with relatively 
proportional vote shares in most groups. 
Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
The breakdown of each candidate’s vote share by ethnic group confirms these trends. 
More than half (52.5 percent) of Humala’s vote came from indigenous-language voters, 
despite the group comprising just 35.2 percent of the overall sample (Table 5.1c). According 
to the self-identification groups, indigenous voters accounted for 10.1 percent of Humala’s 
supporters, although only 6.1 percent of the sample self-identified as indigenous. Both García 
and Flores relied on non-indigenous language voters for around three-quarters of their vote 
(73.2 percent and 75.7 percent, respectively), with just 5.0 percent for García and 2.6 percent 
for Flores coming from self-identified indigenous voters. On the other hand, while only 9.2 
percent of Humala’s vote came from self-identified whites, 18.3 percent of Flores’ supporters 
were white, as were 15.9 percent of García’s.  
These vote compositions result in higher candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for 
Humala and Flores and relatively low scores for García (Table 5.1d). Humala’s linguistic-
group score is noticeably higher than his self-identification score, indicating that the UPP 
performed particularly well among indigenous-mestizos (many of whom self-identify as 
mestizo) in addition to winning strong support among self-identified indigenous. Flores, in 
contrast, has a higher score on the self-identification measure, reflecting her disproportionate 
support from white voters and disproportionate rejection by self-identified indigenous voters. 
As the group-centred analysis suggests, García’s vote was the most diverse, and the APRA 
leader’s candidate-centred scores are considerably lower than those for either Humala or 
Flores on each of the ethnicity measures. 
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The breakdown of vote distributions in Peru’s 2006 election, then, suggests a 
significant role for ethnicity in voting. The following analysis helps determine whether these 
patterns of overall vote share can be causally linked to ethnicity, or whether other, non-ethnic 
factors may explain such voting behaviour. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
Table 5.2 shows the effects of various voter characteristics on the predicted 
probability of voting for each major candidate in 2006. The results are elaborated from a 
multinomial logit (mlogit) model that tests the effect of ethnicity, sociodemographic factors, 
and various economic and political perceptions and attitudes on first-round vote choice. The 
full results of the model are reported in Appendix V. 
Ethnicity Variables 
First, as the overall vote share analysis suggests, the results reported in Table 5.2 
indicate a significant role for ethnicity in shaping vote choice, particularly in terms of the 
linguistic measure. Indeed, an indigenous-language background is associated with a 13.3 
percentage point increase in the overall probability of voting for Humala and a 6.9 percentage 
point decrease in the probability of voting for Flores. However, once other factors are 
controlled for, linguistic group has no significant impact on García’s vote probability.  
However, the ethnic self-identification measure generates few significant effects, with 
only the effect of indigenous over white voters reaching a generous .10 significance level 
(indicating a 16.4 percentage point increase in probability in favour of Flores if the voter is 
white). However, these estimates are based on extremely low cell counts for the relevant 
cross-tabulations (e.g., only two out of 39 self-identified indigenous voters reported voting 
for Flores), and thus provide a weak basis for wider inferences. Indeed, in the case of Peru 
2006, the linguistic variable is probably more useful analytically than the self-identification 
measure, providing both higher cross-tabulation cell counts and capturing a more consistent 
behavioural divide among voters.144 
The significant effects of the linguistic measure and, for the most part, non-significant 
effects of the self-identification variables underline the relative low electoral salience of 
ethnic identification in Peru. However, the electoral significance of a voter’s family linguistic 
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 This is not unique to the Peruvian case. Several studies of ethnic voting elsewhere have found linguistic 




TABLE 5.2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006 
 
 HUMALA GARCÍA FLORES CHÁVEZ 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Parents speak ind. language .133** .044 -.013 .031 -.069** .023 -.017^ .010 
White (Mestizo) -.060 .040 .065 .048 .043 .042 -.037** .008 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -.028 .061 .068 .096 -.120 .083 .091 .083 
Indigenous (White) .032 .071 .003 .118 -.164^ .097 .127 .081 
Income -.018* .008 -.008 .010 .028** .009 .000 .003 
Female -.092** .028 -.022 .029 .134** .021 -.012 .011 
Age .000 .001 .002^ .001 -.002* .001 .000 .001 
Trust in parties -.028** .009 .012 .014 .001 .012 .002 .005 
Participation in protests .085* .038 -.006 .069 -.064 .067 -.023 .023 
National economy improved -.036 .058 -.059 .040 .075^ .042 .007 .016 
Personal finances improved -.017 .049 .024 .032 -.015 .051 -.049^ .027 
Resides in north (Lima) -.001 .045 .079 .062 -.080^ .040 .008 .017 
Resides in Amazon (Lima) .113^ .068 -.100* .044 -.079 .055 .026 .030 
Resides in highlands (Lima) -.039 .057 .025 .060 -.042 .037 -.024* .011 
Resides in rural area .040 .046 -.021 .059 .050 .051 -.011 .017 
Grew up in rural area .072^ .037 -.061 .051 -.052 .046 .013 .014 
Rightist ideology -.041** .007 .016^ .010 .018* .007 .002 .003 
Supports FTA with USA -.180** .033 .108** .034 .087** .029 -.013 .011 
Limit opposition voice -.029 .026 .029 .035 -.031 .028 .037** .013 
‘Strongman’ populist leader .027 .027 -.011 .036 -.048 .030 -.009 .015 
N= 655. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in 
Appendix V. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2006. 
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group suggests that wider sociocultural background, rather than explicit ethnic self-
identification, still influences vote choice. A combination of lingering ethnic attachments, 
common social experiences, and perhaps the use of an ethnic heuristic – connecting ethnic 
background with a broad range of likely preferences, priorities, and characteristics beyond 
those tested explicitly in the statistical models – may help shape voting preferences across a 
wide demographic. In short, the significance of the linguistic measure suggests a role for 
ethnic bias, but one that is not entirely derived from strong psychological group attachments, 
which are more likely to be captured by self-identification measures. 
Non-Ethnic Variables 
In addition to the ethnicity variables, the 2006 vote analysis generates a number of 
significant effects for voters’ non-ethnic characteristics. Table 5.2 shows significant effects of 
voter income (‘Income’), gender (‘Female’), trust in political parties (‘Trust in parties’), 
participation in political protests (‘Participation in protests’), and having a rural background 
(‘Grew up in rural area’). It also indicates a significant relationship between vote choice and 
both political ideology (‘Rightist ideology’) and support for the Free Trade Agreement with 
the United States (‘Supports FTA’). Of particular interest to the current analysis are the 
effects of income, political ideology, and support for the FTA. 
First, Table 5.2 shows significant effects of voter income on vote choice. Wealthier 
voters were more likely to vote for Flores in 2006, with a one-unit increase in income band 
producing a 2.8 percentage point rise in predicted vote probability. In contrast, income was 
negatively associated with a vote for Humala (a 1.8 percentage point decrease), and it had no 
significant effect on García’s vote probabilities. These findings add weight to the 
characterisation of Flores as ‘the candidate of the rich’, while underlining the appeal of 
Humala’s ethnopopulist platform among poorer voters.  
Second, political ideology had significant effects on predicted vote probabilities for 
all three major candidates. A one-unit change from left to right on the ideology scale was 
associated with a 4.1 percentage point decrease in Humala’s vote, and a 1.6 and 1.8 
percentage point increase for García and Flores, respectively. Humala, then, appealed to 
voters not only along ethnic and class lines, but also in terms of political ideology, winning 
greater support among leftist voters even when other factors are controlled for. García and 




Finally, approval of the FTA with the United States, which was due for ratification 
shortly after the election, was associated with an 18.0 percentage point drop in the predicted 
probability of voting for Humala and an increase in support for both his rivals (10.8 
percentage points for García and 8.7 for Flores). The FTA was a key issue in the 2006 
campaign, and each candidate’s stand on the subject appears to have played an important role 
in the electoral calculations of many voters. Humala promised to repeal the agreement, while 
both García and Flores promised ratification, albeit in García’s case on the condition of some 
renegotiation of its terms. As discussed above, although attitudes towards the FTA did not 
necessarily translate into broader macroeconomic preferences, the variable can be taken as a 
partial proxy for voters’ endorsement or opposition to the neoliberal policy model pursued by 
previous Peruvian governments. This model was explicitly rejected by the Humala campaign, 
but it was broadly endorsed (albeit with varying degrees of qualification) by both García and 
Flores. 
In addition to these variables, several other features of the 2006 vote analysis are 
worthy of note. First, without an incumbent in the race, voters’ perception of national 
economic performance (‘National economy has improved’) appears to have had only limited 
influence on electoral preferences. Nevertheless, voters who believed the national economy 
had improved in the previous year were 7.5 percentage points more likely to vote for Flores 
than voters who perceived no change or a worsening of macroeconomic performance. Of the 
three major candidates, Flores may well have been seen as the presidential option offering the 
greatest continuity in terms of economic policy.  
Second, voters who had participated in political protests in the previous year were 8.5 
percentage points more likely to vote for Humala than those who had not, while lower trust in 
political parties also increased Humala’s predicted vote probability by 2.8 percentage points 
for a one-unit change on the 1-7 response scale. Humala, in short, appears to have appealed to 
many voters along traditional populist lines, winning support among voters dissatisfied with 
the political status quo.  
Third, and perhaps surprisingly, region is not particularly significant once other 
factors are controlled for, although all things being equal Amazonian voters were more likely 
to vote for Humala than were Lima residents. However, voters who grew up in rural areas 
were 7.2 percentage points more likely to support Humala compared to those raised in urban 
areas, even if current urban-rural residence was not a significant vote predictor. The former 
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variable may pick up a particular indigenous-mestizo constituency that is not captured fully 
by linguistic group or explicit ethnic self-identification, incorporating urban migrants of 
indigenous descent with voters who remain in rural areas. 
In summary, the initial analysis of Peru’s 2006 vote suggests a causal role for 
ethnicity, particularly in terms of linguistic background. Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo 
voters were far more likely to support Humala even when a wide range of potential 
confounders are controlled for, while white and non-indigenous voters were more likely to 
back García or Flores. However, in addition to Humala’s apparent ethnic appeals, his populist 
programmatic appeals were also important. Humala appealed to voters who were generally 
poorer, more leftist in their ideology, from rural backgrounds, and more opposed to 
neoliberalism than supporters of García and Flores. The following section, which examines 
the interaction of ethnicity with income, political ideology, and support for the FTA, offers a 
more detailed assessment of how ethnic and non-ethnic factors may have combined to shape 
voting outcomes in Peru’s 2006 election. 
Decomposed Effects 
In addition to the main effects reported in Table 5.2 the 2006 vote analysis also 
examined the interaction of ethnicity with other non-ethnic voter characteristics (Figures 5.1 
and 5.2). This decomposition analysis examined the predicted vote probabilities (APRs) and 
average marginal effects (AMEs) on vote probabilities according to various interactions 
between ethnicity and non-ethnic voter characteristics.145 Detailed output from the 
decomposition analysis is included in Appendix V, but some noteworthy findings are 
summarised below. Examining the interactions of ethnicity with these non-ethnic voter 
characteristics can help both to assess the relative salience of ethnicity to vote choice across 
groups and to understand better how ethnic and non-ethnic factors combine to determine 
electoral outcomes.  
Income 
The main effects reported in Table 5.2 suggest a negative effect for income on 
Humala’s vote probabilities, a positive effect for Flores, and no effect for García. Overall, the 
decomposed effects are broadly in line with these trends, yet they also reveal some important 
nuances. First, Humala’s populist appeals to lower-income voters did not seem to resonate 
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 Both APRs and AMEs are calculated from the same base mlogit model used in vote analysis in Table 5.2 
with additional two-way interaction terms for ethnicity with each non-ethnic vote predictor. 
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N = 655; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the 
candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average 
marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression 
model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output). 












































































































FIGURE 5.2: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group, Peru 2006 
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   N = 655; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the 
candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients are average marginal effects 
(AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-
way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output). 





















































































with non-indigenous voters in 2006. Among indigenous-language and self-identified 
indigenous voters, as well as self-identified mestizos, Humala’s APRs increased from around 
thirty percent at higher income levels to around sixty percent at lower income levels.146 
However, among non-indigenous language and self-identified white voters Humala’s APRs 
remained in the thirty percent region irrespective of income. These findings suggest some 
form of ethnic bias (either positive among indigenous voters, or negative among non-
indigenous voters, or both) conditioned Humala’s income-based appeal. The principal 
beneficiary was the centre-left García, who had comparable APRs to Humala among poorer 
non-indigenous voters (around thirty percent), with both candidates preferred over Flores 
(APRs below twenty percent).   
In summary, although income clearly influenced vote choice in Peru’s 2006 election, 
its effects were somewhat conditional on ethnic background. Humala’s ethnopopulist 
platform appealed to many poor voters but particularly to those with some indigenous 
background. Poorer non-indigenous voters, however, were equally likely to vote for García as 
Humala. Wealthy voters across all ethnic groups were more likely to vote for Flores than 
otherwise comparable poor voters, although Flores won very few indigenous votes overall, as 
we have seen. 
Political Ideology 
The main effects indicate a positive association between leftist ideology and a vote for 
Humala, while more rightist ideology was associated with support for García and Flores. The 
decomposition analysis does little to alter this overall interpretation, with the AMEs 
replicating the trend in main effects in most cases.  
However, the APR plots in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 can help demonstrate the substantive 
impact of different hypothetical voter profiles on likely vote choice. The effect of political 
ideology can be seen in the comparison between two hypothetical non-indigenous language 
speakers, one leftist and one rightist (Figure 5.1). Although the leftist voter was most likely to 
vote for Humala (APRs close to fifty percent, compared to less than twenty percent for both 
García and Flores), the rightist voter was more likely to choose APRA or the UN (APRs 
around thirty-five percent, compared to fifteen percent for Humala). Similarly, a rightist 
indigenous-language voter was most likely to vote for García (thirty to forty percent) or 
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 As in Chapter Three, APRs are rounded to the nearest five percent. In most cases, confidence intervals are 
sufficiently wide to make more precise estimations inappropriate. In any case, the objective of the 
decomposition analysis is to examine broad trends rather than precise point estimates. 
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possibly Flores (twenty-five percent), while a leftist voter from the same background was far 
more likely to support Humala (APRs over sixty percent). The APR plots can also help 
underline the impact of ethnic bias on likely vote choice. Indeed, in most cases voters with an 
indigenous-language background were significantly more likely to vote for Humala, and 
significantly less likely to vote for Flores, than ideologically comparable non-indigenous 
voters (Figure 5.1).147 Once again, then, the decomposition analysis suggests substantive 
preferences and ethnic bias combine to shape voting outcomes. 
Approval of FTA with the United States 
The main effects indicate that attitudes on this policy issue were a highly significant 
predictor of vote choice, a finding confirmed by analysis of the decomposed effects. 
However, there are signs that the effects of this policy variable were also conditioned, at least 
to some extent, by ethnic biases. For example, approval of the FTA was associated a decrease 
of between fifteen and twenty percentage points in the predicted probability of voting for 
Humala across all ethnic groups. However, although the APRs are comparable in each group 
among opponents of the FTA (around forty to fifty percent), there are some significant ethnic 
differences among supporters of the FTA that are indicative of ethnic bias: whereas 
indigenous and indigenous-mestizo supporters of the FTA still have APRs of voting for 
Humala of around twenty to thirty percent, the APRs for non-indigenous mestizos and whites 
drop below twenty percent. Thus, although voters’ position on the FTA issue had important 
effects on vote probabilities, positive ethnic bias among indigenous voters and/or negative 
bias among white voters appears to have mitigated these policy effects, at least in Humala’s 
case. 
Similarly, ethnic bias appears to have played a significant role in conditioning the 
effects of support for the FTA on the predicted probability of voting for Flores. Although 
approval of the FTA was positively associated with a vote the UN across all groups, the AME 
is only statistically significant for non-indigenous mestizos (i.e. the non-indigenous language 
group and self-identified mestizo group). The APRs indicate that indigenous-language 
supporters of the FTA were still significantly less likely to vote for Flores compared to non-
indigenous voters, despite the UN’s explicit promise to ratify the agreement. On the other 
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 These ethnic differences were less pronounced in García’s case, however, underlining APRA’s broad 
demographic appeal in 2006. 
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hand, whites who opposed the FTA were generally more likely to support Flores than 
attitudinally comparable mestizos.148  
In short, voters’ position on Peru’s ratification of the FTA with the United States 
clearly affected electoral considerations. Humala’s promise to repeal the agreement 
significantly increased his support among voters who agreed with the UPP’s position, while 
the (conditional) endorsement of the FTA by both García and Flores gained them votes 
among the FTA’s supporters. However, these policy effects were still conditioned by ethnic 
bias. Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters who supported the FTA were just as likely to 
vote for Humala as García – and more likely to vote for Humala than Flores – despite each 
candidate taking clear stands on the issue. White voters, for their part, were generally more 
likely to vote for Humala if they opposed the FTA, although a considerable minority still 
reported support for García and Flores (APRs above twenty percent for both).  
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups and Issues 
 As discussed at the start of this case study, the 2006 Peru survey did not include any 
direct measure of ethnic attitudes. There were, however, several questions about experiences 
of discrimination, as well as a variable measuring trust in Peru’s indigenous movements. 
These measures were tested for their effect on vote choice, both in terms of main effects and 
via their interaction with ethnicity measures. However, the analysis generated few useful 
results. Some brief points of interested are summarised in the text below, and the full 
statistical output is included in Appendix V. 
The analysis finds no significant main effects for voters’ trust in the indigenous 
movement or their experience of discrimination. However, in the interaction with the self-
identification measure of ethnicity, the analysis suggests a possible positive relationship 
between experience of discrimination and a vote for Humala among indigenous voters, 
although the AME is not statistically significant (p = .136). Only when the political attitude 
measures are dropped from the model does the effect of discrimination reach statistical 
significance (p < .05). The analysis also generates a negative coefficient for trust in the 
indigenous movement in the white group (with regard to Flores), although once again the 
AME is not significant (p = .155). However, in Humala’s case, the AME for the indigenous 
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 The FTA issue was also important for García’s vote, although in this case the AMEs are largely comparable 
across ethnic groups.  
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group is positive and significant (at the .10 level; p = .062), indicating a 4.0 percentage point 
increase in vote probability. 
Overall, then, trust in the indigenous movement and experience of discrimination 
appear to have had little effect on vote choice in 2006. However, the AMEs identified, though 
often not statistically significant, hint at a possible positive relationship between trust in the 
indigenous movement and increased indigenous support for Humala, as well as distrust in the 
movement among whites and support for Flores. If the indigenous movement is taken as a 
proxy for broader indigenous political demands, then this might suggest some ethnic bias 
based on perceived group-based interests.  
Discrimination may also have had some influence on increasing Humala’s support 
among indigenous voters. This might suggest discrimination works to increase resentment 
among victimised groups towards the perpetrators of discriminatory acts – in this case whites 
and white-mestizos and their political representatives (García and particularly Flores). 
Discrimination may also strengthen perceptions that group interests can only be served by 
ethnically proximate candidates who have their group’s interests at heart (heuristic ethnic 
bias), while Humala’s explicit criticism of discriminatory practices may also have had 
increased resonance among victims. 
Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
The mediation analysis for Peru’s 2006 election tests the indirect effects of ethnicity 
on a vote for Humala over García, and for Humala over Flores. However, the analysis finds 
no significant indirect effects for any ethnicity measure in the Humala-García comparison, 
although it does confirm a significant direct effect for an indigenous-language background in 
favour of Humala. Thus, Table 5.3 only reports a summary of ethnicity’s indirect effects on 
the log-odds of voting for Humala over Flores in 2006.149 
The analysis finds significant total indirect effects for an indigenous-language 
background in favour of Humala, but not for any self-identification ethnicity measure. As 
with the direct-effects analysis, it seems that ethnic identification has little impact on 
Peruvian voting behaviour, even indirectly, but the wider sociocultural background captured 
by the linguistic measure is much more influential. Nevertheless, the significant total indirect 
effects for linguistic background on vote choice do not capture the full influence of ethnicity 
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 Full results from the mediation analysis are included in Appendix C. 
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TABLE 5.3: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Peru 2006 
 
 Coefficient SE Significant Mediation Pathway Total N 
Family Linguistic Group (indigenous)    342 
Total indirect effects .084^* .048 Income (.037; -.606*/-.298**)  
Direct effect .114^*
 
.065 Rightist ideology (.037; -.587*/-.310**)  
Total effect .198^* .071    
Proportion of total effect mediated .424     
White (mestizo)    322 
Total indirect effects -.013 .060   
Direct effect -.146^* .068   
Total effect -.159 .088   
Proportion of total effect mediated .081     
Indigenous (mestizo)    298 
Total indirect effects .064 .047 Income (.027; -.767^/-.340**)  
Direct effect .050 .085 Strong leader (.021; 1.281*/.597^)  
Total effect .114 .105   
Proportion of total effect mediated .562     
Notes: Table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of the output can be found in Appendix V. Coefficients 
are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Humala over Flores. ^ and * indicated 
indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to the percentile and bias-correction methods, respectively. ‘Proportion of 
total effect mediated’ is based on the product of coefficients/Y-standardisation method. KHB and LDE are only shown where estimates are 
appreciably different (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways are: overall 
indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of mediator on vote 
choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear or non-linear, depending on the mediator. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2006. 
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on electoral outcomes; the mediation analysis indicates that approximately 42.4 percent of the 
total effect is accounted for by ethnicity’s direct effect on vote choice. In addition, despite 
non-significant total indirect effects, two specific mediation pathways generate significant 
indirect effects for the indigenous self-identification measure (compared to mestizo self-
identification), once again in favour of Humala. The analysis also finds a significant direct 
effect in favour of Flores for self-identification as white (compared with mestizo), but no 
indirect effects.  
More detailed examination of the mediation pathways reveals an important role for 
voter income, political ideology, and voters’ preferred style of political leadership (‘Strong 
leader’) in mediating ethnicity’s effect. First, voter income contributes to significant mediated 
effects for an indigenous-language background and self-identification as indigenous, through 
largely comparable mediation pathways. In both cases, an indigenous background was 
associated with lower household income compared with non-indigenous language voters or 
mestizos, respectively, which in turn was associated with a vote for Humala over Flores. 
Thus, an indigenous background increased support for Humala by helping to determine 
voters’ material conditions. However, this indirect effect based on economic circumstances 
did not account fully for ethnic voting patterns, and an indigenous-language background also 
had a significant direct effect on Humala’s vote, indicative of heuristic or affective ethnic 
bias. 
Second, as we saw in the Bolivian cases, political ideology seems to have played a 
significant mediator role in Peru’s 2006 vote. Overall, an indigenous-language background 
was associated with more leftist ideological views, which in turn were associated with a vote 
for Humala over Flores. As numerous studies have shown, the social and cultural 
environment of an individual’s upbringing has an important role in political socialisation, 
particularly with regard to broad worldviews and attitudes (Campbell et. al. 1960, chapter 7; 
Kinder and Sears 1981). Compared with self-identification, linguistic group is likely to be a 
more reliable measure of a voters’ socioethnic background in which such socialisation takes 
place. In Peru, an indigenous background appears to contribute to more leftist ideological 
positions compared to non-indigenous voters, even when other factors (region, income, 
education, and so forth) are controlled for. However, once again, in the 2006 analysis these 
indirect effects of an indigenous-language background were in addition to, not instead of, 
ethnicity’s direct effects. Thus, the analysis provides only partial support for the indirect 
model of ethnic voting. 
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Third, the analysis suggests that indigenous self-identification may have had an 
indirect effect on vote choice (in favour of Humala) by helping to shape the perceived 
preferred characteristics of political leaders. The ‘Strong leader’ variable measures voters’ 
preference for a president who ‘follows the will of the People even if it means breaking some 
laws’, over a president who ‘always obeys the laws even if the People do not like it’. The 
mediation analysis indicates that self-identified indigenous voters were more likely to express 
preference for the former type of populist leader – a preference that was, in turn, associated 
with a vote for Humala over Flores. This mediation pathway suggests that Humala’s appeal 
as a populist outsider may have had particular traction among indigenous constituents. This 
sector of Peruvian society may be less committed to an institutionalised democratic process 
they see as rigged to favour the vested interests of the economic and political elites, 
preferring a strong, populist leader who will follow the will of the people (Cotler 1995). 
In summary, the mediation analysis finds that voters with an indigenous background 
were more likely to live in lower-income households, to hold leftist ideological views, and to 
prefer a political leader who promised direct implementation of popular demands. Each of 
these predispositions was linked with a preference for Humala over Flores, suggesting that 
Humala’s broad populist appeals, in addition to his ethnic appeals, may have resonated 
particularly with indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. However, the analysis still finds 
significant direct effects for linguistic group and self-identification as white, results that 
suggest heuristic or expressive ethnic bias (or a combination of the two) still has an important 
influence on Peruvian electoral behaviour.  
 
PERU 2011 
 In many ways, Peru’s electoral landscape in 2011 resembled the 2006 campaign. 
Once again, electoral regulations barred the out-going president, Alan García, from running 
for personal re-election, and abysmal approval ratings convinced his party, APRA, to forego 
running an alternative candidate. As in 2006, the electoral field was crowded, with 11 
presidential tickets on the ballot paper come election day, with at least four candidates who 
stood a realistic chance of making the inevitable second round (Sánchez-Sibony 2012, 110-
11). These four candidates offered a similar range of electoral options as Peruvian voters had 
faced in 2006: they reflected many of the same regional, ethnic, and class constituencies; they 
comprised a similar range of populist outsiders, well-known political personalities, and 
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professional technocrats; and they ran on political platforms that, despite their generally 
vague, catch-all nature, offered some broad ideological and programmatic alternatives.  
Ollanta Humala, the eventual winner, again ran on the ticket of a broad centre-left 
coalition, Gana Perú (GP). Under the direction of a new team of Brazilian campaign advisors, 
Humala went to considerable lengths to moderate his more radical 2006 image. The red polo 
shirt, occasional poncho, and fiery highland rallies from the 2006 campaign were replaced 
with a white shirt, a suit and tie, and slick, professional television spots delivered in a sober, 
earnest tone, against neutral backdrops. The more radical proposals from the 2006 manifesto 
(such as calls for a new constitution and the reversal of prior privatisations) were dropped or 
moderated in 2011, with Humala insisting that he would preserve many of the broad aspects 
of current macroeconomic policy. Humala and GP also distanced themselves from Hugo 
Chávez and Evo Morales, preferring to compare their project to the more moderate, and 
widely respected, template of Lula da Silva and the Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil 
(Jímenez 2011). Nevertheless, Humala’s personal and family background, his campaign’s 
continued focus on the lower classes, and its overarching message of a transformation in 
political and economic paradigms, all mean that Humala’s 2011 candidacy can still be framed 
in the broad terms of ethnopopulism.150 
Humala’s eventual opponent in the second round was Keiko Fujimori, popularly 
known by her first name. Keiko was the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, who 
was jailed in 2005 for corruption and human rights abuses committed during his 1990-2000 
government. Despite his criminal convictions, Alberto Fujimori had remained popular among 
many Peruvians, who credited him with ending the armed insurgency of the 1980s and 
controlling Peru’s hyperinflation. Keiko ran on a highly personalistic platform that 
emphasised the key elements her father’s neopopulist political movement: crime reduction 
and citizen security; economic neoliberalism; and direct assistance programmes for the poor. 
Her electoral vehicle in 2011 was Fuerza 2011 (F11), and although she made some efforts to 
separate her candidacy from the more negative aspects of the Fujimori legacy, many 
prominent members of her father’s organisation were candidates or advisors for F11 in 2011. 
The third-placed candidate in 2011 was Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, or PPK as he was 
popularly known. Kuczynski headed the centre-right coalition Alianza por el Gran Cambio 
                                                          
150
 Gana Perú’s manifesto was titled ‘The Great Transformation’ and explicitly advocated strengthening public 
companies (though not nationalisations), reorienting the economy towards national development, introducing 
some price controls (e.g. on gas), and a number of extensions to social programmes aimed at the poor (Gana 
Perú 2011, 14, 58-77, 80-84, 173-8).  
202 
 
(APGC), which included Flores’s PPC and several smaller parties. Indeed, if Humala can be 
seen as reprising his 2006 role as the ethnopopulist candidate in 2011 (albeit a toned-down 
version), then Kuczynski and APGC can be seen as a partial replacement for Flores and UN. 
Kuczynski himself is a Limeño of Polish descent who prior to 2011 worked as an investment 
banker in the United States and as an economist at the World Bank and at Peru’s Central 
Bank. He subsequently served as minister of mining, minister of finance, and ultimately as 
Prime Minister in Toledo’s 2001-2006 government. Kuczynski’s family and professional 
background, the political characteristics of the parties in his coalition, and his personal 
appearance (he is tall and fair-skinned), all contributed to the image of a neoliberal technocrat 
who represented the wealthy, white Lima constituencies that had backed Flores in 2006.  
Unlike Flores, however, Kuczynski’s 2011 campaign attracted particularly vocal 
support from middle- and upper-class university students in several of Peru’s major cities. A 
segment of this support achieved some notoriety via its strident and often racist advocacy of 
Kuczynski’s candidacy. Known as the PPKausas (‘those for the PPK cause’), these activists 
used social media to promote Kuczynski and attack his rivals and their supporters, with 
particularly vitriolic racist tirades directed at the perceived indigenous support base of both 
Humala and Fujimori. The activities of the PPKausas and particularly the wider media debate 
that they provoked brought racist discourses, which are normally confined to closed social 
circles, into the public sphere and worked to increase the salience of ethnicity and ethnic 
issues in the 2011 campaign (Ardito 2011; Bruce 2011; Sifuentes 2011). 
The final viable candidate going into the first-round vote was former president 
Alejandro Toledo, who once again ran on his Perú Posible (PP) ticket. As discussed 
previously in this chapter, Toledo is a dark-skinned, self-declared cholo (indigenous-mestizo) 
who grew up in a poor highland community to the north of Lima. In his previous campaigns 
(1995, 2000, and 2001), Toledo had made much of his indigenous background, and he had 
won disproportionate support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters.  
In 2011, Toledo led opinion polls for much of the campaign, but his base of support 
was badly hit by Kuczynski’s entrance into the race. Indeed, Toledo and Kuczynski ran on 
near-identical platforms, and, having served in the same administration, they often called on 
the same government record to promote their presidential credentials. The presence of both 
Toledo and Kuczynski on the ballot paper split the centrist vote – those voters who feared 
Humala’s ethnopopulism, yet strongly opposed Fujimorismo – and was undoubtedly a major 
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factor in the failure of either Toledo or Kuczynski to reach the second round. However, the 
similarities between the two also make their head-to-head comparison of particular analytic 
interest; it provides a ‘real-world’ case of two candidates who are largely comparable in 
terms of programme and record, but who differ markedly in their respective ethnic 
backgrounds. Analysis of Toledo’s and Kuczynski’s vote characteristics, then, provides an 
opportunity to assess ethnicity’s influence on vote choice through a controlled comparison 
case study.  
As in 2006, these diverse candidate profiles represented and appealed to voters along 
various ideological, regional, ethnic, and class lines. Humala’s ethnopopulist platform 
appealed most to poorer indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in Peru’s highland and 
Amazon regions, while Kuczynski in particular attracted support from the educated, white, 
middle- and upper-classes in Peru’s major cities. Both Fujimori and Toledo drew their 
support from somewhat wider constituencies. Many poorer and indigenous voters were still 
loyal to Fujimori, and the F11 candidate finished second to Humala in most highland and 
Amazon regions. However, the long-term commitment of Fujimorismo to neoliberal reform 
brought it strong support from the business community, and the party appealed to many urban 
middle-class voters concerned with rising crime and insecurity. Toledo’s preference for 
neoliberal economics, evidenced through the policies of his previous government, also won 
him support among many voters from the professional middle classes. Moreover, his personal 
background – including his ethnic profile – gained him support among poorer indigenous 
voters, particularly in his native Ancash department and the Amazon.  
Thus, the 2011 Peruvian campaign included many of the key ingredients conducive to 
ethnic voting that were identified in the previous discussion of the 2006 election (and, indeed, 
in the analysis of the two Bolivian cases). Ethnic, regional, and class divides remained 
pronounced in Peruvian society, and the 2011 electoral field included prominent candidates 
whose personal and political profiles linked them, in the minds of many voters, to particular 
socioethnic groups and interests. The entrance of racial discourses into the public sphere, 
aided by the ‘activism’ of the PPKausas and the associated media attention, contributed in 
particular to the increased salience of ethnic identities and inter-ethnic relations in the 
campaign. Finally, in addition to the juxtaposition of Humala and Kuczynski, the comparison 
of the latter with the programmatically similar Toledo provides a particularly interesting case 
for testing ethnicity’s role in voting. 
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Official Results and LAPOP Data 
 As in 2006, Humala topped the first-round count, winning an almost identical 31.7 
percent of the valid vote. Fujimori finished second with 23.6 percent, Kuczynski third with 
18.5 percent, and Toledo fourth with 15.6 percent. Humala and Fujimori thus progressed to a 
second round runoff, which Humala won with 53.4 percent of the valid vote. The following 
analysis, however, focuses on the first-round vote only. 
The data used come from LAPOP’s 2012 survey. The LAPOP vote-share estimates 
are broadly in line with the official results, although they significantly underestimate support 
for both Kuczynski and Toledo, and overestimate support for Humala and Fujimori (see 
Table 5.4a). These inaccuracies may result, in part, from confusion among respondents about 
the first- and second-round vote (support for both second-round contestants is exaggerated). 
In any case, the vote shares in the LAPOP sample are large enough for meaningful statistical 
analysis, and they follow the general trend of the official results.  
 Nevertheless, some aspects of the vote analysis are limited by the low number of 
observations for particular combinations of characteristics. For example, just nine 
indigenous-language respondents reported voting for Kuczynski in the model sample (i.e., the 
sample once all cases with missing data have been excluded). Just one self-identified 
indigenous respondent voted for Kuczynski, and just four for Toledo. The validity of 
inferences drawn from statistical estimates based on so few observations is highly dubious. 
This problem is compounded by the fact that many questions in the 2012 survey, including 
most questions relating to ethnic attitudes, were only posed to half the sample. Thus, the 
model sample for the analysis of ethnic attitudes is just N = 352, which, combined with the 
low overall frequency of affirmative responses to ethnic attitude questions, severely limits 
this aspects of the Peru 2011 analysis. 
Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation 
 The group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Peru 2011 are reported in 
Table 5.4d. In general, the 2011 SD1 scores are lower compared to 2006, suggesting the 
distribution of votes within ethnic groups was relatively less concentrated in 2011. This is 
probably the result of Humala’s wider appeal in 2011, as well as the multi-ethnic electoral 
base of a rejuvenated Fujimorismo. The SD2 scores are slightly higher than 2006, reflecting 
the overall increase in the vote share of the top two candidates in 2011 (and thus proportions 
that are further from the equal-share mean of 20 percent). 
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TABLE 5.4: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Peru 2011  
 
  LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP  Total 









Ollanta Humala 27.3 18.3 3.4 37.7 4.4 45.5 31.7 
Keiko Fujimori 21.3 6.6 2.5 23.8 1.7 28.0 23.6 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 8.3 1.3 1.1 8.2 0.3 9.6 18.5 
Alejandro Toledo 4.4 2.2 0.4 5.7 0.5 6.6 15.6 
Other/Null 7.6 2.6 0.9 8.6 0.8 10.3 10.6 










        
Ollanta Humala 39.5 58.9 41.2 44.9 57.3 45.5  
Keiko Fujimori 30.9 21.4 29.9 28.3 22.0 28.0  
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 21.1 4.1 13.4 9.8 3.3 9.6  
Alejandro Toledo 6.4 7.1 5.2 6.8 6.5 6.6  
Other/Null 11.1 8.5 10.3 10.2 10.9 10.3  












        
Ollanta Humala 59.9 40.1 7.4 82.8 9.7 45.5  
Keiko Fujimori 76.3 23.7 8.8 85.1 6.1 28.0  
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 86.8 13.2 11.5 85.9 2.7 9.6  
Alejandro Toledo 66.7 33.3 6.4 86.0 7.6 6.6  
Other/Null 74.4 25.6 8.3 83.5 8.2 10.3  















        
Group-Centred        
SD1 .025 .055 .023 .003 .049   
SD2 .129 .203 .135 .146 .197   
Candidate-Centred LINGUISTIC GROUP SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP   
Ollanta Humala  .091   .013   
Keiko Fujimori  .073   .011   
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski  .178   .034   
Alejandro Toledo  .023   .013   
Other/Null  .054   .003   
        
N = 1177. 
Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read 
separately) in LAPOP’s 2012 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic 
group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate’s vote share 
received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and 
candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate’s share within 
the ethnic group from the candidate’s full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an ‘equal-share’ mean of .20 (100 percent divided by 
five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic 
and cultural identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.  
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2012 and the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (www.onpe.gob.pe). 
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Nevertheless, although voters across ethnic groups supported a range of candidates in 2011, 
voting preferences were still noticeably more concentrated in indigenous groups (both 
linguistic and self-identified). Table 5.4b shows that 58.9 percent of voters with an 
indigenous-language background, and 57.3 percent of self-identified indigenous voters, 
supported Humala in the first round, proportions well above GP’s overall LAPOP share of 
45.5 percent. However, Humala also appeared to win a substantial share of the white vote in 
2011 – 41.2 percent compared to just 22.4 percent in 2006. This expansion of Humala’s 
appeal is also reflected in a 39.5 percent share of the vote in the non-indigenous language 
group, compared to just 23.7 percent in 2006 (compare Tables 5.1 and 5.4).151 However, 
despite Humala’s gains in non-indigenous groups, these proportions are still below GP’s 
overall vote share in 2011. 
In contrast, both Fujimori and Kuczynski won shares of the non-indigenous language 
and white vote that were in excess of their overall vote proportions, although Fujimori also 
performed respectably in indigenous groups (21-22 percent compared to an overall share of 
28.0 percent). However, although these distributions appear to indicate some continued 
indigenous support for Fujimorismo, Kuczynksi’s candidacy was broadly rejected by most 
voters with an indigenous background (just a 3-4 percent vote for Kuczysnki, compared to an 
overall 9.6 percent share). Finally, support for Toledo in the LAPOP sample is low across all 
groups (an average of just 6.4 percent), although the PP candidate seems to have done 
slightly worse among whites (5.2 percent) and slightly better among indigenous-language 
speakers (7.1 percent). 
The candidate-centred ethnicisation scores reflect the broad trends of the group-
centred analysis. Humala’s 2011 scores are approximately half his 2006 scores, indicating a 
substantial increase in the breadth of his appeal across ethnic groups (compare Tables 5.1d 
and 5.4d). Indeed, almost 59.9 percent of Humala’s vote came from non-indigenous voters in 
2011, compared with just 47.5 percent in 2006, despite comparable proportions of each 
linguistic group across survey samples (compare Tables 5.1a, 5.1c, 5.4a, and 5.4c). Similarly, 
although the portion of Humala’s vote accounted for by white voters decreased slightly 
between 2006 and 2011 (from 9.2 to 7.4 percent), the latter contribution was actually closer 
to the overall proportion of whites in the sample (7.7 percent in 2011 compared to 13.3 
percent in 2006). Nevertheless, Humala still relied disproportionately on indigenous voters in 
                                                          
151
 However, higher 2011 proportions may also be inflated by the overestimation of Humala’s total vote share in 
the LAPOP sample.  
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2011, with 40.1 percent of his vote comprised of voters with an indigenous-language 
background and 9.7 percent accounted for by self-identified indigenous (compared to sample 
proportions of 31.0 and 7.7 percent, respectively).  
As the group-centred breakdown indicates, Fujimori also gained some support from 
indigenous constituents, with 23.7 percent and 6.1 percent of her vote coming from 
indigenous-language and self-identified indigenous voters, respectively (Table 5.4c). 
Fujimori’s respectable performance among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, as 
well as among whites and non-indigenous mestizos, generates a relatively low candidate-
perspective ethnicisation score for the F11 candidate (Table 5.4d). In contrast, the candidate-
centred analysis produces particularly high ethnicisation scores for Kuczynski (.178 and 
.034), comfortably higher than Flores in 2006. This reflects the severe under-representation 
of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in Kuczynski’s vote; just 13.2 percent came 
from voters with an indigenous-language background (compared to 31.0 percent in the 
sample), and just 2.7 percent came from self-identified indigenous voters (compared to 7.7 
percent in the sample). Meanwhile, almost 11.5 percent of Kuczynksi’s vote came from self-
identified whites, well above the 8.2 percent sample proportion. Finally, although Toledo’s 
overall numbers are low in the LAPOP sample, the composition of his vote approximates the 
full sample proportions, suggesting that the PP candidate appealed across ethnic groups in 
2011, albeit to a limited degree. Toledo’s candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are, as a 
result, relatively low. 
In summary, ethnic background appears to have played some role in shaping the 
electoral constituencies of the major candidates in Peru’s 2011 election. Indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo voters showed a disproportionate preference for Humala and GP, while 
Kuczynski performed particularly poorly among those groups but disproportionately well 
among whites and non-indigenous mestizos. Although Fujimori also performed slightly better 
among non-indigenous voters, her populist appeals and the historical links between 
Fujimorismo and indigenous voters brought her a substantial minority of the vote in the latter 
constituencies. Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that representatives of all ethnic groups 
can be found among the supporters of each major candidate, albeit unevenly distributed. At 
first glance, then, there seems to be only limited evidence for expressive ethnic voting in the 
2011 Peruvian election; all candidates won some votes across ethnic lines, and ethnic 
background did not definitely predetermine electoral choices. 
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Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects 
Table 5.5 shows the effects of voter characteristics on the overall predicted 
probability of voting for each major candidate in Peru’s 2011 election. As in previous cases, 
the results are elaborated from a mlogit model, the results of which are reported in Appendix 
V. The analysis generates statistically significant effects for the linguistic measure of 
ethnicity (and, in the case of Kuczynski, for the self-identification measure), even when a 
range of potential confounders are controlled for. These findings strengthen the inference of a 
causal relationship between voters’ wider sociocultural background and vote choice in Peru. 
However, as in previous case studies, the analysis of Peru’s 2011 vote also finds significant 
effects for several other demographic factors, as well as key measures of ideological and 
policy preferences. 
Ethnicity Variables 
The mlogit model reported in Table 5.5 predicts a 15.4 percentage point increase in 
the overall probability of voting for Humala for voters with an indigenous-language 
background. In contrast, the same linguistic background is negatively associated with 
Kuczynski’s vote, decreasing the probability of a vote for the APGC by 8.5 percentage 
points. These effects underline both the broad support for Humala among indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizos and Kuczynski’s particularly limited appeal to these groups. The 
linguistic measure is non-significant for both Fujimori and Toledo, indicating the more 
ethnically diverse appeal of both these candidates. In addition to the linguistic measure, 
indigenous self-identification is also negatively associated with a vote for Kuczynski 
compared to both mestizos and whites. However, as noted previously, these estimates are 
based on very few observations.  
Overall, the results of regression analysis appear to confirm a causal role for ethnicity 
in the 2011 election. In particular, the disproportionate support for Humala among indigenous 
and indigenous-mestizo voters, as well as the concentration of Kuczynski’s support among 
whites and non-indigenous mestizos, is not explained fully by sociodemographic factors, 
economic perceptions, or political attitudes. As in 2006, the linguistic measure of ethnicity is 
a much better predictor of vote choice compared to ethnic self-identification. This reinforces 
the view that ethnic identification may have relatively low electoral salience in Peru, but that 
wider sociocultural background may have quite substantial effects on voting behaviour. 
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TABLE 5.5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011 
 
 HUMALA FUJIMORI KUCZYNSKI TOLEDO 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Parents speak ind. language .154** .050 -.078 .049 -.085** .027 .030 .023 
White (Mestizo) -.023 .064 .030 .057 .027 .041 -.007 .027 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -.006 .083 .115 .077 -.071* .033 .002 .043 
Indigenous (White) .017 .096 .085 .101 -.098^ .053 .009 .045 
Income -.008 .006 -.011* .005 .009** .003 .007* .003 
Female -.177** .037 .114** .027 .015 .021 .020 .018 
Age .002* .001 -.002 .001 -.002** .001 .001 .001 
Trust in parties .003 .011 -.003 .010 .002 .007 .002 .006 
Participation in protests .152** .045 -.100* .049 -.036 .041 .000 .025 
National economy has improved -.024 .041 .055 .042 -.002 .040 -.033 .025 
Personal finances have improved .050 .044 -.035 .042 -.031 .029 .019 .019 
Resides in north (Lima) .088 .056 -.033 .047 -.034 .029 .023 .026 
Resides in Amazon (Lima) .050 .062 .013 .065 -.017 .029 .030 .033 
Resides in highlands (Lima) .024 .059 -.071 .062 .033 .044 -.001 .027 
Resides in rural area .047 .047 .024 .048 -.061^ .030 .024 .024 
Rightist ideology -.004 .008 .011 .008 .005 .006 -.003 .004 
Wealth redistribution .033^ .017 .001 .015 -.013 .010 -.007 .007 
Public health service -.016 .017 -.004 .015 .004 .011 .013 .009 
Nationalisations .023* .009 -.012 .008 -.014* .006 -.009^ .005 
Free trade -.018 .015 .015 .013 -.008 .008 -.002 .006 
Limit opposition voice .010 .012 -.010 .012 .001 .007 .000 .006 
Direct democracy .014 .013 -.008 .012 -.003 .007 .004 .006 
Minorities are a threat -.018 .014 .011 .012 .005 .007 -.002 .006 
N= 807. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in 
Appendix V. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
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TABLE 5.6: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Kuczynski over Toledo 
 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE 
Parents speak indigenous language -.458** .108 
White (Mestizo) .079 .230 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -.181 .231 
Indigenous (White) -.260 .103 
Income .012 .014 
Female .008 .096 
Age -.009** .002 
Trust in parties .006 .023 
Participation in protests -.101 .114 
National economy has improved -.016 .133 
Personal finances have improved -.221* .105 
Resides in north (Lima) -.184 .131 
Resides in Amazon (Lima) -.203* .099 
Resides in highlands (Lima) .150 .103 
Resides in rural area -.129 .090 
Rightist ideology .028 .025 
Wealth redistribution -.007 .041 
Public health service -.038 .058 
Nationalisations -.010 .023 
Free trade -.001 .031 
Limit opposition voice -.001 .037 
Direct democracy -.007 .023 
Minorities are a threat .027 .039 
N= 131. ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects predicted probability of voting for Kuczynski over Toledo based on a reduced version of 
the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix V. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to 
base category in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
211 
 
These effects suggest a role for ethnic bias, but they indicate such bias is not wholly (or even 
mostly) the product of strongly felt, inflexible group identities.  
Non-Ethnic Variables 
Even when ethnic variables are taken into account, the analysis reported in Table 5.5 
shows significant effects of several non-ethnic voter characteristics. These include voter 
income (‘Income’), support for state-led wealth redistribution (‘Wealth redistribution’), and 
nationalisations in key sectors of the economy (‘Nationalisations’). However, unlike in 2006, 
the more general measure of political ideology (‘Rightist ideology’) does not produce 
significant effects in the 2011 analysis. In part, the lack of significant effects for this general 
ideology measure may be explained by the inclusion of the more specific programmatic 
measures in 2011. Variables concerning wealth redistribution, the provision of health 
services, and nationalisations may all capture aspects of voters’ ideological preferences.  
First, income appears to have had less impact on vote choice in 2011 than it did in 
2006. However, in this case the particular characteristics of the 2011 electoral field may 
provide part of the explanation. Table 5.5 shows that an increase in income band was 
negatively associated with Fujimori’s vote probabilities (by an average of 1.1 percentage 
points) and positively associated with both Kuczynski’s and Toledo’s votes (an increase of 
just under one percentage point), but that it had no effect in Humala’s case. It would be 
misleading, though, to claim that Fujimori appealed more to poorer voters than did Humala; 
in fact, the mean income of both candidates’ supporters is nearly identical (7.9 and 7.7 
respectively, based on an income-band scale that runs 0-16). In fact, the analysis suggests that 
several other voter characteristics – in particular ethnicity, participation in protests 
(‘Participation in protests’), and attitudes towards state interventionism (‘Wealth 
redistribution’ and ‘Nationalisations’) – may explain support for Humala better than income. 
In other words, a typical Humala voter differed from supporters of Fujimori, Kuczynski, and 
Toledo on a wide range of non-income variables that ultimately confound any overall effect 
for income. In contrast, many Fujimori voters were comparable with supporters of Kuczynski 
and Toledo in terms of ethnicity and political attitudes, but the former tended to be 
significantly poorer (an average income of 7.9, compared to 9.2 for Kuczynski and 9.8 for 
Toledo). Thus, income emerged as a significant predictor of vote choice with regard to these 
latter candidates, but not in Humala’s case.  
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Second, although political ideology may not have had significant effects in the 2011 
vote analysis, two other measures of broad political attitudes – support for state-led wealth 
redistribution and nationalisations – were significant vote predictors. Support for both 
policies was associated with an increase in the predicted probability of voting for Humala and 
a decrease in the probability of voting for one of Humala’s rivals (although not all the effects 
are statistically significant). Thus, despite toning down his state-interventionist rhetoric, most 
voters still viewed Humala as the candidate most likely to pursue such policies in 2011, and 
they adjusted their electoral calculations accordingly. In part, this was because GP’s 
government plan and campaign publicity still emphasised programmatic initiatives along 
these lines: a windfall tax on mining to help fund expanded social programmes (Gana Perú 
2011a, 71, 173-78); an increase in the minimum wage (62, 107); a reorientation of Peru’s 
development model to a ‘national market economy’ (58-77); some nationalisations in 
strategic sectors (80-84); and recurring references to the redistribution of economic benefits 
(14, 160, 172-74; Partido Nacionalista Peruano 2011a, 2011b).  
In part, however, this thesis would argue that the perception of Humala as a proponent 
of state interventionism was enhanced by his socioethnic profile. According to the prevalent 
ethnic heuristic, Humala’s indigenous-mestizo background linked him to these types of 
programmatic agendas. Indeed, despite efforts by the Humala campaign to moderate the 
candidate’s image, the GP candidate was still perceived in fairly radical terms by certain 
sectors of the electorate. Dire warnings about sweeping nationalisations, seizures of private 
property, excessive price controls, and the closing off of Peru’s economy to foreign 
investment were recurrent themes in the right-wing press, on social media, and in the private 
discussions of many middle- and upper-class voters, particularly in Lima (Ardito 2011; 
Manrique 2011; Sifuentes 2011). Such exaggerated characterisation of Humala’s political 
project, despite explicit information that contradicted the alleged programmatic intentions, 
suggests a heuristic role for ethnic stereotypes that may have had substantial impact of voters’ 
candidate perceptions.  
Finally, in terms of the LAPOP vote model, the analysis suggests that Humala 
remained the closest thing to ‘a candidate of protest’ in 2011, with voters who had 
participated in political protests 15.2 percentage points more likely to vote for Humala than 
those who had not. As in 2006, region did not have significant effects in 2011 once other 
factors (such as ethnicity and income) were controlled for. Rural residence had only one 
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significant effect, a drop of 6.1 percentage points in Kuczynski’s vote probability, a finding 
that appears to confirm Kuczynski’s base of support in the wealthier urban sectors.152  
Kuczynski and Toledo 
 Table 5.6 shows the results from a reduced vote model comparing support for 
Kuczynski and Toledo only. As indicated previously, both candidates ran on near-identical 
programmatic platforms in 2011, and, having served in the same administration, they had a 
comparable recent political record. However, their ethnic profiles differ markedly, and thus a 
head-to-head comparison of their vote offers an excellent opportunity to test the basic ethnic 
voting hypothesis.  
 The analysis generates two key findings. First, voter income and all the political 
attitude measures are non-significant. Voters, it seems, recognised the comparability of the 
two candidates’ programmatic agendas, and as a result these factors had little impact on vote 
decisions.153 Second, the marginal effect of the linguistic ethnic measure is highly significant 
(p < .001) and quite large, indicating that voters with an indigenous-language background 
were almost twice as likely to vote for Toledo as for Kuczynski. The self-identification 
variables suggest the same underlying pattern, with self-identification as indigenous 
associated with a vote for Toledo and self-identification as white linked to a Kuczynski vote. 
However, these effects do not reach statistical significance, in part because of the relatively 
low number observations in this reduced model (N = 131). Other findings of note include 
Kuczynski’s greater appeal among younger voters, and an increase in support for Toledo 
among residents of the Amazon region. 
 Overall, then, the head-to-head comparison of Kuczynski’s and Toledo’s 2011 vote 
indicates a substantial effect for ethnic background on vote choice. Despite the programmatic 
and performance comparability of the two candidates, Toledo’s indigenous background won 
him far greater support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters compared to 
Kuczynski, a white Limeño and second-generation European immigrant. Ethnic bias, in short, 
played an important role in separating supporters of Kuczynski from those of Toledo. 
*          *          * 
                                                          
152
 Economic perceptions were also non-significant, although the usefulness of these measures is reduced given 
the time lapse between the election and the LAPOP survey; the relevant LAPOP questions explicitly referred to 
‘the last 12 months’. 
153
 The effect of ethnic heuristics may also have been considerably less for both candidates given that voters had 
recent experience of the Toledo government on which to make assessments. 
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In sum, ethnicity appears to have played an important role in Peru’s 2011 election. 
Although sociodemographic factors, economic considerations, and political attitudes were 
also important determiners of vote choice, they do not fully account for voting outcomes at 
the individual level. Specifically, they do not fully explain why indigenous and indigenous-
mestizo voters supported Humala to such an extent, or why the same sectors were particularly 
disinclined towards Kuczynski. Similarly, they do not explain the extent of white and non-
indigenous support for Kuczynski, or Humala’s disproportionately poor performance among 
non-indigenous voters. Finally, they do not account for the marked ethnic divide between 
supporters of two programmatically similar, but ethnically distinct, candidates: Kuczynski 
and Toledo. The distinct ethnic profiles of these two candidates appear to have helped them 
develop bases of electoral support from quite different ethnic constituencies. In short, the 
initial analysis of the 2011 vote offers strong evidence that ethnic bias has significant effects 
on electoral choices in Peru.  
However, neither the basic vote-share analysis (Table 5.4) nor the regression analysis 
(Table 5.5) is indicative of unconditional ethnic voting behaviour. Not only did voters from 
the same ethnic group vote for a variety of candidates, including ethnically distant candidates, 
but several non-ethnic characteristics are important vote predictors. These include general 
dissatisfaction with the political status quo, voter income, and fundamental attitudes towards 
the role of the state in society. These findings indicate that voters considered a wide range of 
criteria in reaching their vote decisions, and that programmatic factors – whether influenced 
by ethnic heuristics or not – were important vote determiners in Peru’s 2011 election. 
Decomposed Effects 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the decomposition of ethnicity’s interactions with income, 
political ideology, and attitudes towards wealth redistribution and nationalisations. Full 
statistical output is included in Appendix V, with some illustrative examples summarised 
below. 
Income 
The main effects in Table 5.5 suggest that income had a negligible effect on the 
probability of voting for Humala, a negative effect on Fujimori’s vote probabilities, and 
positive effects for both Kuczynski and Toledo. However, when the interaction between 
ethnicity and income is decomposed, a more complex picture emerges. 
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N = 807; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the 
candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average 
marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression 
model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output). 
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N = 807; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the 
candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average 
marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression 
model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output). Estimates 
for Kuczynski in the indigenous group are excluded due to extremely low cross-tabulation cell counts. Similarly, low cell counts preclude 
the estimation of meaningful APRs or AMEs for Toledo in all but the mestizo group, which closely resembles the main effects reported in 
Table 5.5, and so the Toledo plots are not included here. 















































































































































One noteworthy aspect of the decomposition analysis is the indication that ethnic 
background may have particularly important electoral effects among poorer voters. As in 
2006, Humala’s ethnopopulist appeals seem to have resonated among voters from a broad 
indigenous background, but markedly less so among poor non-indigenous voters. For 
example, a poor voter from an indigenous background had an approximately seventy percent 
chance of voting for Humala, compared to a twenty percent chance of voting for Fujimori and 
less than a five percent chance of voting for either Kuczynski or Toledo. However, a poor 
voter from a non-indigenous background was equally likely to vote for Humala or Fujimori 
(forty percent in both cases) and marginally more likely to vote for Kuczynski compared to a 
poor indigenous voter (APRs around ten percent). We might infer that non-indigenous voters 
read the ethnic component of Humala’s appeal to indicate the prioritisation of more 
indigenous group interests and values in a future GP government, interests that the non-
indigenous voter did not necessarily share. More expressive ethnic preferences or prejudice 
may also have played a role. 
A further noteworthy aspect of ethnicity’s interaction with income is the broad 
tendency for ethnic differences to narrow or disappear at higher-income levels. This suggests 
that material concerns may take precedence over ethnic bias for some wealthier voters. 
Indeed, although ethnic bias appears to have played some role in separating poorer voters into 
Humala or Fujimori supporters, the appeal of both these populist candidates declined as 
income increased. The primary beneficiaries were Kuczynski and Toledo whose vote 
probabilities tended to increase with higher income. Both were well-known members of the 
political establishment whose professional economic training, record in office, and 
macroeconomic policy proposals all pointed to political and economic continuity, making 
them the safer economic choice for higher-income voters. 
In sum, both income-based concerns and ethnic bias were important to voters in 2011, 
but the way in which such preferences combined to shape vote choice was not 
straightforward. Humala’s income-based appeal was concentrated among voters from an 
indigenous background, while Fujimori may have been the preferred choice for many non-
indigenous lower-class voters. However, both Humala and Fujimori were relatively more 
attractive to poorer voters than to wealthier voters, with the latter constituencies showing an 
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increased preference for the more predictable, internationally respected economic technocrats 
Kuczynski and Toledo.154 
Political Ideology 
 Unlike the other cases studies examined in this and preceding chapters, political 
ideology does not seem to have played a prominent role Peru’s 2011 vote. The main effects 
in Table 5.5 are statistically non-significant for each candidate, and with a few notable 
exceptions, the decomposition analysis generates similarly non-significant AMEs in each 
ethnic group. 
 One partial exception is the case of Fujimori. A one-unit move from left to right on 
the ideology scale produces a 1.9 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for 
Fujimori among non-indigenous language voters and within the larger self-identified mestizo 
group. This trend is, perhaps, what we might expect given the political profile of 
Fujimorismo; a strong defence of neoliberalism and a hard-line position on public and 
national security (including persisting authoritarian tendencies) are characteristics that are 
likely to fit with many Peruvians’ perception of more right-wing political preferences. The 
decomposed effects indicate that such an ideological preference did indeed influence 
Fujimori’s vote in 2011 – in the two largest ethnic groups – despite the failure of the main 
effects analysis to generate statistically significant effects.  
Overall, the limited statistical significance of the political ideology measure may 
reflect the confounding effects of the new programmatic preference variables introduced in 
the 2011 analysis. As Table 5.5 indicates, two of these measures (wealth redistribution and 
nationalisations) had significant main effects on vote choice in 2011. Furthermore, both these 
variables, which tap more specific aspects of political ideology, were key themes in GP’s 
manifesto. As the only electoral coalition to offer any ideological alternative to continued 
neoliberalism, we might expect ideological preferences in general, and these two measures in 
particular, to have influenced GP’s vote. However, the same change in survey measures did 
not eliminate the effect of the general ideology variable in the case of Bolivia’s 2009 election. 
Thus, the non-significant effects generated in the Peruvian case may also indicate a more 
limited ideological dimension to contemporary Peruvian politics and electoral behaviour, as 
some analysts have suggested (Cameron 2011). Still, the decomposed analysis does pick up 
                                                          
154
 Despite this general trend both Humala and Fujimori still won substantial support among wealthier voters, 
with the analysis predicting probabilities around forty and twenty percent, respectively, among higher earners 
compared to APRs that rarely reach twenty percent for either Kuczynski or Toledo. 
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some significant effects missed by the main analysis, as outlined in relation to Fujimori’s 
vote.155 
Wealth Redistribution  
The main effects model generated just one statistically significant effect for voters’ 
stance on state-led wealth redistribution, a positive association between support for such an 
agenda and a vote for Humala. The decomposition analysis appears to support this general 
trend, with positive AMEs for Humala in all groups, although only in the indigenous groups 
do the AMEs reach statistical significance. There is a somewhat mixed trend in the AMEs for 
other candidates, although the tendency is towards negative associations, albeit mostly non-
significant.  
Overall, the recurring emphasis on inequality reduction throughout Humala’s 
campaign may have helped increase GP’s vote among supporters of such a programmatic 
agenda, although the effects are only sometimes statistically significant. As noted in regard to 
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, the general lack of statistical significance for this variable 
is partly the result of a broad consensus across much of the electorate; in Peru, the average 
voter-stand on the wealth redistribution issue is between 5.5 and 5.8 (on a 1-7 scale) across 
all ethnic groups, indicating moderate to strong support for such a policy goal.156 Similarly, 
all the major candidates expressed their desire to create a fairer society, with the controversy 
centring more on the means and extent of inequality reduction.  
Nationalisations 
The decomposition of ethnicity’s interaction with voters’ stance on nationalisations 
does not significantly alter the interpretation of the main effects. That is, support for 
nationalisations significantly increased the probability of voting for Humala across all ethnic 
groups and decreased support for his principal opponents, particularly Kuczynski. This trend 
is unsurprising, given that GP was the only electoral alternative to propose nationalisations of 
any kind (Gana Perú 2011, 80-4). 
                                                          
155
 The positive effect for rightist ideology on Humala’s vote in the self-identified indigenous group may reflect 
varying understandings of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ across groups (for example, the association of ‘right’ with 
social and religious conservatism, nationalism, and so forth). However, because we are dealing with relatively 
few observations, we should probably not stretch the interpretation too far in this case.  
156
 Furthermore, the standard deviation of group means for the wealth redistribution measure is just 1.3, 
compared to 1.9 for the nationalisation variable and 3.5 for the political ideology variable. This confirms the 
greater degree of consensus in views on wealth redistribution. 
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However, despite the relatively consistent trend in the AMEs and APRs across ethnic 
groups, ethnic background still appears to have played some conditional (and conditioning) 
role in vote choice. For example, the AMEs in Humala’s case do not reach statistical 
significance in the non-indigenous language group. An examination of the APR plots 
indicates that approval of nationalisations did not generate the same levels of support for 
Humala among non-indigenous voters as it did among voters with an indigenous background:  
APRs were comparable among opponents of nationalisations in both groups (around forty 
percent), yet among supporters of the policy an indigenous voter was significantly more 
likely to vote for Humala than a non-indigenous voter (APRs over sixty percent, compared to 
under fifty percent). Overall, this pattern suggests some role for ethnic bias in mitigating 
positive policy effects among non-indigenous voters, at least in Humala’s case. 
Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Ethnic Attitudes and Issues 
 The 2011 vote analysis finds no evidence that ethnic attitudes influenced vote choice. 
As noted at the start of this case study, only half the respondents to the LAPOP 2012 survey 
were asked questions related to such attitudes, and responses indicative of ethnic prejudice 
were extremely rare. These data features severely limit this aspect of the 2011 vote analysis. 
Where the data allow for meaningful analysis, the results indicate no significant main 
or marginal effects for the three ethnic attitude variables tested. These are: (i) the perceived 
cause of higher poverty levels among dark-skinned Peruvians; (ii) support for racial quotas in 
universities; and (iii) whether dark-skinned people make worse political leaders than light-
skinned people. Even a reduced model, which drops the political attitude measures to 
increase the sample size, does not produce any statistically significant results.157 Thus, and 
whilst bearing in mind the above caveats regarding sample size, this analysis of the LAPOP 
data finds no evidence that ethnic attitudes influenced vote choice in Peru’s 2011 election. 
Indirect Effects of Ethnicity 
 The mediation analysis for the 2011 vote tested the indirect effects of ethnicity on a 
vote for Humala over Fujimori, and for Humala over Kuczynski. As in 2006, the analysis 
only finds significant indirect effects in the more polarised comparison (in this case, between 
                                                          
157
 Full results are included in Appendix C. In the 2012 round of LAPOP surveys, references to ‘indigenous’ 
were replaced with ‘dark-skinned’. 
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Humala and Kuczynski), but it also confirms a positive direct effect of an indigenous-
language background on a vote for Humala over Fujimori.158  
Table 5.6 shows a summary of the vote for Humala over Kuczynski. The analysis 
finds a significant total indirect effect for an indigenous-language background in favour of 
Humala, but no significant indirect effects for the self-identification measure. The analysis 
estimates that approximately 21.1 percent of the total effect is mediated. The estimates in the 
first three model summaries are based on analyses that exclude the ethnic attitude variables, 
while the final model summary includes these measures. As noted above, the inclusion of the 
ethnic attitude variables means reducing the sample size by at least fifty percent. In this case, 
the analysis based on the reduced model offers comparable estimates and, crucially, does not 
suggest a significant mediation role for ethnic attitudes. However, the total indirect effects no 
longer reach statistical significance with the reduced sample, and there is a change in the 
specific mediation pathways that produce individually significant indirect effects (see column 
four in Table 5.6).159 
 An examination of these specific mediation pathways finds that voters’ position on 
the question of nationalisations generates individually significant indirect effects in both the 
full and reduced models. Voters with an indigenous-language background were more likely 
to support nationalisations, a political preference associated with a vote for Humala over 
Kuczynski. This can be seen as partially in line with the significant pathway for political 
ideology identified in the 2006 analysis. In 2006, an indigenous background was linked to 
more leftist ideology, which was linked to a vote for Humala over Flores (see Table 5.3). In 
2011, the measure of support for nationalisations may capture a similar underlying political 
predisposition – support for greater state control in the economy – that was similarly linked to 
a vote for Humala over Kuczynski. Thus, there is some evidence from both election case 
studies that an indigenous background may socialise voters to favour broad state intervention 
in national economic matters. Moreover, both the main vote models and the mediation 
analysis suggest that political attitudes related to state interventionism may have had a 
significant influence on voting behaviour in Peru’s 2006 and 2011 elections.160 
 
                                                          
158
 Full output for the mediation analysis is included in Appendix C. 
159
 The analysis also tested the self-identification variables (including ethnic attitude measures) on the reduced 
sample, but it found no significant results. 
160
 These findings are in line with (but go beyond) a recent study that found indigenous voters in Latin America 
to prefer leftist candidates in general (Moreno Morales 2015). 
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TABLE 5.7: Summary Mediation Analysis, Peru 2011 
 
 Coefficient SE Significant Mediation Pathways Total N 
Family Linguistic Group (indigenous)    476 
Total indirect effects .091 ^ * .032 Income (.043; -1.537**/-.126**)  
Direct effect .340 ^ *
 
.085 Nationalisations (.036; .682**/.237**)  
Total effect .431 ^ * .077    
Proportion of total effect mediated .211     
White (mestizo)    438 
Total indirect effects .015 .026   
Direct effect -.024 .073   
Total effect -.009 .069   
Proportion of total effect mediated -1.746     
Indigenous (mestizo)    436 
Total indirect effects -.012 .029   
Direct effect .172 * .088   
Total effect .159 * .088   
Proportion of total effect mediated -.078    
     
Family Linguistic Group (indigenous):  
with Ethnic Attitude Variables 
  180 
Total indirect effects .081 .093 Nationalisations (.058; .736^/.468*)  
Direct effect .383 ^ * .179 FTA (.041; -.465/-.522*)  
Total effect .464 ^ * .170    
Proportion of total effect mediated .175     
Notes: Table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of the output can be found in Appendix C. The first 
three sub-tables show estimates based on models that dropped the ethnic attitude variables to increase sample size. The final sub-table is 
based on models including the ethnic attitude measures. The estimates produced are broadly comparable (compare first and last sub-
tables). Coefficients are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Humala over 
Kuczynski. ^ and * indicated indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to the percentile and bias-correction methods, 
respectively. ‘Proportion of total effect mediated’ is based on the product of coefficients/Y-standardisation method. KHB and LDE are only 
shown where estimates are appreciably different (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant 
mediation pathways are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); 
and effect of mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear or non-linear, depending on the mediator. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
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Analysis of the full model also finds individually significant indirect effects for voter 
income, once again reproducing the results from 2006. Voters with an indigenous background 
are likely to have lower household incomes, and lower-income voters were, in general, more 
likely to vote for Humala over Kuczynski. However, the indirect effects via income are not 
significant in the reduced model (once ethnic attitudes are added), although the direction of 
the constituent effects remains unchanged. Whether the lack of significance reflects the 
confounding influence of ethnic attitudes, or simply the loss of statistical power as a result of 
the reduced sample size, is unclear. The fact that no ethnic-attitude variables are involved in 
significant individual or total indirect effects, and the comparable coefficients for the income 
variable, suggest the latter.  
The analysis of the reduced model also indicates individually significant indirect 
effects via voters’ general support for free-trade agreements (FTA). An indigenous 
background is associated with greater opposition to free-trade agreements, a political attitude 
linked to a vote for Humala over Kuczynski. This is, perhaps, what we might expect given 
the general association of an indigenous background with greater support for a state 
interventionist, nationalist macroeconomic model. 
 In summary, the mediation analysis for the 2011 vote provides a similar picture to the 
2006 analysis. There is strong evidence that an indigenous-language background may help 
shape both voters’ material circumstances and certain broader political attitudes, particularly 
related to the role of the state, and that the resulting indirect effect of ethnicity on vote choice 
is statistically significant. The self-identification measures appear to be less consistently 
linked to material or attitudinal characteristics, at least once linguistic background is taken 
into account. However, as in 2006, the indirect effects identified in 2011 do not fully capture 
the impact of ethnicity on vote choice, and thus they provide only partial support for the 
indirect model of ethnic voting. Indeed, the confirmation by the mediation analysis of 
significant direct effects for ethnicity, even when indirect influences are taken into account, 
provides further evidence that ethnic bias (whether expressive or heuristic) remains an 








How Voters Decide: 
Ethnic Voting at the Micro Level in Peru 
 
 This chapter examines ethnic voting behaviour at the micro level of individual voters’ 
decision-making. The analysis in the preceding chapters has relied mostly on survey data to 
examine ethnic voting in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Although this analysis has indicated an 
important role for ethnicity in shaping electoral outcomes in several cases, it provides only 
limited insight into the underlying processes that drive such political behaviour. In particular, 
and as noted throughout the previous chapters’ discussion, the survey-based analysis cannot 
easily determine whether expressive or heuristic ethnic voting accounts best for the observed 
ethnic bias in individual-level vote patterns. The experimental data examined in this chapter 
specifically address such questions about the nature, not just the occurrence, of ethnic voting 
in the Andes. The experiment allows us to examine how voters perceive ethnic issues and 
ethnic identities in the context of an electoral campaign, and, through examining individual 
voters’ decision-making processes, provides insight into precisely what role ethnicity and 
ethnic attitudes play in voting. 
As outlined in Chapter One, understanding the nature of ethnic voting in these terms 
is important, both theoretically and empirically, because the way in which ethnicity shapes 
voting behaviour could indicate – and contribute to – quite different underlying sociopolitical 
phenomena. These, in turn, may have quite different implications in terms of assessing the 
quality and terms of democratic representation and accountability, the political priorities and 
electoral strategies of politicians, and the prospects for future democratic stability. For 
example, if voting is primarily an expressive act of group allegiance, then elections become a 
simple question of demographics. Voters lose control over the political agenda, while 
politicians can act at will, already assured the unconditional support of co-ethnics. 
Furthermore, this scenario may drive ethnic polarisation as politicians seek to mobilise voters 
by stirring inter-ethnic distrust and resentment. Alternatively, however, if voters use ethnicity 
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as a shortcut to programmatic information, then these threats to democratic processes and 
stability are somewhat less severe. In this latter scenario, substantive representation is the 
ultimate electoral goal, and ethnic voting is primarily a means for achieving such 
representation. Although politicians may still manipulate stereotypes for electoral benefit, 
they cannot rely on unconditional support if they fail on performance and programmatic 
assessments.  
The primary source of data for this chapter’s analysis is a voting experiment carried 
out in Peru in September and October 2013. The experiment was designed to distinguish 
explicitly between expressive and heuristic forms of ethnic voting, and to trace the 
constituent processes of the latter in particular. Peru was chosen for the experimental study 
because its contemporary political landscape remains particularly inchoate (a condition 
conducive to heuristic use in general), and because it lacks a single, dominant, ‘real-world’ 
political personality. Given that the experiment was concerned with the potential influence of 
a generalised ethnic heuristic, the absence of a dominant ‘real-world’ figure such as Evo 
Morales or Rafael Correa was advantageous. The exceptional political dominance of these 
individual politicians would unavoidably influence perceptions about more general political 
‘types’, and thus a context without such figures may produce results that are somewhat less 
contextually bound.161 
 The chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews the conceptual basis for 
the heuristic model of ethnic voting, including discussion of the Peruvian context specifically. 
Many of these arguments have been elaborated in more detail in Chapter One, and this 
section serves only as a brief summary. The second section provides an overview of the basic 
design and procedures of the voting experiment. A more detailed technical description of the 
experimental set-up was included in Chapter Two, and the outline provide in this chapter is 
primarily intended only to aid interpretation of the subsequent discussion of results. These are 
presented in the third, fourth, and fifth sections as they relate to three principal hypotheses: (i) 
that voters make initial assumptions about candidates based on ethnic stereotypes; (ii) that 
voters adjust their stereotype-based evaluations in the light of new information; and (iii) that 
voters ultimately select candidates they perceive as closest to their substantive, rather than 
(only) descriptive, characteristics. These three hypotheses should all hold if the heuristic 
                                                          
161
 Of course, contemporary ‘real-world’ political personalities undoubtedly influenced Peruvian experiment 
participants as well. The argument is only that the Peruvian context may reduce such effects, at least relative to 
Bolivia and Ecuador. 
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ethnic voting model is correct. The final section draws some initial conclusions, which are 
elaborated further in the final chapter.  
Ethnic Heuristics and Voting in Peru 
 This thesis argues that most voters in the Andes, and in Peru particularly, seek some 
degree of substantive representation when they vote in national elections. Substantive, in this 
case, is defined as preferences and interests linked to material concerns, or to political 
ideology and specific issue preferences. Descriptive ties, including psychological attachments 
to ethnic group identities and prejudice, may play some role in voters’ decision-making, but 
few voters would be willing to vote entirely against their substantive preferences in order to 
ensure ethnic descriptive representation. However, in the complex information environment 
of an election campaign, the task of determining which candidate or party best represents key 
substantive preferences is not straightforward. Faced with uncertainty, voters may often turn 
to heuristics to aid their decision-making, using a particular characteristic of the candidate as 
an indicator from which to estimate wider substantive and personal preferences and traits.  
In many democracies, party identities fulfil such a heuristic function (e.g., Downs 
1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991), yet the absence of stable parties in Peru 
means voters must find alternative political heuristics. This thesis argues that, in a society 
where ethnic differences remain socially salient, voters may use a candidate’s perceived 
ethnic identity as an information shortcut to estimate their likely programmatic and personal 
characteristics (McDermott 1998; Brubaker et al. 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 
2007, 2009).162 Thus, voters in Peru – and possibly elsewhere in the Andes – may seek ethnic 
descriptive representation in order to achieve substantive representation, using ethnic 
heuristics to simplify the decision-making process in a highly complex information 
environment. 
Furthermore, as Chapter Five has argued, several features of Peruvian historical and 
contemporary sociopolitical development have been conducive to the construction of such an 
ethnic heuristic. In terms of wider social relations, ethnic background remains an important 
determinant of socioeconomic status and social opportunities, while ethnic discrimination is a 
prominent feature of every-day social interactions. Thus, social experience may have taught 
                                                          
162
 Ethnicity is not the only alternative heuristic to party identities. Studies have shown how several other 
candidate characteristics may serve a heuristic purpose for voters in certain contexts, including gender (Jones 
2011; Ditonto et al. 2013) and other aspects of physical appearance (Rosenberg and McCafferty 1987; Todorov 
et al. 2005; Lawson et al. 2010). 
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many Peruvian voters the relevance of an ethnic heuristic for understanding and predicting 
the broad values, interests, and behaviour of social others. More specifically, the way in 
which ethnicity has been politicised in Peru (and elsewhere in the Andes) may have 
reinforced and further defined the content of such an ethnic heuristic. Although no indigenous 
movement or party in Peru has had the national platform to develop a political ethnic 
heuristic in the same way as in Bolivia or Ecuador, a series of Peruvian ethnopopulist 
candidates have performed a similar function, at least in some respects. Fujimori, Toledo, and 
Humala campaigned on somewhat distinct programmatic platforms, yet all three candidates 
focused their attention on the lower socioeconomic classes, promised increased social 
spending, and were critical, if not hostile to, political and economic elites. Crucially, their 
campaigns explicitly framed such non-elite substantive agendas in terms of their own non-
elite and non-white (if not indigenous) personal backgrounds. They also sought to reinforce 
popular perceptions about the elite interests and political priorities of their white or white-
mestizo opponents. In this way, Peruvian ethnopopulism may have helped introduce an ethnic 
heuristic into the consciousness of Peruvian voters, in similar ways to indigenous movements 
and parties elsewhere in the Andes.  
Finally, Peruvian voters are unlikely to have been entirely unaware of political events 
and trends in neighbouring countries; in fact, the political experiences of other countries in 
the region have been the source of considerable controversy in recent Peruvian election 
campaigns.163 Thus, it seems likely that Peruvian popular perceptions about the types of 
substantive agendas linked to certain ethnic identities (i.e., ethnic heuristics) may also have 
been influenced by political discourses and developments elsewhere in the region.  
In short, both long-term sociocultural experience, and more recent political 
developments (both within Peru and elsewhere), may have worked to connect an indigenous 
(or non-white) ethnic background with a political agenda that promotes inequality reduction, 
poverty assistance, public works, and popular nationalism. In contrast, a white or white-
mestizo identity may come to be linked to orthodox neoliberalism, and, for some voters, the 
promotion of national and international elite interests to the detriment of social equality. The 
ethnic heuristic hypothesised and tested by the Peruvian voting experiment is defined in these 
broad terms.  
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 For example, the extent to which Ollanta Humala’s political project resembled those of Bolivia’s Evo 
Morales or Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was a recurrent controversy in both the 2006 and 2011 campaign. See 
discussion in Chapter Five. 
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The Peruvian Voting Experiment 
The experiment took the form of a computer-based mock election in which 
participants gathered and evaluated information about hypothetical candidates in a simulated 
presidential campaign. Data from the experiment are used to test a series of hypotheses that 
specify distinct mechanism through which ethnicity might shape vote decisions. Most focus 
on how the perceived ethnicity of electoral candidates might fulfil a heuristic function for 
voters, providing an information shortcut to the programmatic, social, attitudinal, and 
personal characteristics of the candidate. However, a more direct effect for ethnicity in the 
vote decision is also considered, where strong feelings of ethnic solidarity and/or prejudice 
are hypothesised to shape voters’ preferences. Thus the experiment provides a direct 
empirical test of the expressive and heuristic models of ethnic voting, as well as a wealth of 
data on the micro-level processes involved in the latter.  
Experiment Design and Procedures 
The experiments were conducted in Peru during September and October 2013, and 
participants were recruited by local research assistants in various locations across the country. 
Most participants completed the experiment online by logging into the project’s website. On 
accessing the experiment platform, each subject was randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental groups: two ‘treatment’ groups (T1 and T2) and a control group (C). As 
outlined in Chapter Two, the experiment consisted of a mock presidential campaign 
simulated on the computer, and participants played the role of voters, searching and 
evaluating information about two hypothetical candidates. The simulated campaign involved 
three phases (P1, P2, and P3), each lasting five minutes. Each phase contained different types 
of information about the two candidates, and voters completed mini-questionnaires at the end 
of each phase. These questionnaires captured ‘live’ data about voters’ impressions and 
preferences regarding the candidates and the campaign in general. These were then compared 
across experimental groups exposed to distinct candidate profiles, and between experimental 
phases with distinct information content.  
During the first phase of the campaign (P1), voters in all groups were only exposed to 
information about the candidates’ personal background, as well as some non-substantial 
‘filler’ information. Crucially, information about each candidate’s ethnic background was 
also included during P1, but only for T1 and T2. In the control group, all references to 
ethnicity were omitted. In T1 and T2, the two candidates were Guillermo Olarte Rojas and 
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Luis Romero Kaufmann. Olarte was presented explicitly as a dark-skinned mestizo with 
family origins in the southern highlands, and he spoke the indigenous language Quechua, as 
well as Spanish, as a child. Romero was presented as a light-skinned, second-generation 
European immigrant, and he did not speak an indigenous language.164 Aside from ethnic 
background, the two candidates’ personal profiles were near-identical.  
However, although the candidates’ personal characteristics were consistent across all 
phases and groups, their respective programmatic profiles varied according to experimental 
group. In T1, Olarte adopted a left-nationalist programme (favouring strategic 
nationalisations, more powers for the president vis-à-vis congress, higher taxes and social 
spending) and a self-proclaimed moderate leftist ideology. Romero, for his part, offered a 
neoliberal programme, taking the opposite stand to Olarte on each of these broad issues. 
However, in T2 these programmatic profiles were reversed so that Olarte emerged as the 
neoliberal, and Romero as the left-nationalist. The two control-group candidates were exact 
‘de-ethnicisised’ copies of the T2 candidates: Juan Sánchez García was a copy of Olarte as he 
appeared in T2 (neoliberal); Luis Rodríguez López was a copy of Romero as he appeared in 
T2 (left-nationalist).165 Programmatic information was introduced via opposition attack 
advertisements and rebuttals in P2, and through explicit candidate statements in P3. Table 6.1 
summarises the experimental set-up. 
Before the experiment, ‘voters’ completed a short questionnaire about their 
sociodemographic background and political preferences, including the four broad 
issue/ideology measures noted above (i.e., support for nationalisations, for increased 
presidential powers, higher social spending, and left-right political ideology). In addition, at 
the end of each phase, voters were asked to rate the candidates in terms of their perceived 
position on the same four issue/ideology preferences, as well as to give general ‘feeling 
thermometer’ ratings. The programmatic measures were based on scales running from zero to 
100 and were constructed so that zero represented the neoliberal ‘pole’ and 100 represented 
the left-nationalist ‘pole’. These four issue/ideology preferences have been key controversies 
in recent Peruvian elections, and they reflect important components of the ethnic heuristic 
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 Candidate ethnicity was introduced through various information items referring to family and linguistic 
background, explicit ethnic labels used in news reports, and finally a photo. 
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 Family names were selected to suggest ethnic origins, but with enough ambiguity to avoid alerting 
participants to the experiment’s purpose. Olarte is associated with the southern highlands while Rojas is 
connected with a lower-class background. Romero, in contrast, is associated with wealthy elites, while 
Kaufmann is clearly of non-Hispanic European origin. García, Sánchez, Rodríguez, and López are four of the 
most common family names in Peru, and do not carry such specific socioethnic associations. 
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being tested in this chapter. They also have partial equivalents in the LAPOP surveys, 
facilitating some comparison between the survey- and experiment-based analyses. 
Voters were also asked to indicate other impressions about the candidates, including 
social-group associations and each candidate’s personal characteristics. For social-group 
associations, voters were asked to indicate which social groups they thought would benefit 
from the election of one or the other candidate. They were able to choose none or all groups 
from a list of eight, including: trade unions; private companies; campesinos (peasants); 
educated professionals (doctors, lawyers, university professors, and so forth); foreign 
investors; a rich Lima resident; employers; and mining companies. These groups represent 
important social and cultural class identities and interests in contemporary Peruvian society, 
and many of them are linked to the broad socioethnic stereotypes under investigation here. 
For personal candidate characteristics, voters could select none or all of eight traits for both 
candidates, including: hardworking and honest; a democrat; competent; modern; 
sophisticated; qualified; populist; and rash. Once again, many of these are characteristics 
typically linked to ethnic stereotypes, and they have recurrently emerged in popular debates 
about ‘real-world’ electoral candidates in recent Peruvian elections.166 
Hypotheses 
This chapter argues that voters use a candidate’s perceived ethnic identity as an 
information shortcut to make a wide range of assumptions about the candidate’s 
programmatic preferences, more general affinity with certain social groups and interests, and 
personal characteristics. Programmatic profile refers not only to a candidate’s stand on 
specific policy issues (e.g. nationalisations or public spending), but also to their broader 
political ideology. Social-group association refers to voters’ general impressions about those 
social groups and interests that the candidate will favour and which will benefit most from 
the candidate’s election. These may well be linked to programmatic profile, but they exceed 
simple calculations about the utility of policy A or B for a certain group, including 
assumptions about clientelistic benefits and a candidate’s wider sympathies, loyalties, 
networks, and personal as well as political priorities. Perceived programmatic preferences are 
also likely to affect assumptions about a candidate’s personal characteristics, the third aspect 
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 For example, see Ardito (2011), Bruce (2011), Manrique (2011), and Sifuentes (2011), amongst others, on 









Candidate  Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 ROMERO  
T1 ETHNICITY White/European descent White/European descent 
 
White/European descent 












Left-nationalist (attack ads 
from Romero only) 
Left-nationalist (explicit 
statements) 
 ROMERO  
T2 ETHNICITY AS T1 
 
 White/European descent White/European descent 
PROGRAMME AS T1  Left-nationalist (attack ads 




ETHNICITY AS T1  Indigenous/Andean 
descent 
Indigenous/Andean descent 




 RODRÍGUEZ (copy of Romero T2) 
C ETHNICITY None None 
 
None 
PROGRAMME None Left-nationalist (attack ads 
from Sánchez only) 
Left-nationalist (explicit 
statements) 
SÁNCHEZ (copy of Olarte T2) 









The total sample was N = 217 (T1 = 75; T2 = 79; C = 63). Given that T1 and T2 are identical in P1, the analysis of P1 data in the following 
section uses a combined T1/T2 group. 
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TABLE 6.2: Hypotheses 
 
 
H1: Voters will make assumptions about candidates after P1 based on ethnic background 
In the absence of specific information, voters will make assumptions about a candidate’s profile based on ethnic 
background. Therefore, there will be consistent differences in the characteristics attributed to candidates after P1 
according to the stereotypic association of indigenous/Andean with left-nationalist, and white/European with 
neoliberal. 
 H1a: Voters will make assumptions about each candidate’s stand on specific programmatic issues and political 
ideology. 
 H1b: Voters will make assumptions about each candidate’s affinity with certain social groups or interests. 
 H1c: Voters will make assumptions about each candidate’s personal characteristics. 
 
H2: Voters will partially adjust their candidate assessments in the light of specific information in P2 and 
P3. 
When faced with specific information in P2 and P3, voters will adjust their initial assumptions accordingly. However, 
such adjustments will only be partial, and T2 voters will tend to perceive candidates as being closer to their stereotypic 
position than otherwise-identical T1 and control-group candidates. Adjustments will be modest after P2, when 
information is introduced in the more contestable form of opposition attack ads, and more substantial after P3, when 
the candidates explicitly state their positions. 
 H2a: Voters will partially correct their assumptions about each candidate’s programmatic profile after P2, and 
more so after P3, where such corrections are necessary.  
 H2b: Voters will partially adjust their assumptions about the each candidate’s social-group associations according 
to the programmatic profile revealed during P2 and P3. However, because there is no specific information about 
candidate-social group associations, such adjustments will be less pronounced than in H2a. 
 H2c: Voters will partially adjust their assumptions about each candidate’s personal characteristics according to the 
programmatic profile revealed during P2 and P3. However, because there is no specific information about 
candidates’ personal characteristics, and because ethnicity-trait stereotypic associations are likely to be more 
inflexible than programmatic or social-group associations, such adjustments will be less pronounced than in either 
H2a or H2b. 
 
H3: Voters will tend to vote for the candidate they perceive as being closest to their own interests. 
Most voters will seek to vote in line with their self-reported political preferences – that is, they will seek substantive 
representation. If the adjustments specified in H2 are achieved, then most voters will vote ‘correctly’. However, the 
vote pattern will be more inconsistent in T2 because voters will be more uncertain about candidates’ ‘true’ profile and 
may be subject to greater cross-pressures. 
 H3a: Voters will tend to select the candidate whom they perceive as being closest to their own programmatic 
preferences. Whether stereotypes affect vote choice will depend on the extent of ‘corrections’ made in H2a and 
the relative strength of the processes specified by H3b and H3c. 
 H3b: Voters will tend to select the candidate they associate with social group(s) and interests closest to their own. 
However, the current data are insufficient for assessing this relationship directly, so H3b will not be explicitly 
tested. 
 H3c: Voters will tend to select the candidate whom they associate with positive personal characteristics. Whether 
stereotypes influence vote choice will depend on the relative strength of linkages between personal characteristics 





of candidate profile examined, although in this case more deep-seated beliefs about ‘intrinsic’ 
ethnic types may exert more influence. 
The analysis investigates two related mechanisms through which ethnic heuristics 
might influence voting behaviour, both informed by existing theory on stereotypes and 
decision-making. The first mechanism involves the use of ethnic stereotypes as information 
shortcuts; the second refers to the resistance of stereotypes to change (Fiske and Taylor 1991; 
Zaller 1992). Thus, this chapter proposes that voters will not only make stereotype-based 
assumptions about candidates that go well beyond the actual information available, but that 
they will also tend to play down the significance of actual information that contradicts those 
stereotype-based expectations.167  
The experiment works on (and tests) the assumption that most voters in Peru conceive 
of broadly similar ethnic stereotypes – in other words, that the content of the ethnic heuristic 
is, in general terms, comparable across demographic, social, cultural and political divides. It 
proposes that most voters will associate a candidate of ‘white/European descent’ with a 
broadly defined neoliberal programmatic profile, while most voters will associate a candidate 
of ‘indigenous/Andean descent’ with a similarly broad left-nationalist programmatic profile. 
In terms of the programmatic and ideology measures outlined above (i.e., support for 
nationalisations, increased presidential powers, increased public spending, and leftist 
ideology), we might expect voters to place the white/European candidate lower on the scale 
measures (closer to the neoliberal ‘pole’) and the indigenous/Andean candidate higher on the 
scale measures (closer to the left-nationalist ‘pole’). This basic assumption underpins the 
more specific hypotheses that structure this analysis (see Table 6.2). 
In addressing these specific hypotheses – all of which relate to the role of ethnic 
heuristics in voting – this chapter will necessarily consider two versions of a null hypothesis 
as well: (i) that ethnicity has no effect on candidate evaluation or vote choice; and (ii) that 
voters primarily select candidates based on psychological group attachments, not 
programmatic assessments, whether the latter are influenced by stereotypes or not (i.e. the 
expressive model). The former is addressed, and largely rejected, through the presentation of 
evidence in support of the more specific hypotheses regarding heuristic use; the latter is 
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that voters consistently neglected information that was inconsistent with party labels when formulating 




briefly addressed in reference to both initial candidate assessments and final vote choice, but 
it finds only limited support in the data. 
 
Results from the Peruvian Voting Experiment 
The remainder of this chapter presents the key findings from the Peruvian voting 
experiment. After a brief discussion of a possible direct effect of ethnicity on initial candidate 
assessments, the following subsections deal with each of the hypotheses stated Table 6.2. 
First, voters’ assumptions about candidate profiles after Phase One (P1) are examined, with 
the discussion focusing on programmatic profile (H1a), social-group associations (H1b), and 
personal characteristics (H1c). Second, the effect of new information on voters’ candidate 
evaluations at Phase Two (P2) and Phase Three (P3) is assessed, again in reference to 
programme (H2a), social-group associations (H2b), and personal characteristics (H2c). Third, 
the effect of each aspect of candidate profile is examined in relation to final vote choice (H3a, 
H3b, and H3c). This subsection also includes discussion of direct ethnic effects. 
Voter ethnicity and initial candidate preferences 
 Table 6.3 shows the effects of voters’ self-identified ethnic identity and linguistic 
background on candidate ‘feeling thermometers’ after P1. The results are generated by a 
series of ordinary-least-squares (OLS) linear regression models, with voters’ thermometer 
rating of Olarte over Romero (T1 and T2), and Sánchez over Rodriguez (control group), as 
the dependent variable. A separate model was run for each ethnicity measure and candidate 
pair, and controls were included for other sociodemographic factors (age, sex, income, and so 
forth), voters’ self-reported political predispositions, and their relative placement of the 
candidates on the four issue/ideology measures after P1 (e.g., the placement of Olarte, over 
Romero, on the nationalisations issue).  
 According to this analysis, voter ethnicity appears to have had little impact on initial 
candidate preferences. Self-identification as white is associated with a slightly higher 
thermometer rating for Romero (the White/European candidate) compared with Olarte (the 
Indigenous/Andean candidate), while self-identification as indigenous or cholo is associated 
with a relatively higher thermometer rating for Olarte. However, in neither case do the effects 
reach statistical significance (p > .10). The effect of linguistic background on P1 thermometer 
ratings appears to be negligible. 
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TABLE 6.3: Effects of Voter Ethnicity on Candidate Feeling Thermometers after Phase One 
 
Ethnicity measure Candidate Comparison Coefficient and standard errors 
Self-identification as white Olarte over Romero   -3.33 (5.54) 
Sánchez over Rodriguez   - 0.37 (7.50) 
Self-identification as indigenous or cholo
168
 Olarte over Romero 4.13 (4.47) 
Sánchez over Rodriguez 8.30 (8.73) 
Indigenous language background Olarte over Romero   1.86 (4.50) 
Sánchez over Rodriguez   1.53  (9.95) 
N=152 (T1/T2 group); N = 60 (control group);  ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Coefficients are the effect of voter ethnicity (column one) on the relative thermometer rating of the indicated candidate pair, based on 
separate linear regression models (one model for each ethnicity-measure/candidate-comparison combination). 
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 Cholo is a generally understood to denote a mestizo of more indigenous appearance or with more immediate 
links to a rural indigenous family background. In this sense, it is comparable to the term indigenous-mestizo. 
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Overall, these results may indicate some slight preference among white voters for the 
European/white candidate, and a similar preference among indigenous and cholo voters for 
the Indigenous/Andean candidate. However, once other sociodemographic and political 
preferences are taken into account, these effects appear minimal. Affective preferences for an 
ethnically-proximate candidate, then, appear to have had little impact on voters’ general 
feelings about the candidates in the Peruvian experiment. 
Do Voters Make Assumptions about Candidates Based on Ethnic Background? (H1) 
Programmatic Profile (H1a) 
Voters made several significant assumptions about candidates’ programmatic profiles 
after P1. At the group level (Figure 6.1), Romero was placed lower on all three issue scales 
(nationalisations, presidential powers, and public spending) compared to his control-group 
copy (Rodríguez), indicating that voters considered Romero less likely to pursue each of 
these policy initiatives. However, the difference was not quite statistically significant in the 
case of the presidential powers issue. Romero was also placed significantly lower than Olarte, 
his T1/T2 opponent, on the nationalisation issue, and significantly further to the right 
compared to both Olarte and Rodríguez in terms of political ideology. Olarte, for his part, 
was placed at comparable levels to his control-group copy (Sánchez) on each issue measure, 
but significantly further to the left in terms of political ideology. 
 Results at the individual level show a similar pattern (Table 6.4). Experimental group 
had a significant effect on candidate issue-placement on the nationalisation and public 
spending measures for the Romero/Rodríguez pair, and on political ideology for both the 
Romero/Rodríguez and Olarte/Sánchez pairs. In the case of Romero/Rodríguez, T1/T2 
membership was negatively associated with candidate placement on the nationalisation and 
public spending measures (-11.25 and -8.56, respectively), as well as an ideological 
placement significantly further to the right (-11.62). For the Olarte/Sánchez pair, T1/T2 
membership did not have significant effects for any of the policy measures, but it was 
significantly associated with an ideological placement towards the left (+12.38). 
Overall, then, it seems that voters made some initial assumptions about candidates’ 
programmatic profiles based on ethnic background. They tended to perceive the 
white/European candidate (Romero) as being less inclined towards nationalisation or 
increased social spending, and they saw him as more right-wing in general. Conversely, 






N=213; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
The annotation on each group label refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. 
The annotation with the graph title refers to a significance of proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: OS is 
Olarte (T1/2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T1/2) with Rodríguez (C).  
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
 
TABLE 6.4: Effect of Experimental Group on Candidate Placement after Phase One 
 
Issue Stand Candidate Pair Coefficient  Std. Error 
Nationalise key sectors                      Olarte/Sánchez - 0.21 4.10 
Romero/Rodríguez - 11.25** 4.25 
Increase presidential powers Olarte/Sánchez - 4.97 3.82 
Romero/Rodríguez - 3.77 3.82 
Increase public spending Olarte/Sánchez - 0.32 3.85 
Romero/Rodríguez - 8.56* 3.43 
Left political ideology Olarte/Sánchez   12.38** 3.20 
Romero/Rodríguez - 11.62** 3.20 
N = 215; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01. 
Coefficients are the marginal effects of control-group membership on candidate placement for the given candidate pair, based on linear 
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Note: y-axis is perceived candidate stand (group mean)




to the left ideologically, although these assumptions did not translate into significantly 
different perceptions about the candidate’s stand on specific programmatic issues. In general, 
results from P1 offer partial support for H1a, particularly in the case of the white/European 
stereotype and particularly on the nationalisation issue and political ideology. Given the vote 
models in Chapters Three to Five found voters’ political ideology and support for 
nationalisations to be among the most significant vote predictors, the apparent influence of 
ethnic stereotypes on these specific aspects of candidate profiles may be of particular 
importance. 
Social-Group Associations (H1b) 
Voters also made quite substantial assumptions after P1 regarding the social groups 
and interests that were likely to benefit from the election of one or another candidate. Figure 
6.2 shows the proportion of voters (within each experimental group) who identified each 
social group or interest as a likely beneficiary from each candidate’s election. Annotations on 
the graph titles indicate a significant difference between the proportions received by the 
candidate pair indicated (e.g., OS* indicates that the difference between Olarte and Sánchez’s 
proportions is significant at the .05 level). Annotations on the group legend indicate a 
significant difference between the proportions received by each candidate within the given 
group (e.g., T1/T2** indicates that the difference between Olarte and Romero’s proportions 
within the combined T1/T2 group is significant at the .001 level).  
Figure 6.2 shows that over 59 percent of T1/T2 voters considered the election of 
Olarte to benefit trade unions and their members, while 61 percent saw Olarte as the best 
option for campesinos (peasants). Voters predicted Olarte would be a particularly 
unfavourable option for wealthy Limeños (3 percent), foreign investors (12 percent), 
employers (16 percent), and mining companies (14 percent). In contrast, a Romero 
presidency was perceived to benefit private business (62 percent), foreign investors (57 
percent), wealthy Limeños (35 percent), employers (33 percent), and mining companies (35 
percent). Trade unions (13 percent) and campesinos (16 percent) were the groups/interests 
considered least likely to benefit. In each of these cases, the proportion of voters identifying 
the candidate in question with the particular social group/interest was significantly different 







N=154 (T1/T2); N = 60 (C); ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Graphs show the proportion of group members (percent) that indicated the social group/interest would particularly benefit from the 
election of a given candidate. Voters could select none or all of the social group/interests for each candidate in their group.  
The annotation on group labels refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The 
annotation with graph titles refers to the significance of a proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: OS is Olarte 
(T1/2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T1/2) with Rodríguez (C).  
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N=154 (T1/T2); N = 60 (C); ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Graphs show the proportion of group members (percent) that described each candidate with the term shown. Voters could select none or 
all of the descriptions for each candidate in their group.  
The annotation on group labels refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The 
annotation with graph titles refers to the significance of a proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: OS is Olarte 
(T1/2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T1/2) with Rodríguez (C).  

































































































































 These social-group associations are broadly in line with the programmatic 
assumptions reported in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4. We might expect the presumed leftist 
candidate (Olarte) to be perceived as beneficial for trade unions and campesinos, and the 
presumed rightist candidate (Romero, who opposes nationalisation) as the best choice for 
private business and the rich. Whether the assumptions reported in Figure 6.2 are only the 
result of voters’ prior calculations regarding programmatic profiles, or whether they reflect 
more general impressions about candidate-social group associations, is discussed in reference 
to the P2 and P3 data. However, based on the P1 findings, it is clear that voters perceived 
certain candidates as significantly more likely to favour the interests of certain social groups, 
and that these evaluations were reached with little substantive information aside from ethnic 
background. These findings, then, offer support for H1b. 
Personal Characteristics (H1c) 
 Voters also appeared to make a series of assumptions about the personal 
characteristics of both candidates at P1. Figure 6.3 shows the same proportions as Figure 6.2 
but based on the ascription of personal characteristics to each candidate by experimental 
group. Annotations on the graph titles and legends should be read in the same manner as in 
Figure 6.2.  
Figure 6.3 shows a significantly greater proportion of T1/T2 voters described the 
white/European candidate (Romero) as ‘modern’ and ‘sophisticated’ compared to his 
indigenous/Andean opponent (Olarte). In the case of the ‘modern’ description, Romero’s 
proportion was also significantly higher than his control-group copy (Rodríguez). However, 
significantly more voters described Olarte as ‘hardworking and honest’ compared to both 
Romero and Sánchez. Olarte was also perceived as ‘populist’ by a significantly larger 
proportion of voters compared with Romero, while the latter was also perceived as less 
‘populist’ than his control-group copy, Rodríguez.  
In short, faced with two candidates whose personal profiles were effectively identical 
except for ethnic background, and with no more substantive information to go on, voters in 
T1/T2 clearly attributed quite different sets of characteristics to each candidate. Again, 
whether the ascription of such personal characteristics is linked to presumed programmatic 
profile, or whether they reflect more deep-seated perceptions of ‘intrinsic’ socioethnic types, 




How Do Voters Respond to More Specific Information about the Candidates? (H2) 
 The findings from P1 of the election simulation suggest that voters use ethnic 
stereotypes to make assumptions about a candidate’s stand on specific programmatic issues, 
their political ideology, social-group associations, and a range of personal characteristics. But 
how are these initial perceptions affected by exposure to more specific information about the 
candidates in P2 and P3? 
Programmatic Profile (H2a) 
 Figures 6.4 to 6.7 show voters’ candidate placements on the four issue/ideology 
measures at each phase of the campaign. The graph plots show the predicted placement of 
each candidate on the four issue/ideology measures across the three experimental phases and 
groups. The coefficients in the graph legend indicate the marginal effects of experimental 
phase on these candidate placements by group (e.g., the effect of moving from P1 to P2 on a 
T1 voter’s placement of Olarte on the nationalisation measure), while the coefficients in the 
graph plots indicate the marginal effects of experimental group on voters’ candidate 
placements at each phase (e.g., the effect of being in T1 compared to T2 on the placement of 
Olarte on the nationalisation issue at P1). The marginal effects and predictions are generated 
by a series of multilevel, mixed-effects linear models with the placement of each candidate 
pair on each issue/ideology measure as the dependent variable. The experiment dataset was 
converted to longitudinal panel data for the analysis of such within-subject change.  
If H2a is correct, then one would expect to see voters adjust their initial stereotype-
based assumptions from P1 in light of more specific information about the candidates after P2 
and P3. One might expect such ‘corrections’ to be modest after P2, when the new information 
was introduced in more contestable form through opposition attack ads. One might expect the 
corrections to be more decisive after P3, however, when candidates explicitly stated their 
positions on the issues. Because voters in T2 were faced with a candidate pair that reversed 
the hypothesised associations between ethnicity and programme, one might also expect such 
corrections to be most apparent in T2. Indeed, the absence of such corrections would indicate 
highly inflexible and resistant stereotypes.  
Overall, Figures 6.4 to 6.7 indicate the general pattern of correction outlined above. In 
T1, voters ‘confirmed’ their P1 evaluations as they accessed information that supported their 
initial stereotype-based placements, increasing/decreasing their candidate placements towards 






N=214; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based 
on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of 
phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by 
the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients 
with p < .150. 




























T1 (Romero):            -8.81*       1.41        -7.40*
T2 (Olarte):               -6.00^     -5.74^     -11.74**
C (Sánchez):            -9.31*      -0.11        -9.42**





















































T1 (Olarte):                4.00        2.93         6.93*
T2 (Romero):             8.26*      7.03*      15.28**
C (Rodriguez):           6.90^      1.92         8.82*


































N=214; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based 
on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of 
phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by 
the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients 
with p < .150. 






















T1 (Romero):            -8.77**     -2.70      -11.47**
T2 (Olarte):               -0.96        -3.04       -4.00
C (Sánchez):             0.79        -4.54        -3.75


















































T1 (Olarte):               10.81**     2.21        13.02**
T2 (Romero):            10.33**     2.95        13.28**
C (Rodriguez):          15.47**    -0.23        15.24**

































N=214; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based 
on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of 
phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by 
the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients 
with p < .150. 











T1 (Romero):         -2.78       -0.07        -2.85
T2 (Olarte):            -2.19       -1.81        -4.01
C (Sánchez):         -1.89       -1.10        -2.98







































T1 (Olarte):             -1.15      -0.81        -1.96 
T2 (Romero):           2.71       3.76          6.46*
C (Rodriguez):        -3.06       4.79         1.73

































N=214; ^ = p < .10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.  
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based 
on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of 
phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by 
the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients 
with p < .150. 
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T2 (Olarte):                                -12.44**
C (Sánchez):                               -6.77*
















































T1 (Olarte):                                    5.40^
T2 (Romero):                               16.40**
C (Rodriguez):                               4.53


































The x-axis shows the difference (linear prediction) between the left-nationalist and neoliberal candidate in each group (T1: Olarte-Romero; 
T2: Romero-Olarte; C: Rodríguez-Sánchez). At P2 and P3, then, positive values indicate correct identification of the candidates’ relative 
stances. At P1, positive values (circled) indicate stereotype-consistent perceptions in T1 (Olarte-Romero), and negative values (circled) 
indicate stereotype-consistent perceptions in T2 (Romero-Olarte). The control group (C Group) is directly comparable with T2. 









































































































































Stereotype-Consistent (P1) and Correct Candidate Placement (P2 and P3)
T1 Group (O-R) T2 Group (R-O) C Group (D-S)
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except the public spending issue, where candidate placements did not change significantly at 
any phase (Figure 6.6). Moving from P1 to P2 had significant effects on Romero’s 
nationalisation placement (-8.81) and significant effects for both candidates on the 
presidential powers measure (-8.77 for Romero and +10.81 for Olarte; see Figure 6.5). 
However, there were no significant changes between P2 and P3 on any issue, suggesting that 
T1 voters were generally satisfied with the reliability of P2 information. T1 voters also 
‘confirmed’ their ideological evaluations of both candidates (Figure 6.7), with significant 
changes from P1 to P3 for Romero (-6.67) and Olarte (+5.40). In general, results in the 
control group resembled T1, although in many cases the candidate placements were more 
polarised. This is perhaps unsurprising given that voters in the control group made their 
assessments based only on programmatic information. 
 The effects of phase were even more pronounced in T2. Changes between P1 and P2 
were in the ‘correct’ direction for both candidates for each issue/ideology measure, although 
the effects fall outside conventional levels of statistical significance for Olarte on the 
presidential powers issues, and for both candidates on public spending (Figure 6.5 and 6.6). 
The change between P2 and P3 was also significant on the nationalisation issue (Figure 6.4), 
suggesting that voters were initially sceptical of the counter-stereotype information they 
received in P2. In general, changes from P1 to P3 tend to be larger in T2 compared with T1 
and the control group, reflecting the need for voters in T2 to ‘correct’ initial stereotype-based 
assumptions that proved contrary to the candidate’s actual programmatic profile. This is 
particularly evident in the case of political ideology (Figure 6.7), where stereotype effects 
appeared particularly large at P1 and where the change between P1 and P3 was 12-16 
percentage points (compared to the ‘confirmatory’ changes of 5-6 points in T1). 
The ideology variable is also exceptional in being the only measure where 
experimental group still had a significant effect for both candidates at P3 (Figure 6.7). 
Romero in T1 (Neoliberal) was rated more than ten points further to the right than Olarte in 
T2 (Neoliberal), while Olarte in T1 (Left-nationalist) was rated more than five points further 
to the left than Romero in T2 (Left-nationalist). Olarte in T2 (Neoliberal) was also rated eight 
points to the left of his control-group copy (Sánchez), but group was not significant for the 
Romero/Rodríguez pair (Left-nationalists). However, on the three specific programmatic 
issues, the effect of group at P2 and P3 was more mixed. Compared with T1, membership in 
T2 did not have a significant effect on candidate placement on any of the three measures. 
Compared with the control group, membership in T2 was significant for the nationalisation 
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and presidential powers issues at both P2 and P3, but only for the left-nationalist profile 
(Figure 6.5 and 6.6). However, as Figure 6.5 and 6.6 indicate visually, these effects may have 
more to do with the overall higher placements reported by control-group members (higher 
than the ratings of both candidates in T1 and T2), rather than any specific effect for T2. 
Additionally, the effect of T2 compared to the control group is significant for the neoliberal 
profile on the presidential powers issue (at P2), although the effect runs counter to the 
hypothesised direction in this case. 
Overall, there is mixed evidence for the effect of initial stereotype-based assumptions 
on voters’ evaluation of subsequent political information. Although initial assumptions 
appear to have affected perceptions about candidates’ political ideology, they tended to have 
far less consistent effects on specific issue placements. This probably reflects the wider 
conceptual scope of the political ideology measure, which in contrast to the single-issue 
measures was not directly addressed by the information pieces in P2 and P3.169  In other 
words, voters had more room to construct ideological profiles according to their particular 
stereotypical associations and their own understanding of the ideological labels, whereas 
explicit statements about each issue stance were more difficult to ignore.  
In summary, it is clear that voters in all groups were quite responsive to the 
information they received in P2 and P3, even if it ran counter to their initial assumptions, and 
the general trend shows that voters correctly identified the programmatic distinctions between 
candidates. Figure 6.8 confirms this trend, showing that the predicted difference between 
candidate pairs is comparable across the three groups, both in terms of direction (i.e. voters 
correctly identified which candidate was lower/higher on the issue scale) and magnitude (i.e. 
the perceived distance between the two candidates). However, as the above discussion has 
suggested, the one exception is the political ideology measure, where the difference between 
candidates in T2 was in the correct direction (Romero placed to the left of Olarte), but 
significantly smaller than the corresponding difference in T1. In other words, although T2 
voters correctly perceived the relative ideological positions of their candidates, they 
considered them to be much closer ideologically than T1 voters did. In fact, T2 membership 
                                                          
169
 The ideology question was modelled on the equivalent question used in the LAPOP surveys. It asks 
respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale according to their own understanding of these terms. 
Despite the explicit subjectivity of the wording, analysis of LAPOP responses shows a relatively high degree of 
consistency between stated ideological position and more specific attitudes towards the role of the state, 
particularly with regard to economic matters (Zechmeister and Corral 2010).  
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was associated with an 18-point decrease in the perceived difference between the candidates, 
compared with T1 (Figure 6.8).170 
Social-Group Associations (H2b) 
In general, a comparison of Figures 6.2 and 6.9 shows that candidate-social group 
associations were adjusted, where necessary, according to the programmatic profile of the 
candidates. In other words, where specific information accessed in P2 and P3 confirmed 
stereotype-based assumptions (T1), the difference in the proportion of candidate-social group 
associations widened at P3; where specific information in P2 and P3 contradicted stereotype-
based assumptions (T2), the difference in proportions was (partially) reversed between P1 
and P3. In fact, in T2 only two candidate-social group associations did not reverse their 
relative proportions between P1 and P3: in the ‘rich Lima’ category Romero’s higher 
proportion at P1 was replicated at P3 (although the difference was not statistically significant 
in the latter case), while the proportions for the ‘employers’ category became virtually 
identical at P3 (rather than showing a clear reverse).171 However, on all other social-group 
associations, however, the proportions in T2 were reversed over the course of the campaign, 
suggesting that voters perceived such associations as being closely linked to programmatic 
profile. In the control group, where voters had only programmatic information to go on, the 
proportions were largely comparable to T2 at P3, reinforcing the conclusion that 
programmatic profile was an important indicator of candidate-social group associations. 
Nevertheless, and despite this general trend, Figure 6.9 shows that the difference in 
proportions between the candidates was considerably smaller in T2 compared with T1. 
Indeed, within-group differences are statistically significant in only four out of eight cases in 
T2, compared to seven out of eight cases for T1, and six out of eight cases for the control 
group (see annotation on x-axis). Substantively, this means that many more T2 voters 
believed that certain social groups and interests would still benefit from the election of a 
candidate whose programmatic profile turned out to be quite unfavourable to the group. For 
example, despite explicit policy pledges that made Olarte the unambiguous best choice for
                                                          
170
 However, experimental group is not significant for either the T1/C or T2/C group comparisons (the C group 
difference is approximately half-way between the T1 and T2 group differences). This suggests that the T1/T2 
difference results from a combination of an ‘enhancement’ effect in the T1 group (i.e. specific information that 
confirms stereotype-based expectations results in relatively clear perceptions of ideological difference) and an 
‘inhibiting' effect in the T2 group (i.e. specific information that counters stereotype-based expectations results in 
more cautious perceptions of ideological difference). 
171
 There were also only limited differences in the proportion of voters who associated each candidate with the 
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foreign investors, private employers, and wealthy Limeños (at least on economic grounds), a 
considerable minority of voters still perceived Romero as the candidate with these groups’ 
interests at heart.172 Conversely, even when Romero undoubtedly proposed the most 
favourable programme for trade unions and their members and offered policies that were 
highly beneficial for campesinos, many voters still identified Olarte as the candidate most 
likely to serve those constituencies.173 Thus, although a candidate’s programmatic profile 
clearly influenced voters’ perception of social-group associations, stereotype-based 
assumptions about the ‘natural’ constituencies of a white/European or an indigenous/Andean 
politician still carried considerable weight. Overall, these findings are in line with H2b. 
Personal Characteristics 
 Compared with social-group associations, the changes in proportions of voter-
ascribed personal characteristics between P1 and P3 are considerably less pronounced (see 
Figures 6.3 and 6.10). Indeed, in no cases are the proportions reversed in T2 so that the 
candidate with a significantly higher proportion at P1 has a significantly lower proportion at 
P3. In fact, Romero (the white/European candidate) was considered ‘modern’, 
‘sophisticated’, and qualified by a significantly larger proportion of voters than Olarte (the 
indigenous/Andean candidate), even when the two were programmatically identical (in the 
graph, both RO and OR comparisons are statistically significant). Furthermore, on 
the‘sophistication’ measure, Romero’s proportion was significantly larger than Olarte’s 
irrespective of programmatic profile (i.e. within both T1 and T2, as well as between groups). 
Romero was also considered ‘modern’ and ‘sophisticated’ by a larger proportion of T2 voters 
than his control-group copy, Rodríguez (in the graph, RD comparison is significant). 
                                                          
172
 For instance, when both candidates were neoliberals, Romero was identified as the best option for foreign 
investors by 64 percent of voters (T1), compared with Olarte’s 46 percent (T2). However, when both candidates 
were left-nationalists, 29 percent of voters still considered Romero to be the best option for investors (T2) 
compared to just 12 percent for Olarte (T1). Similarly, 48 percent of voters thought a neoliberal Romero was the 
best choice for private ‘employers’, compared to 19 percent for a left-nationalist Olarte (T1). Yet when the 
programmatic profiles were reversed (T2), near-identical proportions of voters associated a left-nationalist 
Romero and a neoliberal Olarte with the same employers’ interests (38 and 39 percent, respectively). Finally, 
Romero was considered the best candidate for wealthy Limeños by 37 percent of voters as a neoliberal, 
compared to Olarte’s 14 percent (T1), and 22 percent as a left-nationalist, compared to 3 percent for Olarte (T2). 
173
 An Olarte presidency was considered to benefit trade union interests by 27 percent of T2 voters, despite the 
candidate’s strongly neoliberal profile. Although this is less than the 38 percent who believed Romero to be the 
trade union candidate in T2, the difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, the 27 percent of T2 voters 
who linked Olarte with trade union interests is significantly more than Romero’s 7 percent in T1, which is the 
directly comparable candidate pair in programmatic terms. Similarly, only 12 percent of voters considered 
Romero the best candidate for campesinos, compared with Olarte’s 32 percent, when both were neoliberals, and 
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In addition to the differences on ‘modern’, ‘sophisticated’, and ‘qualified’, Olarte was 
described as ‘populist’ by a larger proportion of voters than Romero within both T1 and T2. 
Moreover, the differences between programmatically identical pairs across T1 and T2, as 
well as between T2 and the control group, are statistically significant in all cases. In other 
words, voters considered Olarte to be more populist than both Romero and Sánchez (Olarte’s 
control-group copy) irrespective of programmatic profile, while they also considered Romero 
to be less ‘populist’ than any other candidate. Only in the ‘hardworking and honest’ category 
was a neoliberal Olarte significantly higher than a programmatically identical Romero (29 
percent compared to 17 percent), although as left-nationalists the two candidates received 
near-identical proportions. 
In short, although the overall pattern of P1-P3 changes is comparable to the social-
group associations – that is, differences tended to increase in T1 and partially reverse in T2 – 
the adjustments were considerably less pronounced in the case of personal characteristics. 
Indeed, in several T2 cases the distribution of ascribed personal characteristics at P3 followed 
the same hierarchy as at P1. Thus, it appears that the ascription of personal trairs to 
candidates was only partially influenced by programmatic profile, and without specific 
information to counter P1 stereotype-based assumptions, many voters maintained their initial 
assessments.  
Conceptually, it seems likely that the ascription of personal traits to candidates may 
reflect far less flexible notions of ethnic stereotypes compared to programmatic and social-
group associations. Indeed, many of the personal characteristics identified here have been 
prominent in popular debates about real-world electoral candidates in Peru, with terms such 
as ‘modern’, ‘sophisticated’, and ‘qualified’ featuring heavily in legitimating descriptions of 
white/European candidates (often explicitly set against the absence of such characteristics in 
non-white opponents), while ‘honesty’, ‘hard work’, and ‘closeness to the people’ recur in 
positive descriptions of indigenous/Andean candidates. Conversely, many negative 
descriptions of non-white politicians employ the terms ‘populist’, ‘unrefined’, or ‘backward’, 
while white candidates may be discredited as ‘foreigners’ and ‘snobs’ who ‘do not 
understand the country’.174 Overall, then, the findings of the election simulation are in line 
with these real-word observations. 
                                                          
174
 See, for example, Ardito (2011) and Manrique (2011) on the ethnic stereotypes that permeated popular online 
discussion regarding the 2011 Peruvian election. See Muñoz (2011) on the importance of Humala’s perceived 
honesty – particularly among indigenous voters – as a driver of his 2011 vote. 
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How Do Voters Actually Cast their Votes? (H3) 
 The preceding section has shown how voters tended to ‘correct’ their assessment of 
candidates, particularly on programmatic issues, in cases where initial assumptions proved 
inaccurate. But how would voters actually cast their votes? Might voters ignore these 
adjusted assessments and simply vote for the candidate they preferred at P1? Even if voters’ 
disregard for the information they received was not so blatant, might more cautious candidate 
issue-placements (at least on some measures), or more ambiguous perceptions of social-group 
associations and personal characteristics, have more subtle effects on vote choice? 
Direct Ethnic Effects 
 The simulation provides no clear evidence that voters are prepared to set aside 
programmatic or other sociopolitical assessments in order to select candidates based solely on 
ethnicity. Neither categorical nor linguistic measures of ethnicity are statistically significant 
predictors of P3 thermometer ratings or final vote choice (see Appendix Table D5-D8). More 
generally, there is little evidence that voters maintain their initial P1 preferences irrespective 
of information accessed later in the campaign: P1 thermometer ratings do a rather poor job at 
predicting final vote choice.175 Thus, at least in this simulated election, it appears that voters 
either subordinated expressive ethnic biases to other criteria in reaching their vote decision, 
or they were not particularly influenced by such biases in the first place. In short, this 
simulation finds little evidence of expressive ethnic voting, and it suggests that most voters 
will not seek to maintain ethnic descriptive representation at the expense of substantive 
representation. 
Programmatic Profile (H3a) 
 The analysis in the previous section has shown how voters were generally willing to 
alter their initial preferences as they progressed through the campaign, suggesting that initial 
stereotype-based assumptions were relatively flexible. But did this mean that voters set aside 
their initial assumptions and voted unambiguously for the candidate closest to their self-
reported preferences?  
 The simplest way to examine the relationship between voters’ political preferences 
and vote choice is to assess the former’s predictive power in relation to the latter. The results 
                                                          
175
 The only significant effect is for Olarte in T2, where a 10-unit increase in the P1 thermometer rating is 
associated with a very modest one percent increase in vote probability (see Appendix D). 
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from this analysis, a simple logistic regression model, are reported in Appendix Table D8. 
These results highlight an important difference among the three experiment groups: whereas 
six out of the seven issue-measures from the pre-experiment questionnaire are significant 
predictors of vote choice in T1, and three out of seven in the control group, only one measure 
is significant for T2 voters. These findings suggest that T1 and control-group voters selected 
candidates whose profiles were, at least to some extent, in line with their own substantive 
preferences; T2 voters did not. However, although these findings provide some initial insight 
into voting patterns and underlying motivations, the analysis does not take into consideration 
whether or not the voter had correctly identified the candidates’ position in the first place. In 
other words, did T2 voters select candidates who were unfavourable to their substantive 
interests because they prioritised other criteria, or because they simply misidentified the 
candidates’ relative stands on the issues? Furthermore, this type of analysis is not 
immediately indicative of actual vote choice; that is, it provides evidence of effects on vote 
probabilities, rather than the predicted vote probabilities themselves.  
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 provide a more nuanced (and more easily interpretable) picture 
of voting behaviour in each group. Both figures show the predicted probability of voting for 
the left-nationalist candidate according to a voter’s position on the four issue/ideology 
measures. In Figure 6.11 the variable measuring voters’ position is simply the mean of their 
self-reported scores on the four issue/ideology scales from the pre-experiment questionnaire 
(support nationalisation, presidential powers, public spending, and leftist political ideology). 
Because the original scales ran from zero to 100, values below 50 on this combined measure 
indicate a voter who is, on average, closer to the neoliberal end of the scale, while values over 
50 indicate an average position towards the left-nationalist end of the scale. 
Figure 6.12 employs a slightly different measure of ‘voter-candidate affinity’, 
calculated as the mean of the distances between voter and candidate on the four 
issue/ideology measures. The variable is calculated so that values to the right of zero on the 
x-axis (labelled ‘no difference’ in the graph) indicate that the voter’s self-reported position is 
progressively closer to the position of the left-nationalist candidate as perceived by the voter, 
while values to the left of zero indicate that the voter’s position is progressively closer to the 
perceived stand of the neoliberal. The key difference between these two variables is that the 
voter-candidate affinity measure (Figure 6.12) expresses how closely a voter’s preferences 






N = 214. 
The graphs show the predicted probabilities (within 95 percent confidence intervals) of voting for the left-nationalist candidate by average 
voter issue-stance (the mean of voters’ self-reported stance on nationalisations, presidential powers, public spending, and political 
ideology). The results are from a logistic regression model that includes an interaction term for group and voter issue stance and controls 
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N = 214.  
The graphs show the predicted probabilities (within 95 percent confidence intervals) of voting for the left-nationalist candidate by average 
voter-candidate affinity, a measure of the relative distance between voters’ self-reported stance on nationalisations, presidential powers, 
public spending, and political ideology and the voters’ P3 placement of each candidate on the same measures. Values to the right of the 
horizontal ‘no difference’ marker indicate greater relative proximity to the left-nationalist candidate; values to the left of the marker 
indicate greater proximity to the neoliberal candidate. The results are from a logistic regression model that includes an interaction term 
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6.11)  indicates the proximity of a voter’s preferences to the ‘objective’ programmatic poles 
of neoliberal and left-nationalist.176 The predicted vote probabilities are generated by a 
logistic regression model with vote choice as the dependent variable, and an interaction term 
between experimental group and either the voter-issue or voter-candidate affinity variable. 
Controls for voters’ demographic background are also included. 
The y-axis in both cases shows the predicted probability of voting for the left-
nationalist candidate in each group. Thus values above 0.5 indicate the prediction of a left-
nationalist vote, while values below 0.5 indicate the prediction of a neoliberal vote. In 
general, if voters selected candidates in line with their self-reported substantive preferences, 
then we should see a positive trend in the predicted probabilities, with probabilities over 50 
percent for voters with a more left-nationalist profile (the upper-right quadrant of the graphs) 
and probabilities below 50 percent for voters with a more neoliberal profile (the lower-left 
quadrant of the graphs).  
Overall, Figure 6.11 and 6.12 show very similar trends, at least for T1 and T2. In T1, 
the strong positive trend indicates that voters tended to select the candidate who was broadly 
in line with their self-reported substantive preferences. The predicted probabilities of voting 
for the left-nationalist candidate are significantly greater than 50 percent for voters whose 
profiles placed them closer to the left-nationalist pole (Figure 6.11) or closer to the perceived 
position of the left-nationalist candidate (Figure 6.12). Meanwhile, the predicted vote 
probabilities are significantly less than 50 percent for those voters closer to the neoliberal 
pole or closer to the perceived position of the neoliberal candidate. The results in the control 
group closely resemble T1 for the voter-candidate affinity measure (Figure 6.12), indicating 
that most control-group voters were also likely to select the candidate they perceived as being 
closest to their own substantive preferences. The anomalous results in Figure 6.11for the 
control group – indicating similar predicted vote probabilities irrespective of voter profile – 
are probably best explained by the calculation method for the voter-issue variable.177  
In contrast with T1 and the control group, the predicted vote probabilities in T2 are 
not significantly different from 50 percent for most voter profiles (in both Figures 6.11 and 
6.12). This indicates that T2 voters were, in general, much less likely to vote in line with their 
                                                          
176
 Overall, we might argue that the voter-candidate affinity variable is a better measure of voting motivations. It 
is based on the voter’s own perception of their electoral options rather than the voter-issue variable, which does 
not account for misidentified candidate profiles in the first place or for potential misinterpretations of the zero to 
100 scale. 
177
 This issue is discussed in Appendix D. 
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self-reported substantive preferences, at least as far as these four issue/ideology measures are 
concerned. 
This chapter would argue that the broad pattern of voting behaviour outlined above 
resulted from greater uncertainty among T2 voters, compared with T1 and control-group 
voters, about various aspects of the candidates’ profiles. Although T2 voters tended to 
correctly identify the relative stands of their candidates on programmatic issues (Figure 6.8), 
the assessments they reported – particularly in terms of political ideology – were sometimes 
more cautious compared with T1 voters and the control group. At least some T2 voters, then, 
appeared to consider the two candidates to be somewhat closer programmatically than their 
counterparts in other groups. Similarly, the perception of social-group associations among T2 
voters also suggests ambiguity, with considerable minorities identifying social groups and 
interests with a candidate whose programme was distinctly unfavourable to the group in 
question.  
In short, in the later phases of the campaign, T2 voters were faced with information 
that contradicted many of their initial expectations. This helped to increase voters’ confusion 
and uncertainty regarding candidate profiles and the ‘correct’ vote choice, and it may have 
caused different aspects of a candidate’s profile to exert contradictory pressures on voters 
(some assessments were still based on initial stereotypical assumptions, others were based on 
information accessed subsequently). This chapter argues that voters in T2 resolved these 
ambiguities in idiosyncratic ways depending on individual priorities, preconceptions, 
strategies for information search and processing, and the specific information pieces accessed 
during the experiment. The result, overall, was a far less consistent pattern of vote choice in 
T2.178 In contrast, in T1 and the control group most indicators about the candidates were 
relatively consistent with voters’ expectations, and different aspects of candidates’ profiles 
may have been perceived as less contradictory, making the vote choice much more 
straightforward. 
Social-group Associations (H3b) 
 The simulation data do not offer the possibility of assessing directly the effects of 
social-group associations on vote choice. In order to do so, we would need more detailed data 
on voters’ perceptions of certain social groups, as well as some measure of identification with 
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 It is possible that less instrumental biases – affective group loyalties, resentment, or prejudices – also have 
greater influence when other aspects of a candidate’s profile are perceived as being more ambiguous. However, 
the current data are insufficient to test such a hypothesis. 
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each group. However, it seems reasonable to assume that social-group associations will 
influence electoral decision-making to some extent. Several studies have shown that voters 
often perceive their own interests in terms of wider group interests (e.g. Ferree 2006, 805), 
and thus the perception of a particular candidate’s affinity with specific social interests may 
well influence voting preferences. 
 In terms of the hypotheses presented in this chapter, the previous section made clear 
that voters’ perceptions of social-group associations were significantly affected by 
programmatic profile. However, the findings also indicated that such associations were 
considerably more persistent – that is, more resistant to adjustment in the light of new 
information – than similar assumptions about specific programmatic positions. This suggests 
that ethnic stereotypes may have a particularly important influence on voters’ candidate 
evaluation by shaping these broader social-group associations (compared with more specific 
programmatic assumptions). These social-group associations contribute to voters’ general 
impressions about a candidate’s networks, loyalties, and personal as well as political 
priorities, impressions that may, in turn, shape voting preferences. 
Personal Characteristics (H3c) 
 The effect of a candidate’s perceived personal characteristics on vote choice is easier 
to assess. However, the data provide no means of weighting characteristics in terms of 
salience to the voter, and the causal direction of any effects is questionable (do perceived 
positive characteristics affect vote choice, or do voters attribute positive characteristics to the 
candidate they have already decided to support?). Nonetheless, while keeping these caveats in 
mind, examination of the link between a candidate’s personal characteristics and vote choice 
reveals significant positive associations in most cases, even when sociodemographic and 
political preferences are taken into account.179  
 In the experiment, being described as ‘hardworking and honest’ had a significant 
positive effect on both Olarte’s and Romero’s vote probabilities. ‘Competence’ and 
‘sophistication’ were positively associated with Olarte’s vote probabilities (but not 
Romero’s), while ‘qualified’ was significant for Romero in both groups and for Olarte in T2. 
In contrast, being described as ‘populist’ had a negative effect on vote probabilities for all 
candidates, although it was only significant for the left-nationalist profile.  
                                                          
179
 See Figure D1. 
264 
 
 Although this chapter cannot offer firm conclusions about the processes linking ethnic 
stereotypes, a candidate’s perceived personal characteristics, and vote choice, a number of 
cases suggest that an effect exists. ‘Hardworking and honest’ and ‘populist’ were both 
disproportionately associated with the indigenous/Andean candidate (Figures 6.2 and 6.10), 
and both have significant effects on vote probabilities. The extremely skewed pattern of 
distribution for the ‘populist’ description may indicate a particularly damaging association for 
Olarte’s candidacy; the combination of a left-nationalist programmatic profile and an 
indigenous/Andean ethnic background appears to provoke a far more negative reaction than 
the combination of the same programmatic profile with a white/European ethnic background 
(60 percent describe the former as ‘populist’, compared to just 22 percent for the latter). In 
terms of the white/European candidate, both ‘competency’ and ‘sophistication’ were 
disproportionately associated with Romero, but the ascription of these characteristics only 
appears to affect Olarte’s vote probabilities. This suggests that the perceived absence of such 
characteristics may be an important factor contributing to more negative views of the 
indigenous/Andean candidate (or, of course, vice versa).  
 In short, although the extent of the relationship between stereotypes, personal 
characteristics, and vote choice is not explored fully here, ethnic background certainly 
appears to shape voters’ ascription of personal traits to candidates. These, in turn, have 
significant effects on vote probabilities, lending some support to H3c. However, it seems 
likely that the unequal ascription of personal traits to candidates with different ethnic 
backgrounds (but otherwise-identical profiles), and the relative resilience of those ascriptions 
to change, indicate a form of stereotypical association that is far more inflexible than 
programmatic or social-group assumptions. In fact, the former may well constitute processes 




 Data from the Peruvian voting experiment provide some evidence that ethnic 
stereotypes serve a heuristic purpose in voters’ decision-making. In the absence of actual 
information, many voters appear to make initial assumptions about a candidate’s 
programmatic profile, social-group associations, and personal characteristics based in part on 
the candidate’s perceived ethnic background. However, there is little evidence from the 
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experimental data that these stereotype-based assumptions are entirely fixed or inflexible. 
When voters had access to specific information about a candidate’s programmatic agenda, 
most adjusted their candidate assessments accordingly, even if this meant reversing initial 
assumptions. In short, voters were responsive to what candidates said and did; they were 
persuadable, at least to some extent.180  
Nevertheless, despite this general trend of adjustment in light of better information, 
initial stereotype-based assumptions may still influence subsequent candidate evaluations. 
This may be particularly true of more general impressions about electoral candidates that 
cannot be unambiguously countered by a specific piece of factual information or an explicit 
statement by the candidate. Indeed, almost all voters in the experiment accurately perceived 
the two candidates’ stands on the three specific policy issues tested, whether they were in the 
stereotype-consistent (T1), stereotype–inconsistent (T2) or control group (C). Similarly, most 
voters accurately identified their candidates’ relative position on the conceptually broader 
ideology measure, although in this case stereotype-based assumptions appeared to mitigate 
the impact of specific policy information.  
However, when voters were asked about social-group associations and personal 
characteristics, neither of which was addressed explicitly by information pieces in the 
experiment, the effect of stereotypes was particularly apparent. Certainly, a majority of voters 
still reported social-group associations in line with the candidate’s programmatic profile, 
making adjustments in light of new information where necessary. Yet a sizeable minority 
continued to perceive such associations according to their initial stereotype-based 
assumptions. These voters appeared to play down or ignore information indicating a 
programmatic profile that was clearly antithetical to the social group or interest in question.  
Finally, in the case of personal characteristics, the pattern of ascribing traits to 
candidates suggests more deep-seated assumptions about ‘intrinsic’ ethnic types. Although a 
candidate’s programmatic profile appears to have played a role in these trait ascriptions, 
counter-stereotype adjustments according to programme were considerably less pronounced. 
In general, this suggests that some attitudes about ethnic identities are more indicative of the 
affective ties and prejudices that drive expressive, rather than heuristic, ethnic voting. 
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Overall, it appears that a combination of initial assumptions and only partial 
subsequent adjustments had some effect on vote choice in the voting experiment. Where a 
candidate’s explicit programme ran counter to stereotype-based expectations, and thus where 
different aspects of the candidate’s profile may have appeared contradictory, voters were 
much less likely to vote in line with their self-expressed political preferences. Uncertainty, 
confusion, and (perceived) contradictory pressures may have led individual voters to view 
key aspects of a candidate’s profile differently or to prioritize different selection criteria. Less 
clear-cut programmatic options may also have increased the influence of less instrumental 
motivations, such as feelings of ethnic solidarity and ethnic prejudice. Nevertheless, this 
chapter would argue that the distinct voting patterns among the three experimental groups 
suggest an important role for ethnic heuristics, although not necessarily at the expense of 
more expressive voting behaviour. 
Drawing wider inferences from an experiment involving only 217 participants is 
obviously problematic. Nevertheless, the findings from the voting experiment would seem to 
suggest that ethnic stereotypes may shape important aspects of voters’ decision-making in 
Peru. In an inchoate electoral environment without stable political parties, where multiple 
candidates contest elections, and where politicians routinely subordinate programmatic 
distinction to vague catch-all appeals, voters turn to whatever decision-making aids are 
available. In Peru, and perhaps in several other Latin American countries, ethnic identities – 
understood in the broadest possible terms – may provide one such decision-making tool. 
Overall, this chapter would argue that the use of ethnic heuristic may often contribute to 
observable ethnic voting outcomes in Latin America. However, it does not deny some causal 
role for affective ethnic loyalties and prejudice. Indeed, the personal-trait ascriptions assessed 
in Figures 6.3 and 6.10 suggest that less instrumental ethnic sentiments and attitudes are still 






The rise of ethnic politics has been a prominent feature of Latin America’s recent 
political history, particularly in the central Andean countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. 
Beginning in the 1980s, indigenous social movements emerged as influential national 
political actors in both Bolivia and Ecuador and they played a central role in the subsequent 
formation of indigenous parties in both cases. More generally, various mestizo parties and 
politicians have increasingly incorporated ethnic appeals into their political projects and 
campaigns, in Peru as well as Bolivia and Ecuador. These candidates have forged alliances 
with indigenous organisations, run indigenous candidates, embraced indigenous symbols and 
specific policy demands, and framed aspects of their personal and political identities in ethnic 
terms, broadly defined. In many cases, such ethnic appeals have been integrated into wider 
populist platforms, while the most electorally successful indigenous parties have similarly 
combined ethnic and populist appeals. This type of ethnopopulism has the potential to appeal 
across a wide section of the electorate – to many lower class mestizos and whites, as well as 
indigenous voters – and it has emerged as a key ingredient of electoral politics in the Andes. 
This thesis has focused on the impact of ethnic politics in the electoral arena, and 
specifically in presidential voting. It has argued that the occurrence and nature of ethnic 
voting in the Andes – and perhaps Latin American more generally – is shaped by three sets of 
factors: the region’s specific ethnic landscape; the way in which ethnicity has been 
politicised; and both the specific electoral and wider political context of the campaigns in 
question. It has argued that broad similarities in each of these respects, both across countries 
and over time, have produced patterns of electoral behaviour that are in many ways 
comparable in the three countries examined. However, it has also argued that variation in 
these general contextual conditions may explain some of the differences observed in voting 
patterns among countries and electoral cycles. 
With regard to electoral behaviour specifically, this thesis has argued that ethnic 
voting in recent Andean presidential elections can be explained in terms of three broad causal 
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mechanisms: the expressive model, in which voting constitutes a more or less unconditional 
expression of ethnic group allegiance; the heuristic model, where voters use ethnicity as an 
information shortcut; and the indirect model, where ethnic background helps determine broad 
political preferences and material circumstances, which in turn influence vote choice. 
Comparing evidence in support of each of these three conceptual models has been a key 
objective of the analysis, and one that may provide important insights into the workings of 
contemporary democratic politics in the region. Indeed, the prevalence of one or another form 
of ethnic voting has significant implications for assessing the nature and terms of democratic 
representation and accountability, the effectiveness of various campaign strategies, and the 
wider prospects for democratic stability and social peace. As such, determining the nature of 
ethnic voting in presidential elections has both direct empirical significance for Latin 
American democracies and wider theoretical significance for studies of ethnic politics 
elsewhere. 
This concluding chapter proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the key features of 
ethnic politicisation in Latin America and how they may affect voting behaviour along the 
lines of the three vote models proposed. In the course of this discussion, the principal 
empirical findings from the preceding chapters are reviewed. Second, it offers some initial 
thoughts on how variation in wider contextual factors may account for distinct vote patterns 
across countries and electoral cycles. Third, it draws out some of the implications of this 
thesis’s findings in terms of contemporary Latin American democracy as well as comparative 
studies of ethnic politics more generally. Finally, it suggests a number of areas for further 
research. 
The Occurrence, Nature, and Implications of Ethnic Voting in the Andes 
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature on ethnic politics and electoral 
democracy in the Andes. Most generally, it develops a strong overall case for ethnic voting in 
presidential elections across the region. The analysis goes beyond existing studies in 
examining a greater number of individual elections using comparable data, testing more 
diverse ethnicity measures (including ethnic attitudes), and examining interactions between 
ethnicity and non-ethnic voter characteristics. However, the thesis also examines the nature, 
not just occurrence, of ethnic voting. By examining the ways in which ethnicity shapes the 
preferences and electoral decision-making of individual voters, the analysis provides new 
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insight into the underlying processes that drive such political behaviour. These have 
potentially significant implications for assessing wider democratic processes in the Andes. 
Expressive Ethnic Voting 
The analysis in this thesis indicates an important role for ethnic bias in presidential 
voting. Ethnopopulist candidates in all three countries have won disproportionate shares of 
the indigenous and indigenous-mestizo vote, while several white electoral opponents have 
performed disproportionately well among non-indigenous voters. These voting patterns 
cannot be explained in terms of other demographic factors or political preferences, suggesting 
a direct causal role for ethnic bias in voting behaviour. Although the survey-based analysis 
cannot easily determine the underlying nature of such bias – whether it results from 
expressive or heuristic motivations – several findings indicate a more expressive dimension, 
particularly in Bolivia. Moreover, although the Peruvian voting experiment finds strongest 
support for the heuristic model, there is also some evidence for expressive voting in the 
simulated campaign. 
First, the relative effect of different measures of ethnicity on vote choice may provide 
some insight into voting motivations in the survey-based analyses (Chapters Three to Five). 
For example, in Bolivia both linguistic background and explicit ethnic identification (as 
indigenous or white, compared to mestizo, and as Aymara or Quechua, compared to non-
indigenous) had statistically significant effects on vote choice. In partial contrast, only the 
linguistic measure was significantly linked to voting outcomes in Peru, while a single 
measure of indigenous self-identification generated significant effects in Ecuador 2002. A 
link between linguistic group and vote choice suggests that voters’ wider sociolcultural 
background may have influenced electoral behaviour, at least in Bolivia and Peru. However, 
significant effects for the self-identification measure indicate that more explicit group 
attachements may also shape presidential voting, particularly in Bolivia.181  Choosing to self-
identify as white, or declaring no identification with any indigenous culture, may relfect a 
particular subgroup of non-indigenous language speakers who consider themselves especially 
detached from indigenous culture, values, and interests. Of course, ethnic bias in the voting 
behaviour of such subgroups may still derive from ethnic heuristic use or more homogenous 
in-group preferences on substantive issues. However, as far as the Bolivian analysis is 
concerned, the facts that self-identification differentiates behaviour among voters who share 
                                                          
181
 In Ecuador, the LAPOP surveys did not record linguistic group before 2008, limiting comparison between 
these two ethnicity measures in the Ecuadorian case.   
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similar ethnic backgrounds (at least in terms of linguistic group), and that the vote models 
include controls for a wide range of demographic and attitudinal characteristics, suggest a 
role for more psychological group attachments and/or prejudice. 
Moreover, several variables measuring inter-ethnic distrust or prejudice were directly 
linked to vote choice in Bolivia. Indigenous voters who expressed a preference for an ethnic 
in-group leader were significantly more likely to vote for Morales in 2005. In the same 
election, negative views of Aymara Bolivians reduced support for Morales, while negative 
views of whites increased the probability of a MAS vote. Similarly, voters who believed 
indigenous poverty resulted from innate biological or cultural deficiencies, or who 
disapproved of a son or daughter marrying an indigenous person, were significantly less 
likely to vote for Morales in 2009. Such effects are more indicative of electoral preferences 
influenced by psychological group attachments, including prejudice towards specific out-
groups, rather than the more instrumentalist motivations underlying heuristic voting. 
It is noteworthy that similar measures did not generally produce statistically 
significant effects in Ecuador or Peru, although data limitations are no doubt part of the 
explanation (ethnic attitudes were not recorded in most Ecuador surveys and for only half the 
Peru 2012 sample). In fact, Peruvian indigenous and mestizo voters reported comparable 
levels of ethnic discrimination to their Bolivian counterparts (and the proportions are only 
slightly lower for Ecuador), suggesting some of the same social conditions conducive to 
expressive voting may exist in Ecuador and Peru. However, in these latter cases, the electoral 
impact of ethnic attitudes remains unclear. At least for Peru, the voting experiment provides 
some additional support for expressive voting. It indicates a possible relationship between 
voter ethnicity and initial candidate approval ratings, even when substantive preferences are 
controlled for, although the effects fall outside conventional levels of statistical significance. 
It also shows how voters’ assumptions about the personal characteristics of candidates tend to 
persist through the campaign irrespective of changing non-ethnic profiles (indicative, 
perhaps, of more deep-seated beliefs about intrinsic ethnic types). Yet, in general, the 
experimental data offer far stronger support for the heuristic model, and expressive ethnic 
bias appears to have had only limited impact on voting in the experiment. 
In sum, expressive ethnic voting may play some role in Andean presidential elections. 
Overall, the evidence is strongest in the Bolivian case, although data limitations for Peru and 
especially Ecuador may contribute to this finding. However, Bolivia’s particular social and 
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political context may also increase the prevalence of expressive ethnic bias. Strong ethnic 
identification at the individual level, the prominent use of ethnic appeals by politicians, 
greater alignment of ethnic divisions with other social cleavages, and a polarised political 
environment, are all conditions typically conducive to more expressive voting.  
However, even in Bolivia there is little evidence for an unconditional relationship 
between voter ethnicity and electoral choice. Vote models from all three countries show 
predicted vote probabilities that vary within, not only across, ethnic groups, indicating a 
conditional relationship in which ethnic bias and substantive preferences combine to shape 
voting outcomes. On the one hand, this means ethnic bias may mitigate the effect of 
programmatic preferences in many cases, leading some voters to select candidates who do not 
represent their positions on important policy issues. However, these patterns of interaction 
also underline a pervasive instrumentalist dimension to voting behaviour in the region, 
indicating as they do the continued importance of substantive preferences in many voters’ 
decision-making.  
Heuristic Ethnic Voting 
The case for a more instrumentalist dimension to Andean electoral behaviour is 
further strengthened by the experimental findings (Chapter Six). Voters in the Peruvian 
experiment made far-reaching initial assumptions about candidate characteristics based 
primarily on ethnic background. These included assumptions about the candidates’ political 
preferences (particularly ideology and support for nationalisations), their relative affinity with 
distinct social groups and interests (including trade unions, peasants, private business, and 
wealthy residents of the capital city), and the candidates’ personal characteristics (most 
noticeably with regard to honesty, competency, sophistication, and a populist leadership 
style).182 The experiment also showed how, when faced with explicit information about the 
candidates, voters only adjusted their initial assumptions to some extent. Adjustments were 
most pronounced concerning specific policy stands, but considerably less so concerning more 
general ideological preferences, social-group associations, and personal characteristics. 
This thesis has argued that, where candidates’ programmatic profiles proved contrary 
to stereotype-based expectations (T2 group in the experiment), voters were more uncertain 
about candidates’ ‘true’ characteristics, and they perceived greater contradictions between 
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 The apparent influence of ethnic stereotypes on voters’ assessments of a candidate’s ideological preferences 
(including the issue of nationalisations specifically) may be particularly important given the significant effects 
these characteristics had on vote choice in the survey-based analyses. 
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known characteristics (explicitly stated in the experiment; e.g., policy positions) and assumed 
characteristics (based on stereotypic associations not explicitly countered in the experiment; 
e.g., social-group associations and personal traits). As a result, vote choice was more 
unpredictable under these conditions, and it produced a more ambiguous relationship between 
substantive preferences and voting outcomes. In light of these experimental findings, this 
thesis has argued that similar heuristic use may account for some of the ethnic bias observed 
in the survey-based analysis, both in Peru and elsewhere in the Andes, although the relative 
influence of expressive and heuristic bias is likely to vary considerably.  
However, the nature of the experiment’s design and data raise several concerns about 
external validity, and thus the general salience of heuristic ethnic voting in real-world Andean 
elections. These concerns relate both to the experimental procedures themselves and their 
relationship to the conceptual propositions being examined. However, this thesis maintains 
that wider inferences based on the experimental data are justifiable, and that limitations 
inherent in the experiment do not entirely negate the external validity of its findings. 
First, although the experimental sample was relatively small, comprising just 217 
participants, it was nonetheless large enough to permit meaningful statistical analysis. 
Moreover, it reflected a broad cross-section of Peruvian society (and, at least to some extent, 
a more general Andean population), even if it cannot be considered fully representative of a 
national or regional electorate. Second, despite the inevitably contrived nature of the 
simulated campaign, it still captured several key features of a real-world election. Voters 
faced a dynamic and complex information environment (multiple information items and 
contradictory sources), they experienced time and effort pressures (actively seeking out 
information in a time-limited setting), and they were able to shape their own decision-making 
strategies and context (based on what information they accessed, ignored, or simply missed).  
Third, theory suggests that heuristic use is most prevalent when voters have limited 
prior knowledge of candidates. Thus, by presenting two candidates who were entirely 
unknown, the experiment created an environment that was exceptionally conducive to 
heuristic voting. Yet such an outcome was by no means inevitable. In order to identify 
heuristic ethnic voting, participants actually needed to use ethnic stereotypes in this way. 
Furthermore, the experimental procedure did not preclude other forms of ethnic voting; 
expressive voting could (and perhaps did) take place, as the preceding discussion has 
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outlined.183 Certainly, the experimental campaign diverged from many real-world elections in 
that it provided only unknown candidates. Yet political newcomers are not unusual in Andean 
elections, and thus the simulated campaign reflected an important feature of the region’s 
electoral politics.  
Of course, if heuristic use is most prominent when voters have little previous 
knowledge of candidates, then the prevalence of heuristic ethnic voting will vary according to 
specific electoral contexts. For example, we might expect heuristic use to be quite prominent 
in voters’ evaluation of Humala in 2006, but considerably less so in the cases of Morales or 
Correa by 2009. Assessment of the incumbent’s substantive performance or more expressive 
ethnic voting may play a greater role in these latter cases.184 Nevertheless, in the inchoate 
electoral environment of the Andes, where parties lack stable programmatic identities, 
multiple candidates contest elections, and vague catch-all appeals dominate campaigns, 
voters’ recourse to electoral heuristics, including ethnic heuristics, is likely to remain high. 
Moreover, according to the experiment, stereotype-based assumptions not only affected 
initial candidate evaluations, but they also influenced voters’ assessment of subsequent 
political information. Thus, ethnic heuristics may continue to shape candidate evaluations 
beyond voters’ initial assumptions.   
Finally, the wider context of elections will not only influence heuristic use by 
providing familiar or unknown candidates, but, over time, it may also affect the content of the 
ethnic heuristics themselves. If ethnic heuristics vary across countries and regions, then the 
broader significance of the Peruvian experiment is called into question. For example, we 
might argue that, in the Andean context, recent social and political experiences in Bolivia and 
Ecuador have worked to develop an ethnic heuristic linking indigenous identity with left-
nationalism. Prominent indigenous movements and parties have consistenly promoted 
nationalism and state-interventionism as defining features of their political identities. Yet the 
same cannot be said for Peru, where ethnopopulists have included both free-market 
entrepreneurs (e.g., Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo) and nationalist state-
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 In fact, similar experimental techniques have been used to identify exactly the type of in-group favouritism 
and out-group prejudice implied by the expressive model. These have even included studies focused explicitly 
on ethnic voting (e.g., Goodyear-Grant and Tolley 2015). For its part, indirect voting was not tested in the 
experiment because the experimental data add nothing to such a test compared with the survey-based analysis 
(whether or not voters use ethnic heuristics has little impact on indirect voting, which deals with the prior effect 
of ethnicity on political attitudes). With this in mind, examination of the indirect model focused on the survey 
data, which provided much larger and nationally representative samples. 
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 For example, the vote models in Chapters Three and Four indicate that voters’ economic assessments are 
important predictors of support for both Correa and Morales in the 2009 elections. 
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interventionists (e.g., Ollanta Humala). Thus, we might question whether the political content 
of ethnic stereotypes is consistent across the region.  
However, despite some variation, broad similarities among the central Andean 
countries – especially in terms of ethnic relations and the politicisation of ethnicity – suggest 
a degree of comparability. Indeed, although we might expect the link between indigenous 
ethnicity and left-nationalism to be relatively less prevalent in Peru, voters in the Peruvian 
experiment made precisely this assumption about their candidates. Thus, it seems plausible 
that voters in Bolivia and Ecuador (where the stereotypic associations tested in the 
experiment are arguable more likely) may employ a similar ethnic heuristic to their Peruvian 
counterparts, at least in the context of lesser known candidates. 
Indirect Ethnic Voting 
This thesis has also argued that ethnicity may play a more indirect role in voting 
behaviour. The mediation analyses reported in Chapters Three to Five indicate ethnic 
background may help shape various voter characteristics – socioeconomic status, political 
ideology and policy preferences, and attitudes towards other ethnic groups – that 
subsequently influence voting decisions. Although some previous studies have implied 
similar indirect effects (e.g., Moreno Morales 2015), they have not tested explicitly the 
mediation pathways implied (i.e., ethnicity → political attitude or interest → vote choice). 
This thesis’s analysis does so, finding indirect effects for ethnicity on vote choice mediated 
through political ideology, socioeconomic status, several issue-based preferences, and 
attitudes towards other ethnic groups.  
In particular, the analysis has shown how voters from a broadly-defined indigenous 
background tend to be poorer and more left-wing ideologically, characteristics that are 
consistently linked to vote choice across the region. At least in Bolivia (the only case where 
full data were available), indigenous voters also tended to have more negative views of 
whites, while non-indigenous Bolivians were on average more likely to express negative 
feelings towards indigenous groups, particularly Aymaras. Both these attitudes were also 
linked to vote choice in Bolivia 2005 and 2009. 
More generally, the analysis suggests that broader measures of ethnicity, such as 
linguistic group or cultural identification, may have more consistent indirect effects on voting 
outcomes than explicit self-identification. Linguistic group or cultural identification had 
statistically significant indirect effects in all four elections from Bolivia and Peru, while self-
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identification with a generic ethnic category (white, mestizo, indigenous) produced 
significant effects only in Bolivia 2009.185 As argued previously with regard to expressive 
voting, we might hypothesise that measures of linguistic or cultural group reflect voters’ 
broader ethnic background, and thus capture socialised interests and preferences better than 
self-identification as white or indigenous. The latter may signal more politicised expressions 
of group allegiance, which are likely to connect more directly with voting outcomes 
(indicative, perhaps, of expressive ethnic voting).186  
Overall, the analysis suggests that mediated effects may sometimes contribute to 
ethnic voting patterns in the Andes. However, in most cases examined, the indirect effects 
were supplementary to, rather than encompassing of, ethnicity’s direct effect on voting. Thus, 
although the indirect voting hypothesis provides some insight into ethnicity’s multifaceted 
role in electoral behaviour, homogenous preferences within ethnic groups do not appear to 
account fully for voting outcomes in the region. Looking beyond the Andes, we might 
surmise that indirect ethnic voting is likely to occur where ethnic groups are more 
geographically and socioeconomically concentrated (leading to more homogenous material 
conditions and socialised political preferences), yet where political behaviour is not 
overwhelmingly driven by unconditional group allegiances or prejudice. These are key 
characteristics of the central Andean democracies, but similar conditions may also apply to 
many multi-ethnic polities beyond the region. 
Wider Implications for Electoral Democracy in the Andes 
 The findings presented in this thesis have several implications for studies of 
contemporary electoral democracy in the Andes. First, both the survey- and experiment-based 
analyses suggest that voters are at least partly concerned with substantive representation 
when casting their vote, not merely with achieving ethnic descriptive representation. In most 
cases, substantive preferences condition the effect of ethnic bias on voting outcomes, a 
feature that is not indicative of unconditional group allegiances. Moreover, many voters may 
seek ethnic descriptive representation in part to improve substantive representation, relying to 
some extent on ethnic heuristics in their candidate evaluations. If these inferences are correct, 
then elections should retain key representative and accountability functions. Voters should 
still exert some control over the programmatic political agenda, and leaders should be held 
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 For example, according to the mediation analysis, linguistic group had both indirect and direct effects on vote 
choice in Peru 2006 and 2011, while self-identification as white had only direct effects. In contrast, cultural 
identification as Aymara or Quechua had indirect, but not direct, effects on vote choice in both Bolivian cases.  
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accountable, at least to some extent, based on their substantive performance. Indeed, there is 
little in the preceding chapters’ analyses to indicate politicians can ignore voters’ 
programmatic preferences – either as candidates or elected leaders – and still retain 
significant support based only on ethnic descriptive ties. 
 These findings have obvious implications for candidates’ electoral strategies. They 
suggest candidates may gain some electoral advantage from ethnic appeals, drawing on both 
expressive ethnic biases and capitalising on various assumptions linked to ethnic stereotypes. 
However, this thesis has shown that expressive preferences are rarely unconditional in terms 
of electoral choice, while stereotypic assumptions are not immutable (although some may be 
considerably more or less easy to debunk). Ultimately, however, the findings in this thesis 
suggest that successful candidates will need to develop and communicate a political agenda 
that voters perceive as providing substantive, not just descriptive, representation (or, of 
course, develop other ‘substantive’ forms of electoral incentivisation linked to organisational 
ties, clientelistic benefits, and so forth). 
Finally, in terms of wider inter-ethnic relations, this thesis finds some evidence that 
conditions may exist to facilitate further ethnic polarisation. Electoral choices that are, at least 
in part, influenced by ethnic in-group attachments and/or out-group resentment provide 
candidates with some incentive to stoke inter-ethnic tensions as a means of mobilising 
electoral support. This has been most evident in Bolivia, particularly in 2009. Similarly, even 
if ethnic voting resembles the heuristic model, there are clear risks associated with the 
reinforcement and manipulation of ethnic stereotypes by candidates seeking an electoral 
advantage. Yet, overall, the key characteristics of voters’ electoral behaviour outlined in this 
thesis – especially the strong instrumentalist dimension to voters’ decision-making – suggest 
mobilisation strategies that prioritise ethnic descriptive over substantive appeals will garner 
little popular support. Thus, at least for the time being, mainstream politicians are unlikely to 
opt for ethnically antagonistic electoral appeals, and the prospects for severe ethnic 
polarisation or conflict remain low.  
Contextual Factors  
 Although this thesis has focused primarily on ethnic voting at the micro level of 
individual voters’ electoral choices, it has also included some discussion of wider contextual 
factors. Specifically, it has argued that some of the variation across countries and electoral 
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cycles can be explained by divergent national ethnic landscapes and both the specific 
electoral and wider political context of the election campaign. 
First, it has argued that the strength of ethnic identification at the individual level 
inevitably affects ethnic voting behaviour. For example, most of the data suggest that 
indigenous ethnic identification is considerably weaker in Ecuador and Peru compared to 
Bolivia (see introductory discussion in Chapters Three, Four, and Five). If voters’ place less 
importance on ethnic group identities, then we might expect expressive (and perhaps 
heuristic) ethnic voting to be relatively less prevalent. The vote models reported in Chapters 
Three to Five appear to support this general hypothesis, as the preceding discussion has 
summarised. Whereas both ethnic self-identification and linguistic background were 
important factors in explaining vote choice in Bolivia, only the broader linguistic measure 
was consistently linked to vote choice Peru. Meanwhile, the effect of voter ethnicity on vote 
choice in Ecuador was much more limited, with ethnic background only emerging as a 
potentially significant factor in the 2002 election.187  
Second, although the nature and strength of ethnic identification are products of long-
term social and political processes, contemporary political events may raise the electoral 
salience of ethnicity in the shorter term. For example, Bolivia’s polarised political 
environment may well have contributed to a higher incidence of ethnic voting in both 2005 
and 2009. In both cases, the two principal electoral options captured and exacerbated a multi-
cleavage divide in which regional, socioeconomic, ideological, outsider-establishment, and 
ethnic differences tended to align. Moreover, compared with Ecuador and Peru, the political 
rhetoric of the major candidates and their supporters was considerably more antagonistic, and 
it included a pronounced ethnic (and sometimes racist) component. Both elections were also 
preceded by sustained periods of political and social conflict, including instances of ethnic 
violence. These factors are likely to strengthen ethnic in-group solidarity and out-group 
prejudice, which, in the context of numerically large ethnic groups (and Bolivia has the 
largest indigenous population in the region), is likely to increase the prevalence of ethnic 
voting and expressive ethnic voting in particular. The vote analyses in Chapters Three to Five 
                                                          
187




appear to support such a hypothesis, with both the group- and individual-level data indicating 
the particular salience of ethnicity to presidential voting outcomes in Bolivia.188 
Third, this thesis has argued that electoral cross-pressure may significantly reduce 
ethnic voting. Comparison between Ecuador on the one hand, and Bolivia and Peru on the 
other, is informative in this regard. Cross-pressures are, of course, linked to the number and 
profile of candidates competing for the vote of a particular constituency (see below), but they 
also derive from various features of the wider sociopolitical context. Although cross-
pressures affect voters in all democracies, this thesis has argued that the electoral pushes and 
pulls of partisan or organisational loyalties, associated clientelistic benefits, regional 
identities, religious affiliations, and programmatic preferences are arguably more 
contradictory in Ecuador than in either Bolivia or Peru. Moreover, these pressures tend to 
cross-cut ethnic divides in Ecuador, while they have to a greater extent tended to align with 
ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru, as discussed previously. The presence of such cross-
pressures, then, is likely to reduce the observable relationship between voter ethnicity and 
vote choice in Ecuador, and to a lesser extent in Peru, compared with Bolivia.  
Finally, Chapter Four has argued that considerably greater competition for the 
indigenous vote in Ecuador may help explain the more limited occurrence of ethnic voting in 
this country. In Bolivia, only a few small parties challenged Morales for the indigenous vote, 
and Humala similarly emerged as the clearest perceived representative of indigenous and 
indigenous-mestizo constituencies in Peru (although he faced some competition from Toledo 
and Keiko Fujimori in 2011).189 In contrast, several prominent parties and candidates have 
actively wooed indigenous voters in Ecuador, including Pachakutik (2002 and 2006), Lucio 
and Gilmar Gutiérrez (in 2002, 2006, and 2009), Correa (in 2006 and 2009), and several 
major leftist parties (e.g., Izquierda Democrática in both 2002 and 2006). Many of these 
candidates have pursued alliances with indigenous and social organisations, employed direct 
ethnic appeals to indigenous voters, and adopted conventional populist and clientelistic 
electoral strategies. In this context, we might expect ethnic voting in general to be more 
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limited, with multiple candidates offering indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters some 
combination of descriptive, substantive, and clientelistic incentives. 
In summary, this thesis has argued that the occurrence, and perhaps the nature, of 
ethnic voting depends not just on attitudes towards ethnic identities and issues among voters, 
but also on the profile of the candidates who run, their electoral strategies, and the wider 
electoral-political context, particularly the nature of electoral cross-pressures. Each of these 
factors may, under certain circumstances, work to increase or reduce the relative salience of 
ethnicity to political behaviour, thus enhancing or mitigating the role of ethnic voting (in 
some or all of its forms) in shaping electoral outcomes. 
Beyond the Andes 
 This thesis also contributes to the wider comparative literature on ethnic politics and 
elections. First, it follows scholars such as Ferree (2006) and Birnir (2007, 2009) in 
proposing an expanded conceptual framework for the study of ethnic voting, one which takes 
into account the multifaceted nature of ethnicity’s influence on electoral behaviour. Such an 
approach may be particularly appropriate in societies with a high degree of ethnic mixing, 
comparatively weak ethnic identification, and low ethnic polarisation. The Andes, and 
perhaps Latin America more generally, constitutes one such case, but similar conditions also 
characterise societies elsewhere in the world. In such contexts, ethnic voting is unlikely to 
consist of an unconditional relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice, but rather a 
more complex and conditional combination of psychological ethnic attachments, varying 
perceptions about socioethnic identities and issues, and substantive political preferences. This 
thesis’s analysis of the expressive, heuristic, and indirect models of ethnic voting (as well as a 
‘policy-as-usual’ vote model) provides a framework for empirical analysis that encompasses 
each of these dimensions.  
More specifically, this thesis has argued that our understanding of ethnic voting can 
be enhanced by including a wider set of variables in the analysis: a range of ethnicity 
measures; ethnic attitudes as well as demographic markers; various non-ethnic voter 
characteristics; and the interactions among these sets of characteristics. Moreover, it has 
argued that examining the underlying causal processes – how and why such characteristics 
come to produce voting outcomes – is as important for causal explanation as the 
identification of the overarching cause-effect relationship. Indeed, expressive, heuristic, and 
indirect ethnic voting might all be observationally similar in survey data, and thus failure to 
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examine the underlying processes precludes an accurate assessment of the wider political 
implications of ethnic voting. These conceptual propositions regarding research design, as 
well as the methods adopted in this study to address such propositions (particularly, the use of 
a voting simulation experiment), may be of use for studies of ethnic voting elsewhere. 
The study of diverse ethnic voting models in this thesis also helps integrate the 
Andean case into the wider literature on ethnic voting. In this respect, the examination of 
heuristic voting is perhaps of particular significance. Several more recent studies of ethnic 
voting outside Latin America have found ethnic heuristics to play an important role in voters’ 
decision-making (e.g., Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2009), yet no previous study sought 
to examine the nature of Latin American ethnic voting in these terms. The findings of this 
thesis suggest the types of heuristic ethnic voting identified elsewhere may also play an 
important role in Latin America.  
Finally, although the studies cited above have developed and tested various 
hypotheses regarding heuristic ethnic voting, they have not examined the precise content of 
such heuristics, or the way in which associated assumptions are influenced by new 
information. This study has shown how ethnic stereotypes signal a wide range of candidate 
characteristics, including both specific personal and programmatic traits, as well as the 
candidate’s perceived affinity with certain social groups. It has also traced the processes by 
which heuristic assumptions are adjusted in the light of new information, a key requisite for 
determining the extent of heuristics’ electoral influence. The Peruvian voting experiment has 
provided insight into what types of political information accomplish more or less changes in 
voters’ candidate assessments, and which types of assumed candidate characteristics 
(programmatic, social-group, or personal traits) are most resistant to change. 
Future Research 
The analysis in this thesis suggests a number of areas for further research. First, the 
findings from the experimental study require testing on a larger, more geographically-diverse 
sample in order to strengthen any wider inferences. Similar experiments could be conducted 
in Peru and other countries in the region following the general methods and fieldwork 
approaches outlined in this thesis. Second, future studies will need to test the experimental 
findings in the ‘real world’. Although the type of effects in question are not easily accessed 
outside an experimental context, carefully designed survey questions (e.g., about voters’ 
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candidate-social group associations) and more qualitative approaches (e.g. quasi-
experimental focus groups concerned with real candidates) can provide valuable insight.190 
More generally, although both the survey- and experiment-based analyses shed new 
light on aspects of voters’ decision-making, they do not explicitly address the behaviour of 
politicians, and they only superficially examine the impact of wider contextual factors. The 
electoral strategies employed by candidates (the content, style, and tone of campaigning, 
including the use of ethnic appeals), as well as the specific electoral and wider political 
context of the campaign (the number and profiles of candidates, the dynamics of electoral 
cross-pressures, the role of social, political, and organisational networks, and so forth), are 
clearly fundamental to how voters’ make their decisions. Furthermore, these factors affect 
how voters engage with, and perceive, democratic politics more generally. This thesis has 
offered a number of broad hypotheses regarding the effects of such contextual factors on 
cross-country and over-time variation in voting behaviour, yet future studies would need to 
test and extend these propositions more systematically. Integrating an analysis of candidates’ 
campaign strategies and several of the key contextual variables outlined above into the type 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Bolivia 2006 
Personal Linguistic Background White Mestiza Indigenous Black Total 
Spanish speakers      
Evo Morales 29 282 46 2 359 
Jorge Quiroga 59 209 24 3 295 
Samuel Doria 9 62 8 0 79 
Michiaki Nagatani 14 38 11 0 63 
Other/Null 5 47 8 1 61 
Indigenous-language speakers      
Evo Morales 3 98 77 3 181 
Jorge Quiroga 1 10 5 1 17 
Samuel Doria  2 2  4 
Michiaki Nagatani 1 4 2  7 
Other/Null  7 5 1 13 
Total 121 759 188 11 1,079 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome     
QUIROGA       
White (Mestizo) 0.955 0.358 2.670 0.008 0.251 1.659 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.433 0.359 -1.210 0.228 -1.139 0.273 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.320 0.341 -3.870 0.000 -1.991 -0.648 
Income 0.159 0.085 1.870 0.063 -0.008 0.326 
Female -0.110 0.201 -0.550 0.585 -0.505 0.285 
Age -0.007 0.007 -0.930 0.353 -0.021 0.007 
Trust in parties -0.005 0.071 -0.070 0.942 -0.145 0.134 
Participation in protests -0.180 0.201 -0.890 0.372 -0.575 0.216 
National economy has improved -0.413 0.224 -1.840 0.066 -0.854 0.028 
Personal finances have improved 0.336 0.255 1.310 0.190 -0.167 0.838 
Resides in media luna 1.163 0.213 5.450 0.000 0.743 1.583 
Resides in rural area 0.044 0.099 0.440 0.659 -0.150 0.238 
Rightist ideology 0.325 0.053 6.130 0.000 0.220 0.429 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.133 0.041 -3.260 0.001 -0.214 -0.053 
Strongman populist leader 0.153 0.170 0.900 0.370 -0.183 0.488 
Direct democracy -0.161 0.298 -0.540 0.590 -0.749 0.426 
Minority to follow majority 0.032 0.276 0.120 0.907 -0.511 0.575 
Constant -1.979 0.645 -3.070 0.002 -3.248 -0.710 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 0.317 0.529 0.600 0.549 -0.725 1.359 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.229 0.515 -0.440 0.658 -1.242 0.785 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.219 0.539 -2.260 0.025 -2.280 -0.157 
Income 0.134 0.121 1.110 0.268 -0.104 0.371 
Female -0.042 0.306 -0.140 0.892 -0.645 0.561 
Age -0.012 0.014 -0.870 0.383 -0.039 0.015 
Trust in parties -0.069 0.120 -0.580 0.566 -0.306 0.168 
Participation in protests -0.522 0.443 -1.180 0.240 -1.394 0.350 
National economy has improved -0.033 0.410 -0.080 0.936 -0.839 0.773 
Personal finances have improved 0.198 0.354 0.560 0.576 -0.499 0.896 
Resides in media luna 1.640 0.381 4.300 0.000 0.889 2.391 
Resides in rural area -0.170 0.186 -0.910 0.362 -0.536 0.197 
Rightist ideology 0.133 0.063 2.090 0.037 0.008 0.258 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.150 0.075 -1.980 0.048 -0.298 -0.001 
Strongman populist leader 0.216 0.213 1.020 0.310 -0.203 0.635 
Direct democracy -0.946 0.537 -1.760 0.079 -2.004 0.111 
Minority to follow majority 0.118 0.423 0.280 0.781 -0.714 0.950 
Constant -1.476 1.063 -1.390 0.166 -3.569 0.617 
NAGATANI       
White (Mestizo) 1.268 0.506 2.500 0.013 0.271 2.264 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.199 0.558 0.360 0.721 -0.899 1.297 
Speaks an indigenous language -0.067 0.633 -0.110 0.916 -1.314 1.179 
Income 0.042 0.153 0.280 0.783 -0.258 0.343 
Female -0.122 0.344 -0.350 0.723 -0.798 0.554 
Age 0.047 0.012 3.780 0.000 0.022 0.071 
Trust in parties -0.011 0.128 -0.080 0.933 -0.262 0.240 
Participation in protests -0.530 0.416 -1.270 0.204 -1.350 0.289 
National economy has improved -0.034 0.420 -0.080 0.935 -0.860 0.792 
Personal finances have improved -0.479 0.430 -1.110 0.267 -1.326 0.368 
Resides in media luna 2.472 0.432 5.730 0.000 1.622 3.321 
Resides in rural area -0.051 0.174 -0.290 0.772 -0.394 0.293 
Rightist ideology 0.444 0.084 5.300 0.000 0.279 0.608 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.194 0.092 -2.110 0.036 -0.375 -0.013 
Strongman populist leader 0.288 0.251 1.150 0.253 -0.207 0.783 
Direct democracy -1.152 0.701 -1.640 0.102 -2.532 0.229 
Minority to follow majority -1.135 0.577 -1.970 0.050 -2.270 0.001 
Constant -6.405 1.680 -3.810 0.000 -9.713 -3.097 
N = 1079. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).  
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification) 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome     
QUIROGA       
Quechua (none) -0.512 0.273 -1.880 0.061 -1.049 0.024 
Aymara (none) -1.192 0.388 -3.070 0.002 -1.955 -0.428 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.057 0.432 0.130 0.894 -0.792 0.907 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.242 0.333 -3.730 0.000 -1.898 -0.587 
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Table A3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification) 
Voter Characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Income 0.157 0.088 1.780 0.076 -0.016 0.330 
Female -0.134 0.202 -0.660 0.508 -0.531 0.263 
Age -0.005 0.007 -0.820 0.413 -0.018 0.008 
Trust in parties 0.023 0.068 0.330 0.740 -0.111 0.156 
Participation in protests -0.132 0.202 -0.650 0.516 -0.529 0.266 
National economy has improved -0.292 0.223 -1.310 0.192 -0.731 0.147 
Personal finances have improved 0.275 0.248 1.110 0.270 -0.214 0.764 
Resides in media luna 0.610 0.234 2.610 0.010 0.150 1.071 
Resides in rural area 0.040 0.098 0.420 0.678 -0.151 0.232 
Rightist ideology 0.306 0.052 5.920 0.000 0.204 0.407 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.116 0.039 -2.930 0.004 -0.193 -0.038 
Strongman populist leader 0.185 0.165 1.120 0.263 -0.140 0.510 
Direct democracy -0.072 0.300 -0.240 0.810 -0.662 0.518 
Minority to follow majority -0.091 0.279 -0.330 0.744 -0.640 0.458 
Constant -1.526 0.709 -2.150 0.032 -2.921 -0.130 
DORIA       
Quechua (none) 0.106 0.380 0.280 0.781 -0.642 0.853 
Aymara (none) 0.110 0.545 0.200 0.840 -0.963 1.184 
Other Indigenous (none) -0.100 0.547 -0.180 0.855 -1.176 0.976 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.328 0.568 -2.340 0.020 -2.445 -0.211 
Income 0.160 0.124 1.290 0.197 -0.084 0.404 
Female -0.014 0.320 -0.040 0.966 -0.644 0.617 
Age -0.007 0.012 -0.570 0.572 -0.030 0.016 
Trust in parties -0.062 0.119 -0.520 0.601 -0.296 0.171 
Participation in protests -0.612 0.434 -1.410 0.159 -1.466 0.242 
National economy has improved -0.016 0.415 -0.040 0.968 -0.834 0.801 
Personal finances have improved 0.254 0.343 0.740 0.461 -0.422 0.929 
Resides in media luna 1.602 0.388 4.130 0.000 0.838 2.367 
Resides in rural area -0.170 0.186 -0.910 0.363 -0.536 0.197 
Rightist ideology 0.136 0.068 2.010 0.046 0.003 0.268 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.145 0.076 -1.900 0.059 -0.294 0.005 
Strongman populist leader 0.219 0.209 1.050 0.295 -0.192 0.631 
Direct democracy -0.842 0.540 -1.560 0.121 -1.905 0.222 
Minority to follow majority 0.119 0.424 0.280 0.780 -0.716 0.953 
Constant -1.917 1.096 -1.750 0.081 -4.075 0.240 
NAGATANI       
Quechua (none) -2.052 0.468 -4.380 0.000 -2.974 -1.130 
Aymara (none) -3.198 0.848 -3.770 0.000 -4.867 -1.529 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.326 0.532 0.610 0.541 -0.723 1.374 
Speaks an indigenous language 1.035 0.582 1.780 0.077 -0.111 2.181 
Income -0.015 0.159 -0.090 0.925 -0.328 0.298 
Female -0.119 0.367 -0.320 0.747 -0.842 0.604 
Age 0.051 0.013 3.890 0.000 0.025 0.077 
Trust in parties 0.002 0.129 0.020 0.987 -0.251 0.255 
Participation in protests -0.274 0.417 -0.660 0.513 -1.095 0.548 
National economy has improved 0.004 0.429 0.010 0.993 -0.840 0.848 
Personal finances have improved -0.203 0.393 -0.520 0.606 -0.976 0.571 
Resides in media luna 1.294 0.478 2.710 0.007 0.354 2.234 
Resides in rural area -0.077 0.205 -0.380 0.707 -0.481 0.327 
Rightist ideology 0.380 0.082 4.630 0.000 0.219 0.542 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.161 0.097 -1.660 0.098 -0.352 0.030 
Strongman populist leader 0.316 0.249 1.270 0.204 -0.173 0.806 
Direct democracy -1.086 0.654 -1.660 0.098 -2.375 0.202 
Minority to follow majority -1.269 0.584 -2.180 0.030 -2.418 -0.121 
Constant -4.848 1.760 -2.760 0.006 -8.311 -1.384 
N = 1077. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).  
Source: LAPOP 2006 
 
 
 Table A4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristics Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome     
QUIROGA       
White (Mestizo) 0.967 0.356 2.710 0.007 0.266 1.668 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.403 0.362 -1.120 0.266 -1.115 0.309 
Speaks an indigenous language -3.749 1.729 -2.170 0.031 -7.152 -0.346 
Income 0.146 0.091 1.610 0.108 -0.032 0.324 
Female -0.117 0.204 -0.580 0.565 -0.519 0.284 
Age -0.007 0.007 -0.940 0.346 -0.021 0.007 
Trust in parties -0.013 0.072 -0.180 0.861 -0.153 0.128 
Participation in protests -0.171 0.203 -0.840 0.402 -0.571 0.229 
National economy has improved -0.427 0.224 -1.910 0.058 -0.867 0.014 
Personal finances have improved 0.337 0.255 1.320 0.187 -0.165 0.839 
Resides in media luna 1.179 0.217 5.420 0.000 0.751 1.607 
Resides in rural area 0.043 0.098 0.440 0.663 -0.151 0.236 
Rightist ideology 0.321 0.057 5.640 0.000 0.209 0.433 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.148 0.044 -3.380 0.001 -0.234 -0.062 
Strongman populist leader 0.176 0.190 0.930 0.354 -0.197 0.550 
Direct democracy -0.140 0.324 -0.430 0.666 -0.778 0.498 
Minority to follow majority 0.024 0.301 0.080 0.937 -0.569 0.616 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology 0.105 0.130 0.810 0.421 -0.151 0.360 
Supports gas nationalisation 0.168 0.195 0.860 0.390 -0.216 0.552 
Strongman populist leader -0.114 0.540 -0.210 0.833 -1.176 0.948 
Direct democracy -0.071 0.934 -0.080 0.939 -1.909 1.767 
Minority to follow majority -0.243 0.923 -0.260 0.792 -2.060 1.573 
Income 0.201 0.250 0.810 0.421 -0.290 0.693 
Constant -1.794 0.692 -2.590 0.010 -3.157 -0.432 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 0.298 0.528 0.560 0.573 -0.742 1.337 
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 Table A4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristics Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.231 0.545 -0.420 0.673 -1.303 0.842 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.212 1.881 0.110 0.910 -3.490 3.915 
Income 0.154 0.125 1.230 0.219 -0.092 0.399 
Female -0.040 0.314 -0.130 0.899 -0.658 0.578 
Age -0.012 0.014 -0.850 0.396 -0.040 0.016 
Trust in parties -0.067 0.123 -0.540 0.588 -0.309 0.176 
Participation in protests -0.500 0.444 -1.130 0.261 -1.373 0.374 
National economy has improved -0.065 0.409 -0.160 0.873 -0.871 0.741 
Personal finances have improved 0.179 0.361 0.500 0.620 -0.532 0.890 
Resides in media luna 1.670 0.378 4.420 0.000 0.926 2.415 
Resides in rural area -0.195 0.185 -1.060 0.292 -0.558 0.169 
Rightist ideology 0.135 0.069 1.970 0.050 0.000 0.271 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.143 0.076 -1.890 0.060 -0.292 0.006 
Strongman populist leader 0.289 0.228 1.270 0.205 -0.159 0.738 
Direct democracy -1.219 0.626 -1.950 0.053 -2.453 0.014 
Minority to follow majority 0.012 0.467 0.030 0.979 -0.907 0.932 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
 Rightist ideology -0.066 0.229 -0.290 0.774 -0.515 0.384 
Supports gas nationalisation 0.032 0.295 0.110 0.915 -0.548 0.612 
Strongman populist leader -0.921 0.862 -1.070 0.287 -2.618 0.777 
Direct democracy 2.145 1.074 2.000 0.047 0.032 4.259 
Minority to follow majority 0.698 1.019 0.690 0.494 -1.307 2.704 
Income -0.548 0.779 -0.700 0.482 -2.082 0.985 
Constant -1.604 1.112 -1.440 0.150 -3.792 0.585 
NAGATANI       
White (Mestizo) 1.258 0.502 2.510 0.013 0.270 2.247 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.261 0.548 0.480 0.634 -0.818 1.340 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.336 4.574 0.070 0.942 -8.669 9.340 
Income 0.084 0.137 0.610 0.540 -0.186 0.354 
Female -0.129 0.359 -0.360 0.720 -0.835 0.577 
Age 0.048 0.011 4.320 0.000 0.026 0.069 
Trust in parties -0.029 0.121 -0.240 0.812 -0.266 0.209 
Participation in protests -0.588 0.419 -1.400 0.161 -1.412 0.236 
National economy has improved -0.038 0.425 -0.090 0.928 -0.874 0.798 
Personal finances have improved -0.503 0.428 -1.180 0.241 -1.346 0.339 
Resides in media luna 2.553 0.444 5.740 0.000 1.678 3.428 
Resides in rural area -0.001 0.170 -0.010 0.995 -0.336 0.334 
Rightist ideology 0.452 0.091 4.990 0.000 0.274 0.630 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.199 0.090 -2.210 0.028 -0.376 -0.022 
Strongman populist leader 0.271 0.283 0.960 0.340 -0.287 0.829 
Direct democracy -0.799 0.733 -1.090 0.277 -2.242 0.645 
Minority to follow majority -1.629 0.617 -2.640 0.009 -2.844 -0.414 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology -0.014 0.233 -0.060 0.953 -0.472 0.445 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.040 0.313 -0.130 0.899 -0.657 0.577 
Strongman populist leader 0.069 0.528 0.130 0.896 -0.970 1.108 
Direct democracy -14.397 1.235 -11.660 0.000 -16.828 -11.965 
Minority to follow majority 1.627 1.338 1.220 0.225 -1.008 4.262 
Income -0.005 0.421 -0.010 0.991 -0.833 0.824 
Constant -6.688 1.342 -4.980 0.000 -9.329 -4.046 
N = 1077. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic 
group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES       
QUIROGA       
White (Mestizo) 4.733 2.315 2.040 0.042 0.176 9.290 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -3.548 1.929 -1.840 0.067 -7.345 0.248 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.346 0.353 -3.820 0.000 -2.041 -0.652 
Income 0.204 0.087 2.340 0.020 0.033 0.375 
Female -0.091 0.203 -0.450 0.655 -0.490 0.309 
Age -0.005 0.007 -0.750 0.452 -0.019 0.009 
Trust in parties 0.007 0.072 0.100 0.919 -0.135 0.149 
Participation in protests -0.185 0.202 -0.920 0.360 -0.583 0.212 
National economy has improved -0.397 0.229 -1.730 0.084 -0.848 0.054 
Personal finances have improved 0.318 0.256 1.240 0.215 -0.185 0.822 
Resides in media luna 1.141 0.212 5.390 0.000 0.724 1.558 
Resides in rural area 0.029 0.102 0.290 0.774 -0.171 0.230 
Rightist ideology 0.315 0.065 4.870 0.000 0.188 0.442 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.141 0.046 -3.060 0.002 -0.232 -0.050 
Strongman populist leader 0.233 0.196 1.190 0.235 -0.153 0.620 
Direct democracy -0.031 0.361 -0.090 0.931 -0.741 0.679 
Minority to follow majority -0.041 0.334 -0.120 0.903 -0.698 0.617 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.108 0.159 -0.680 0.497 -0.420 0.204 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology 0.233 0.175 1.330 0.183 -0.111 0.577 
White * Supports gas national. -0.059 0.145 -0.410 0.683 -0.344 0.226 
Indigenous * Supports gas national. 0.199 0.143 1.390 0.165 -0.083 0.481 
White * Strongman pop. leader -0.668 0.574 -1.160 0.245 -1.798 0.462 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader 0.059 0.481 0.120 0.902 -0.887 1.005 
White * Direct democracy -0.788 0.802 -0.980 0.326 -2.366 0.790 
Indigenous * Direct democracy -0.006 0.982 -0.010 0.995 -1.939 1.927 
White * Minority follow maj. 0.829 0.872 0.950 0.343 -0.889 2.546 
Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -0.458 0.844 -0.540 0.587 -2.119 1.202 
White * Income -0.524 0.260 -2.020 0.045 -1.036 -0.012 
Indigenous * Income 0.103 0.223 0.460 0.646 -0.336 0.542 
Constant -2.164 0.723 -2.990 0.003 -3.587 -0.741 
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Table A5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) -2.180 3.241 -0.670 0.502 -8.560 4.201 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.542 1.977 0.780 0.436 -2.350 5.435 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.288 0.626 -2.060 0.041 -2.520 -0.055 
Income 0.144 0.130 1.110 0.269 -0.112 0.401 
Female -0.050 0.305 -0.160 0.869 -0.650 0.550 
Age -0.013 0.015 -0.890 0.376 -0.043 0.016 
Trust in parties -0.075 0.122 -0.610 0.539 -0.314 0.165 
Participation in protests -0.523 0.446 -1.170 0.242 -1.401 0.355 
National economy has improved -0.077 0.421 -0.180 0.854 -0.906 0.751 
Personal finances have improved 0.235 0.379 0.620 0.537 -0.512 0.981 
Resides in media luna 1.688 0.394 4.290 0.000 0.913 2.463 
Resides in rural area -0.202 0.189 -1.070 0.287 -0.575 0.171 
Rightist ideology 0.135 0.080 1.680 0.094 -0.023 0.293 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.148 0.083 -1.780 0.076 -0.311 0.015 
Strongman populist leader 0.206 0.231 0.890 0.372 -0.248 0.660 
Direct democracy -0.902 0.596 -1.510 0.132 -2.076 0.272 
Minority to follow majority -0.010 0.484 -0.020 0.983 -0.962 0.942 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.084 0.151 -0.560 0.576 -0.381 0.213 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.084 0.151 -0.560 0.576 -0.381 0.213 
White * Supports gas national. 0.297 0.199 1.490 0.137 -0.095 0.689 
Indigenous * Supports gas national. -0.322 0.155 -2.080 0.039 -0.628 -0.017 
White * Strongman pop. leader 0.609 0.797 0.760 0.445 -0.960 2.178 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -0.196 0.509 -0.380 0.701 -1.198 0.807 
White * Direct democracy -14.002 0.991 -14.130 0.000 -15.953 -12.051 
Indigenous * Direct democracy 0.013 1.064 0.010 0.990 -2.082 2.108 
White * Minority follow maj. -14.199 1.015 -13.980 0.000 -16.198 -12.200 
Indigenous * Minority follow maj. 1.931 1.171 1.650 0.100 -0.375 4.237 
White * Income 0.003 0.371 0.010 0.994 -0.728 0.734 
Indigenous * Income -0.199 0.467 -0.430 0.671 -1.119 0.721 
Constant -1.422 1.209 -1.180 0.241 -3.803 0.959 
NAGATANI       
White (Mestizo) 0.808 3.420 0.240 0.813 -5.925 7.540 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.037 2.141 0.480 0.629 -3.179 5.252 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.013 0.622 0.020 0.983 -1.210 1.237 
Income 0.009 0.205 0.040 0.966 -0.396 0.413 
Female -0.223 0.361 -0.620 0.537 -0.933 0.487 
Age 0.052 0.012 4.350 0.000 0.028 0.076 
Trust in parties -0.006 0.123 -0.050 0.961 -0.249 0.237 
Participation in protests -0.620 0.423 -1.460 0.144 -1.453 0.213 
National economy has improved -0.069 0.423 -0.160 0.871 -0.902 0.764 
Personal finances have improved -0.567 0.411 -1.380 0.169 -1.377 0.242 
Resides in media luna 2.483 0.456 5.450 0.000 1.586 3.379 
Resides in rural area -0.043 0.169 -0.260 0.798 -0.376 0.290 
Rightist ideology 0.445 0.126 3.540 0.000 0.197 0.692 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.227 0.112 -2.030 0.044 -0.447 -0.006 
Strongman populist leader 0.471 0.323 1.460 0.145 -0.164 1.107 
Direct democracy -1.018 0.931 -1.090 0.275 -2.851 0.815 
Minority to follow majority -1.700 0.719 -2.360 0.019 -3.116 -0.284 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology 0.077 0.223 0.350 0.730 -0.363 0.517 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.221 0.186 -1.190 0.237 -0.588 0.146 
White * Supports gas national. 0.166 0.277 0.600 0.548 -0.378 0.711 
Indigenous * Supports gas national. -0.110 0.190 -0.580 0.562 -0.485 0.264 
White * Strongman pop. leader -0.454 0.660 -0.690 0.492 -1.754 0.845 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -0.720 0.575 -1.250 0.211 -1.851 0.411 
White * Direct democracy 0.234 1.193 0.200 0.844 -2.115 2.584 
Indigenous * Direct democracy -0.577 1.649 -0.350 0.727 -3.823 2.669 
White * Minority follow maj. 2.165 1.292 1.680 0.095 -0.379 4.709 
Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -12.445 0.988 -12.600 0.000 -14.390 -10.500 
White * Income -0.275 0.351 -0.780 0.434 -0.966 0.416 
Indigenous * Income 0.621 0.279 2.230 0.027 0.072 1.170 
Constant -6.401 2.147 -2.980 0.003 -10.627 -2.175 
N = 1079. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-
identified group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES       
QUIROGA       
White (Mestizo) 0.773 0.428 1.800 0.072 -0.071 1.616 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.186 0.365 -0.510 0.611 -0.904 0.533 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.138 0.416 -2.740 0.007 -1.957 -0.319 
Income 0.150 0.103 1.450 0.147 -0.053 0.352 
Female -0.139 0.233 -0.590 0.553 -0.598 0.321 
Age -0.007 0.008 -0.830 0.409 -0.023 0.009 
Trust in parties -0.006 0.085 -0.070 0.943 -0.174 0.162 
Participation in protests -0.648 0.248 -2.610 0.009 -1.137 -0.160 
National economy has improved -0.686 0.294 -2.330 0.020 -1.265 -0.107 
Personal finances have improved 0.599 0.289 2.080 0.039 0.031 1.167 
Resides in media luna 0.888 0.247 3.590 0.000 0.401 1.374 
Resides in rural area 0.064 0.141 0.450 0.653 -0.215 0.342 
Rightist ideology 0.292 0.061 4.790 0.000 0.172 0.412 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.055 0.047 -1.180 0.240 -0.147 0.037 
Strongman populist leader 0.166 0.187 0.890 0.376 -0.202 0.534 
Direct democracy -0.211 0.388 -0.540 0.586 -0.975 0.552 
Minority to follow majority 0.072 0.357 0.200 0.841 -0.631 0.775 
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Table A6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -0.157 0.328 -0.480 0.633 -0.804 0.490 
One national culture 0.092 0.345 0.270 0.790 -0.587 0.771 
Negative view of Aymara 1.069 0.339 3.150 0.002 0.401 1.737 
Negative view of Quechua 0.077 0.329 0.230 0.816 -0.572 0.725 
Negative view of Camba -0.352 0.308 -1.140 0.254 -0.960 0.255 
Negative view of White -0.565 0.268 -2.110 0.036 -1.093 -0.037 
Experience of discrimination -0.097 0.089 -1.090 0.276 -0.272 0.078 
Constant -2.148 0.846 -2.540 0.012 -3.814 -0.482 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 0.189 0.675 0.280 0.780 -1.140 1.518 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.343 0.609 -0.560 0.574 -1.542 0.856 
Speaks an indigenous language -2.405 1.019 -2.360 0.019 -4.411 -0.398 
Income -0.009 0.148 -0.060 0.954 -0.300 0.283 
Female -0.011 0.398 -0.030 0.977 -0.795 0.772 
Age -0.020 0.016 -1.220 0.222 -0.051 0.012 
Trust in parties 0.024 0.140 0.170 0.866 -0.252 0.300 
Participation in protests -0.685 0.443 -1.550 0.123 -1.557 0.187 
National economy has improved 0.376 0.440 0.850 0.394 -0.490 1.241 
Personal finances have improved 0.170 0.389 0.440 0.663 -0.596 0.936 
Resides in media luna 1.490 0.394 3.790 0.000 0.715 2.265 
Resides in rural area -0.517 0.281 -1.840 0.066 -1.070 0.035 
Rightist ideology 0.142 0.080 1.770 0.078 -0.016 0.299 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.148 0.087 -1.710 0.089 -0.319 0.023 
Strongman populist leader 0.224 0.235 0.950 0.341 -0.238 0.687 
Direct democracy -1.334 0.780 -1.710 0.088 -2.870 0.202 
Minority to follow majority 0.420 0.582 0.720 0.471 -0.726 1.565 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.555 0.524 1.060 0.290 -0.476 1.586 
One national culture -1.554 1.031 -1.510 0.133 -3.584 0.476 
Negative view of Aymara 0.450 0.457 0.990 0.325 -0.450 1.350 
Negative view of Quechua 0.655 0.563 1.160 0.246 -0.454 1.764 
Negative view of Camba -0.253 0.439 -0.580 0.566 -1.117 0.612 
Negative view of White -0.195 0.419 -0.470 0.642 -1.020 0.630 
Experience of discrimination -0.193 0.159 -1.210 0.227 -0.506 0.120 
Constant -0.555 1.059 -0.520 0.601 -2.640 1.530 
NAGATANI       
White (Mestizo) 1.488 0.589 2.530 0.012 0.329 2.647 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.720 0.600 1.200 0.232 -0.462 1.902 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.766 0.627 1.220 0.223 -0.468 2.000 
Income 0.072 0.180 0.400 0.691 -0.283 0.426 
Female -0.478 0.429 -1.110 0.267 -1.323 0.368 
Age 0.049 0.011 4.520 0.000 0.027 0.070 
Trust in parties 0.097 0.136 0.710 0.478 -0.172 0.365 
Participation in protests -0.645 0.506 -1.270 0.204 -1.640 0.351 
National economy has improved 0.468 0.549 0.850 0.395 -0.613 1.549 
Personal finances have improved -0.325 0.552 -0.590 0.557 -1.412 0.763 
Resides in media luna 2.109 0.467 4.520 0.000 1.190 3.029 
Resides in rural area -0.226 0.221 -1.020 0.308 -0.661 0.209 
Rightist ideology 0.407 0.107 3.820 0.000 0.197 0.617 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.165 0.109 -1.510 0.132 -0.380 0.050 
Strongman populist leader 0.272 0.333 0.820 0.415 -0.384 0.927 
Direct democracy -1.443 0.726 -1.990 0.048 -2.874 -0.013 
Minority to follow majority -1.080 0.591 -1.830 0.069 -2.245 0.085 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -0.312 0.563 -0.550 0.580 -1.422 0.798 
One national culture -0.027 0.604 -0.040 0.965 -1.217 1.163 
Negative view of Aymara 0.897 0.591 1.520 0.130 -0.266 2.061 
Negative view of Quechua 0.461 0.521 0.890 0.377 -0.565 1.488 
Negative view of Camba -0.102 0.520 -0.200 0.845 -1.126 0.922 
Negative view of White -0.804 0.453 -1.770 0.077 -1.697 0.088 
Experience of discrimination -0.626 0.227 -2.760 0.006 -1.073 -0.179 
Constant -6.425 1.767 -3.640 0.000 -9.905 -2.945 
N = 787. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales). 
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES       
QUIROGA       
Quechua (none) -0.221 0.360 -0.610 0.540 -0.931 0.489 
Aymara (none) -0.670 0.470 -1.430 0.155 -1.595 0.255 
Other Indigenous (none) -0.176 0.520 -0.340 0.736 -1.200 0.848 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.107 0.423 -2.610 0.009 -1.941 -0.273 
Income 0.142 0.101 1.410 0.161 -0.057 0.342 
Female -0.156 0.226 -0.690 0.492 -0.602 0.290 
Age -0.007 0.008 -0.890 0.374 -0.022 0.008 
Trust in parties 0.018 0.081 0.220 0.824 -0.142 0.179 
Participation in protests -0.576 0.237 -2.430 0.016 -1.043 -0.109 
National economy has improved -0.572 0.282 -2.030 0.044 -1.128 -0.016 
Personal finances have improved 0.538 0.283 1.900 0.059 -0.020 1.095 
Resides in media luna 0.619 0.303 2.050 0.042 0.023 1.215 
Resides in rural area 0.067 0.139 0.480 0.629 -0.206 0.340 
Rightist ideology 0.292 0.057 5.090 0.000 0.179 0.406 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.050 0.045 -1.110 0.269 -0.139 0.039 
Strongman populist leader 0.188 0.187 1.010 0.314 -0.179 0.556 
Direct democracy -0.129 0.365 -0.350 0.723 -0.848 0.590 
Minority to follow majority -0.041 0.345 -0.120 0.905 -0.720 0.638 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -0.141 0.309 -0.450 0.650 -0.750 0.469 
One national culture 0.099 0.346 0.290 0.775 -0.582 0.780 
Negative view of Aymara 0.908 0.338 2.690 0.008 0.243 1.573 
Negative view of Quechua 0.093 0.342 0.270 0.786 -0.580 0.766 
Negative view of Camba -0.244 0.308 -0.790 0.430 -0.851 0.364 
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Table A7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Negative view of White -0.490 0.271 -1.810 0.071 -1.024 0.043 
Experience of discrimination -0.124 0.089 -1.390 0.165 -0.299 0.051 
Constant -1.908 0.879 -2.170 0.031 -3.639 -0.176 
DORIA       
Quechua (none) 0.186 0.493 0.380 0.706 -0.785 1.157 
Aymara (none) 0.307 0.691 0.440 0.657 -1.053 1.667 
Other Indigenous (none) -0.145 0.621 -0.230 0.815 -1.368 1.077 
Speaks an indigenous language -2.451 1.030 -2.380 0.018 -4.479 -0.423 
Income 0.028 0.146 0.190 0.847 -0.260 0.316 
Female 0.055 0.401 0.140 0.891 -0.735 0.845 
Age -0.013 0.014 -0.910 0.363 -0.041 0.015 
Trust in parties -0.001 0.137 -0.010 0.992 -0.271 0.268 
Participation in protests -0.810 0.427 -1.900 0.059 -1.651 0.030 
National economy has improved 0.324 0.462 0.700 0.484 -0.586 1.234 
Personal finances have improved 0.269 0.377 0.710 0.477 -0.474 1.012 
Resides in media luna 1.640 0.473 3.470 0.001 0.708 2.571 
Resides in rural area -0.460 0.262 -1.760 0.080 -0.975 0.055 
Rightist ideology 0.155 0.084 1.850 0.065 -0.010 0.321 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.144 0.092 -1.570 0.118 -0.326 0.037 
Strongman populist leader 0.196 0.232 0.850 0.399 -0.261 0.653 
Direct democracy -1.198 0.758 -1.580 0.115 -2.690 0.294 
Minority to follow majority 0.379 0.559 0.680 0.498 -0.721 1.479 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.383 0.540 0.710 0.479 -0.680 1.447 
One national culture -1.420 0.967 -1.470 0.143 -3.324 0.484 
Negative view of Aymara 0.416 0.457 0.910 0.364 -0.485 1.316 
Negative view of Quechua 0.573 0.582 0.990 0.325 -0.572 1.719 
Negative view of Camba -0.131 0.445 -0.290 0.769 -1.006 0.745 
Negative view of White -0.313 0.418 -0.750 0.454 -1.136 0.509 
Experience of discrimination -0.213 0.162 -1.310 0.191 -0.532 0.106 
Constant -1.159 1.072 -1.080 0.281 -3.271 0.953 
NAGATANI       
Quechua (none) -1.696 0.538 -3.150 0.002 -2.755 -0.637 
Aymara (none) -3.332 0.828 -4.030 0.000 -4.962 -1.702 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.538 0.570 0.940 0.346 -0.584 1.660 
Speaks an indigenous language 1.780 0.702 2.540 0.012 0.398 3.162 
Income -0.050 0.166 -0.300 0.761 -0.377 0.276 
Female -0.422 0.432 -0.980 0.330 -1.273 0.429 
Age 0.062 0.013 4.880 0.000 0.037 0.087 
Trust in parties 0.057 0.136 0.420 0.675 -0.210 0.324 
Participation in protests -0.303 0.490 -0.620 0.536 -1.268 0.661 
National economy has improved 0.450 0.538 0.830 0.405 -0.611 1.510 
Personal finances have improved -0.067 0.488 -0.140 0.891 -1.028 0.894 
Resides in media luna 1.163 0.469 2.480 0.014 0.239 2.087 
Resides in rural area -0.273 0.228 -1.200 0.232 -0.722 0.176 
Rightist ideology 0.346 0.099 3.490 0.001 0.151 0.542 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.174 0.111 -1.570 0.117 -0.392 0.044 
Strongman populist leader 0.381 0.306 1.250 0.214 -0.221 0.982 
Direct democracy -1.593 0.732 -2.180 0.031 -3.035 -0.151 
Minority to follow majority -1.251 0.567 -2.210 0.028 -2.367 -0.135 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.239 0.494 0.480 0.629 -0.734 1.211 
One national culture 0.329 0.522 0.630 0.529 -0.699 1.357 
Negative view of Aymara 0.174 0.572 0.300 0.762 -0.954 1.301 
Negative view of Quechua 0.922 0.534 1.730 0.085 -0.129 1.973 
Negative view of Camba 0.133 0.561 0.240 0.812 -0.971 1.238 
Negative view of White -1.142 0.456 -2.500 0.013 -2.041 -0.243 
Experience of discrimination -0.612 0.234 -2.620 0.009 -1.073 -0.152 
N = 783. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales). 




Table A8: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES       
QUIROGA       
White (Mestizo) 0.678 0.429 1.580 0.115 -0.166 1.522 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.169 0.387 -0.440 0.662 -0.931 0.592 
Speaks an indigenous language -6.799 3.514 -1.930 0.054 -13.720 0.121 
Income 0.162 0.114 1.420 0.156 -0.062 0.386 
Female -0.167 0.234 -0.720 0.475 -0.627 0.293 
Age -0.007 0.008 -0.830 0.408 -0.023 0.009 
Trust in parties -0.015 0.086 -0.170 0.862 -0.185 0.155 
Participation in protests -0.707 0.254 -2.780 0.006 -1.207 -0.206 
National economy has improved -0.697 0.295 -2.360 0.019 -1.278 -0.116 
Personal finances have improved 0.516 0.292 1.770 0.078 -0.059 1.091 
Resides in media luna 0.919 0.269 3.420 0.001 0.389 1.448 
Resides in rural area 0.063 0.146 0.430 0.666 -0.224 0.350 
Rightist ideology 0.299 0.069 4.310 0.000 0.163 0.436 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.072 0.050 -1.450 0.147 -0.171 0.026 
Strongman populist leader 0.150 0.203 0.740 0.460 -0.249 0.550 
Direct democracy -0.124 0.417 -0.300 0.766 -0.946 0.697 
Minority to follow majority 0.027 0.389 0.070 0.945 -0.739 0.792 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.078 0.359 0.220 0.827 -0.629 0.786 
One national culture 0.138 0.364 0.380 0.706 -0.580 0.855 
Negative view of Aymara 0.954 0.368 2.590 0.010 0.229 1.678 
Negative view of Quechua 0.179 0.350 0.510 0.611 -0.512 0.869 
Negative view of Camba -0.407 0.326 -1.250 0.213 -1.049 0.235 
Negative view of White -0.539 0.285 -1.890 0.060 -1.100 0.023 
Experience of discrimination -0.078 0.102 -0.770 0.444 -0.278 0.122 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology 0.200 0.163 1.230 0.222 -0.121 0.522 
Supports gas nationalisation 0.507 0.263 1.930 0.055 -0.010 1.024 
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Table A8: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Strongman populist leader 0.356 0.581 0.610 0.541 -0.788 1.499 
Direct democracy -21.101 1.385 -15.240 0.000 -23.829 -18.374 
Minority to follow majority -0.797 1.412 -0.560 0.573 -3.579 1.985 
Income 0.111 0.499 0.220 0.825 -0.872 1.094 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -2.152 1.387 -1.550 0.122 -4.884 0.580 
One national culture -1.845 0.964 -1.910 0.057 -3.744 0.054 
Negative view of Aymara 0.789 0.881 0.900 0.371 -0.946 2.525 
Negative view of Quechua -1.769 0.900 -1.970 0.050 -3.542 0.003 
Negative view of Camba 1.844 0.912 2.020 0.044 0.048 3.639 
Negative view of White -0.494 0.995 -0.500 0.620 -2.455 1.466 
Experience of discrimination -0.037 0.313 -0.120 0.906 -0.653 0.579 
Constant -2.031 0.921 -2.210 0.028 -3.844 -0.218 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 0.022 0.657 0.030 0.974 -1.272 1.315 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.606 0.700 -0.870 0.387 -1.983 0.772 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.241 2.509 0.100 0.923 -4.699 5.182 
Income 0.015 0.158 0.090 0.927 -0.297 0.326 
Female -0.042 0.415 -0.100 0.919 -0.859 0.775 
Age -0.020 0.016 -1.260 0.208 -0.052 0.011 
Trust in parties 0.019 0.149 0.120 0.901 -0.276 0.313 
Participation in protests -0.667 0.448 -1.490 0.138 -1.548 0.215 
National economy has improved 0.279 0.456 0.610 0.541 -0.618 1.176 
Personal finances have improved 0.028 0.390 0.070 0.943 -0.740 0.796 
Resides in media luna 1.646 0.386 4.270 0.000 0.886 2.406 
Resides in rural area -0.685 0.321 -2.130 0.034 -1.317 -0.052 
Rightist ideology 0.151 0.085 1.780 0.076 -0.016 0.317 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.135 0.090 -1.490 0.137 -0.312 0.043 
Strongman populist leader 0.280 0.239 1.170 0.242 -0.190 0.750 
Direct democracy -1.640 0.854 -1.920 0.056 -3.321 0.041 
Minority to follow majority 0.173 0.617 0.280 0.779 -1.041 1.388 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.839 0.519 1.610 0.108 -0.184 1.861 
One national culture -1.496 1.036 -1.440 0.150 -3.536 0.545 
Negative view of Aymara 0.379 0.490 0.770 0.440 -0.585 1.343 
Negative view of Quechua 0.659 0.620 1.060 0.289 -0.562 1.880 
Negative view of Camba -0.261 0.457 -0.570 0.568 -1.161 0.638 
Negative view of White -0.183 0.428 -0.430 0.670 -1.026 0.660 
Experience of discrimination -0.134 0.153 -0.870 0.383 -0.436 0.168 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology -2.356 0.262 -9.010 0.000 -2.871 -1.841 
Supports gas nationalisation -1.897 0.161 -11.750 0.000 -2.215 -1.579 
Strongman populist leader -5.835 0.854 -6.840 0.000 -7.516 -4.154 
Direct democracy 14.674 1.176 12.480 0.000 12.359 16.990 
Minority to follow majority 11.001 1.000 11.000 0.000 9.031 12.970 
Income -1.796 0.478 -3.750 0.000 -2.737 -0.854 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -4.591 1.215 -3.780 0.000 -6.984 -2.199 
One national culture 1.375 1.365 1.010 0.315 -1.313 4.063 
Negative view of Aymara 8.482 0.977 8.680 0.000 6.557 10.406 
Negative view of Quechua 5.456 1.483 3.680 0.000 2.536 8.376 
Negative view of Camba -4.923 1.201 -4.100 0.000 -7.289 -2.557 
Negative view of White -1.884 1.422 -1.320 0.186 -4.684 0.916 
Experience of discrimination -2.145 0.446 -4.810 0.000 -3.023 -1.267 
Constant -0.546 1.126 -0.480 0.628 -2.762 1.671 
NAGATANI       
White (Mestizo) 1.434 0.604 2.370 0.018 0.244 2.623 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.234 0.640 1.930 0.055 -0.026 2.493 
Speaks an indigenous language 194.478 7.886 24.660 0.000 178.947 210.009 
Income 0.245 0.185 1.320 0.187 -0.120 0.610 
Female -0.156 0.436 -0.360 0.721 -1.016 0.703 
Age 0.045 0.011 4.010 0.000 0.023 0.067 
Trust in parties 0.093 0.139 0.670 0.503 -0.181 0.367 
Participation in protests -0.889 0.616 -1.440 0.150 -2.101 0.324 
National economy has improved 0.326 0.517 0.630 0.529 -0.692 1.344 
Personal finances have improved -0.634 0.590 -1.070 0.284 -1.796 0.528 
Resides in media luna 2.362 0.560 4.210 0.000 1.258 3.465 
Resides in rural area 0.008 0.208 0.040 0.970 -0.402 0.418 
Rightist ideology 0.423 0.125 3.390 0.001 0.177 0.669 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.161 0.103 -1.550 0.121 -0.364 0.043 
Strongman populist leader 0.122 0.351 0.350 0.727 -0.568 0.813 
Direct democracy -1.149 0.772 -1.490 0.138 -2.668 0.371 
Minority to follow majority -1.851 0.854 -2.170 0.031 -3.533 -0.170 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.401 0.534 0.750 0.453 -0.651 1.453 
One national culture 0.037 0.648 0.060 0.954 -1.239 1.313 
Negative view of Aymara 1.139 0.656 1.740 0.084 -0.153 2.432 
Negative view of Quechua 0.084 0.552 0.150 0.880 -1.003 1.170 
Negative view of Camba -0.316 0.542 -0.580 0.560 -1.382 0.751 
Negative view of White -0.447 0.499 -0.890 0.372 -1.430 0.537 
Experience of discrimination -0.345 0.207 -1.670 0.097 -0.752 0.062 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology -3.967 0.486 -8.170 0.000 -4.923 -3.011 
Supports gas nationalisation 2.322 0.461 5.040 0.000 1.415 3.229 
Strongman populist leader 26.420 1.705 15.490 0.000 23.062 29.779 
Direct democracy -75.060 5.420 -13.850 0.000 -85.734 -64.385 
Minority to follow majority -57.708 2.541 -22.710 0.000 -62.712 -52.703 
Income -40.465 1.521 -26.610 0.000 -43.460 -37.471 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -163.753 5.683 -28.810 0.000 -174.945 -152.561 
One national culture 13.706 1.455 9.420 0.000 10.840 16.571 
Negative view of Aymara -29.928 2.225 -13.450 0.000 -34.310 -25.546 
Negative view of Quechua 48.535 2.100 23.120 0.000 44.400 52.670 
Negative view of Camba -27.445 1.629 -16.850 0.000 -30.652 -24.237 
Negative view of White -122.171 5.301 -23.050 0.000 -132.611 -111.731 
Experience of discrimination -91.531 3.321 -27.560 0.000 -98.070 -84.991 
Constant -7.732 1.752 -4.410 0.000 -11.183 -4.281 
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Table A8: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
N = 787. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic 
group and the non-ethnic/ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A9: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome      
QUIROGA       
White (Mestizo) 5.969 3.827 1.560 0.120 -1.568 13.507 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.648 2.357 -1.120 0.262 -7.290 1.994 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.150 0.470 -2.440 0.015 -2.076 -0.223 
Income 0.231 0.107 2.160 0.032 0.020 0.442 
Female -0.221 0.246 -0.900 0.368 -0.705 0.262 
Age -0.009 0.008 -1.110 0.268 -0.026 0.007 
Trust in parties 0.010 0.090 0.110 0.915 -0.169 0.188 
Participation in protests -0.560 0.246 -2.280 0.024 -1.044 -0.076 
National economy has improved -0.711 0.311 -2.290 0.023 -1.323 -0.099 
Personal finances have improved 0.472 0.300 1.570 0.117 -0.118 1.062 
Resides in media luna 0.908 0.259 3.500 0.001 0.397 1.418 
Resides in rural area 0.062 0.148 0.420 0.674 -0.228 0.353 
Rightist ideology 0.311 0.074 4.200 0.000 0.165 0.456 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.090 0.052 -1.710 0.088 -0.193 0.014 
Strongman populist leader 0.174 0.222 0.780 0.434 -0.263 0.612 
Direct democracy -0.141 0.467 -0.300 0.764 -1.061 0.780 
Minority to follow majority 0.044 0.407 0.110 0.915 -0.758 0.845 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.225 0.368 0.610 0.540 -0.499 0.949 
One national culture -0.361 0.416 -0.870 0.387 -1.181 0.459 
Negative view of Aymara 0.775 0.381 2.030 0.043 0.024 1.525 
Negative view of Quechua 0.356 0.364 0.980 0.329 -0.361 1.074 
Negative view of Camba -0.089 0.354 -0.250 0.802 -0.786 0.608 
Negative view of White -0.540 0.303 -1.780 0.076 -1.138 0.057 
Experience of discrimination -0.063 0.103 -0.610 0.542 -0.266 0.140 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.184 0.213 -0.860 0.389 -0.603 0.236 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology 0.147 0.223 0.660 0.510 -0.292 0.586 
White * Supports gas national. 0.084 0.151 0.560 0.577 -0.212 0.381 
Indigenous * Supports gas national. 0.161 0.186 0.860 0.388 -0.206 0.528 
White * Strongman pop. leader -0.051 0.620 -0.080 0.934 -1.273 1.171 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader 0.074 0.678 0.110 0.913 -1.262 1.411 
White * Direct democracy -0.384 1.228 -0.310 0.755 -2.802 2.034 
Indigenous * Direct democracy 0.718 1.158 0.620 0.536 -1.564 2.999 
White * Minority follow maj. 0.065 1.467 0.040 0.965 -2.825 2.954 
Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -0.608 1.059 -0.570 0.567 -2.694 1.478 
White * Income -0.881 0.497 -1.770 0.077 -1.859 0.098 
Indigenous * Income 0.165 0.287 0.570 0.566 -0.400 0.730 
White * Prefer leaders same et.    -0.156 0.953 -0.160 0.870 -2.034 1.722 
Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.  -2.090 0.702 -2.980 0.003 -3.472 -0.708 
White * One nat. cult.  1.690 1.072 1.580 0.116 -0.422 3.802 
Indigenous * One nat. cult.  1.920 0.990 1.940 0.053 -0.029 3.870 
White * Neg. Aymara  -0.085 1.085 -0.080 0.937 -2.223 2.052 
Indigenous * Neg. Aymara 2.918 1.267 2.300 0.022 0.422 5.414 
White * Neg. Quechua  -0.263 1.006 -0.260 0.794 -2.244 1.718 
Indigenous * Neg Quechua -1.168 1.190 -0.980 0.328 -3.512 1.177 
White * Neg. Camba  -1.987 0.848 -2.340 0.020 -3.656 -0.317 
Indigenous * Neg. Camba 0.253 0.972 0.260 0.795 -1.661 2.167 
White * Neg. White  0.058 0.801 0.070 0.942 -1.519 1.635 
Indigenous * Neg. White -1.824 1.148 -1.590 0.114 -4.085 0.438 
White * Discrimination  -0.228 0.296 -0.770 0.442 -0.811 0.355 
Indigenous * Discrimination -0.127 0.241 -0.530 0.598 -0.601 0.347 
Constant -2.374 0.938 -2.530 0.012 -4.222 -0.526 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 3.658 3.765 0.970 0.332 -3.757 11.073 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 9.881 3.593 2.750 0.006 2.805 16.956 
Speaks an indigenous language -10.455 4.958 -2.110 0.036 -20.218 -0.692 
Income 0.056 0.181 0.310 0.758 -0.301 0.412 
Female -0.266 0.455 -0.580 0.559 -1.162 0.630 
Age -0.028 0.018 -1.490 0.137 -0.064 0.009 
Trust in parties 0.016 0.148 0.110 0.914 -0.275 0.308 
Participation in protests -0.571 0.478 -1.190 0.233 -1.512 0.370 
National economy has improved 0.331 0.474 0.700 0.486 -0.603 1.265 
Personal finances have improved 0.156 0.426 0.370 0.714 -0.683 0.995 
Resides in media luna 1.727 0.416 4.150 0.000 0.907 2.547 
Resides in rural area -0.788 0.399 -1.980 0.049 -1.573 -0.003 
Rightist ideology 0.190 0.100 1.900 0.059 -0.007 0.388 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.168 0.102 -1.650 0.099 -0.368 0.032 
Strongman populist leader 0.348 0.273 1.270 0.204 -0.190 0.886 
Direct democracy -1.509 0.907 -1.660 0.097 -3.295 0.277 
Minority to follow majority 0.212 0.696 0.300 0.761 -1.158 1.582 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 1.174 0.655 1.790 0.074 -0.116 2.463 
One national culture -1.440 1.052 -1.370 0.172 -3.511 0.631 
Negative view of Aymara 0.076 0.737 0.100 0.918 -1.375 1.528 
Negative view of Quechua 1.071 0.775 1.380 0.168 -0.456 2.598 
Negative view of Camba 0.196 0.493 0.400 0.692 -0.775 1.166 
Negative view of White -0.584 0.444 -1.320 0.189 -1.458 0.290 
Experience of discrimination -0.209 0.183 -1.140 0.256 -0.569 0.152 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.676 0.278 -2.430 0.016 -1.223 -0.129 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.169 0.572 -0.290 0.769 -1.296 0.959 
White * Supports gas national. 0.396 0.318 1.250 0.214 -0.230 1.022 
Indigenous * Supports gas national. -1.190 0.747 -1.590 0.112 -2.661 0.281 
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Table A9: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
White * Strongman pop. leader 0.666 0.886 0.750 0.453 -1.078 2.410 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -0.811 1.121 -0.720 0.470 -3.018 1.396 
White * Direct democracy -19.309 1.484 -13.010 0.000 -22.233 -16.386 
Indigenous * Direct democracy -7.055 4.784 -1.470 0.142 -16.477 2.367 
White * Minority follow maj. -18.877 1.614 -11.700 0.000 -22.055 -15.699 
Indigenous * Minority follow maj. 12.953 5.450 2.380 0.018 2.220 23.685 
White * Income -0.718 0.592 -1.210 0.226 -1.883 0.447 
Indigenous * Income -1.630 1.281 -1.270 0.205 -4.152 0.893 
White * Prefer leaders same et.    1.482 1.317 1.120 0.262 -1.112 4.076 
Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.  -16.088 6.833 -2.350 0.019 -29.544 -2.632 
White * One nat. cult.  -3.011 2.072 -1.450 0.147 -7.091 1.069 
Indigenous * One nat. cult.  3.835 2.502 1.530 0.127 -1.093 8.762 
White * Neg. Aymara  1.219 2.082 0.590 0.559 -2.881 5.319 
Indigenous * Neg. Aymara 10.196 5.431 1.880 0.062 -0.498 20.891 
White * Neg. Quechua  -3.785 1.588 -2.380 0.018 -6.912 -0.659 
Indigenous * Neg Quechua -4.756 1.988 -2.390 0.017 -8.672 -0.841 
White * Neg. Camba  -0.745 1.139 -0.650 0.513 -2.988 1.498 
Indigenous * Neg. Camba 0.013 2.028 0.010 0.995 -3.980 4.007 
White * Neg. White  1.580 1.127 1.400 0.162 -0.639 3.799 
Indigenous * Neg. White -2.245 1.867 -1.200 0.230 -5.921 1.432 
White * Discrimination  0.984 0.582 1.690 0.092 -0.161 2.130 
Indigenous * Discrimination -0.750 0.765 -0.980 0.328 -2.257 0.757 
Constant -0.502 1.412 -0.360 0.722 -3.282 2.278 
NAGATANTI       
White (Mestizo) -1.272 4.039 -0.310 0.753 -9.226 6.682 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.466 3.246 0.450 0.652 -4.927 7.859 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.656 0.721 0.910 0.364 -0.764 2.076 
Income 0.025 0.240 0.100 0.917 -0.447 0.497 
Female -0.794 0.517 -1.540 0.126 -1.812 0.225 
Age 0.053 0.012 4.460 0.000 0.029 0.076 
Trust in parties 0.046 0.151 0.310 0.760 -0.251 0.344 
Participation in protests -0.430 0.616 -0.700 0.486 -1.643 0.783 
National economy has improved 0.530 0.574 0.920 0.356 -0.600 1.661 
Personal finances have improved -0.654 0.579 -1.130 0.260 -1.795 0.486 
Resides in media luna 2.476 0.655 3.780 0.000 1.186 3.765 
Resides in rural area -0.258 0.254 -1.020 0.310 -0.759 0.242 
Rightist ideology 0.430 0.150 2.880 0.004 0.136 0.725 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.216 0.143 -1.510 0.132 -0.496 0.065 
Strongman populist leader 0.498 0.445 1.120 0.264 -0.378 1.375 
Direct democracy -1.645 1.184 -1.390 0.166 -3.977 0.687 
Minority to follow majority -1.881 1.057 -1.780 0.076 -3.963 0.201 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity 0.323 0.754 0.430 0.669 -1.163 1.809 
One national culture -0.481 0.931 -0.520 0.606 -2.315 1.353 
Negative view of Aymara 0.627 0.837 0.750 0.454 -1.022 2.276 
Negative view of Quechua 0.581 0.665 0.870 0.383 -0.729 1.891 
Negative view of Camba 0.284 0.675 0.420 0.674 -1.044 1.612 
Negative view of White -1.042 0.624 -1.670 0.096 -2.272 0.187 
Experience of discrimination -0.508 0.251 -2.030 0.044 -1.002 -0.014 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology 0.320 0.304 1.050 0.293 -0.278 0.919 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.433 0.293 -1.480 0.140 -1.009 0.143 
White * Supports gas national. 0.247 0.259 0.950 0.341 -0.263 0.756 
Indigenous * Supports gas national. -0.273 0.229 -1.190 0.234 -0.724 0.178 
White * Strongman pop. leader -0.313 0.994 -0.310 0.754 -2.271 1.646 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader 0.335 1.298 0.260 0.797 -2.222 2.892 
White * Direct democracy 0.724 1.862 0.390 0.698 -2.942 4.391 
Indigenous * Direct democracy 2.423 1.699 1.430 0.155 -0.922 5.768 
White * Minority follow maj. 1.998 1.837 1.090 0.278 -1.620 5.615 
Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -12.485 2.390 -5.220 0.000 -17.191 -7.778 
White * Income -0.358 0.551 -0.650 0.516 -1.443 0.726 
Indigenous * Income 1.201 0.550 2.180 0.030 0.118 2.283 
White * Prefer leaders same et.    -0.354 1.545 -0.230 0.819 -3.398 2.689 
Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.  -15.821 1.307 -12.100 0.000 -18.395 -13.247 
White * One nat. cult.  2.162 1.512 1.430 0.154 -0.816 5.141 
Indigenous * One nat. cult.  2.135 1.366 1.560 0.119 -0.554 4.825 
White * Neg. Aymara  -0.533 1.457 -0.370 0.715 -3.403 2.337 
Indigenous * Neg. Aymara 4.294 1.891 2.270 0.024 0.570 8.017 
White * Neg. Quechua  0.929 1.492 0.620 0.534 -2.009 3.866 
Indigenous * Neg Quechua -1.187 1.851 -0.640 0.522 -4.833 2.459 
White * Neg. Camba  -0.849 1.273 -0.670 0.505 -3.355 1.657 
Indigenous * Neg. Camba -1.694 1.739 -0.970 0.331 -5.119 1.730 
White * Neg. White  1.335 1.372 0.970 0.331 -1.367 4.038 
Indigenous * Neg. White -3.249 1.686 -1.930 0.055 -6.569 0.071 
White * Discrimination  -1.262 1.140 -1.110 0.269 -3.508 0.983 
Indigenous * Discrimination 0.476 0.426 1.120 0.265 -0.363 1.315 
Constant -6.317 2.095 -3.020 0.003 -10.442 -2.192 
N = 787. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-
identified group and the non-ethnic/ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES       
QUIROGA       
None -0.882 1.934 -0.460 0.649 -4.691 2.927 
Aymara -2.285 1.867 -1.220 0.222 -5.962 1.393 
Other Indigenous  4.274 2.251 1.900 0.059 -0.160 8.708 
Speaks Indigenous language -1.132 0.450 -2.510 0.013 -2.018 -0.245 
Income 0.209 0.176 1.190 0.237 -0.138 0.555 
Female -0.125 0.257 -0.490 0.626 -0.631 0.381 
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Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Age -0.012 0.009 -1.330 0.184 -0.030 0.006 
Trust in parties 0.002 0.084 0.030 0.979 -0.164 0.168 
Participation in protests -0.511 0.261 -1.960 0.051 -1.024 0.002 
National economy has improved -0.611 0.333 -1.840 0.068 -1.267 0.045 
Personal finances have improved 0.473 0.271 1.740 0.082 -0.061 1.007 
Resides in media luna 0.673 0.342 1.970 0.050 -0.001 1.347 
Resides in rural area -0.013 0.130 -0.100 0.920 -0.269 0.243 
Rightist ideology 0.305 0.088 3.470 0.001 0.132 0.478 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.027 0.091 -0.290 0.770 -0.205 0.152 
Strongman populist leader 0.024 0.329 0.070 0.941 -0.624 0.673 
Direct democracy -0.924 0.637 -1.450 0.148 -2.178 0.331 
Minority to follow majority -0.263 0.637 -0.410 0.680 -1.517 0.991 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -0.089 0.511 -0.170 0.862 -1.096 0.918 
One national culture 0.366 0.515 0.710 0.478 -0.648 1.380 
Negative view of Aymara 0.685 0.607 1.130 0.260 -0.511 1.881 
Negative view of Quechua -0.218 0.609 -0.360 0.721 -1.418 0.982 
Negative view of Camba -0.337 0.585 -0.580 0.565 -1.489 0.814 
Negative view of White -0.438 0.483 -0.910 0.366 -1.390 0.514 
Experience of discrimination -0.006 0.160 -0.040 0.969 -0.322 0.309 
INTERACTIONS       
None * Rightist ideology 0.236 0.155 1.530 0.128 -0.069 0.541 
Aymara * Rightist ideology -0.050 0.187 -0.260 0.791 -0.419 0.319 
Other Indigenous * Rightist ideology  -0.056 0.204 -0.280 0.784 -0.459 0.346 
None * Supports gas national. -0.128 0.121 -1.060 0.291 -0.368 0.111 
Aymara * Supports gas national. 0.203 0.163 1.240 0.215 -0.118 0.523 
Other Indigenous * Supports gas national.  -0.141 0.204 -0.690 0.490 -0.542 0.260 
None * Strongman pop. leader -0.142 0.490 -0.290 0.772 -1.107 0.823 
Aymara * Strongman pop. Leader 0.664 0.510 1.300 0.194 -0.340 1.668 
Other Indigenous * Strongman pop. leader  0.468 0.770 0.610 0.544 -1.048 1.984 
None * Direct democracy 2.152 0.954 2.260 0.025 0.274 4.030 
Aymara * Direct democracy 1.493 1.165 1.280 0.201 -0.801 3.787 
Other Indigenous * Direct democracy -1.165 1.244 -0.940 0.350 -3.615 1.286 
None * Minority follow maj. 0.032 0.837 0.040 0.970 -1.616 1.679 
Aymara * Minority follow maj. 1.056 1.197 0.880 0.379 -1.302 3.414 
Other Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -1.942 1.240 -1.570 0.118 -4.383 0.499 
None * Income -0.020 0.252 -0.080 0.938 -0.515 0.476 
Aymara * Income -0.026 0.315 -0.080 0.934 -0.647 0.595 
Other Indigenous * Income -0.440 0.309 -1.420 0.156 -1.049 0.169 
None * Prefer leaders same et.    0.487 0.821 0.590 0.554 -1.129 2.103 
Aymara * Prefer leaders same et.  -0.371 1.131 -0.330 0.743 -2.599 1.857 
Other Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et. 0.179 1.301 0.140 0.891 -2.383 2.741 
None * One nat. cult.  -0.438 0.754 -0.580 0.562 -1.923 1.047 
Aymara * One nat. cult.  -1.032 1.101 -0.940 0.349 -3.200 1.135 
Other Indigenous * One nat. cult. -0.498 0.924 -0.540 0.590 -2.319 1.322 
None * Neg. Aymara  1.372 0.999 1.370 0.171 -0.595 3.339 
Aymara * Neg. Aymara -0.298 0.904 -0.330 0.742 -2.079 1.483 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Aymara 3.335 1.289 2.590 0.010 0.797 5.873 
None * Neg. Quechua  -0.283 1.032 -0.270 0.784 -2.316 1.750 
Aymara * Neg Quechua 1.794 0.971 1.850 0.066 -0.119 3.706 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Quechua -3.684 1.294 -2.850 0.005 -6.233 -1.136 
None * Neg. Camba  -0.523 0.756 -0.690 0.490 -2.013 0.966 
Aymara * Neg. Camba 0.231 0.940 0.250 0.806 -1.620 2.081 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Camba 0.620 1.009 0.620 0.539 -1.366 2.607 
None * Neg. White  0.973 0.735 1.320 0.187 -0.475 2.420 
Aymara * Neg. White -1.025 0.786 -1.300 0.194 -2.574 0.524 
Other Indigenous * Neg. White -0.575 0.991 -0.580 0.562 -2.526 1.376 
None * Discrimination  -0.213 0.253 -0.840 0.402 -0.712 0.286 
Aymara * Discrimination -0.089 0.302 -0.290 0.768 -0.683 0.505 
Other Indigenous * Discrimination -0.473 0.290 -1.630 0.104 -1.043 0.097 
Constant -1.904 1.392 -1.370 0.173 -4.645 0.837 
DORIA       
None -1.982 4.055 -0.490 0.625 -9.967 6.003 
Aymara -7.042 4.794 -1.470 0.143 -16.484 2.399 
Other Indigenous  -4.274 7.051 -0.610 0.545 -18.160 9.611 
Speaks Indigenous language -3.735 1.481 -2.520 0.012 -6.651 -0.819 
Income -0.605 0.558 -1.080 0.279 -1.703 0.494 
Female 0.162 0.479 0.340 0.735 -0.780 1.105 
Age -0.025 0.015 -1.700 0.090 -0.054 0.004 
Trust in parties 0.104 0.146 0.710 0.479 -0.184 0.392 
Participation in protests -1.180 0.503 -2.350 0.020 -2.170 -0.189 
National economy has improved 0.656 0.532 1.230 0.219 -0.392 1.704 
Personal finances have improved 0.048 0.510 0.090 0.925 -0.957 1.052 
Resides in media luna 1.605 0.539 2.980 0.003 0.543 2.666 
Resides in rural area -0.608 0.261 -2.330 0.021 -1.122 -0.094 
Rightist ideology 0.451 0.209 2.150 0.032 0.039 0.863 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.402 0.223 -1.800 0.073 -0.841 0.038 
Strongman populist leader 0.512 0.432 1.180 0.237 -0.339 1.363 
Direct democracy -3.176 1.680 -1.890 0.060 -6.486 0.133 
Minority to follow majority 3.670 1.103 3.330 0.001 1.497 5.843 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -0.849 1.269 -0.670 0.504 -3.348 1.651 
One national culture 0.278 1.062 0.260 0.794 -1.814 2.369 
Negative view of Aymara -1.123 1.053 -1.070 0.287 -3.198 0.951 
Negative view of Quechua 3.906 1.241 3.150 0.002 1.462 6.350 
Negative view of Camba -1.583 1.529 -1.040 0.302 -4.595 1.428 
Negative view of White 0.023 1.281 0.020 0.986 -2.500 2.545 
Experience of discrimination -0.545 0.413 -1.320 0.188 -1.357 0.268 
INTERACTIONS       
None * Rightist ideology -0.343 0.264 -1.300 0.195 -0.864 0.177 
Aymara * Rightist ideology 0.902 0.371 2.430 0.016 0.171 1.634 
Other Indigenous * Rightist ideology  -0.564 0.402 -1.400 0.162 -1.356 0.228 
None * Supports gas national. 0.234 0.251 0.930 0.353 -0.261 0.729 
Aymara * Supports gas national. 0.007 0.353 0.020 0.984 -0.689 0.703 
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Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Other Indigenous * Supports gas national.  0.734 0.481 1.530 0.128 -0.213 1.682 
None * Strongman pop. leader -0.745 0.625 -1.190 0.234 -1.975 0.485 
Aymara * Strongman pop. Leader 3.187 1.104 2.890 0.004 1.013 5.361 
Other Indigenous * Strongman pop. leader  0.027 1.481 0.020 0.985 -2.889 2.943 
None * Direct democracy 2.593 2.142 1.210 0.227 -1.626 6.812 
Aymara * Direct democracy 6.215 2.088 2.980 0.003 2.102 10.328 
Other Indigenous * Direct democracy -15.408 1.979 -7.790 0.000 -19.306 -11.511 
None * Minority follow maj. -5.968 1.540 -3.880 0.000 -9.001 -2.935 
Aymara * Minority follow maj. -20.989 1.473 -14.250 0.000 -23.889 -18.089 
Other Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -3.614 2.010 -1.800 0.073 -7.572 0.344 
None * Income 0.796 0.596 1.330 0.183 -0.379 1.971 
Aymara * Income 0.088 0.619 0.140 0.887 -1.130 1.307 
Other Indigenous * Income 0.865 0.959 0.900 0.368 -1.025 2.754 
None * Prefer leaders same et.    2.070 1.517 1.360 0.174 -0.917 5.057 
Aymara * Prefer leaders same et.  3.122 1.824 1.710 0.088 -0.471 6.715 
Other Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et. 1.148 2.370 0.480 0.629 -3.519 5.814 
None * One nat. cult.  -4.194 1.508 -2.780 0.006 -7.164 -1.223 
Aymara * One nat. cult.  -22.880 2.583 -8.860 0.000 -27.967 -17.792 
Other Indigenous * One nat. cult. -19.502 2.726 -7.150 0.000 -24.870 -14.133 
None * Neg. Aymara  3.887 1.400 2.780 0.006 1.130 6.644 
Aymara * Neg. Aymara -0.871 1.334 -0.650 0.514 -3.498 1.755 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Aymara 4.854 2.301 2.110 0.036 0.322 9.385 
None * Neg. Quechua  -5.204 1.635 -3.180 0.002 -8.424 -1.984 
Aymara * Neg Quechua -1.673 1.711 -0.980 0.329 -5.042 1.697 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Quechua -7.247 2.065 -3.510 0.001 -11.313 -3.180 
None * Neg. Camba  1.108 1.717 0.650 0.519 -2.274 4.490 
Aymara * Neg. Camba 2.307 2.247 1.030 0.306 -2.118 6.733 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Camba -3.133 2.722 -1.150 0.251 -8.494 2.228 
None * Neg. White  0.427 1.434 0.300 0.766 -2.398 3.252 
Aymara * Neg. White -1.598 1.703 -0.940 0.349 -4.952 1.757 
Other Indigenous * Neg. White 0.402 1.975 0.200 0.839 -3.487 4.291 
None * Discrimination  0.587 0.508 1.160 0.249 -0.414 1.588 
Aymara * Discrimination -0.376 0.927 -0.410 0.685 -2.203 1.450 
Other Indigenous * Discrimination -0.121 0.854 -0.140 0.888 -1.802 1.561 
Constant 0.869 3.560 0.240 0.807 -6.141 7.879 
NAGATANI       
None -5.891 2.878 -2.050 0.042 -11.559 -0.223 
Aymara -62.238 5.737 -10.850 0.000 -73.536 -50.940 
Other Indigenous  -4.099 3.224 -1.270 0.205 -10.448 2.250 
Speaks Indigenous language 0.742 0.905 0.820 0.413 -1.041 2.525 
Income -0.645 0.350 -1.840 0.067 -1.335 0.045 
Female -0.086 0.435 -0.200 0.843 -0.942 0.770 
Age 0.055 0.013 4.120 0.000 0.029 0.081 
Trust in parties 0.083 0.144 0.580 0.566 -0.201 0.367 
Participation in protests -0.380 0.617 -0.620 0.538 -1.595 0.834 
National economy has improved 0.289 0.578 0.500 0.618 -0.849 1.427 
Personal finances have improved -0.149 0.491 -0.300 0.762 -1.115 0.818 
Resides in media luna 1.454 0.543 2.680 0.008 0.384 2.523 
Resides in rural area -0.365 0.267 -1.370 0.173 -0.890 0.161 
Rightist ideology -0.263 0.158 -1.670 0.096 -0.574 0.047 
Supports gas nationalisation -0.198 0.195 -1.020 0.311 -0.583 0.186 
Strongman populist leader 0.368 0.533 0.690 0.490 -0.681 1.418 
Direct democracy -1.920 1.039 -1.850 0.066 -3.966 0.126 
Minority to follow majority 0.648 0.655 0.990 0.324 -0.642 1.938 
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity -1.417 1.462 -0.970 0.333 -4.296 1.462 
One national culture 0.787 1.127 0.700 0.485 -1.432 3.007 
Negative view of Aymara -0.610 0.780 -0.780 0.435 -2.147 0.927 
Negative view of Quechua 1.301 0.917 1.420 0.157 -0.505 3.107 
Negative view of Camba 0.766 2.059 0.370 0.710 -3.289 4.821 
Negative view of White -1.875 2.373 -0.790 0.430 -6.549 2.798 
Experience of discrimination -1.268 0.798 -1.590 0.113 -2.839 0.303 
INTERACTIONS       
None * Rightist ideology 0.882 0.255 3.460 0.001 0.380 1.384 
Aymara * Rightist ideology 6.520 0.438 14.880 0.000 5.657 7.383 
Other Indigenous * Rightist ideology  0.613 0.285 2.150 0.032 0.052 1.173 
None * Supports gas national. -0.062 0.245 -0.260 0.799 -0.544 0.419 
Aymara * Supports gas national. 1.151 0.375 3.070 0.002 0.413 1.889 
Other Indigenous * Supports gas national.  0.113 0.314 0.360 0.720 -0.506 0.732 
None * Strongman pop. leader -0.689 0.695 -0.990 0.322 -2.059 0.680 
Aymara * Strongman pop. Leader 1.584 1.272 1.250 0.214 -0.921 4.088 
Other Indigenous * Strongman pop. leader  1.146 0.939 1.220 0.224 -0.704 2.995 
None * Direct democracy 1.568 1.464 1.070 0.285 -1.314 4.451 
Aymara * Direct democracy 1.058 2.917 0.360 0.717 -4.687 6.803 
Other Indigenous * Direct democracy -3.098 2.144 -1.450 0.150 -7.321 1.124 
None * Minority follow maj. -3.381 1.232 -2.740 0.006 -5.806 -0.955 
Aymara * Minority follow maj. 2.383 2.875 0.830 0.408 -3.279 8.044 
Other Indigenous * Minority follow maj. -15.985 1.359 -11.760 0.000 -18.661 -13.309 
None * Income 0.734 0.377 1.950 0.053 -0.008 1.476 
Aymara * Income 1.355 0.959 1.410 0.159 -0.533 3.243 
Other Indigenous * Income 0.686 0.570 1.200 0.230 -0.437 1.808 
None * Prefer leaders same et.    3.167 1.642 1.930 0.055 -0.066 6.400 
Aymara * Prefer leaders same et.  -9.303 2.091 -4.450 0.000 -13.421 -5.185 
Other Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et. 1.131 1.927 0.590 0.558 -2.664 4.925 
None * One nat. cult.  -0.360 1.422 -0.250 0.800 -3.161 2.441 
Aymara * One nat. cult.  -31.085 2.557 -12.160 0.000 -36.121 -26.048 
Other Indigenous * One nat. cult. -0.020 1.538 -0.010 0.990 -3.048 3.009 
None * Neg. Aymara  2.021 1.339 1.510 0.133 -0.616 4.659 
Aymara * Neg. Aymara 0.047 1.277 0.040 0.971 -2.468 2.563 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Aymara 2.955 1.920 1.540 0.125 -0.826 6.736 
None * Neg. Quechua  -1.598 1.407 -1.140 0.257 -4.368 1.172 
Aymara * Neg Quechua -2.344 2.497 -0.940 0.349 -7.262 2.574 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Quechua -2.965 2.159 -1.370 0.171 -7.217 1.287 
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Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
None * Neg. Camba  -1.559 2.224 -0.700 0.484 -5.939 2.821 
Aymara * Neg. Camba 1.586 2.253 0.700 0.482 -2.851 6.022 
Other Indigenous * Neg. Camba -0.372 2.216 -0.170 0.867 -4.735 3.991 
None * Neg. White  2.124 2.462 0.860 0.389 -2.724 6.972 
Aymara * Neg. White -8.598 3.298 -2.610 0.010 -15.092 -2.103 
Other Indigenous * Neg. White -0.005 2.603 0.000 0.999 -5.130 5.121 
None * Discrimination  0.623 0.906 0.690 0.492 -1.162 2.409 
Aymara * Discrimination -5.455 1.633 -3.340 0.001 -8.671 -2.239 
Other Indigenous * Discrimination 0.510 0.882 0.580 0.563 -1.226 2.247 
Constant -0.096 1.803 -0.050 0.957 -3.648 3.455 
N = 783. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-
identified cultural group and the non-ethnic/ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A11: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Personal Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .008 .000 .009 -.008 .027 (P) 
    -.007 .028 (BC) 
Trust in parties .002 .000 .005 -.007 .012 (P) 
    -.004 .016 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .034^* .001 .012 .013 .062 (P) 
    .014 .065 (BC) 
Gas nationalization -.004 .000 .004 -.013 .003 (P) 
    -.019 .001 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader -.002 .000 .003 -.009 .004 (P) 
    -.013 .002 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.002 .000 .007 -.016 .012 (P) 
    -.021 .008 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority .005 .000 .009 -.011 .027 (P) 
    -.009 .029 (BC) 
Prefers in-group representative -.001 .000 .010 -.022 .020 (P) 
    -.021 .020 (BC) 
Favours a single national culture .001 .001 .004 -.006 .012 (P) 
    -.004 .016 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara .003 .001 .014 -.023 .032 (P) 
    -.023 .031 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua .000 -.001 .007 -.016 .014 (P) 
    -.014 .015 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba .020*^ .000 .012 .001 .048 (P) 
    .002 .051 (BC) 
Negative views of White .014 .001 .011 -.005 .042 (P) 
    -.004 .043 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .009 -.001 .009 -.011 .028 (P) 
    -.007 .033 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .086^* .002 .029 .034 .146 (P) 
    .030 .143 (BC) 
Direct effect .222^* .006 .068 .101 .365 (P) 
    .096 .355 (BC) 
Total effect .309^* .007 .063 .193 .439 (P) 
    .179 .422 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .280      
N = 624. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of personal linguistic background (knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of 
the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and 
confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 248 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, 
Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.002 .000 .004 -.011 .005 (P) 
    -.015 .002 (BC) 
Trust in parties .000 .000 .004 -.009 .008 (P) 
    -.007 .010 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.022 -.001 .014 -.052 .002 (P) 
    -.053 .002 (BC) 
Gas nationalization .003 .000 .005 -.007 .014 (P) 
    -.004 .017 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader -.001 .000 .008 -.019 .015 (P) 
    -.021 .014 (BC) 
Direct democracy .004 .000 .007 -.008 .020 (P) 
    -.004 .025 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority .000 .000 .005 -.009 .011 (P) 
    -.008 .012 (BC) 
Prefers in-group representative -.004 .000 .008 -.022 .011 (P) 
    -.029 .007 (BC) 
Favours a single national culture .000 .000 .007 -.014 .017 (P) 
    -.013 .018 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara -.019* -.001 .013 -.049 .001 (P) 
    -.054 -.001 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua -.003 .000 .009 -.024 .013 (P) 
    -.028 .010 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba -.011 .000 .010 -.032 .005 (P) 
    -.039 .002 (BC) 
Negative views of White -.012 -.001 .012 -.039 .008 (P) 
    -.040 .007 (BC) 
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Table A12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, 
Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Experience of discrimination -.001 .000 .004 -.009 .006 (P) 
    -.012 .003 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.068 -.002 .029 -.128 -.013 (P) 
    -.125 -.010 (BC) 
Direct effect -.146 -.005 .062 -.272 -.030 (P) 
    -.256 -.005 (BC) 
Total effect -.214 -.007 .059 -.336 -.104 (P) 
    -.318 -.090 (BC) 
Proportion of total effects mediated .316      
N = 513. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 226 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A13: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over 
Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .018 .000 .013 -.006 .046 (P) 
    -.004 .049 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.003 .000 .005 -.014 .005 (P) 
    -.018 .003 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .012 -.001 .014 -.018 .039 (P) 
    -.015 .042 (BC) 
Gas nationalization .000 .000 .004 -.009 .007 (P) 
    -.009 .007 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .001 .000 .003 -.007 .008 (P) 
    -.004 .011 (BC) 
Direct democracy .003 .000 .006 -.008 .018 (P) 
    -.004 .031 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority -.004 .000 .008 -.022 .009 (P) 
    -.030 .005 (BC) 
Prefers in-group representative .000 .001 .008 -.016 .018 (P) 
    -.017 .017 (BC) 
Favours a single national culture .000 .000 .004 -.009 .007 (P) 
    -.008 .007 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara .005 .000 .015 -.026 .034 (P) 
    -.025 .035 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua -.001 .000 .006 -.014 .012 (P) 
    -.020 .007 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba .004 .001 .008 -.008 .023 (P) 
    -.006 .026 (BC) 
Negative views of White .014* .001 .011 -.001 .041 (P) 
    .000 .045 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .001 .000 .004 -.006 .011 (P) 
    -.003 .018 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .049 .001 .033 -.014 .116 (P) 
    -.015 .112 (BC) 
Direct effect .047 .001 .062 -.073 .173 (P) 
    -.076 .170 (BC) 
Total effect .096 .002 .068 -.032 .230 (P) 
    -.045 .220 (BC) 
Proportion of total effects mediated .599      
N = 557. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through 
the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 241 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Morales over 
Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.026 .002 .043 -.119 .056 (P) 
    -.129 .049 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.007 .002 .017 -.044 .025 (P) 
    -.068 .014 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .038* .001 .025 -.003 .093 (P) 
    .000 .101 (BC) 
Gas nationalization .000 .002 .009 -.015 .026 (P) 
    -.019 .018 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .026 .001 .031 -.020 .109 (P) 
    -.012 .124 (BC) 
Direct democracy .004 -.002 .022 -.049 .050 (P) 
    -.027 .075 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority -.004 -.003 .026 -.065 .041 (P) 
    -.074 .032 (BC) 
Prefers in-group representative .001 .002 .017 -.031 .044 (P) 
    -.028 .051 (BC) 
Favours a single national culture .027 .005 .034 -.019 .115 (P) 
    -.016 .129 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara .067 .005 .051 -.009 .190 (P) 
    -.008 .192 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua -.010 .000 .024 -.065 .030 (P) 
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Table A14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Morales over 
Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
    -.099 .016 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba .017 .002 .034 -.048 .095 (P) 
    -.045 .095 (BC) 
Negative views of White -.005 -.002 .045 -.122 .073 (P) 
    -.139 .068 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .012 .001 .021 -.022 .062 (P) 
    -.016 .070 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .138 .015 .095 -.044 .331 (P) 
    -.080 .298 (BC) 
Direct effect .297^* -.004 .097 .095 .485 (P) 
    .095 .479 (BC) 
Total effect .435^* .011 .100 .244 .624 (P) 
    .195 .596 (BC) 
Proportion of total effects mediated .318      
N = 178. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.  
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through 
the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (995repetitions, from 120 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A15: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Aymara (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over 
Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation Variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .031 .000 .030 -.025 .096 (P) 
    -.022 .099 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.018 .000 .016 -.055 .007 (P) 
    -.064 .004 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .047 .002 .032 -.006 .121 (P) 
    -.005 .123 (BC) 
Gas Nationalisation .010 -.001 .010 -.005 .033 (P) 
    -.002 .042 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .003 .000 .012 -.021 .032 (P) 
    -.014 .041 (BC) 
Direct democracy .004 -.001 .016 -.034 .039 (P) 
    -.017 .059 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority .000 .002 .018 -.038 .045 (P) 
    -.040 .039 (BC) 
Prefers ethnic representation .000 .001 .012 -.025 .028 (P) 
    -.032 .021 (BC) 
Favours single national culture .000 .000 .010 -.022 .022 (P) 
    -.026 .020 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara .047* .002 .033 -.004 .123 (P) 
    .000 .132 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua .000 .001 .012 -.024 .029 (P) 
    -.025 .028 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba .036 .001 .024 -.003 .086 (P) 
    -.002 .089 (BC) 
Negative views of White .014 -.001 .027 -.037 .069 (P) 
    -.030 .076 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .011 -.001 .020 -.029 .050 (P) 
    -.024 .056 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .184^* .005 .070 .048 .335 (P) 
    .044 .331 (BC) 
Direct effect .132 .003 .114 -.107 .355 (P) 
    -.118 .343 (BC) 
Total effects .316^* .008 .110 .101 .527 (P) 
    .075 .499 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .582      
N = 310. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.  
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as Aymara (compared with no indigenous group) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated 
through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and 
confidence intervals are bootstrap (990 repetitions, from 163 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A16: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Quechua (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over 
Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .011 .000 .012 -.009 .038 (P) 
    -.006 .041 (BC) 
Trust in parties .000 .001 .004 -.007 .010 (P) 
    -.015 .004 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .037^* .001 .020 .002 .080 (P) 
    .002 .079 (BC) 
Gas Nationalisation .012 -.001 .013 -.012 .040 (P) 
    -.009 .044 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .000 .000 .009 -.019 .018 (P) 
    -.020 .017 (BC) 
Direct democracy .002 .000 .007 -.009 .021 (P) 
    -.005 .029 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority -.003 -.001 .009 -.025 .011 (P) 
    -.027 .010 (BC) 
Prefers ethnic representation -.005 .000 .010 -.030 .012 (P) 
    -.039 .005 (BC) 
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Table A16: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Quechua (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over 
Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Favours single national culture .006 -.001 .009 -.010 .025 (P) 
    -.005 .033 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara .014 -.001 .017 -.017 .050 (P) 
    -.012 .056 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua -.003 -.001 .012 -.031 .017 (P) 
    -.034 .014 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba .030 .001 .021 -.007 .077 (P) 
    -.006 .078 (BC) 
Negative views of White .011 .001 .018 -.021 .053 (P) 
    -.020 .054 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .001 .000 .006 -.012 .016 (P) 
    -.010 .019 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .111^* .002 .043 .027 .194 (P) 
    .024 .191 (BC) 
Direct effect .111 .002 .076 -.036 .255 (P) 
    -.042 .251 (BC) 
Total effects .222^* .004 .072 .080 .367 (P) 
    .064 .352 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .500      
N = 426. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.  
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as Quechua (compared with no indigenous group) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and 
assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, undated); (iv) 
standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are bootstrap (999 repetitions, from 193 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A17: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification with a Lowland Indigenous group (compared with no indigenous) on 
Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .002 .001 .008 -.010 .020 (P) 
    -.008 .024 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.011 .000 .011 -.035 .007 (P) 
    -.039 .006 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.001 .000 .022 -.042 .045 (P) 
    -.041 .047 (BC) 
Gas Nationalisation .010 .001 .010 -.005 .035 (P) 
    -.002 .040 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .002 .001 .009 -.014 .024 (P) 
    -.012 .028 (BC) 
Direct democracy .000 .002 .009 -.016 .026 (P) 
    -.020 .019 (BC) 
Minorities accede to majority -.010 .000 .013 -.042 .010 (P) 
    -.049 .007 (BC) 
Prefers ethnic representation .010 .004 .019 -.007 .066 (P) 
    -.006 .077 (BC) 
Favours single national culture .000 .000 .009 -.021 .019 (P) 
    -.016 .019 (BC) 
Negative views of Aymara .016 .001 .032 -.046 .082 (P) 
    -.044 .084 (BC) 
Negative views of Quechua -.007 -.003 .017 -.055 .018 (P) 
    -.057 .016 (BC) 
Negative views of Camba -.034^* -.002 .023 -.087 -.003 (P) 
    -.087 -.003 (BC) 
Negative views of White -.003 -.001 .009 -.027 .013 (P) 
    -.030 .008 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .019 -.001 .017 -.013 .055 (P) 
    -.010 .061 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.008 .002 .058 -.109 .109 (P) 
    -.107 .119 (BC) 
Direct effect .093 .005 .086 -.075 .265 (P) 
    -.094 .241 (BC) 
Total effects .085 .007 .085 -.083 .250 (P) 
    -.111 .231 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -.099      
N = 261. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.  
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification with a lowland indigenous group (compared with no indigenous group) on vote choice (Morales over 
Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, 
and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, undated); (iv) 
standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are bootstrap (575 repetitions, from 134 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table A18: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Bolivia 2010 
Personal linguistic background Ethnic Self-Identification  
Vote Choice White Mestiza Indigenous Total 
Spanish-speakers     
Evo Morales 18 367 54 439 
Manfred Reyes Villa 27 169 1 197 
Samuel Doria 3 29 0           32 
Other/Null 10 102 9 121 
Indigenous-language speakers     
Evo Morales 2 112 86 200 
Manfred Reyes Villa 1 8 2 11 
Samuel Doria 0 3 1 4 
Other/Null 0 8 6 14 
Total 61 798 159 1018 




Table A19: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome      
REYES VILLA       
White (Mestizo) 1.909 0.345 5.530 0.000 1.226 2.592 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -1.270 0.736 -1.720 0.087 -2.725 0.186 
Speaks indigenous language -1.096 0.515 -2.130 0.035 -2.114 -0.077 
Income 0.164 0.082 2.010 0.047 0.002 0.325 
Female -0.104 0.248 -0.420 0.674 -0.594 0.385 
Age -0.012 0.008 -1.540 0.125 -0.027 0.003 
Trust in parties -0.071 0.068 -1.060 0.292 -0.205 0.062 
Participation in protests 1.002 0.289 3.460 0.001 0.430 1.574 
National economy has improved -1.220 0.401 -3.040 0.003 -2.013 -0.427 
Personal finances have improved -0.490 0.307 -1.600 0.113 -1.097 0.117 
Resides in media luna 1.896 0.285 6.650 0.000 1.333 2.460 
Resides in rural area -0.075 0.189 -0.390 0.694 -0.449 0.300 
Rightist ideology 0.416 0.077 5.400 0.000 0.264 0.568 
Wealth redistribution -0.027 0.114 -0.240 0.814 -0.253 0.199 
Social security -0.108 0.134 -0.810 0.420 -0.374 0.157 
Nationalisations -0.202 0.073 -2.760 0.007 -0.347 -0.057 
Free trade 0.086 0.095 0.900 0.368 -0.102 0.274 
Limit opposition voice -0.323 0.086 -3.770 0.000 -0.492 -0.154 
Direct democracy -0.216 0.077 -2.820 0.006 -0.367 -0.064 
Minorities to follow majority 0.039 0.099 0.390 0.698 -0.158 0.235 
Constant -1.271 1.087 -1.170 0.244 -3.420 0.878 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 1.785 0.548 3.260 0.001 0.701 2.869 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -1.424 0.869 -1.640 0.104 -3.142 0.294 
Speaks indigenous language -1.017 0.662 -1.540 0.127 -2.327 0.292 
Income 0.199 0.130 1.520 0.130 -0.059 0.457 
Female 0.465 0.385 1.210 0.229 -0.296 1.226 
Age -0.024 0.013 -1.790 0.075 -0.050 0.002 
Trust in parties -0.107 0.139 -0.770 0.443 -0.381 0.168 
Participation in protests 1.198 0.519 2.310 0.022 0.172 2.223 
National economy has improved -0.751 0.565 -1.330 0.186 -1.868 0.367 
Personal finances have improved 0.202 0.415 0.490 0.626 -0.617 1.022 
Resides in media luna 0.965 0.367 2.630 0.009 0.241 1.690 
Resides in rural area -0.058 0.134 -0.430 0.665 -0.323 0.206 
Rightist ideology 0.242 0.077 3.140 0.002 0.090 0.394 
Wealth redistribution 0.068 0.179 0.380 0.706 -0.286 0.421 
Social security -0.275 0.194 -1.420 0.159 -0.659 0.109 
Nationalisations -0.334 0.085 -3.910 0.000 -0.502 -0.165 
Free trade 0.012 0.163 0.070 0.942 -0.310 0.333 
Limit opposition voice -0.286 0.114 -2.510 0.013 -0.512 -0.061 
Direct democracy -0.151 0.108 -1.390 0.166 -0.365 0.063 
Minorities to follow majority -0.033 0.140 -0.230 0.816 -0.310 0.245 
Constant -0.136 1.063 -0.130 0.898 -2.238 1.966 
N = 1151. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).  
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A20: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome     
REYES VILLA       
Quechua (none) -0.432 0.341 -1.270 0.207 -1.107 0.242 
Aymara (none) -2.671 0.649 -4.110 0.000 -3.955 -1.387 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.307 0.411 0.750 0.457 -0.507 1.120 
Speaks indigenous language -1.100 0.445 -2.470 0.015 -1.979 -0.221 
Income 0.140 0.085 1.640 0.103 -0.029 0.309 
Female -0.159 0.262 -0.610 0.544 -0.677 0.359 
Age -0.010 0.008 -1.150 0.251 -0.026 0.007 
Trust in parties -0.086 0.073 -1.170 0.243 -0.231 0.059 
Participation in protests 0.960 0.295 3.250 0.001 0.377 1.543 
National economy has improved -1.158 0.418 -2.770 0.006 -1.985 -0.331 
Personal finances have improved -0.406 0.316 -1.280 0.201 -1.031 0.219 
Resides in media luna 1.195 0.268 4.460 0.000 0.665 1.725 
Resides in rural area -0.101 0.170 -0.590 0.554 -0.436 0.235 
Rightist ideology 0.419 0.075 5.590 0.000 0.271 0.567 
Wealth redistribution -0.054 0.117 -0.460 0.645 -0.285 0.177 
Social security -0.080 0.129 -0.620 0.535 -0.336 0.175 
Nationalisations -0.189 0.068 -2.790 0.006 -0.323 -0.055 
Free trade 0.125 0.103 1.220 0.225 -0.078 0.329 
Limit opposition voice -0.318 0.094 -3.380 0.001 -0.504 -0.132 
Direct democracy -0.163 0.077 -2.100 0.037 -0.316 -0.010 
Minorities to follow majority 0.039 0.113 0.340 0.732 -0.184 0.262 
Constant -0.780 1.047 -0.750 0.457 -2.850 1.290 
DORIA       
Quechua (none) -0.053 0.512 -0.100 0.918 -1.066 0.960 
Aymara (none) -0.109 0.613 -0.180 0.860 -1.321 1.104 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.656 0.532 1.230 0.220 -0.396 1.708 
Speaks indigenous language -1.204 0.726 -1.660 0.099 -2.639 0.231 
Income 0.184 0.130 1.410 0.160 -0.074 0.442 
Female 0.356 0.371 0.960 0.339 -0.378 1.089 
Age -0.013 0.013 -1.010 0.314 -0.039 0.013 
Trust in parties -0.115 0.150 -0.770 0.445 -0.413 0.182 
Participation in protests 1.014 0.480 2.120 0.036 0.066 1.963 
National economy has improved -0.620 0.522 -1.190 0.237 -1.652 0.413 
Personal finances have improved 0.306 0.372 0.820 0.412 -0.430 1.043 
Resides in media luna 0.775 0.510 1.520 0.130 -0.232 1.783 




Table A20: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Rightist ideology 0.234 0.075 3.130 0.002 0.086 0.381 
Wealth redistribution 0.073 0.193 0.380 0.705 -0.309 0.456 
Social security -0.322 0.219 -1.470 0.144 -0.755 0.111 
Nationalisations -0.318 0.082 -3.860 0.000 -0.481 -0.155 
Free trade 0.069 0.156 0.440 0.657 -0.239 0.378 
Limit opposition voice -0.275 0.117 -2.340 0.021 -0.506 -0.043 
Direct democracy -0.201 0.120 -1.670 0.097 -0.439 0.037 
Minorities to follow majority -0.076 0.137 -0.550 0.581 -0.348 0.196 
Constant -0.113 1.130 -0.100 0.921 -2.347 2.122 
N = 1146. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales). 
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A21: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome      
REYES VILLA       
White (Mestizo) 1.925 0.353 5.450 0.000 1.227 2.624 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -1.277 0.620 -2.060 0.041 -2.503 -0.051 
Speaks indigenous language 0.596 2.689 0.220 0.825 -4.721 5.912 
Income 0.150 0.089 1.680 0.094 -0.026 0.326 
Female -0.088 0.246 -0.360 0.721 -0.574 0.398 
Age -0.011 0.008 -1.490 0.138 -0.027 0.004 
Trust in parties -0.087 0.067 -1.290 0.201 -0.220 0.047 
Participation in protests 1.079 0.293 3.680 0.000 0.499 1.659 
National economy has improved -1.217 0.403 -3.020 0.003 -2.013 -0.421 
Personal finances have improved -0.520 0.312 -1.660 0.098 -1.138 0.098 
Resides in media luna 1.984 0.295 6.730 0.000 1.401 2.566 
Resides in rural area -0.080 0.196 -0.410 0.685 -0.468 0.308 
Rightist ideology 0.447 0.083 5.380 0.000 0.282 0.611 
Wealth redistribution -0.042 0.121 -0.340 0.732 -0.282 0.198 
Social security -0.076 0.130 -0.590 0.559 -0.333 0.181 
Nationalisations -0.238 0.073 -3.240 0.001 -0.382 -0.093 
Free trade 0.067 0.101 0.660 0.508 -0.133 0.268 
Limit opposition voice -0.283 0.099 -2.870 0.005 -0.478 -0.088 
Direct democracy -0.218 0.081 -2.700 0.008 -0.378 -0.058 
Minorities to follow majority 0.029 0.115 0.250 0.802 -0.199 0.257 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology -0.345 0.175 -1.970 0.051 -0.692 0.002 
Wealth redistribution -0.138 0.457 -0.300 0.764 -1.041 0.766 
Social security -0.171 0.544 -0.310 0.754 -1.246 0.905 
Nationalisations 0.445 0.393 1.130 0.259 -0.332 1.221 
Free trade 0.480 0.286 1.680 0.096 -0.085 1.045 
Limit opposition voice -0.718 0.314 -2.290 0.024 -1.338 -0.098 
Direct democracy 0.102 0.246 0.410 0.679 -0.384 0.588 
Minorities to follow majority -0.146 0.242 -0.610 0.546 -0.625 0.332 
Income 0.035 0.280 0.130 0.900 -0.519 0.590 
Constant -1.354 1.187 -1.140 0.256 -3.701 0.994 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 1.801 0.561 3.210 0.002 0.692 2.910 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -1.584 0.976 -1.620 0.107 -3.514 0.345 
Speaks indigenous language 1.750 3.753 0.470 0.642 -5.670 9.170 
Income 0.171 0.136 1.260 0.208 -0.097 0.440 
Female 0.440 0.407 1.080 0.282 -0.365 1.244 
Age -0.025 0.014 -1.880 0.063 -0.052 0.001 
Trust in parties -0.111 0.143 -0.780 0.438 -0.394 0.171 
Participation in protests 1.229 0.530 2.320 0.022 0.182 2.277 
National economy has improved -0.791 0.582 -1.360 0.176 -1.942 0.360 
Personal finances have improved 0.162 0.422 0.380 0.701 -0.672 0.996 
Resides in media luna 0.967 0.378 2.560 0.012 0.220 1.713 
Resides in rural area -0.094 0.146 -0.640 0.523 -0.382 0.195 
Rightist ideology 0.240 0.082 2.930 0.004 0.078 0.402 
Wealth redistribution 0.058 0.190 0.310 0.758 -0.316 0.433 
Social security -0.255 0.208 -1.230 0.221 -0.666 0.155 
Nationalisations -0.368 0.094 -3.900 0.000 -0.555 -0.181 
Free trade 0.015 0.171 0.090 0.931 -0.324 0.354 
Limit opposition voice -0.243 0.125 -1.950 0.054 -0.490 0.004 
Direct democracy -0.105 0.111 -0.940 0.349 -0.325 0.116 
Minorities to follow majority -0.073 0.151 -0.480 0.629 -0.372 0.226 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Rightist ideology 0.311 0.253 1.230 0.222 -0.190 0.812 
Wealth redistribution -0.306 0.327 -0.940 0.350 -0.953 0.340 
Social security -0.212 0.470 -0.450 0.652 -1.141 0.717 
Nationalisations 0.397 0.319 1.240 0.216 -0.234 1.028 
Free trade -0.030 0.413 -0.070 0.942 -0.847 0.786 
Limit opposition voice -0.491 0.346 -1.420 0.158 -1.176 0.194 
Direct democracy -0.994 0.369 -2.690 0.008 -1.724 -0.264 
Minorities to follow majority -0.007 0.214 -0.030 0.973 -0.429 0.415 
Income 0.083 0.290 0.290 0.776 -0.491 0.657 
Constant 0.078 1.165 0.070 0.946 -2.225 2.382 
N = 1151. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic 
group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A22: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 




Table A22: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
REYES VILLA       
White (Mestizo) -0.318 3.942 -0.080 0.936 -8.113 7.478 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 4.910 4.491 1.090 0.276 -3.970 13.791 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.166 0.460 -2.530 0.012 -2.076 -0.256 
Income 0.232 0.098 2.380 0.019 0.039 0.426 
Female -0.118 0.252 -0.470 0.640 -0.616 0.380 
Age -0.012 0.008 -1.450 0.150 -0.028 0.004 
Trust in parties -0.061 0.072 -0.850 0.399 -0.204 0.082 
Participation in protests 1.222 0.297 4.120 0.000 0.635 1.808 
National economy has improved -1.403 0.434 -3.240 0.002 -2.260 -0.545 
Personal finances have improved -0.480 0.316 -1.520 0.131 -1.104 0.145 
Resides in media luna 1.862 0.277 6.730 0.000 1.315 2.409 
Resides in rural area -0.092 0.185 -0.500 0.621 -0.457 0.274 
Rightist ideology 0.412 0.074 5.530 0.000 0.265 0.559 
Wealth redistribution -0.052 0.121 -0.430 0.666 -0.292 0.187 
Social security -0.100 0.141 -0.710 0.479 -0.379 0.179 
Nationalisations -0.249 0.081 -3.090 0.002 -0.409 -0.090 
Free trade 0.115 0.099 1.160 0.247 -0.081 0.312 
Limit opposition voice -0.262 0.094 -2.800 0.006 -0.447 -0.077 
Direct democracy -0.235 0.078 -3.000 0.003 -0.391 -0.080 
Minorities to follow majority 0.018 0.128 0.140 0.885 -0.234 0.271 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology 0.906 0.318 2.850 0.005 0.277 1.536 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.389 0.178 -2.180 0.031 -0.740 -0.037 
White * Wealth redist. -0.187 0.411 -0.450 0.651 -1.000 0.627 
Indigenous * Wealth redist. -0.370 0.550 -0.670 0.503 -1.457 0.717 
White * Social security 0.744 0.572 1.300 0.196 -0.387 1.874 
Indigenous * Social security 0.244 0.464 0.530 0.600 -0.674 1.162 
White * Nationalisations 0.753 0.339 2.220 0.028 0.082 1.423 
Indigenous * Nationalisations 0.354 0.407 0.870 0.386 -0.450 1.158 
White * Free trade -0.484 0.440 -1.100 0.272 -1.354 0.385 
Indigenous * Free trade -0.327 0.351 -0.930 0.353 -1.021 0.367 
White * Limit opp. voice -0.851 0.475 -1.790 0.075 -1.790 0.088 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice -0.771 0.294 -2.620 0.010 -1.353 -0.189 
White * Direct democracy 0.382 0.348 1.100 0.274 -0.306 1.070 
Indigenous * Direct democracy -0.878 0.341 -2.580 0.011 -1.552 -0.204 
White * Minorities follow maj. 0.152 0.425 0.360 0.720 -0.687 0.992 
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj. 0.814 0.380 2.140 0.034 0.063 1.566 
White * Income -0.995 0.343 -2.900 0.004 -1.673 -0.316 
Indigenous * Income -0.202 0.256 -0.790 0.433 -0.709 0.305 
Constant -1.496 1.291 -1.160 0.248 -4.049 1.056 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 5.082 5.299 0.960 0.339 -5.396 15.560 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -9.980 7.455 -1.340 0.183 -24.723 4.762 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.443 0.977 -1.480 0.142 -3.376 0.489 
Income 0.039 0.126 0.310 0.756 -0.210 0.288 
Female 0.696 0.408 1.710 0.090 -0.111 1.503 
Age -0.015 0.013 -1.170 0.243 -0.041 0.010 
Trust in parties -0.043 0.143 -0.300 0.764 -0.326 0.240 
Participation in protests 1.432 0.537 2.670 0.009 0.371 2.494 
National economy has improved -0.717 0.565 -1.270 0.207 -1.834 0.401 
Personal finances have improved 0.244 0.418 0.580 0.560 -0.582 1.070 
Resides in media luna 0.823 0.383 2.150 0.033 0.066 1.579 
Resides in rural area -0.095 0.145 -0.660 0.512 -0.382 0.191 
Rightist ideology 0.267 0.088 3.020 0.003 0.092 0.442 
Wealth redistribution 0.198 0.184 1.080 0.282 -0.165 0.562 
Social security -0.427 0.205 -2.080 0.039 -0.833 -0.022 
Nationalisations -0.345 0.106 -3.240 0.002 -0.555 -0.134 
Free trade 0.085 0.176 0.480 0.631 -0.264 0.433 
Limit opposition voice -0.121 0.133 -0.910 0.362 -0.383 0.141 
Direct democracy -0.074 0.105 -0.710 0.482 -0.282 0.134 
Minorities to follow majority -0.256 0.142 -1.800 0.074 -0.537 0.025 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.529 0.541 -0.980 0.330 -1.600 0.541 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology 4.674 0.470 9.940 0.000 3.744 5.604 
White * Wealth redist. 0.369 0.713 0.520 0.606 -1.041 1.779 
Indigenous * Wealth redist. -4.602 0.743 -6.190 0.000 -6.071 -3.132 
White * Social security -0.031 0.864 -0.040 0.971 -1.739 1.677 
Indigenous * Social security 1.466 0.670 2.190 0.030 0.141 2.791 
White * Nationalisations -0.326 0.553 -0.590 0.557 -1.420 0.768 
Indigenous * Nationalisations 0.350 0.400 0.870 0.383 -0.441 1.140 
White * Free trade -1.995 0.701 -2.850 0.005 -3.381 -0.609 
Indigenous * Free trade -9.498 0.580 -16.360 0.000 -10.645 -8.350 
White * Limit opp. voice -2.603 0.765 -3.400 0.001 -4.115 -1.091 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice -11.618 1.282 -9.060 0.000 -14.152 -9.083 
White * Direct democracy -1.444 0.746 -1.930 0.055 -2.920 0.032 
Indigenous * Direct democracy -22.667 1.286 -17.630 0.000 -25.210 -20.124 
White * Minorities follow maj. 2.781 1.311 2.120 0.036 0.188 5.374 
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj. 22.723 1.478 15.380 0.000 19.801 25.646 
White * Income 1.677 1.095 1.530 0.128 -0.489 3.844 
Indigenous * Income 4.993 1.012 4.930 0.000 2.991 6.994 
Constant -0.216 0.960 -0.220 0.822 -2.115 1.683 
N = 1151. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-
identified group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A23: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification) 




MORALES base outcome      
REYES VILLA       
White (Mestizo) 1.680 0.357 4.710 0.000 0.974 2.386 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.914 0.761 -1.200 0.232 -2.419 0.592 
Speaks indigenous language -1.408 0.654 -2.160 0.033 -2.701 -0.116 
Income 0.143 0.090 1.600 0.113 -0.034 0.321 
Female -0.280 0.264 -1.060 0.292 -0.803 0.243 
Age -0.015 0.009 -1.750 0.082 -0.032 0.002 
Trust in parties -0.056 0.072 -0.780 0.438 -0.198 0.086 
Participation in protests 1.278 0.279 4.590 0.000 0.727 1.830 
National economy has improved -1.193 0.459 -2.600 0.010 -2.101 -0.286 
Personal finances have improved -0.559 0.378 -1.480 0.142 -1.307 0.189 
Resides in media luna 1.785 0.296 6.040 0.000 1.200 2.370 
Resides in rural area -0.058 0.184 -0.320 0.751 -0.421 0.305 
Rightist ideology 0.335 0.077 4.330 0.000 0.182 0.489 
Wealth redistribution -0.035 0.116 -0.300 0.763 -0.264 0.194 
Social security 0.005 0.147 0.030 0.975 -0.286 0.295 
Nationalisations -0.193 0.077 -2.500 0.014 -0.346 -0.040 
Free trade 0.121 0.112 1.080 0.281 -0.100 0.342 
Limit opposition voice -0.335 0.087 -3.860 0.000 -0.506 -0.163 
Direct democracy -0.221 0.074 -3.000 0.003 -0.367 -0.076 
Minorities to follow majority 0.044 0.104 0.420 0.672 -0.162 0.251 
Mix of races 'good' -0.002 0.095 -0.020 0.984 -0.189 0.186 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -0.276 0.109 -2.530 0.013 -0.492 -0.060 
Indigenous poverty: low education 0.195 0.261 0.750 0.457 -0.322 0.711 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.041 0.294 3.550 0.001 0.461 1.622 
Indigenous treated worse -0.059 0.306 -0.190 0.848 -0.664 0.547 
Indigenous political influence -0.431 0.270 -1.600 0.113 -0.964 0.103 
Experience of discrimination -0.021 0.184 -0.120 0.908 -0.385 0.343 
Constant  -0.143 1.051 -0.140 0.892 -2.222 1.937 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 1.951 0.583 3.350 0.001 0.797 3.104 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.110 1.125 -1.880 0.063 -4.335 0.116 
Speaks indigenous language -0.632 0.628 -1.010 0.316 -1.875 0.611 
Income 0.290 0.137 2.110 0.037 0.018 0.561 
Female -0.008 0.417 -0.020 0.984 -0.832 0.816 
Age -0.030 0.015 -1.980 0.050 -0.060 0.000 
Trust in parties -0.037 0.130 -0.280 0.777 -0.294 0.220 
Participation in protests 1.601 0.641 2.500 0.014 0.333 2.869 
National economy has improved -0.944 0.551 -1.710 0.089 -2.033 0.146 
Personal finances have improved 0.542 0.479 1.130 0.260 -0.405 1.490 
Resides in media luna 0.755 0.386 1.960 0.053 -0.009 1.518 
Resides in rural area -0.095 0.128 -0.740 0.460 -0.349 0.159 
Rightist ideology 0.294 0.097 3.040 0.003 0.103 0.486 
Wealth redistribution 0.139 0.190 0.730 0.464 -0.236 0.515 
Social security -0.514 0.204 -2.520 0.013 -0.917 -0.111 
Nationalisations -0.273 0.095 -2.880 0.005 -0.461 -0.085 
Free trade -0.059 0.148 -0.400 0.691 -0.351 0.233 
Limit opposition voice -0.245 0.137 -1.780 0.077 -0.517 0.027 
Direct democracy -0.056 0.101 -0.560 0.579 -0.255 0.143 
Minorities to follow majority -0.020 0.124 -0.160 0.872 -0.265 0.225 
Mix of races 'good' 0.184 0.149 1.240 0.219 -0.111 0.479 
Approves of inter-racial marriage 0.191 0.148 1.290 0.199 -0.102 0.483 
Indigenous poverty: low education 1.213 0.526 2.310 0.023 0.172 2.253 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.189 0.520 2.290 0.024 0.161 2.218 
Indigenous treated worse 0.204 0.395 0.520 0.606 -0.576 0.985 
Indigenous political influence -0.417 0.487 -0.860 0.394 -1.381 0.547 
Experience of discrimination 0.062 0.278 0.220 0.823 -0.488 0.612 
Constant  -3.023 1.620 -1.870 0.064 -6.228 0.183 
N = 1018. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales). 
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A24: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome      
REYES VILLA       
Quechua (none) -0.244 0.387 -0.630 0.530 -1.010 0.522 
Aymara (none) -2.302 0.679 -3.390 0.001 -3.645 -0.959 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.569 0.390 1.460 0.147 -0.203 1.340 
Speaks indigenous language -1.503 0.618 -2.430 0.016 -2.725 -0.282 
Income 0.123 0.090 1.360 0.175 -0.055 0.301 
Female -0.283 0.283 -1.000 0.319 -0.842 0.276 
Age -0.013 0.009 -1.440 0.153 -0.031 0.005 
Trust in parties -0.083 0.078 -1.070 0.289 -0.238 0.072 
Participation in protests 1.193 0.297 4.010 0.000 0.605 1.782 
National economy has improved -1.042 0.507 -2.050 0.042 -2.045 -0.039 
Personal finances have improved -0.453 0.395 -1.150 0.253 -1.234 0.328 
Resides in media luna 1.178 0.303 3.890 0.000 0.578 1.777 
Resides in rural area -0.082 0.163 -0.500 0.618 -0.405 0.242 
Rightist ideology 0.344 0.070 4.890 0.000 0.205 0.482 
Wealth redistribution -0.035 0.121 -0.290 0.773 -0.274 0.204 
Social security 0.001 0.156 0.010 0.993 -0.308 0.310 
Nationalisations -0.185 0.077 -2.410 0.017 -0.337 -0.033 
Free trade 0.194 0.115 1.690 0.094 -0.033 0.421 
Limit opposition voice -0.337 0.093 -3.630 0.000 -0.520 -0.153 
Direct democracy -0.180 0.069 -2.610 0.010 -0.316 -0.043 
Minorities to follow majority 0.034 0.120 0.290 0.775 -0.202 0.271 
Mix of races 'good' -0.061 0.101 -0.600 0.547 -0.260 0.139 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -0.288 0.121 -2.380 0.019 -0.528 -0.048 




Table A24: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.036 0.289 3.580 0.000 0.464 1.608 
Indigenous treated worse 0.139 0.286 0.490 0.628 -0.427 0.704 
Indigenous political influence -0.336 0.292 -1.150 0.252 -0.913 0.242 
Experience of discrimination 0.024 0.196 0.120 0.903 -0.364 0.412 
Constant  0.373 1.060 0.350 0.725 -1.724 2.471 
DORIA       
Quechua (none) 0.150 0.610 0.250 0.806 -1.056 1.356 
Aymara (none) 0.138 0.690 0.200 0.842 -1.227 1.503 
Other Indigenous (none) 0.593 0.594 1.000 0.320 -0.582 1.769 
Speaks indigenous language -0.983 0.666 -1.480 0.143 -2.301 0.335 
Income 0.304 0.142 2.140 0.034 0.023 0.586 
Female -0.022 0.398 -0.060 0.955 -0.810 0.765 
Age -0.017 0.015 -1.140 0.255 -0.045 0.012 
Trust in parties -0.033 0.128 -0.260 0.794 -0.287 0.220 
Participation in protests 1.191 0.618 1.930 0.056 -0.031 2.413 
National economy has improved -0.627 0.513 -1.220 0.224 -1.642 0.388 
Personal finances have improved 0.577 0.408 1.420 0.159 -0.230 1.383 
Resides in media luna 0.704 0.531 1.320 0.188 -0.347 1.755 
Resides in rural area -0.092 0.136 -0.680 0.498 -0.361 0.176 
Rightist ideology 0.265 0.092 2.870 0.005 0.082 0.447 
Wealth redistribution 0.206 0.216 0.950 0.342 -0.221 0.634 
Social security -0.567 0.233 -2.430 0.016 -1.028 -0.106 
Nationalisations -0.287 0.086 -3.340 0.001 -0.457 -0.117 
Free trade 0.025 0.148 0.170 0.867 -0.268 0.318 
Limit opposition voice -0.234 0.141 -1.660 0.099 -0.513 0.045 
Direct democracy -0.125 0.115 -1.090 0.280 -0.353 0.103 
Minorities to follow majority -0.073 0.135 -0.540 0.589 -0.341 0.195 
Mix of races 'good' 0.122 0.152 0.800 0.426 -0.180 0.423 
Approves of inter-racial marriage 0.096 0.152 0.630 0.528 -0.205 0.397 
Indigenous poverty: low education 1.318 0.625 2.110 0.037 0.081 2.554 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.501 0.613 2.450 0.016 0.288 2.713 
Indigenous treated worse 0.246 0.422 0.580 0.561 -0.589 1.081 
Indigenous political influence -0.260 0.531 -0.490 0.626 -1.310 0.791 
Experience of discrimination 0.071 0.259 0.270 0.784 -0.442 0.584 
Constant  -3.024 1.693 -1.790 0.076 -6.374 0.325 
N = 1020. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales). 
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A25: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome      
REYES VILLA       
White (Mestizo) 1.677 0.364 4.610 0.000 0.957 2.397 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.985 0.711 -1.390 0.168 -2.391 0.421 
Speaks indigenous language -18.633 2.445 -7.620 0.000 -23.469 -13.797 
Income 0.151 0.091 1.670 0.097 -0.028 0.331 
Female -0.259 0.261 -1.000 0.321 -0.775 0.256 
Age -0.016 0.009 -1.860 0.065 -0.034 0.001 
Trust in parties -0.076 0.070 -1.090 0.276 -0.214 0.062 
Participation in protests 1.359 0.268 5.070 0.000 0.829 1.888 
National economy has improved -1.194 0.461 -2.590 0.011 -2.106 -0.282 
Personal finances have improved -0.552 0.377 -1.460 0.145 -1.298 0.194 
Resides in media luna 1.859 0.308 6.040 0.000 1.250 2.468 
Resides in rural area -0.021 0.178 -0.120 0.908 -0.372 0.331 
Rightist ideology 0.350 0.076 4.600 0.000 0.200 0.501 
Wealth redistribution -0.030 0.121 -0.250 0.806 -0.270 0.210 
Social security 0.007 0.150 0.040 0.964 -0.289 0.303 
Nationalisations -0.216 0.075 -2.890 0.005 -0.365 -0.068 
Free trade 0.125 0.115 1.090 0.277 -0.101 0.352 
Limit opposition voice -0.336 0.086 -3.900 0.000 -0.506 -0.166 
Direct democracy -0.223 0.072 -3.110 0.002 -0.365 -0.081 
Minorities to follow majority 0.035 0.106 0.330 0.741 -0.175 0.246 
Mix of races 'good' -0.025 0.095 -0.270 0.791 -0.212 0.162 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -0.306 0.113 -2.710 0.008 -0.529 -0.082 
Indigenous poverty: low education 0.113 0.266 0.420 0.672 -0.413 0.639 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.045 0.311 3.360 0.001 0.430 1.659 
Indigenous treated worse -0.072 0.332 -0.220 0.829 -0.729 0.585 
Indigenous political influence -0.500 0.296 -1.690 0.094 -1.085 0.085 
Experience of discrimination 0.137 0.179 0.770 0.445 -0.217 0.492 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Mix of races 'good' 0.378 0.265 1.420 0.157 -0.147 0.902 
Approves of inter-racial marriage 0.257 0.339 0.760 0.450 -0.414 0.928 
Indigenous poverty: low education 14.131 1.218 11.600 0.000 11.721 16.541 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 14.276 1.146 12.450 0.000 12.008 16.543 
Indigenous treated worse 0.132 1.280 0.100 0.918 -2.401 2.665 
Indigenous political influence 0.992 0.892 1.110 0.269 -0.774 2.757 
Experience of discrimination -1.376 0.722 -1.910 0.059 -2.804 0.052 
Constant 0.081 1.144 0.070 0.944 -2.182 2.343 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 2.011 0.599 3.360 0.001 0.825 3.196 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.449 1.371 -1.790 0.076 -5.160 0.262 
Speaks indigenous language -35.681 3.793 -9.410 0.000 -43.183 -28.179 
Income 0.255 0.135 1.890 0.061 -0.012 0.521 
Female -0.003 0.442 -0.010 0.995 -0.878 0.872 
Age -0.035 0.015 -2.370 0.019 -0.064 -0.006 
Trust in parties -0.054 0.136 -0.400 0.690 -0.322 0.214 
Participation in protests 1.780 0.683 2.610 0.010 0.429 3.131 




Table A25: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Personal finances have improved 0.681 0.507 1.340 0.182 -0.323 1.684 
Resides in media luna 0.705 0.423 1.670 0.098 -0.132 1.542 
Resides in rural area -0.218 0.161 -1.350 0.179 -0.536 0.101 
Rightist ideology 0.284 0.104 2.730 0.007 0.079 0.490 
Wealth redistribution 0.175 0.196 0.890 0.375 -0.213 0.563 
Social security -0.571 0.216 -2.650 0.009 -0.998 -0.144 
Nationalisations -0.295 0.107 -2.770 0.006 -0.506 -0.084 
Free trade -0.078 0.161 -0.480 0.630 -0.397 0.242 
Limit opposition voice -0.283 0.156 -1.810 0.072 -0.591 0.026 
Direct democracy -0.031 0.106 -0.290 0.771 -0.241 0.179 
Minorities to follow majority -0.005 0.140 -0.030 0.974 -0.281 0.272 
Mix of races 'good' 0.135 0.165 0.820 0.414 -0.191 0.461 
Approves of inter-racial marriage 0.249 0.168 1.480 0.141 -0.083 0.581 
Indigenous poverty: low education 1.239 0.558 2.220 0.028 0.134 2.343 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 0.918 0.577 1.590 0.114 -0.224 2.059 
Indigenous treated worse 0.053 0.409 0.130 0.898 -0.756 0.861 
Indigenous political influence -0.565 0.522 -1.080 0.281 -1.597 0.467 
Experience of discrimination 0.062 0.326 0.190 0.851 -0.584 0.707 
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *       
Mix of races 'good' 1.218 0.500 2.440 0.016 0.229 2.206 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -0.709 0.310 -2.280 0.024 -1.323 -0.095 
Indigenous poverty: low education -1.286 1.405 -0.920 0.361 -4.064 1.492 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 16.020 1.310 12.230 0.000 13.429 18.612 
Indigenous treated worse 1.337 1.536 0.870 0.386 -1.701 4.374 
Indigenous political influence 18.342 2.246 8.170 0.000 13.899 22.785 
Experience of discrimination -1.198 0.695 -1.720 0.087 -2.573 0.177 
Constant -1.984 1.599 -1.240 0.217 -5.147 1.178 
N = 1018. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic 
group and the non-ethnic /ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A26: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Generic Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES base outcome      
REYES VILLA       
White (Mestizo) 3.343 1.112 3.010 0.003 1.143 5.544 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -38.622 2.754 -14.030 0.000 -44.069 -33.175 
Speaks indigenous language -1.609 0.699 -2.300 0.023 -2.991 -0.227 
Income 0.164 0.092 1.770 0.078 -0.019 0.347 
Female -0.248 0.260 -0.950 0.342 -0.762 0.266 
Age -0.017 0.009 -1.830 0.070 -0.035 0.001 
Trust in parties -0.086 0.072 -1.180 0.238 -0.228 0.057 
Participation in protests 1.465 0.309 4.740 0.000 0.854 2.076 
National economy has improved -1.282 0.447 -2.870 0.005 -2.167 -0.397 
Personal finances have improved -0.517 0.375 -1.380 0.171 -1.258 0.225 
Resides in media luna 1.763 0.294 6.000 0.000 1.182 2.345 
Resides in rural area -0.005 0.172 -0.030 0.977 -0.346 0.336 
Rightist ideology 0.373 0.078 4.790 0.000 0.219 0.527 
Wealth redistribution -0.041 0.120 -0.340 0.734 -0.278 0.196 
Social security 0.005 0.154 0.030 0.975 -0.300 0.309 
Nationalisations -0.220 0.077 -2.870 0.005 -0.371 -0.068 
Free trade 0.159 0.113 1.410 0.162 -0.065 0.383 
Limit opposition voice -0.332 0.088 -3.780 0.000 -0.505 -0.158 
Direct democracy -0.216 0.076 -2.850 0.005 -0.366 -0.066 
Minorities to follow majority 0.026 0.109 0.240 0.809 -0.189 0.242 
Mix of races 'good' -0.027 0.094 -0.290 0.771 -0.213 0.158 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -0.277 0.109 -2.550 0.012 -0.492 -0.062 
Indigenous poverty: low education 0.192 0.290 0.660 0.509 -0.381 0.766 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 0.793 0.319 2.480 0.014 0.161 1.424 
Indigenous treated worse -0.335 0.329 -1.020 0.310 -0.987 0.316 
Indigenous political influence -0.413 0.288 -1.440 0.154 -0.982 0.156 
Experience of discrimination 0.098 0.160 0.610 0.540 -0.218 0.415 
INTERACTIONS:     White * mix of races -0.259 0.440 -0.590 0.557 -1.129 0.611 
Indigenous * mix of races -0.580 0.576 -1.010 0.316 -1.720 0.559 
White * inter-racial marriage 0.196 0.312 0.630 0.531 -0.421 0.813 
Indigenous * inter-racial marriage 15.373 1.303 11.800 0.000 12.796 17.950 
White * ind. poverty: edu -1.257 1.016 -1.240 0.218 -3.266 0.752 
Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu 2.157 1.377 1.570 0.120 -0.566 4.880 
White * ind. poverty: innate/cult 17.264 1.749 9.870 0.000 13.804 20.723 
Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult 19.998 1.859 10.760 0.000 16.321 23.675 
White * ind. treated worse -0.429 1.165 -0.370 0.713 -2.733 1.875 
Indigenous * ind. treated worse 3.231 1.582 2.040 0.043 0.102 6.361 
White * ind. pol. influence -2.723 1.476 -1.840 0.067 -5.642 0.197 
Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence 19.900 1.647 12.080 0.000 16.643 23.158 
White * discrimination -0.780 0.926 -0.840 0.401 -2.612 1.052 
Indigenous * discrimination -15.044 1.501 -10.020 0.000 -18.014 -12.074 
DORIA       
White (Mestizo) 2.653 1.227 2.160 0.032 0.227 5.079 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -34.893 2.662 -13.110 0.000 -40.159 -29.628 
Speaks indigenous language -0.839 0.631 -1.330 0.186 -2.086 0.408 
Income 0.255 0.119 2.140 0.035 0.019 0.491 
Female -0.013 0.436 -0.030 0.976 -0.876 0.849 
Age -0.030 0.014 -2.140 0.034 -0.057 -0.002 
Trust in parties -0.023 0.119 -0.190 0.850 -0.258 0.213 
Participation in protests 1.889 0.661 2.860 0.005 0.581 3.198 
National economy has improved -0.956 0.549 -1.740 0.084 -2.043 0.130 
Personal finances have improved 0.739 0.437 1.690 0.093 -0.125 1.603 




Table A26: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Generic Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Resides in rural area -0.065 0.136 -0.480 0.634 -0.333 0.204 
Rightist ideology 0.294 0.096 3.070 0.003 0.104 0.483 
Wealth redistribution 0.129 0.211 0.610 0.542 -0.289 0.547 
Social security -0.552 0.213 -2.590 0.011 -0.973 -0.131 
Nationalisations -0.258 0.102 -2.520 0.013 -0.460 -0.056 
Free trade 0.003 0.137 0.020 0.982 -0.268 0.274 
Limit opposition voice -0.184 0.146 -1.260 0.209 -0.473 0.105 
Direct democracy -0.044 0.107 -0.410 0.682 -0.257 0.168 
Minorities to follow majority -0.067 0.135 -0.490 0.622 -0.334 0.201 
Mix of races 'good' 0.174 0.161 1.090 0.280 -0.143 0.492 
Approves of inter-racial marriage 0.181 0.124 1.460 0.148 -0.065 0.427 
Indigenous poverty: low education 1.226 0.647 1.890 0.061 -0.055 2.506 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.337 0.603 2.220 0.028 0.145 2.529 
Indigenous treated worse 0.159 0.435 0.370 0.715 -0.700 1.019 
Indigenous political influence -0.365 0.528 -0.690 0.490 -1.409 0.679 
Experience of discrimination 0.163 0.247 0.660 0.510 -0.325 0.650 
INTERACTIONS:     White * mix of races -0.019 0.329 -0.060 0.954 -0.670 0.632 
Indigenous *  mix of races -0.178 0.281 -0.630 0.528 -0.734 0.378 
White * inter-racial marriage -0.193 0.502 -0.380 0.702 -1.186 0.801 
Indigenous * inter-racial marriage 0.256 0.279 0.920 0.359 -0.295 0.808 
White * ind. poverty: edu 1.210 1.059 1.140 0.255 -0.885 3.305 
Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu -19.519 1.589 -12.280 0.000 -22.663 -16.375 
White * ind. poverty: innate/cult -2.156 1.439 -1.500 0.136 -5.001 0.690 
Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult 17.740 1.255 14.140 0.000 15.258 20.223 
White * ind. treated worse 1.401 1.151 1.220 0.226 -0.876 3.679 
Indigenous * ind. treated worse -14.775 1.674 -8.820 0.000 -18.087 -11.462 
White * ind. pol. influence -2.354 1.515 -1.550 0.123 -5.352 0.644 
Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence 18.234 2.007 9.080 0.000 14.263 22.205 
White * discrimination -17.366 1.666 -10.430 0.000 -20.661 -14.071 
Indigenous * discrimination -12.520 1.881 -6.660 0.000 -16.241 -8.800 
N = 1018. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-
identified group and the non-ethnic /ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated. The interactions between ethnicity * political preferences (included in 2005 analysis) were 
dropped to improve degrees of freedom. The interactions of ethnicity with ‘Mix of races ‘good’’ and ‘Approves of inter-racial marriage’ were also dropped from the analysis because 
their inclusion produced a highly singular variance matrix, precluding the estimation of standard errors. Parameter estimates for these two sets of interactions are from a second 
model, which included all the above variables as main effects but only the interactions between ethnicity and ‘Mix of races ‘good’’ and ‘Approves of inter-racial marriage’. The 
coefficients for most other variables do not show substantial changes between the two models. 
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A27: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Cultural Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
MORALES       
REYES VILLA       
Quechua (none) -1.367 1.499 -0.910 0.363 -4.332 1.598 
Aymara (none) -10.964 3.646 -3.010 0.003 -18.177 -3.752 
Other Indigenous (none) 4.366 1.809 2.410 0.017 0.788 7.943 
Speaks indigenous language -1.485 0.646 -2.300 0.023 -2.762 -0.207 
Income 0.109 0.086 1.270 0.205 -0.060 0.279 
Female -0.312 0.271 -1.150 0.251 -0.848 0.223 
Age -0.016 0.010 -1.620 0.108 -0.035 0.004 
Trust in parties -0.053 0.078 -0.680 0.500 -0.207 0.101 
Participation in protests 1.351 0.299 4.510 0.000 0.758 1.943 
National economy has improved -1.180 0.512 -2.310 0.023 -2.193 -0.168 
Personal finances have improved -0.519 0.379 -1.370 0.173 -1.268 0.230 
Resides in media luna 1.121 0.298 3.760 0.000 0.531 1.711 
Resides in rural area -0.104 0.159 -0.660 0.513 -0.418 0.210 
Rightist ideology 0.376 0.071 5.270 0.000 0.235 0.518 
Wealth redistribution -0.039 0.125 -0.320 0.752 -0.286 0.207 
Social security 0.021 0.158 0.130 0.896 -0.292 0.333 
Nationalisations -0.197 0.072 -2.740 0.007 -0.339 -0.055 
Free trade 0.199 0.112 1.790 0.076 -0.021 0.420 
Limit opposition voice -0.311 0.078 -3.960 0.000 -0.466 -0.156 
Direct democracy -0.182 0.078 -2.340 0.021 -0.335 -0.028 
Minorities to follow majority 0.028 0.115 0.250 0.806 -0.199 0.256 
Mix of races 'good' 0.030 0.136 0.220 0.829 -0.240 0.299 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -0.344 0.149 -2.300 0.023 -0.639 -0.048 
Indigenous poverty: low education -0.160 0.556 -0.290 0.774 -1.260 0.940 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.023 0.645 1.590 0.115 -0.253 2.298 
Indigenous treated worse 0.226 0.490 0.460 0.645 -0.744 1.196 
Indigenous political influence -0.117 0.466 -0.250 0.802 -1.040 0.805 
Experience of discrimination 0.403 0.279 1.450 0.151 -0.148 0.953 
INTERACTIONS:       
Quechua * mix of races 0.032 0.221 0.140 0.885 -0.406 0.470 
Aymara *  mix of races -2.122 0.395 -5.380 0.000 -2.902 -1.341 
Other Indigenous * mix of races -0.533 0.208 -2.560 0.011 -0.945 -0.122 
Quechua * inter-racial marriage 0.166 0.191 0.870 0.387 -0.212 0.543 
Aymara * inter-racial marriage 1.223 0.644 1.900 0.060 -0.051 2.497 
Other Indigenous * inter-racial marriage 0.068 0.148 0.460 0.645 -0.225 0.362 
Quechua * ind. poverty: edu 0.947 0.867 1.090 0.277 -0.768 2.662 
Aymara * ind. poverty: edu 0.493 0.959 0.510 0.608 -1.404 2.391 
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu 11.256 1.281 8.780 0.000 8.721 13.791 
Quechua * ind. poverty: innate/cult 16.173 1.398 11.570 0.000 13.409 18.938 
Aymara * ind. poverty: innate/cult -0.939 0.883 -1.060 0.289 -2.685 0.807 
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult -1.328 1.268 -1.050 0.297 -3.835 1.180 
Quechua * ind. treated worse -0.476 0.679 -0.700 0.484 -1.820 0.867 
Aymara * ind. treated worse -0.216 0.930 -0.230 0.817 -2.056 1.624 
Other Indigenous * ind/ treated worse 0.413 0.766 0.540 0.591 -1.102 1.928 
Quechua * ind. pol. influence -0.242 0.688 -0.350 0.726 -1.602 1.119 
Aymara * ind. pol. influence -3.277 1.199 -2.730 0.007 -5.648 -0.905 




Table A27: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Cultural Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Quechua * discrimination -0.329 0.474 -0.690 0.490 -1.266 0.609 
Aymara * discrimination -8.414 1.204 -6.990 0.000 -10.796 -6.032 
Other Indigenous * discrimination -0.404 0.538 -0.750 0.454 -1.468 0.660 
Constant -0.096 1.408 -0.070 0.946 -2.881 2.689 
DORIA       
Quechua (none) -1.463 3.181 -0.460 0.646 -7.755 4.830 
Aymara (none) -29.201 3.460 -8.440 0.000 -36.045 -22.357 
Other Indigenous (none) -11.360 2.485 -4.570 0.000 -16.275 -6.444 
Speaks indigenous language -1.050 0.593 -1.770 0.079 -2.223 0.122 
Income 0.297 0.127 2.350 0.020 0.047 0.548 
Female -0.201 0.398 -0.510 0.614 -0.989 0.586 
Age -0.013 0.016 -0.800 0.423 -0.045 0.019 
Trust in parties -0.128 0.140 -0.910 0.363 -0.404 0.149 
Participation in protests 0.880 0.574 1.530 0.128 -0.255 2.015 
National economy has improved -0.591 0.554 -1.070 0.288 -1.687 0.505 
Personal finances have improved 0.776 0.385 2.020 0.046 0.015 1.537 
Resides in media luna 0.655 0.497 1.320 0.190 -0.328 1.638 
Resides in rural area -0.069 0.141 -0.490 0.624 -0.349 0.210 
Rightist ideology 0.236 0.103 2.290 0.024 0.032 0.440 
Wealth redistribution 0.175 0.221 0.790 0.429 -0.262 0.613 
Social security -0.581 0.236 -2.470 0.015 -1.048 -0.115 
Nationalisations -0.302 0.095 -3.190 0.002 -0.489 -0.115 
Free trade 0.019 0.152 0.130 0.900 -0.281 0.320 
Limit opposition voice -0.188 0.155 -1.220 0.226 -0.495 0.118 
Direct democracy -0.141 0.126 -1.130 0.262 -0.390 0.107 
Minorities to follow majority -0.056 0.128 -0.430 0.665 -0.310 0.198 
Mix of races 'good' 0.041 0.244 0.170 0.866 -0.441 0.524 
Approves of inter-racial marriage 0.100 0.305 0.330 0.743 -0.504 0.704 
Indigenous poverty: low education 1.811 1.317 1.380 0.171 -0.794 4.415 
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural 1.526 1.353 1.130 0.261 -1.149 4.202 
Indigenous treated worse -0.095 0.738 -0.130 0.897 -1.556 1.365 
Indigenous political influence -0.138 0.915 -0.150 0.880 -1.947 1.671 
Experience of discrimination 0.613 0.446 1.370 0.172 -0.269 1.495 
INTERACTIONS:       
Quechua * mix of races 0.622 0.423 1.470 0.144 -0.215 1.458 
Aymara *  mix of races -0.108 0.436 -0.250 0.805 -0.970 0.754 
Other Indigenous * mix of races -1.016 0.447 -2.270 0.025 -1.900 -0.132 
Quechua * inter-racial marriage -0.079 0.419 -0.190 0.850 -0.908 0.749 
Aymara * inter-racial marriage -0.244 0.401 -0.610 0.543 -1.038 0.549 
Other Indigenous * inter-racial marriage 0.759 0.550 1.380 0.170 -0.329 1.848 
Quechua * ind. poverty: edu -2.236 1.524 -1.470 0.145 -5.250 0.779 
Aymara * ind. poverty: edu -0.827 1.538 -0.540 0.592 -3.869 2.215 
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu 15.175 1.485 10.220 0.000 12.237 18.113 
Quechua * ind. poverty: innate/cult 15.471 1.710 9.050 0.000 12.089 18.853 
Aymara * ind. poverty: innate/cult 14.586 1.909 7.640 0.000 10.810 18.361 
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult 16.408 1.756 9.340 0.000 12.934 19.881 
Quechua * ind. treated worse 0.784 1.280 0.610 0.541 -1.748 3.317 
Aymara * ind. treated worse 0.744 1.138 0.650 0.514 -1.506 2.995 
Other Indigenous * ind/ treated worse -18.955 2.797 -6.780 0.000 -24.488 -13.421 
Quechua * ind. pol. influence -0.587 1.268 -0.460 0.644 -3.096 1.921 
Aymara * ind. pol. influence 16.570 1.403 11.810 0.000 13.794 19.345 
Other Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence -1.950 1.831 -1.060 0.289 -5.572 1.672 
Quechua * discrimination -0.624 0.665 -0.940 0.350 -1.939 0.692 
Aymara * discrimination -0.960 0.571 -1.680 0.095 -2.089 0.169 
Other Indigenous * discrimination -17.257 1.632 -10.570 0.000 -20.487 -14.028 
Constant -2.470 2.411 -1.020 0.308 -7.240 2.300 
N = 1020. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic 
group and the non-ethnic /ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.  
Source: LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A28: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Personal Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .006 .001 .006 -.001 .022 (P) 
    -.001 .025 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.001 .000 .004 -.009 .008 (P) 
    -.010 .006 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.002 .002 .024 -.047 .044 (P) 
    -.053 .037 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution -.002 .001 .004 -.011 .005 (P) 
    -.017 .002 (BC) 
Social security .000 .000 .003 -.008 .007 (P) 
    -.007 .009 (BC) 
Nationalizations .000 .000 .004 -.010 .008 (P) 
    -.009 .010 (BC) 
Free trade -.002 .000 .004 -.010 .005 (P) 
    -.017 .002 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .020^* .000 .012 .002 .049 (P) 
    .004 .053 (BC) 
Direct democracy .007 .000 .006 -.003 .021 (P) 
    -.002 .028 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .000 .000 .004 -.008 .009 (P) 
    -.012 .006 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .000 .001 .003 -.003 .007 (P) 
    -.004 .007 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .001 .000 .004 -.005 .010 (P) 
    -.004 .013 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty -.013 .001 .010 -.037 .003 (P) 




Table A28: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Personal Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Indigenous treated worse than whites .002 -.001 .004 -.008 .010 (P) 
    -.002 .016 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking -.001 .000 .004 -.012 .007 (P) 
    -.013 .005 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.002 .001 .009 -.021 .017 (P) 
    -.028 .012 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .014 .005 .037 -.054 .094 (P) 
    -.060 .085 (BC) 
Direct effect .195^* -.015 .075 .031 .329 (P) 
    .059 .357 (BC) 
Total effects .209^* -.010 .076 .050 .345 (P) 
    .072 .359 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .066      
N = 847. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of personal linguistic background (knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes 
Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and 
assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard 
errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (951 repetitions, from 134 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A29: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Reyes 
Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.004 .000 .004 -.014 .003 (P) 
    -.018 .001 (BC) 
Trust in parties .000 .000 .002 -.006 .004 (P) 
    -.006 .004 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.045^* -.001 .020 -.086 -.006 (P) 
    -.082 -.005 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 .000 .002 -.006 .004 (P) 
    -.006 .004 (BC) 
Social security .000 .000 .003 -.008 .006 (P) 
    -.011 .004 (BC) 
Nationalizations -.010* .000 .006 -.025 .000 (P) 
    -.028 -.001 (BC) 
Free trade -.001 .001 .004 -.007 .011 (P) 
    -.017 .005 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition -.013 .001 .010 -.038 .005 (P) 
    -.042 .003 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.006 .000 .005 -.017 .002 (P) 
    -.020 .001 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .004 -.001 .009 -.012 .024 (P) 
    -.009 .026 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" -.002 .000 .006 -.015 .010 (P) 
    -.014 .011 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage -.018 .001 .012 -.044 .002 (P) 
    -.049 .001 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty -.008 .000 .006 -.021 .001 (P) 
    -.022 .000 (BC) 
Indigenous treated worse than whites .005 -.001 .005 -.006 .016 (P) 
    -.002 .021 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking -.001 .000 .004 -.011 .007 (P) 
    -.015 .004 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .002 .000 .004 -.004 .011 (P) 
    -.003 .013 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.098^* .000 .030 -.156 -.036 (P) 
    -.151 -.030 (BC) 
Direct effect -.121^* -.006 .042 -.213 -.048 (P) 
    -.201 -.039 (BC) 
Total effects -.219^* -.006 .042 -.310 -.145 (P) 
    -.300 -.131 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .448      
N = 704. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and 
assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard 
errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 132 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A30: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Reyes 
Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .007* -.001 .005 -.001 .018 (P) 
    .001 .022 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.002 .001 .007 -.016 .014 (P) 
    -.020 .011 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .031 .002 .022 -.006 .078 (P) 
    -.007 .078 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution -.001 .000 .003 -.007 .005 (P) 
    -.011 .003 (BC) 
Social security .000 .000 .003 -.007 .008 (P) 
    -.007 .008 (BC) 
Nationalizations .007* .000 .006 -.001 .023 (P) 
    .000 .026 (BC) 
Free trade -.002 .000 .004 -.011 .005 (P) 
    -.017 .001 (BC) 




Table A30: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Reyes 
Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
    .013 .062 (BC) 
Direct democracy .021^* .000 .011 .004 .047 (P) 
    .005 .050 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.003 .001 .005 -.014 .007 (P) 
    -.021 .002 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .000 .000 .003 -.006 .007 (P) 
    -.006 .008 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .009* .000 .007 -.001 .026 (P) 
    .000 .029 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty .005 .000 .006 -.006 .020 (P) 
    -.002 .027 (BC) 
Indigenous treated worse than whites .002 .000 .004 -.005 .013 (P) 
    -.002 .019 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking .000 .000 .004 -.007 .011 (P) 
    -.006 .011 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.003 .004 .012 -.021 .029 (P) 
    -.027 .019 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .104^* .008 .029 .059 .172 (P) 
    .047 .156 (BC) 
Direct effect .196^* -.008 .089 .028 .370 (P) 
    .052 .401 (BC) 
Total effects .300^* .000 .084 .155 .474 (P) 
    .157 .479 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .346      
N = 799. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and 
assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard 
errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (944 repetitions, from 133 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A31: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Morales over Reyes 
Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.016 .014 .027 -.061 .052 (P) 
    -.142 .006 (BC) 
Trust in parties .021 -.003 .034 -.051 .095 (P) 
    -.025 .120 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .090^* .003 .053 .007 .209 (P) 
    .012 .214 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution -.018* .013 .020 -.046 .041 (P) 
    -.076 -.001 (BC) 
Social security .002 -.002 .018 -.041 .037 (P) 
    -.020 .068 (BC) 
Nationalizations .006 .018 .051 -.078 .125 (P) 
    -.158 .081 (BC) 
Free trade .005 .001 .019 -.024 .056 (P) 
    -.009 .092 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .048 .004 .050 -.020 .180 (P) 
    -.013 .200 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.003 -.006 .053 -.114 .090 (P) 
    -.101 .108 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .045* -.065 .049 -.109 .083 (P) 
    .010 .127 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" -.023 .005 .070 -.139 .146 (P) 
    -.134 .167 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .137 -.134 .118 -.231 .242 (P) 
    .048 .415 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty .015 .020 .062 -.077 .175 (P) 
    -.137 .128 (BC) 
Indigenous treated worse than whites -.005 .002 .019 -.047 .032 (P) 
    -.090 .008 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking -.029 .027 .040 -.077 .084 (P) 
    -.149 .006 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .081 -.021 .059 -.055 .195 (P) 
    -.007 .240 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .357* -.123 .123 -.019 .483 (P) 
    .246 .599 (BC) 
Direct effect .281^ .107 .144 .085 .658 (P) 
    -.034 .457 (BC) 
Total effects .638^* -.016 .102 .425 .818 (P) 
    .440 .829 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .560      
N = 191. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated 
through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and 
confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (414 repetitions, from 0 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A32: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for 
Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .047* -.006 .026 -.005 .096 (P) 




Table A32: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for 
Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Trust in parties -.002 .002 .007 -.017 .014 (P) 
    -.028 .003 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .084^* .006 .032 .027 .157 (P) 
    .019 .145 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .004 .001 .009 -.012 .028 (P) 
    -.008 .030 (BC) 
Social secruity .000 .001 .008 -.014 .020 (P) 
    -.020 .013 (BC) 
Nationalisations .053^* -.003 .023 .012 .103 (P) 
    .021 .114 (BC) 
Free trade .001 .000 .007 -.011 .017 (P) 
    -.006 .024 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .024* -.003 .015 -.004 .054 (P) 
    .002 .071 (BC) 
Direct democracy .017 -.002 .017 -.011 .054 (P) 
    -.003 .079 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .003 .000 .006 -.008 .019 (P) 
    -.004 .024 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" -.016 .005 .017 -.047 .021 (P) 
    -.063 .009 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .034 -.007 .027 -.023 .085 (P) 
    -.006 .103 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of ind. poverty .014* -.001 .011 -.003 .038 (P) 
    .000 .049 (BC) 
Ind. treated worse than whites .001 .002 .008 -.010 .023 (P) 
    -.011 .021 (BC) 
Indigenous political influence -.004 .000 .016 -.039 .025 (P) 
    -.045 .023 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .037 .023 .044 -.006 .163 (P) 
    -.029 .106 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .295^* .017 .076 .161 .466 (P) 
    .135 .436 (BC) 
Direct effects .161 -.008 .131 -.085 .423 (P) 
    -.063 .447 (BC) 
Total effect .456^* .009 .088 .308 .652 (P) 
    .291 .632 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .647      
N = 409. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Aymara culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes 
Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and 
assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, undated); (iv) 
standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (659 repetitions, from 101 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) 
methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A33: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for 
Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .004 .003 .009 -.004 .030 (P) 
    -.004 .030 (BC) 
Trust in parties .000 .001 .005 -.008 .014 (P) 
    -.012 .007 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .053 .008 .034 -.006 .125 (P) 
    -.022 .110 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .001 -.001 .009 -.021 .018 (P) 
    -.010 .028 (BC) 
Social secruity -.003 -.001 .010 -.028 .015 (P) 
    -.035 .011 (BC) 
Nationalisations .021 .002 .018 -.004 .063 (P) 
    -.004 .063 (BC) 
Free trade -.004 -.001 .009 -.029 .009 (P) 
    -.032 .006 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .024^* -.002 .014 -.002 .051 (P) 
    .003 .066 (BC) 
Direct democracy .007 -.003 .012 -.021 .026 (P) 
    -.011 .037 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .005 .000 .009 -.008 .028 (P) 
    -.005 .039 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" -.004 .001 .012 -.029 .020 (P) 
    -.035 .014 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .025* .000 .017 -.005 .063 (P) 
    .000 .071 (BC) 
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty .000 .002 .010 -.017 .026 (P) 
    -.024 .019 (BC) 
Ind. treated worse than whites .006 -.001 .008 -.008 .025 (P) 
    -.004 .038 (BC) 
Indigenous political influence .002 .000 .012 -.023 .026 (P) 
    -.022 .028 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.010 .003 .014 -.034 .020 (P) 
    -.047 .011 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .127^* .011 .056 .032 .252 (P) 
    .024 .239 (BC) 
Direct effects .060 .003 .077 -.101 .203 (P) 
    -.124 .190 (BC) 
Total effect .187^* .014 .069 .059 .334 (P) 
    .005 .301 (BC) 




Table A33: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for 
Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
N = 557. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Quechua culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over 
Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in 
protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, 
undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (997 repetitions, from 114 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction 
(BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A34: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with a Lowland Indigenous culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on 
Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .006 .002 .011 -.010 .033 (P) 
    -.009 .036 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.002 .002 .010 -.022 .021 (P) 
    -.040 .011 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .002 .008 .027 -.044 .063 (P) 
    -.064 .049 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution -.002 -.001 .007 -.019 .011 (P) 
    -.022 .010 (BC) 
Social secruity -.002 .001 .007 -.018 .013 (P) 
    -.029 .007 (BC) 
Nationalisations .026 -.005 .019 -.015 .058 (P) 
    -.004 .069 (BC) 
Free trade -.004 -.001 .018 -.047 .025 (P) 
    -.051 .021 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .038* -.007 .022 -.008 .074 (P) 
    .003 .090 (BC) 
Direct democracy .016 -.002 .015 -.011 .048 (P) 
    -.002 .085 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.016 .005 .016 -.052 .015 (P) 
    -.079 .002 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" -.012 .005 .013 -.033 .019 (P) 
    -.045 .005 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .024* -.003 .014 -.002 .050 (P) 
    .003 .064 (BC) 
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty .007 .001 .011 -.007 .037 (P) 
    -.006 .042 (BC) 
Ind. treated worse than whites -.002 .000 .009 -.026 .013 (P) 
    -.033 .009 (BC) 
Indigenous political influence .013 .003 .026 -.032 .067 (P) 
    -.040 .061 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .000 .000 .006 -.012 .014 (P) 
    -.010 .017 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .091^ .007 .050 .004 .201 (P) 
    -.005 .191 (BC) 
Direct effects -.141 .022 .083 -.252 .093 (P) 
    -.285 .024 (BC) 
Total effect -.050 .029 .080 -.159 .156 (P) 
    -.186 .104 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -1.830      
N = 325. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with a lowland indigenous culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on vote choice 
(Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, 
participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” 
(Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (858 repetitions, from 87 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-
correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A35: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with Quechua culture) on Voting for Morales 
over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .008 -.001 .020 -.034 .047 (P) 
    -.032 .051 (BC) 
Trust in parties .006* -.003 .007 -.009 .017 (P) 
    .000 .035 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.010 .008 .026 -.044 .056 (P) 
    -.054 .044 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution -.001 .001 .009 -.024 .017 (P) 
    -.048 .008 (BC) 
Social secruity -.002 .000 .010 -.023 .018 (P) 
    -.030 .015 (BC) 
Nationalisations .000 -.001 .012 -.029 .021 (P) 
    -.028 .023 (BC) 
Free trade .000 .002 .010 -.017 .025 (P) 
    -.023 .018 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .014 .000 .016 -.015 .050 (P) 
    -.011 .055 (BC) 
Direct democracy .038^* -.007 .018 .002 .071 (P) 
    .014 .103 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.010 .003 .010 -.029 .009 (P) 
    -.062 .000 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .011 .003 .013 -.007 .044 (P) 
    -.009 .039 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .004 .000 .015 -.024 .036 (P) 




Table A35: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with Quechua culture) on Voting for Morales 
over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty .018^ .031 .028 .011 .125 (P) 
    -.004 .028 (BC) 
Ind. treated worse than whites -.003 .004 .009 -.017 .023 (P) 
    -.035 .003 (BC) 
Indigenous political influence .004 .005 .014 -.009 .046 (P) 
    -.014 .037 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.003 .004 .017 -.030 .044 (P) 
    -.039 .029 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .074^ .049 .059 .022 .251 (P) 
    -.051 .130 (BC) 
Direct effects .361^* -.025 .107 .133 .540 (P) 
    .189 .612 (BC) 
Total effect .435^* .024 .104 .273 .665 (P) 
    .235 .629 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .170      
N = 355. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Aymara culture (compared Quechua culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and 
assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, undated); (iv) 
standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (859 repetitions, from 88 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A36: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on Voting 
for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .028 .003 .024 -.015 .089 (P) 
    -.018 .085 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.006 .002 .020 -.043 .047 (P) 
    -.051 .028 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .112^* .002 .056 .005 .240 (P) 
    .006 .240 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .015* -.010 .012 -.019 .029 (P) 
    .002 .075 (BC) 
Social secruity -.006 .002 .017 -.038 .035 (P) 
    -.051 .018 (BC) 
Nationalisations -.012 -.004 .019 -.061 .022 (P) 
    -.054 .027 (BC) 
Free trade .021 -.006 .028 -.031 .082 (P) 
    -.005 .155 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice -.041 .012 .057 -.150 .096 (P) 
    -.187 .048 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.009 .002 .028 -.059 .056 (P) 
    -.074 .037 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .055 -.008 .043 -.039 .135 (P) 
    -.005 .154 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .006 .004 .017 -.016 .056 (P) 
    -.017 .053 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .021 -.002 .031 -.050 .082 (P) 
    -.030 .099 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of ind. poverty .007 .000 .027 -.045 .064 (P) 
    -.027 .073 (BC) 
Ind. treated worse than whites -.026 -.001 .033 -.105 .020 (P) 
    -.132 .010 (BC) 
Indigenous political influence .028* -.011 .021 -.021 .066 (P) 
    .006 .114 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.012 -.025 .036 -.114 .022 (P) 
    -.061 .060 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .181* -.037 .103 -.053 .348 (P) 
    .024 .598 (BC) 
Direct effects .364^* .005 .164 .019 .633 (P) 
    .019 .630 (BC) 
Total effect .545^* -.032 .159 .178 .789 (P) 
    .244 .804 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .332      
N = 292. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Aymara culture (compared a lowland indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over 
Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in 
protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, 
undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (590 repetitions, from 72 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction 
(BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table A37: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on 
Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.002 -.001 .006 -.018 .007 (P) 
    -.023 .004 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.012 .004 .011 -.031 .014 (P) 
    -.039 .001 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .036^ .008 .026 .000 .101 (P) 
    -.005 .091 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .003 .002 .011 -.009 .035 (P) 
    -.006 .043 (BC) 
Social secruity -.006 .000 .013 -.041 .017 (P) 




Table A37: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on 
Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009 
Mediator Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Nationalisations .000 .000 .011 -.021 .024 (P) 
    -.026 .021 (BC) 
Free trade .016* -.004 .012 -.011 .038 (P) 
    .001 .052 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice -.011 .003 .024 -.052 .046 (P) 
    -.058 .037 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.015 .001 .014 -.044 .010 (P) 
    -.049 .006 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .002 .000 .007 -.011 .018 (P) 
    -.005 .032 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .003 .001 .010 -.013 .028 (P) 
    -.013 .027 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage .017* -.001 .014 -.005 .051 (P) 
    .000 .065 (BC) 
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty -.003 .000 .011 -.030 .013 (P) 
    -.040 .010 (BC) 
Ind. treated worse than whites .006 .002 .013 -.017 .038 (P) 
    -.018 .036 (BC) 
Indigenous political influence -.002 -.002 .010 -.029 .010 (P) 
    -.032 .009 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.011 .001 .014 -.039 .014 (P) 
    -.045 .010 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .021 .013 .071 -.081 .187 (P) 
    -.087 .178 (BC) 
Direct effects .226^* -.009 .081 .036 .352 (P) 
    .026 .351 (BC) 
Total effect .247^* .004 .101 .033 .443 (P) 
    .019 .431 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .085      
N = 440. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Quechua culture (compared a lowland indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over 
Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in 
protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender, 
undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (984 repetitions, from 93 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction 
(BC) methods. 
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Table B1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2002 
Vote Choice White Mestizo Indigenous Black Total 
Gutiérrez 45 275 4 28 352 
Noboa 11 66 3 4 84 
Roldós 10 92 2 0 104 
Borja 57 426 16 39 538 
Other/Null 53 476 38 19 586 
Total 176 1,335 63 90 1,664 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group. 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2004 
 
Table B2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
GUTIÉRREZ          base outcome     
NOBOA       
White (Mestizo) 0.389 0.268 1.450 0.148 -0.138 0.915 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.781 0.620 -1.260 0.208 -1.997 0.436 
Black (Mestizo) 0.351 0.349 1.010 0.315 -0.333 1.035 
Income -0.005 0.040 -0.120 0.906 -0.083 0.073 
Female -0.163 0.173 -0.950 0.345 -0.503 0.176 
Age -0.019 0.006 -3.240 0.001 -0.030 -0.007 
Trust in parties -0.060 0.058 -1.030 0.304 -0.174 0.054 
National economy has improved -0.168 0.292 -0.580 0.564 -0.741 0.405 
Personal finances have improved 0.049 0.246 0.200 0.842 -0.434 0.532 
Resides in highlands (coast) -1.204 0.196 -6.130 0.000 -1.589 -0.819 
Resides in Amazon (coast) -1.460 0.241 -6.060 0.000 -1.932 -0.987 
Resides in rural area -0.556 0.203 -2.740 0.006 -0.954 -0.158 
Rightist ideology 0.096 0.040 2.370 0.018 0.017 0.175 
Strongman populist leader -0.012 0.190 -0.070 0.947 -0.384 0.359 
President can bypass Congress 0.005 0.173 0.030 0.978 -0.334 0.344 
Constant  0.977 0.702 1.390 0.164 -0.401 2.355 
ROLDÓS       
White (Mestizo) 0.278 0.418 0.670 0.505 -0.541 1.098 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.409 0.722 -0.570 0.571 -1.826 1.007 
Black (Mestizo) 0.092 0.615 0.150 0.881 -1.114 1.299 
Income 0.200 0.062 3.240 0.001 0.079 0.321 
Female 0.140 0.275 0.510 0.610 -0.399 0.679 
Age -0.011 0.008 -1.390 0.165 -0.028 0.005 
Trust in parties -0.004 0.087 -0.040 0.966 -0.174 0.166 
National economy has improved -0.389 0.535 -0.730 0.467 -1.439 0.660 
Personal finances have improved -0.164 0.418 -0.390 0.694 -0.984 0.655 
Resides in highlands (coast) -0.330 0.290 -1.140 0.255 -0.898 0.238 
Resides in Amazon (coast) -1.137 0.460 -2.470 0.014 -2.039 -0.235 
Resides in rural area -0.983 0.399 -2.460 0.014 -1.765 -0.201 
Rightist ideology -0.070 0.065 -1.080 0.282 -0.198 0.058 
Strongman populist leader -0.006 0.307 -0.020 0.984 -0.607 0.595 
President can bypass Congress -0.256 0.281 -0.910 0.363 -0.808 0.296 
Constant  -1.443 1.116 -1.290 0.196 -3.632 0.747 
BORJA       
White (Mestizo) -0.116 0.433 -0.270 0.788 -0.966 0.733 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.749 0.768 -0.980 0.329 -2.256 0.757 
Black (Mestizo) -13.595 0.420 -32.350 0.000 -14.420 -12.771 
Income 0.238 0.063 3.770 0.000 0.114 0.361 
Female 0.057 0.265 0.210 0.830 -0.462 0.576 
Age -0.005 0.008 -0.680 0.496 -0.021 0.010 
Trust in parties 0.155 0.075 2.060 0.039 0.008 0.302 
National economy has improved -0.144 0.425 -0.340 0.734 -0.978 0.689 
Personal finances have improved 0.197 0.362 0.550 0.586 -0.513 0.907 
Resides in highlands (coast) 1.562 0.402 3.890 0.000 0.774 2.351 
Resides in Amazon (coast) 0.000 0.571 0.000 0.999 -1.120 1.121 
Resides in rural area -0.254 0.341 -0.740 0.457 -0.923 0.415 
Rightist ideology -0.168 0.065 -2.590 0.010 -0.295 -0.041 
Strongman populist leader 0.445 0.301 1.480 0.139 -0.145 1.035 
President can bypass Congress 0.213 0.260 0.820 0.413 -0.297 0.722 
Constant  -4.599 1.179 -3.900 0.000 -6.912 -2.286 
N = 1664. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2002 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Gutiérrez). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Coast’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2004. 
 
Table B3: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2006 
Vote Choice White Mestiza Indigenous Black Total 
Álvaro Noboa 17 107 6 8 138 
Rafael Correa 79 900 36 38 1,053 
Gilmar Gutiérrez 2 65 12 3 82 
León Roldós 3 59 1 1 64 
Other/Null 13 87 4 8 112 
Total 114 1,218 59 58 1,449 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group. 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2006 
 
Table B4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
NOBOA        base outcome     
CORREA       
White (Mestizo) -0.107 0.346 -0.310 0.758 -0.791 0.577 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.250 0.561 -0.450 0.656 -1.361 0.861 
Black (Mestizo) -0.057 0.414 -0.140 0.892 -0.876 0.762 
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Table B4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Income -0.105 0.067 -1.570 0.119 -0.238 0.027 
Female -0.001 0.245 -0.010 0.996 -0.486 0.483 
Age 0.003 0.008 0.390 0.699 -0.013 0.020 
Trust in parties 0.108 0.068 1.580 0.117 -0.027 0.243 
Resides in highlands (coast) 0.936 0.215 4.350 0.000 0.510 1.362 
Resides in Amazon (coast) 1.164 0.342 3.400 0.001 0.487 1.840 
Resides in rural area 0.613 0.225 2.730 0.007 0.168 1.057 
Rightist ideology -0.201 0.049 -4.060 0.000 -0.299 -0.103 
Wealth redistribution 0.089 0.064 1.410 0.162 -0.036 0.215 
Nationalisations 0.037 0.061 0.610 0.544 -0.084 0.158 
Free trade 0.002 0.067 0.030 0.979 -0.131 0.135 
Limit opposition voice 0.070 0.058 1.200 0.231 -0.045 0.186 
Direct democracy 0.113 0.057 1.960 0.052 -0.001 0.226 
Minorities to follow majority 0.120 0.050 2.410 0.017 0.021 0.218 
Constant 0.140 0.777 0.180 0.857 -1.397 1.676 
G. GUTIÉRREZ       
White (Mestizo) -0.452 1.046 -0.430 0.666 -2.521 1.616 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.093 0.745 1.470 0.145 -0.380 2.567 
Black (Mestizo) 1.388 0.886 1.570 0.120 -0.366 3.141 
Income -0.327 0.121 -2.690 0.008 -0.566 -0.087 
Female -0.872 0.426 -2.040 0.043 -1.715 -0.028 
Age -0.001 0.015 -0.040 0.971 -0.031 0.030 
Trust in parties 0.208 0.119 1.750 0.082 -0.027 0.443 
Resides in highlands (coast) 2.133 0.497 4.290 0.000 1.150 3.116 
Resides in Amazon (coast) 3.804 0.577 6.590 0.000 2.662 4.946 
Resides in rural area 0.078 0.415 0.190 0.851 -0.744 0.900 
Rightist ideology -0.190 0.092 -2.070 0.041 -0.372 -0.008 
Wealth redistribution -0.094 0.124 -0.750 0.452 -0.339 0.152 
Nationalisations 0.031 0.136 0.230 0.820 -0.238 0.299 
Free trade -0.118 0.133 -0.880 0.379 -0.382 0.146 
Limit opposition voice -0.077 0.124 -0.620 0.537 -0.321 0.168 
Direct democracy 0.091 0.106 0.860 0.392 -0.119 0.300 
Minorities to follow majority 0.189 0.125 1.520 0.131 -0.057 0.436 
Constant -0.528 1.640 -0.320 0.748 -3.773 2.718 
ROLDÓS       
White (Mestizo) -0.513 0.651 -0.790 0.432 -1.801 0.774 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.953 1.159 -2.550 0.012 -5.247 -0.660 
Black (Mestizo) -0.542 0.985 -0.550 0.583 -2.490 1.406 
Income 0.142 0.099 1.440 0.152 -0.053 0.338 
Female -0.611 0.406 -1.500 0.135 -1.415 0.193 
Age 0.026 0.014 1.860 0.065 -0.002 0.054 
Trust in parties -0.091 0.132 -0.690 0.491 -0.352 0.170 
Resides in highlands (coast) 2.012 0.384 5.240 0.000 1.253 2.771 
Resides in Amazon (coast) 1.072 0.673 1.590 0.113 -0.259 2.404 
Resides in rural area 0.326 0.426 0.770 0.445 -0.516 1.168 
Rightist ideology -0.052 0.078 -0.660 0.509 -0.207 0.103 
Wealth redistribution 0.080 0.101 0.790 0.433 -0.121 0.280 
Nationalisations -0.129 0.113 -1.140 0.257 -0.353 0.095 
Free trade 0.040 0.130 0.310 0.756 -0.216 0.297 
Limit opposition voice 0.072 0.091 0.780 0.434 -0.109 0.252 
Direct democracy 0.097 0.109 0.890 0.374 -0.118 0.313 
Minorities to follow majority -0.094 0.090 -1.040 0.298 -0.272 0.084 
Constant -3.432 1.134 -3.030 0.003 -5.675 -1.189 
N = 1449. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Noboa). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Coast’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2008. 
 
Table B5: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.003 .000 .004 -.012 .005 (P) 
    -.014 .003 (BC) 
Trust in parties .001 .000 .003 -.004 .008 (P) 
    -.003 .012 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .005 .001 .010 -.012 .027 (P) 
    -.011 .027 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 .000 .002 -.005 .005 (P) 
    -.004 .006 (BC) 
Nationalizations .002 .000 .004 -.004 .012 (P) 
    -.002 .016 (BC) 
Free trade .002 .000 .003 -.004 .009 (P) 
    -.002 .015 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .000 .000 .003 -.008 .007 (P) 
    -.008 .006 (BC) 
Direct democracy .000 .000 .002 -.005 .006 (P) 
    -.005 .006 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .002 .001 .004 -.003 .013 (P) 
    -.002 .014 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .008 .001 .014 -.015 .039 (P) 
    -.015 .038 (BC) 
Direct effect -.058 .002 .053 -.152 .050 (P) 
    -.149 .052 (BC) 
Total effects -.049 .003 .053 -.144 .063 (P) 
    -.145 .062 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -.166      
N=1044. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) 
mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap 
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Table B5: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
(1000 repetitions, from 131 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2008. 
 
Table B6: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .001 .000 .002 -.004 .007 (P) 
    -.002 .009 (BC) 
Trust in parties .001 .000 .003 -.004 .009 (P) 
    -.004 .010 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .016* -.001 .009 -.001 .034 (P) 
    .001 .039 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 .000 .002 -.005 .006 (P) 
    -.005 .005 (BC) 
Nationalizations .005 .000 .005 -.002 .018 (P) 
    -.002 .020 (BC) 
Free trade .005 .000 .006 -.008 .017 (P) 
    -.007 .018 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition -.005 .000 .005 -.017 .002 (P) 
    -.019 .002 (BC) 
Direct democracy .001 .000 .003 -.005 .009 (P) 
    -.003 .011 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .000 .000 .002 -.006 .004 (P) 
    -.008 .003 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .022 -.001 .016 -.011 .054 (P) 
    -.011 .055 (BC) 
Direct effect -.084 .010 .056 -.168 .051 (P) 
    -.180 .039 (BC) 
Total effects -.062 .009 .057 -.150 .075 (P) 
    -.158 .060 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -.348      
N=988. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) 
mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap 
(994 repetitions, from 131 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2008. 
 
Table B7: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.009 -.001 .027 -.069 .040 (P) 
    -.106 .022 (BC) 
Trust in parties .005 -.010 .040 -.101 .068 (P) 
    -.059 .103 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .003 -.002 .021 -.042 .048 (P) 
    -.026 .071 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .013 -.027 .035 -.092 .060 (P) 
    -.007 .120 (BC) 
Nationalizations -.016 .015 .049 -.105 .104 (P) 
    -.147 .053 (BC) 
Free trade -.005 .006 .057 -.129 .115 (P) 
    -.234 .060 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .005 .002 .030 -.058 .073 (P) 
    -.062 .072 (BC) 
Direct democracy .011 .000 .026 -.035 .072 (P) 
    -.031 .081 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.020 -.020 .052 -.182 .034 (P) 
    -.131 .075 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.013 -.036 .096 -.245 .137 (P) 
    -.162 .196 (BC) 
Direct effect .089 .027 .226 -.291 .612 (P) 
    -.310 .563 (BC) 
Total effects .076 -.009 .213 -.314 .526 (P) 
    -.283 .623 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -.168      
N=121. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) 
mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap 
(626 repetitions, from 60 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2008. 
Table B8: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Black or Mulatta (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over 
Noboa, Ecuador 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .001 .000 .002 -.003 .006 (P) 
    -.002 .009 (BC) 
Trust in parties .000 .000 .003 -.006 .005 (P) 
    -.004 .007 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.018^* .000 .010 -.040 -.002 (P) 
    -.042 -.003 (BC) 




Table B9: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2009 
Linguistic background and vote choice White Mestiza Indigenous Black Total 
Parents only speak Spanish      
Rafael Correa 96 762 6 35 899 
Lucio Gutierrez 20 123 0 2 145 
Alvaro Noboa 10 95 0 6 111 
Other/None 13 168 1 8 190 
Parents speak indigenous language      
Rafael Correa 0 16 25 0 41 
Lucio Gutierrez 0 8 4 0 12 
Alvaro Noboa 0  2 0 2 
Other/None 0 2 8 0 10 
Total 139 1,174 46 51 1,410 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice, linguistic, and self-identified ethnic group. 
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010 
 
  Table B10: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
CORREA         base outcome     
L. GUTIÉRREZ       
White (Mestizo) 0.337 0.233 1.450 0.150 -0.124 0.799 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.157 0.854 -2.520 0.013 -3.849 -0.465 
Black (Mestizo) -1.169 1.014 -1.150 0.251 -3.176 0.839 
Parents speak indigenous language 1.103 0.570 1.940 0.055 -0.026 2.232 
Income 0.010 0.064 0.150 0.878 -0.117 0.137 
Female 0.009 0.225 0.040 0.967 -0.436 0.454 
Age -0.005 0.008 -0.580 0.564 -0.021 0.012 
Trust in parties -0.010 0.085 -0.120 0.908 -0.179 0.159 
Participation in protests 0.301 0.289 1.040 0.301 -0.273 0.874 
National economy has improved -0.546 0.271 -2.010 0.046 -1.083 -0.009 
Personal finances have improved -0.084 0.300 -0.280 0.780 -0.678 0.510 
Resides in highlands (coast) 0.093 0.243 0.380 0.701 -0.388 0.575 
Resides in Amazon (coast) 0.754 0.313 2.410 0.018 0.134 1.373 
Resides in rural area 0.336 0.314 1.070 0.286 -0.286 0.958 
Rightist ideology 0.114 0.042 2.710 0.008 0.031 0.198 
Wealth redistribution -0.212 0.071 -2.990 0.003 -0.353 -0.072 
Social security 0.172 0.113 1.530 0.129 -0.051 0.395 
Nationalisations -0.137 0.052 -2.640 0.009 -0.239 -0.034 
Free trade -0.075 0.067 -1.120 0.264 -0.208 0.058 
Limit opposition voice -0.219 0.060 -3.630 0.000 -0.338 -0.099 
Direct democracy 0.140 0.061 2.290 0.024 0.019 0.261 
Minorities to follow majority -0.037 0.060 -0.610 0.542 -0.156 0.082 
Constant -1.405 0.910 -1.540 0.125 -3.208 0.398 
NOBOA       
White (Mestizo) -0.487 0.470 -1.040 0.303 -1.419 0.445 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.933 0.549 1.700 0.092 -0.155 2.020 
Black (Mestizo) 0.095 0.528 0.180 0.857 -0.950 1.141 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.967 0.619 -1.560 0.121 -2.194 0.259 
Income -0.196 0.089 -2.190 0.030 -0.373 -0.019 
Female -0.052 0.193 -0.270 0.789 -0.435 0.331 
Age -0.006 0.008 -0.720 0.473 -0.021 0.010 
Trust in parties -0.056 0.087 -0.640 0.523 -0.227 0.116 
Participation in protests 0.731 0.237 3.080 0.003 0.260 1.201 
National economy has improved -0.603 0.357 -1.690 0.094 -1.311 0.104 
Personal finances have improved -0.417 0.330 -1.260 0.209 -1.071 0.237 
Resides in highlands (coast) -1.284 0.246 -5.220 0.000 -1.771 -0.797 
Resides in Amazon (coast) -0.310 0.344 -0.900 0.369 -0.991 0.371 
Resides in rural area -0.791 0.392 -2.020 0.046 -1.567 -0.015 
Rightist ideology 0.081 0.051 1.590 0.115 -0.020 0.181 
Wealth redistribution -0.046 0.089 -0.510 0.608 -0.222 0.131 
Social security -0.024 0.105 -0.230 0.820 -0.232 0.184 
Nationalisations -0.150 0.090 -1.670 0.097 -0.329 0.028 
Free trade 0.166 0.064 2.600 0.011 0.039 0.292 
Limit opposition voice -0.153 0.062 -2.490 0.014 -0.276 -0.031 
Direct democracy 0.082 0.071 1.160 0.249 -0.058 0.222 
    -.003 .006 (BC) 
Nationalizations -.006 .000 .005 -.018 .004 (P) 
    -.019 .002 (BC) 
Free trade -.002 .000 .004 -.014 .003 (P) 
    -.016 .001 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .001 .000 .003 -.007 .008 (P) 
    -.003 .013 (BC) 
Direct democracy .000 .000 .004 -.008 .008 (P) 
    -.010 .007 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.004 .000 .005 -.016 .003 (P) 
    -.018 .002 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.028^* -.001 .015 -.061 -.002 (P) 
    -.060 -.001 (BC) 
Direct effect .021 .006 .048 -.060 .130 (P) 
    -.063 .117 (BC) 
Total effects -.007 .005 .048 -.084 .099 (P) 
    -.088 .095 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated 3.969      
N=995. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as black or mulatta (compared with mestiza) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated 
through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal 
finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with 
bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 131 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2008. 
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  Table B10: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Minorities to follow majority -0.084 0.055 -1.510 0.133 -0.194 0.026 
Constant 1.121 1.051 1.070 0.288 -0.961 3.204 
N = 1410. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Correa). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Coast’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table B11: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .000 .000 .008 -.016 .018 (P) 
    -.015 .018 (BC) 
Trust in parties .003 .000 .006 -.009 .017 (P) 
    -.004 .026 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.003 .001 .005 -.013 .008 (P) 
    -.018 .003 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .001 .000 .005 -.010 .013 (P) 
    -.006 .016 (BC) 
Social security .000 .000 .003 -.006 .008 (P) 
    -.006 .008 (BC) 
Nationalizations -.001 .000 .006 -.015 .013 (P) 
    -.020 .010 (BC) 
Free trade .006 .001 .009 -.009 .028 (P) 
    -.008 .029 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition -.001 -.001 .009 -.019 .017 (P) 
    -.018 .019 (BC) 
Direct democracy .001 .000 .005 -.011 .012 (P) 
    -.004 .022 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .001 .000 .005 -.012 .013 (P) 
    -.009 .015 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .001 .000 .004 -.009 .011 (P) 
    -.005 .014 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black) .005 .000 .007 -.007 .022 (P) 
    -.006 .023 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty -.005 -.001 .009 -.027 .005 (P) 
    -.030 .004 (BC) 
Black treated worse than whites .000 .001 .006 -.010 .017 (P) 
    -.009 .018 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking -.004 .000 .007 -.022 .005 (P) 
    -.032 .002 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .001 .000 .005 -.007 .012 (P) 
    -.005 .017 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .004 .001 .021 -.036 .046 (P) 
    -.038 .043 (BC) 
Direct effect .108 .007 .079 -.005 .240 (P) 
    -.010 .228 (BC) 
Total effects .112 .008 .077 .011 .248 (P) 
    .005 .233 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .032      
N=937. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of personal linguistic background (knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated 
through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and 
confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (836 repetitions, from 119 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table B12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.004 -.001 .006 -.018 .005 (P) 
    -.021 .003 (BC) 
Trust in parties .003 .000 .005 -.006 .014 (P) 
    -.003 .019 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.005 .000 .005 -.018 .002 (P) 
    -.022 .001 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 .000 .003 -.008 .007 (P) 
    -.006 .008 (BC) 
Social security .000 .000 .003 -.007 .005 (P) 
    -.010 .003 (BC) 
Nationalizations .009 .001 .008 -.002 .029 (P) 
    -.001 .034 (BC) 
Free trade -.006 .000 .005 -.017 .002 (P) 
    -.020 .001 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .002 .000 .006 -.009 .015 (P) 
    -.007 .018 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.001 .000 .003 -.008 .006 (P) 
    -.012 .002 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .003 .000 .003 -.002 .011 (P) 
    -.001 .014 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .000 .000 .003 -.007 .005 (P) 
    -.007 .004 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black) -.012 .000 .009 -.032 .002 (P) 
    -.036 .001 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty .000 .000 .004 -.009 .009 (P) 
    -.010 .008 (BC) 
Black treated worse than whites -.007 .000 .008 -.023 .007 (P) 
    -.026 .006 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking -.002 .000 .004 -.012 .006 (P) 
    -.017 .003 (BC) 
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Table B12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Experience of discrimination .000 .000 .002 -.005 .003 (P) 
    -.004 .004 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.021 .000 .020 -.059 .022 (P) 
    -.059 .022 (BC) 
Direct effect .091 .008 .078 -.051 .252 (P) 
    -.057 .247 (BC) 
Total effects .071 .009 .077 -.067 .227 (P) 
    -.073 .222 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -.292      
N=855. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 119 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table B13: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.014 .000 .012 -.042 .002 (P) 
    -.052 .000 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.001 .000 .007 -.015 .014 (P) 
    -.017 .014 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .006 .000 .007 -.008 .020 (P) 
    -.004 .024 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 .000 .006 -.013 .013 (P) 
    -.011 .015 (BC) 
Social security .001 .000 .005 -.008 .013 (P) 
    -.005 .017 (BC) 
Nationalizations .001 -.001 .007 -.016 .016 (P) 
    -.011 .019 (BC) 
Free trade .005 .000 .008 -.008 .025 (P) 
    -.006 .031 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition -.001 .001 .009 -.018 .018 (P) 
    -.022 .016 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.003 .000 .007 -.020 .008 (P) 
    -.027 .005 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.002 .000 .006 -.016 .009 (P) 
    -.022 .006 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .001 .001 .005 -.008 .015 (P) 
    -.006 .019 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black) -.013 -.001 .012 -.041 .004 (P) 
    -.044 .002 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty .005 .002 .012 -.016 .032 (P) 
    -.017 .029 (BC) 
Black treated worse than whites -.008 .000 .010 -.032 .011 (P) 
    -.035 .008 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking .002 .001 .006 -.008 .017 (P) 
    -.006 .023 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .002 .002 .007 -.006 .020 (P) 
    -.006 .020 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.020 .004 .027 -.067 .035 (P) 
    -.079 .026 (BC) 
Direct effect -.071 -.018 .068 -.208 .014 (P) 
    -.178 .033 (BC) 
Total effects -.091 -.013 .066 -.216 -.004 (P) 
    -.201 .009 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .218      
N=803. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (882 repetitions, from 117 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table B14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.006 .003 .033 -.085 .066 (P) 
    -.155 .027 (BC) 
Trust in parties .010 .011 .100 -.244 .266 (P) 
    -.256 .210 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .031 -.001 .087 -.141 .242 (P) 
    -.082 .297 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 -.001 .061 -.135 .135 (P) 
    -.149 .134 (BC) 
Social security .035 .022 .117 -.224 .277 (P) 
    -.310 .178 (BC) 
Nationalizations -.063 -.016 .114 -.321 .142 (P) 
    -.279 .171 (BC) 
Free trade .001 -.008 .110 -.305 .234 (P) 
    -.305 .234 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition -.002 .016 .066 -.115 .189 (P) 
    -.172 .118 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.006 -.024 .093 -.317 .124 (P) 
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Table B14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, 
Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
    -.193 .168 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .014 -.010 .065 -.137 .169 (P) 
    -.052 .248 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" .006 -.020 .064 -.172 .087 (P) 
    -.050 .342 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black) -.035 .004 .089 -.260 .135 (P) 
    -.354 .041 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty .041 -.014 .141 -.419 .308 (P) 
    -.217 .317 (BC) 
Black treated worse than whites .014 -.025 .084 -.268 .181 (P) 
    -.029 .255 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking .130 -.037 .177 -.301 .432 (P) 
    -.003 .594 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.007 .006 .109 -.206 .252 (P) 
    -.233 .196 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .164 -.094 .378 -.660 .751 (P) 
    -.480 .931 (BC) 
Direct effect .628* -.733 .393 -.718 .609 (P) 
    .637 .730 (BC) 
Total effects .792* -.827 .341 -.704 .655 (P) 
    .825 .825 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .208      
N=114. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (145 repetitions, from 52 clusters, across 4 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2010. 
 
Table B15: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Black or Mulatta (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over 
Noboa, Ecuador 2009 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.016^* .001 .008 -.032 .001 (P) 
    -.037 -.002 (BC) 
Trust in parties .002 .000 .003 -.003 .010 (P) 
    -.002 .012 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.002 -.001 .004 -.013 .004 (P) 
    -.014 .003 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution -.001 .000 .004 -.010 .006 (P) 
    -.015 .003 (BC) 
Social security -.001 .001 .003 -.005 .008 (P) 
    -.011 .002 (BC) 
Nationalizations .003 .000 .005 -.005 .017 (P) 
    -.003 .022 (BC) 
Free trade .007 .001 .008 -.002 .026 (P) 
    -.002 .030 (BC) 
Limit voice of opposition .001 .000 .007 -.014 .016 (P) 
    -.012 .019 (BC) 
Direct democracy .000 .001 .003 -.005 .008 (P) 
    -.008 .003 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .001 .000 .004 -.007 .011 (P) 
    -.004 .015 (BC) 
Mix of races "good" -.001 .000 .006 -.012 .011 (P) 
    -.015 .009 (BC) 
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black) .008 .000 .007 -.003 .025 (P) 
    -.001 .027 (BC) 
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty .000 .000 .003 -.007 .007 (P) 
    -.007 .008 (BC) 
Black treated worse than whites .000 .000 .004 -.008 .009 (P) 
    -.008 .009 (BC) 
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking .002 .000 .004 -.006 .012 (P) 
    -.003 .015 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .001 .000 .005 -.008 .012 (P) 
    -.008 .012 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .005 .004 .023 -.034 .058 (P) 
    -.042 .048 (BC) 
Direct effect .027 .007 .062 -.075 .169 (P) 
    -.084 .164 (BC) 
Total effects .032 .011 .064 -.068 .187 (P) 
    -.073 .175 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .162      
N=979. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as black or mulatta (compared with mestiza) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated 
through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and 
confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (961 repetitions, from 117 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
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Table C1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Peru 2006 
 White Mestiza Indigenous Black Total 
Parents speak Spanish only      
Ollanta Humala 11 95 3 2 111 
Alan Garcia 25 87 2 2 116 
Lourdes Flores 23 91 0 0                 114 
Martha Chavez 0 17 0 0                 17 
Other/Null 11 54 2 2 69 
Parents speak an indigenous language      
Ollanta Humala 9 81 17 2 109 
Alan Garcia 1 38 7 1 47 
Lourdes Flores 3 28 2 1 34 
Martha Chavez 0 2 2 0                 4 
Other/Null 1 28 4 1 34 
Total 84 521 39 11 655 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group 




Table C2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA base outcome      
GARCÍA       
White (Mestizo) 0.549 0.342 1.600 0.112 -0.132 1.230 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.300 0.526 0.570 0.570 -0.747 1.347 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.609 0.248 -2.450 0.016 -1.103 -0.115 
Income 0.054 0.061 0.880 0.380 -0.068 0.176 
Female 0.361 0.217 1.670 0.100 -0.070 0.792 
Age 0.008 0.007 1.120 0.265 -0.006 0.022 
Trust in parties 0.166 0.091 1.840 0.070 -0.014 0.347 
Participation in protests -0.415 0.366 -1.140 0.259 -1.142 0.312 
National economy has improved -0.050 0.366 -0.140 0.892 -0.778 0.679 
Personal finances have improved 0.185 0.312 0.590 0.555 -0.436 0.806 
Resides in north 0.262 0.349 0.750 0.454 -0.432 0.956 
Resides in Amazon -1.103 0.456 -2.420 0.018 -2.010 -0.196 
Resides in highlands 0.267 0.450 0.590 0.554 -0.627 1.162 
Resides in rural area -0.202 0.372 -0.540 0.588 -0.943 0.539 
Grew up in rural area -0.594 0.313 -1.900 0.061 -1.215 0.028 
Rightist ideology 0.255 0.058 4.390 0.000 0.139 0.371 
Supports FTA with USA 1.288 0.211 6.110 0.000 0.868 1.707 
Limit opposition voice 0.232 0.218 1.060 0.291 -0.202 0.666 
Strongman populist leader -0.196 0.221 -0.890 0.378 -0.636 0.244 
Constant -2.996 0.607 -4.940 0.000 -4.204 -1.789 
FLORES       
White (Mestizo) 0.547 0.360 1.520 0.133 -0.169 1.262 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.803 0.911 -0.880 0.381 -2.614 1.009 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.950 0.259 -3.670 0.000 -1.465 -0.435 
Income 0.236 0.062 3.800 0.000 0.113 0.359 
Female 1.185 0.196 6.040 0.000 0.795 1.575 
Age -0.007 0.007 -1.060 0.293 -0.021 0.006 
Trust in parties 0.133 0.082 1.630 0.107 -0.029 0.296 
Participation in protests -0.730 0.398 -1.830 0.070 -1.521 0.061 
National economy has improved 0.562 0.468 1.200 0.233 -0.368 1.492 
Personal finances have improved 0.023 0.456 0.050 0.960 -0.885 0.931 
Resides in north -0.429 0.336 -1.270 0.206 -1.097 0.240 
Resides in Amazon -0.937 0.479 -1.960 0.054 -1.890 0.016 
Resides in highlands -0.017 0.427 -0.040 0.969 -0.865 0.832 
Resides in rural area 0.105 0.428 0.250 0.807 -0.747 0.956 
Grew up in rural area -0.653 0.332 -1.970 0.053 -1.314 0.007 
Rightist ideology 0.288 0.056 5.150 0.000 0.177 0.399 
Supports FTA with USA 1.360 0.278 4.890 0.000 0.807 1.913 
Limit opposition voice -0.057 0.227 -0.250 0.803 -0.509 0.395 
Strongman populist leader -0.398 0.240 -1.660 0.101 -0.875 0.079 
Constant -3.653 0.704 -5.190 0.000 -5.053 -2.253 
CHÁVEZ       
White (Mestizo) -13.542 0.375 -36.120 0.000 -14.288 -12.796 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.465 0.860 1.700 0.092 -0.245 3.175 
Parents speak indigenous language -1.043 0.450 -2.320 0.023 -1.938 -0.149 
Income 0.083 0.093 0.890 0.376 -0.102 0.268 
Female 0.011 0.397 0.030 0.979 -0.779 0.801 
Age -0.001 0.021 -0.040 0.966 -0.043 0.041 
Trust in parties 0.190 0.167 1.140 0.260 -0.143 0.523 
Participation in protests -1.088 0.758 -1.440 0.155 -2.595 0.419 
National economy has improved 0.268 0.578 0.460 0.644 -0.882 1.418 
Personal finances have improved -1.493 0.994 -1.500 0.137 -3.471 0.485 
Resides in north 0.249 0.525 0.470 0.636 -0.795 1.293 
Resides in Amazon 0.287 0.673 0.430 0.671 -1.052 1.625 
Resides in highlands -1.364 1.248 -1.090 0.278 -3.845 1.118 
Resides in rural area -0.511 0.649 -0.790 0.433 -1.802 0.779 
Grew up in rural area 0.042 0.532 0.080 0.938 -1.016 1.100 
Rightist ideology 0.215 0.093 2.320 0.023 0.030 0.399 
Supports FTA with USA 0.291 0.399 0.730 0.468 -0.502 1.084 
Limit opposition voice 1.303 0.380 3.430 0.001 0.547 2.059 
Strongman populist leader -0.399 0.529 -0.750 0.453 -1.451 0.653 
Constant -4.138 1.527 -2.710 0.008 -7.176 -1.099 
N = 655. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Lima’. 




Table C3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA base outcome      
GARCÍA       
White (Mestizo) 0.594 0.344 1.730 0.087 -0.089 1.278 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.383 0.584 0.660 0.514 -0.779 1.544 
Parents speak indigenous language -1.316 1.240 -1.060 0.291 -3.782 1.150 
Income 0.008 0.080 0.090 0.925 -0.152 0.167 
Female 0.302 0.230 1.310 0.192 -0.155 0.759 
Age 0.007 0.007 1.040 0.301 -0.007 0.021 
Trust in parties 0.167 0.091 1.830 0.071 -0.015 0.349 
Participation in protests -0.374 0.376 -0.990 0.323 -1.122 0.374 
National economy has improved -0.028 0.378 -0.070 0.941 -0.781 0.725 
Personal finances have improved 0.224 0.310 0.720 0.471 -0.392 0.841 
Resides in north 0.256 0.347 0.740 0.462 -0.434 0.947 
Resides in Amazon -1.126 0.444 -2.530 0.013 -2.010 -0.242 
Resides in highlands 0.203 0.464 0.440 0.662 -0.721 1.127 
Resides in rural area -0.180 0.377 -0.480 0.634 -0.930 0.570 
Grew up in rural area -0.608 0.337 -1.800 0.075 -1.278 0.062 
Rightist ideology 0.250 0.072 3.470 0.001 0.106 0.393 
Supports FTA with USA 1.451 0.258 5.630 0.000 0.939 1.963 
Limit opposition voice -0.081 0.283 -0.290 0.774 -0.644 0.481 
Strongman populist leader 0.003 0.251 0.010 0.991 -0.496 0.502 
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:       
Rightist ideology 0.050 0.136 0.370 0.711 -0.219 0.320 
Supports FTA with USA -0.365 0.455 -0.800 0.425 -1.271 0.541 
Limit opposition voice 0.912 0.472 1.930 0.057 -0.027 1.852 
Strongman populist leader -0.513 0.515 -1.000 0.321 -1.537 0.510 
Income 0.092 0.164 0.560 0.577 -0.234 0.417 
Constant -2.730 0.662 -4.130 0.000 -4.046 -1.413 
FLORES       
White (Mestizo) 0.580 0.370 1.570 0.121 -0.156 1.316 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.772 0.937 -0.820 0.412 -2.636 1.091 
Parents speak indigenous language -1.519 0.817 -1.860 0.066 -3.144 0.105 
Income 0.179 0.064 2.800 0.006 0.052 0.306 
Female 1.175 0.208 5.650 0.000 0.761 1.589 
Age -0.008 0.007 -1.160 0.248 -0.022 0.006 
Trust in parties 0.130 0.082 1.590 0.116 -0.033 0.294 
Participation in protests -0.728 0.388 -1.880 0.064 -1.500 0.043 
National economy has improved 0.591 0.466 1.270 0.208 -0.337 1.519 
Personal finances have improved 0.023 0.452 0.050 0.960 -0.876 0.921 
Resides in north -0.460 0.342 -1.340 0.183 -1.140 0.221 
Resides in Amazon -0.968 0.479 -2.020 0.046 -1.920 -0.016 
Resides in highlands -0.020 0.456 -0.040 0.965 -0.927 0.886 
Resides in rural area 0.131 0.435 0.300 0.764 -0.734 0.995 
Grew up in rural area -0.696 0.331 -2.100 0.038 -1.353 -0.038 
Rightist ideology 0.278 0.067 4.150 0.000 0.145 0.411 
Supports FTA with USA 1.584 0.343 4.610 0.000 0.901 2.266 
Limit opposition voice -0.090 0.279 -0.320 0.748 -0.645 0.465 
Strongman populist leader -0.329 0.271 -1.210 0.229 -0.868 0.211 
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:       
Rightist ideology 0.038 0.105 0.360 0.721 -0.171 0.246 
Supports FTA with USA -0.712 0.579 -1.230 0.223 -1.864 0.441 
Limit opposition voice -0.030 0.524 -0.060 0.954 -1.073 1.013 
Strongman populist leader -0.116 0.430 -0.270 0.788 -0.972 0.740 
Income 0.164 0.113 1.450 0.152 -0.062 0.389 
Constant -3.380 0.706 -4.790 0.000 -4.784 -1.976 
CHÁVEZ       
White (Mestizo) -13.259 0.374 -35.460 0.000 -14.003 -12.515 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.363 0.806 1.690 0.095 -0.241 2.967 
Parents speak indigenous language -2.295 1.967 -1.170 0.247 -6.207 1.618 
Income -0.038 0.117 -0.320 0.747 -0.271 0.195 
Female 0.066 0.402 0.160 0.870 -0.733 0.865 
Age -0.004 0.019 -0.180 0.856 -0.042 0.035 
Trust in parties 0.196 0.162 1.210 0.230 -0.127 0.519 
Participation in protests -1.086 0.693 -1.570 0.121 -2.463 0.292 
National economy has improved 0.315 0.525 0.600 0.550 -0.730 1.360 
Personal finances have improved -1.487 0.995 -1.500 0.139 -3.466 0.491 
Resides in north 0.214 0.516 0.410 0.680 -0.813 1.240 
Resides in Amazon 0.347 0.687 0.510 0.615 -1.019 1.713 
Resides in highlands -0.899 1.223 -0.730 0.465 -3.331 1.534 
Resides in rural area -0.599 0.726 -0.820 0.412 -2.044 0.846 
Grew up in rural area 0.010 0.548 0.020 0.985 -1.079 1.100 
Rightist ideology 0.199 0.109 1.820 0.072 -0.018 0.417 
Supports FTA with USA 0.329 0.521 0.630 0.530 -0.708 1.366 
Limit opposition voice 1.569 0.510 3.080 0.003 0.555 2.584 
Strongman populist leader -0.267 0.586 -0.460 0.650 -1.433 0.899 
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:       
Rightist ideology -0.163 0.350 -0.460 0.643 -0.860 0.534 
Supports FTA with USA 0.141 0.796 0.180 0.860 -1.442 1.723 
Limit opposition voice -1.534 1.238 -1.240 0.219 -3.997 0.929 
Strongman populist leader -0.527 0.842 -0.630 0.533 -2.203 1.148 
Income 0.530 0.154 3.430 0.001 0.223 0.837 
Constant -3.674 1.829 -2.010 0.048 -7.313 -0.035 
N = 655. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between 
linguistic group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 




Table C4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA  base outcome           
GARCÍA             
White (Mestizo) -1.823 1.515 -1.200 0.232 -4.838 1.191 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -36.386 3.574 -10.180 0.000 -43.496 -29.277 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.536 0.238 -2.250 0.027 -1.011 -0.062 
Income 0.046 0.060 0.780 0.440 -0.072 0.165 
Female 0.338 0.217 1.560 0.123 -0.094 0.770 
Age 0.010 0.007 1.420 0.160 -0.004 0.025 
Trust in parties 0.197 0.084 2.350 0.021 0.031 0.364 
Participation in protests -0.311 0.388 -0.800 0.426 -1.083 0.461 
National economy has improved -0.126 0.312 -0.400 0.688 -0.747 0.495 
Personal finances have improved 0.291 0.306 0.950 0.345 -0.318 0.900 
Resides in north 0.253 0.357 0.710 0.480 -0.457 0.964 
Resides in Amazon -1.100 0.465 -2.360 0.020 -2.025 -0.175 
Resides in highlands 0.239 0.489 0.490 0.627 -0.735 1.212 
Resides in rural area -0.196 0.392 -0.500 0.619 -0.975 0.583 
Grew up in rural area -0.571 0.297 -1.920 0.058 -1.162 0.020 
Rightist ideology 0.229 0.075 3.060 0.003 0.080 0.377 
Supports FTA with USA 1.191 0.251 4.750 0.000 0.693 1.690 
Limit opposition voice 0.061 0.223 0.280 0.783 -0.382 0.505 
Strongman populist leader -0.113 0.229 -0.490 0.624 -0.569 0.344 
INTERACTIONS:             
White * Rightist ideology  0.390 0.259 1.510 0.136 -0.125 0.905 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology   -0.631 0.455 -1.390 0.170 -1.537 0.275 
White * Supports FTA with USA  1.063 0.674 1.580 0.119 -0.278 2.405 
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA  35.488 3.115 11.390 0.000 29.290 41.685 
White * Limit opp. voice  0.688 0.689 1.000 0.321 -0.683 2.059 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 37.778 2.898 13.040 0.000 32.013 43.543 
White * Strongman pop. Leader 0.472 0.599 0.790 0.433 -0.719 1.664 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -2.641 1.969 -1.340 0.184 -6.559 1.277 
White * Income -0.118 0.169 -0.700 0.485 -0.454 0.217 
Indigenous * Income 1.059 0.514 2.060 0.042 0.037 2.081 
Constant -2.972 0.574 -5.180 0.000 -4.114 -1.831 
FLORES             
White (Mestizo) -0.142 2.703 -0.050 0.958 -5.519 5.234 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -52.798 4.308 -12.260 0.000 -61.368 -44.229 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.948 0.250 -3.800 0.000 -1.445 -0.452 
Income 0.250 0.054 4.660 0.000 0.143 0.356 
Female 1.206 0.202 5.980 0.000 0.805 1.608 
Age -0.005 0.007 -0.760 0.447 -0.019 0.009 
Trust in parties 0.144 0.082 1.760 0.083 -0.019 0.307 
Participation in protests -0.673 0.399 -1.690 0.095 -1.466 0.120 
National economy has improved 0.512 0.414 1.240 0.220 -0.312 1.336 
Personal finances have improved 0.059 0.458 0.130 0.898 -0.852 0.970 
Resides in north -0.434 0.318 -1.360 0.176 -1.068 0.199 
Resides in Amazon -0.894 0.485 -1.840 0.069 -1.859 0.072 
Resides in highlands -0.074 0.449 -0.170 0.869 -0.968 0.819 
Resides in rural area 0.076 0.428 0.180 0.859 -0.775 0.928 
Grew up in rural area -0.709 0.365 -1.940 0.056 -1.435 0.017 
Rightist ideology 0.296 0.051 5.840 0.000 0.195 0.397 
Supports FTA with USA 1.278 0.280 4.560 0.000 0.721 1.835 
Limit opposition voice -0.313 0.259 -1.210 0.230 -0.828 0.202 
Strongman populist leader -0.246 0.243 -1.010 0.316 -0.730 0.239 
INTERACTIONS:             
White * Rightist ideology  0.171 0.280 0.610 0.542 -0.385 0.728 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology   -0.240 0.637 -0.380 0.708 -1.508 1.028 
White * Supports FTA with USA  0.540 0.522 1.040 0.304 -0.498 1.578 
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA  53.647 4.297 12.480 0.000 45.098 62.195 
White * Limit opp. voice  1.325 0.806 1.640 0.104 -0.277 2.928 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 36.987 4.578 8.080 0.000 27.879 46.094 
White * Strongman pop. Leader -0.024 0.673 -0.040 0.971 -1.364 1.315 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -2.280 2.895 -0.790 0.433 -8.039 3.479 
White * Income -0.143 0.303 -0.470 0.638 -0.746 0.460 
Indigenous * Income 0.223 0.685 0.330 0.746 -1.140 1.587 
Constant -3.837 0.579 -6.630 0.000 -4.989 -2.686 
CHÁVEZ             
White (Mestizo) -20.342 2.369 -8.590 0.000 -25.055 -15.629 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -334.102 16.336 -20.450 0.000 -366.600 -301.604 
Parents speak indigenous language -1.644 0.691 -2.380 0.020 -3.020 -0.269 
Income 0.012 0.112 0.100 0.917 -0.211 0.234 
Female 0.203 0.454 0.450 0.656 -0.701 1.106 
Age -0.007 0.022 -0.310 0.757 -0.050 0.036 
Trust in parties 0.295 0.165 1.790 0.077 -0.033 0.623 
Participation in protests -1.514 0.910 -1.660 0.100 -3.324 0.296 
National economy has improved -0.086 0.632 -0.140 0.892 -1.344 1.171 
Personal finances have improved -1.269 1.036 -1.230 0.224 -3.330 0.791 
Resides in north 0.062 0.513 0.120 0.904 -0.958 1.082 
Resides in Amazon 0.347 0.659 0.530 0.599 -0.963 1.658 
Resides in highlands -0.584 1.159 -0.500 0.616 -2.890 1.722 
Resides in rural area -0.572 0.746 -0.770 0.446 -2.056 0.913 
Grew up in rural area 0.190 0.645 0.290 0.769 -1.094 1.473 
Rightist ideology 0.162 0.121 1.340 0.184 -0.079 0.403 
Supports FTA with USA -0.155 0.495 -0.310 0.756 -1.140 0.831 
Limit opposition voice 1.422 0.450 3.160 0.002 0.528 2.317 
Strongman populist leader -0.459 0.491 -0.930 0.353 -1.437 0.518 
INTERACTIONS:             
White * Rightist ideology  0.021 0.266 0.080 0.938 -0.509 0.550 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology   -29.248 1.491 -19.620 0.000 -32.213 -26.283 
White * Supports FTA with USA  1.579 0.638 2.480 0.015 0.311 2.847 
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA  120.022 4.752 25.250 0.000 110.568 129.476 
White * Limit opp. voice  -0.559 0.760 -0.730 0.465 -2.071 0.953 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 34.636 3.067 11.290 0.000 28.534 40.738 
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Table C4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
White * Strongman pop. Leader 0.399 0.876 0.460 0.650 -1.343 2.142 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -89.402 4.272 -20.930 0.000 -97.900 -80.903 
White* Income -0.027 0.219 -0.120 0.902 -0.462 0.408 
Indigenous * Income 58.762 2.748 21.390 0.000 53.296 64.228 
Constant -3.507 1.830 -1.920 0.059 -7.148 0.134 
N = 655. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-
identified group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 
Source: LAPOP 2006.. 
 
Table C5: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA      
GARCÍA       
White (Mestizo) 0.341 0.332 1.030 0.308 -0.321 1.002 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.231 0.591 0.390 0.697 -0.945 1.406 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.620 0.265 -2.340 0.022 -1.148 -0.092 
Income 0.035 0.063 0.550 0.585 -0.091 0.161 
Female 0.424 0.231 1.840 0.070 -0.035 0.883 
Age 0.004 0.007 0.490 0.623 -0.011 0.018 
Trust in parties 0.144 0.088 1.650 0.103 -0.030 0.319 
Participation in protests -0.536 0.403 -1.330 0.187 -1.338 0.266 
National economy has improved 0.120 0.374 0.320 0.748 -0.623 0.863 
Personal finances have improved 0.008 0.313 0.020 0.980 -0.614 0.630 
Resides in north 0.365 0.346 1.050 0.296 -0.325 1.054 
Resides in Amazon -1.213 0.517 -2.340 0.021 -2.242 -0.184 
Resides in highlands 0.339 0.478 0.710 0.481 -0.612 1.290 
Resides in rural area -0.104 0.377 -0.280 0.784 -0.853 0.646 
Grew up in rural area -0.690 0.342 -2.020 0.047 -1.370 -0.009 
Rightist ideology 0.278 0.065 4.260 0.000 0.148 0.407 
Supports FTA with USA 1.389 0.203 6.850 0.000 0.986 1.793 
Limit opposition voice 0.141 0.229 0.620 0.540 -0.315 0.597 
Strongman populist leader -0.188 0.230 -0.820 0.416 -0.646 0.269 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.040 0.086 -0.470 0.640 -0.212 0.131 
Experience of discrimination 0.011 0.115 0.090 0.927 -0.219 0.240 
Constant -2.621 0.757 -3.460 0.001 -4.126 -1.116 
FLORES       
White (Mestizo) 0.489 0.402 1.220 0.227 -0.310 1.288 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.746 0.881 -0.850 0.399 -2.499 1.006 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.915 0.267 -3.430 0.001 -1.446 -0.385 
Income 0.208 0.061 3.420 0.001 0.087 0.328 
Female 1.312 0.206 6.360 0.000 0.902 1.722 
Age -0.011 0.007 -1.550 0.126 -0.025 0.003 
Trust in parties 0.130 0.092 1.420 0.159 -0.052 0.312 
Participation in protests -0.683 0.376 -1.820 0.073 -1.432 0.065 
National economy has improved 0.711 0.497 1.430 0.156 -0.278 1.699 
Personal finances have improved 0.005 0.422 0.010 0.991 -0.834 0.844 
Resides in north -0.426 0.389 -1.090 0.277 -1.200 0.348 
Resides in Amazon -0.952 0.513 -1.860 0.067 -1.974 0.069 
Resides in highlands 0.016 0.454 0.040 0.972 -0.888 0.920 
Resides in rural area 0.050 0.468 0.110 0.916 -0.882 0.981 
Grew up in rural area -0.602 0.347 -1.730 0.087 -1.293 0.090 
Rightist ideology 0.316 0.067 4.700 0.000 0.182 0.449 
Supports FTA with USA 1.366 0.265 5.150 0.000 0.837 1.894 
Limit opposition voice -0.163 0.237 -0.690 0.492 -0.634 0.308 
Strongman populist leader -0.421 0.247 -1.700 0.092 -0.912 0.070 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.043 0.096 -0.450 0.655 -0.235 0.148 
Experience of discrimination 0.047 0.133 0.350 0.724 -0.217 0.311 
Constant -3.310 0.656 -5.050 0.000 -4.614 -2.005 
CHÁVEZ       
White (Mestizo) -13.569 0.386 -35.160 0.000 -14.337 -12.801 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 1.858 1.114 1.670 0.099 -0.358 4.074 
Parents speak indigenous language -1.777 0.629 -2.830 0.006 -3.028 -0.526 
Income 0.054 0.102 0.530 0.595 -0.148 0.257 
Female -0.138 0.517 -0.270 0.790 -1.166 0.890 
Age -0.016 0.024 -0.660 0.510 -0.063 0.031 
Trust in parties 0.249 0.178 1.400 0.166 -0.106 0.603 
Participation in protests -0.934 0.897 -1.040 0.301 -2.718 0.851 
National economy has improved 0.557 0.634 0.880 0.382 -0.704 1.818 
Personal finances have improved -1.521 1.050 -1.450 0.152 -3.611 0.569 
Resides in north 0.321 0.594 0.540 0.590 -0.860 1.502 
Resides in Amazon 0.345 0.749 0.460 0.646 -1.145 1.836 
Resides in highlands -0.920 1.424 -0.650 0.520 -3.753 1.912 
Resides in rural area -0.250 0.701 -0.360 0.722 -1.644 1.144 
Grew up in rural area -0.668 0.777 -0.860 0.393 -2.215 0.879 
Rightist ideology 0.268 0.101 2.650 0.010 0.067 0.470 
Supports FTA with USA 0.583 0.407 1.430 0.155 -0.226 1.393 
Limit opposition voice 1.192 0.491 2.430 0.017 0.216 2.168 
Strongman populist leader -0.258 0.638 -0.400 0.687 -1.526 1.011 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.132 0.193 -0.690 0.495 -0.516 0.252 
Experience of discrimination -0.097 0.184 -0.530 0.600 -0.463 0.269 
Constant -3.387 1.960 -1.730 0.088 -7.287 0.513 
N = 607. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Lima’. 
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
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Table C6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA base outcome     
GARCÍA       
White (Mestizo) 0.345 0.324 1.070 0.290 -0.299 0.989 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.487 0.660 0.740 0.462 -0.826 1.801 
Parents speak indigenous language 0.314 1.716 0.180 0.855 -3.101 3.729 
Income 0.031 0.080 0.390 0.701 -0.129 0.191 
Female 0.384 0.243 1.580 0.119 -0.101 0.868 
Age 0.002 0.007 0.340 0.736 -0.012 0.017 
Trust in parties 0.145 0.091 1.590 0.115 -0.036 0.325 
Participation in protests -0.512 0.429 -1.190 0.237 -1.366 0.343 
National economy has improved 0.136 0.417 0.330 0.744 -0.694 0.967 
Personal finances have improved -0.045 0.311 -0.140 0.885 -0.664 0.574 
Resides in north 0.374 0.367 1.020 0.311 -0.355 1.104 
Resides in Amazon -1.284 0.512 -2.510 0.014 -2.302 -0.265 
Resides in highlands 0.101 0.461 0.220 0.827 -0.816 1.018 
Resides in rural area -0.052 0.387 -0.130 0.894 -0.821 0.718 
Grew up in rural area -0.706 0.372 -1.900 0.061 -1.447 0.034 
Rightist ideology 0.265 0.075 3.560 0.001 0.117 0.414 
Supports FTA with USA 1.527 0.272 5.630 0.000 0.987 2.068 
Limit opposition voice -0.054 0.311 -0.170 0.863 -0.673 0.565 
Strongman populist leader -0.069 0.263 -0.260 0.792 -0.593 0.454 
Trust in indigenous movement 0.093 0.126 0.740 0.460 -0.157 0.344 
Experience of discrimination 0.151 0.175 0.870 0.389 -0.196 0.499 
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:       
Rightist ideology 0.112 0.166 0.670 0.504 -0.219 0.442 
Supports FTA with USA -0.124 0.457 -0.270 0.787 -1.034 0.786 
Limit opposition voice 0.699 0.476 1.470 0.146 -0.248 1.646 
Strongman populist leader -0.381 0.542 -0.700 0.484 -1.458 0.697 
Income -0.012 0.164 -0.070 0.942 -0.339 0.315 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.331 0.265 -1.250 0.216 -0.859 0.197 
Experience of discrimination -0.255 0.250 -1.020 0.310 -0.753 0.242 
Constant -3.119 0.914 -3.410 0.001 -4.939 -1.300 
FLORES       
White (Mestizo) 0.479 0.408 1.170 0.244 -0.333 1.290 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.588 0.937 -0.630 0.532 -2.452 1.276 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.168 1.250 -0.130 0.893 -2.656 2.319 
Income 0.182 0.070 2.590 0.011 0.042 0.322 
Female 1.328 0.213 6.230 0.000 0.904 1.751 
Age -0.013 0.008 -1.660 0.100 -0.028 0.002 
Trust in parties 0.120 0.090 1.340 0.184 -0.058 0.299 
Participation in protests -0.681 0.366 -1.860 0.066 -1.409 0.047 
National economy has improved 0.715 0.495 1.450 0.152 -0.269 1.699 
Personal finances have improved -0.058 0.411 -0.140 0.887 -0.875 0.759 
Resides in north -0.451 0.402 -1.120 0.266 -1.251 0.349 
Resides in Amazon -1.023 0.496 -2.060 0.042 -2.009 -0.036 
Resides in highlands -0.106 0.464 -0.230 0.821 -1.030 0.818 
Resides in rural area 0.092 0.464 0.200 0.843 -0.832 1.016 
Grew up in rural area -0.665 0.354 -1.880 0.064 -1.369 0.039 
Rightist ideology 0.303 0.080 3.810 0.000 0.145 0.461 
Supports FTA with USA 1.557 0.341 4.570 0.000 0.879 2.235 
Limit opposition voice -0.048 0.296 -0.160 0.871 -0.638 0.541 
Strongman populist leader -0.454 0.283 -1.600 0.113 -1.017 0.109 
Trust in indigenous movement 0.077 0.094 0.820 0.415 -0.110 0.264 
Experience of discrimination 0.102 0.221 0.460 0.645 -0.337 0.542 
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:       
Rightist ideology 0.079 0.138 0.570 0.570 -0.197 0.354 
Supports FTA with USA -0.425 0.617 -0.690 0.493 -1.653 0.803 
Limit opposition voice -0.279 0.511 -0.550 0.586 -1.295 0.737 
Strongman populist leader 0.057 0.505 0.110 0.910 -0.948 1.062 
Income 0.070 0.126 0.560 0.578 -0.180 0.321 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.278 0.152 -1.830 0.071 -0.580 0.024 
Experience of discrimination -0.046 0.283 -0.160 0.871 -0.610 0.518 
Constant -3.643 0.755 -4.830 0.000 -5.145 -2.141 
CHÁVEZ       
White (Mestizo) -16.899 0.424 -39.820 0.000 -17.743 -16.054 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.896 1.166 0.770 0.445 -1.424 3.215 
Parents speak indigenous language -17.388 4.499 -3.870 0.000 -26.339 -8.437 
Income -0.049 0.115 -0.420 0.673 -0.278 0.180 
Female -0.067 0.513 -0.130 0.896 -1.087 0.953 
Age -0.020 0.022 -0.900 0.370 -0.064 0.024 
Trust in parties 0.343 0.180 1.900 0.060 -0.015 0.702 
Participation in protests -1.834 1.214 -1.510 0.135 -4.249 0.581 
National economy has improved 0.338 0.664 0.510 0.612 -0.982 1.659 
Personal finances have improved -1.837 1.500 -1.220 0.224 -4.821 1.148 
Resides in north 0.521 0.608 0.860 0.394 -0.689 1.731 
Resides in Amazon 0.536 0.785 0.680 0.497 -1.026 2.098 
Resides in highlands 0.373 1.111 0.340 0.738 -1.838 2.584 
Resides in rural area -0.401 0.854 -0.470 0.640 -2.100 1.298 
Grew up in rural area -0.723 0.870 -0.830 0.409 -2.455 1.009 
Rightist ideology 0.213 0.131 1.620 0.108 -0.048 0.474 
Supports FTA with USA 0.368 0.533 0.690 0.491 -0.691 1.428 
Limit opposition voice 1.593 0.527 3.020 0.003 0.544 2.641 
Strongman populist leader -0.575 0.581 -0.990 0.326 -1.731 0.581 
Trust in indigenous movement 0.045 0.166 0.270 0.786 -0.284 0.375 
Experience of discrimination -0.095 0.258 -0.370 0.715 -0.608 0.418 
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:       
Rightist ideology 0.534 0.558 0.960 0.341 -0.576 1.644 
Supports FTA with USA 17.305 2.012 8.600 0.000 13.302 21.308 
Limit opposition voice -23.125 3.566 -6.490 0.000 -30.220 -16.030 
Strongman populist leader -3.208 2.646 -1.210 0.229 -8.473 2.056 
Income 2.586 0.983 2.630 0.010 0.630 4.542 
Trust in indigenous movement -6.661 2.822 -2.360 0.021 -12.276 -1.047 
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Table C6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Experience of discrimination -1.044 1.158 -0.900 0.370 -3.349 1.261 
Constant -3.515 2.346 -1.500 0.138 -8.182 1.153 
N = 607. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between 
linguistic group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics and ethnic attitudes. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table C7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA  base outcome         
GARCÍA             
White (Mestizo) -2.342 1.952 -1.200 0.234 -6.226 1.543 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -167.746 10.438 -16.070 0.000 -188.514 -146.977 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.624 0.281 -2.220 0.029 -1.183 -0.065 
Income 0.026 0.064 0.400 0.689 -0.102 0.154 
Female 0.396 0.230 1.720 0.088 -0.061 0.853 
Age 0.003 0.008 0.430 0.670 -0.012 0.019 
Trust in parties 0.182 0.084 2.170 0.033 0.015 0.349 
Participation in protests -0.573 0.459 -1.250 0.215 -1.486 0.340 
National economy has improved 0.035 0.357 0.100 0.921 -0.674 0.745 
Personal finances have improved 0.077 0.321 0.240 0.812 -0.561 0.714 
Resides in north 0.396 0.358 1.110 0.271 -0.316 1.108 
Resides in Amazon -1.265 0.558 -2.270 0.026 -2.376 -0.155 
Resides in highlands 0.274 0.535 0.510 0.609 -0.790 1.339 
Resides in rural area -0.097 0.424 -0.230 0.819 -0.940 0.746 
Grew up in rural area -0.831 0.374 -2.220 0.029 -1.574 -0.087 
Rightist ideology 0.269 0.082 3.300 0.001 0.107 0.431 
Supports FTA with USA 1.298 0.252 5.140 0.000 0.796 1.800 
Limit opposition voice -0.060 0.252 -0.240 0.813 -0.561 0.441 
Strongman populist leader -0.074 0.237 -0.310 0.755 -0.546 0.397 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.107 0.091 -1.170 0.244 -0.288 0.075 
Experience of discrimination 0.107 0.133 0.800 0.424 -0.158 0.371 
INTERACTIONS:             
White * Rightist ideology  0.274 0.273 1.000 0.318 -0.269 0.816 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology   8.738 1.137 7.680 0.000 6.475 11.001 
White * Supports FTA with USA  0.784 0.676 1.160 0.250 -0.562 2.129 
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA  111.213 3.544 31.380 0.000 104.161 118.265 
White * Limit opp. voice  0.809 0.767 1.060 0.294 -0.716 2.335 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 140.849 4.965 28.370 0.000 130.971 150.727 
White * Strongman pop. Leader 0.514 0.580 0.890 0.378 -0.640 1.669 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader -77.464 2.804 -27.630 0.000 -83.043 -71.886 
White * Income -0.087 0.187 -0.460 0.643 -0.460 0.286 
Indigenous * Income -8.160 0.682 -11.960 0.000 -9.518 -6.803 
White * Trust in indigenous movt. 0.207 0.244 0.850 0.399 -0.279 0.693 
Indigenous * Trust in indigenous movt. 26.742 1.509 17.720 0.000 23.740 29.744 
White * discrimination -0.136 0.529 -0.260 0.798 -1.188 0.916 
Indigenous * discrimination -21.279 0.918 -23.180 0.000 -23.105 -19.452 
Constant -2.309 0.753 -3.060 0.003 -3.808 -0.810 
FLORES       
White (Mestizo) 1.417 2.100 0.670 0.502 -2.762 5.595 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -597.330 19.430 -30.740 0.000 -635.989 -558.670 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.987 0.283 -3.490 0.001 -1.550 -0.424 
Income 0.223 0.063 3.560 0.001 0.099 0.348 
Female 1.331 0.217 6.130 0.000 0.899 1.763 
Age -0.013 0.007 -1.950 0.055 -0.026 0.000 
Trust in parties 0.132 0.100 1.320 0.190 -0.066 0.330 
Participation in protests -0.755 0.391 -1.930 0.057 -1.533 0.022 
National economy has improved 0.694 0.467 1.490 0.141 -0.235 1.622 
Personal finances have improved -0.006 0.458 -0.010 0.989 -0.918 0.906 
Resides in north -0.423 0.390 -1.090 0.281 -1.199 0.352 
Resides in Amazon -0.879 0.538 -1.630 0.106 -1.949 0.192 
Resides in highlands -0.129 0.481 -0.270 0.789 -1.085 0.827 
Resides in rural area -0.022 0.486 -0.050 0.964 -0.989 0.945 
Grew up in rural area -0.661 0.373 -1.770 0.080 -1.403 0.081 
Rightist ideology 0.332 0.058 5.750 0.000 0.217 0.446 
Supports FTA with USA 1.284 0.280 4.580 0.000 0.727 1.842 
Limit opposition voice -0.403 0.273 -1.480 0.144 -0.947 0.140 
Strongman populist leader -0.267 0.269 -0.990 0.325 -0.802 0.269 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.020 0.091 -0.220 0.825 -0.202 0.161 
Experience of discrimination 0.141 0.137 1.030 0.305 -0.131 0.414 
INTERACTIONS:       
White * Rightist ideology  0.078 0.279 0.280 0.781 -0.478 0.634 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology   51.502 1.801 28.600 0.000 47.919 55.085 
White * Supports FTA with USA  0.413 0.604 0.680 0.496 -0.789 1.616 
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA  196.607 6.356 30.930 0.000 183.962 209.253 
White * Limit opp. voice  1.239 0.926 1.340 0.185 -0.605 3.082 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 155.697 7.161 21.740 0.000 141.448 169.945 
White * Strongman pop. Leader -0.046 0.693 -0.070 0.948 -1.425 1.334 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader 4.860 2.913 1.670 0.099 -0.936 10.656 
White * Income -0.173 0.241 -0.720 0.475 -0.652 0.306 
Indigenous * Income 6.326 0.545 11.620 0.000 5.242 7.410 
White * Trust in indigenous movt. -0.213 0.295 -0.720 0.471 -0.800 0.373 
Indigenous * Trust in indigenous movt. 36.600 1.236 29.610 0.000 34.141 39.059 
White * discrimination -0.033 0.784 -0.040 0.966 -1.592 1.526 
Indigenous * discrimination -63.986 1.863 -34.350 0.000 -67.692 -60.279 
Constant -3.479 0.730 -4.760 0.000 -4.933 -2.026 
CHÁVEZ       
White (Mestizo) -15.516 2.768 -5.610 0.000 -21.023 -10.009 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -22.154 3.312 -6.690 0.000 -28.745 -15.563 
Parents speak indigenous language -17.712 0.603 -29.360 0.000 -18.912 -16.511 
Income -0.030 0.114 -0.260 0.793 -0.257 0.197 
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Table C7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Female 0.038 0.509 0.070 0.941 -0.974 1.051 
Age -0.026 0.024 -1.110 0.270 -0.074 0.021 
Trust in parties 0.400 0.179 2.240 0.028 0.045 0.756 
Participation in protests -1.341 1.045 -1.280 0.203 -3.420 0.738 
National economy has improved 0.088 0.727 0.120 0.904 -1.357 1.534 
Personal finances have improved -1.292 1.160 -1.110 0.269 -3.600 1.016 
Resides in north 0.330 0.594 0.560 0.580 -0.852 1.512 
Resides in Amazon 0.436 0.797 0.550 0.586 -1.151 2.022 
Resides in highlands 0.392 1.117 0.350 0.726 -1.830 2.614 
Resides in rural area -0.153 0.820 -0.190 0.853 -1.785 1.479 
Grew up in rural area -0.897 0.907 -0.990 0.326 -2.703 0.908 
Rightist ideology 0.206 0.131 1.570 0.120 -0.055 0.467 
Supports FTA with USA 0.133 0.507 0.260 0.793 -0.875 1.142 
Limit opposition voice 1.437 0.530 2.710 0.008 0.382 2.491 
Strongman populist leader -0.396 0.569 -0.700 0.489 -1.529 0.737 
Trust in indigenous movement -0.116 0.190 -0.610 0.543 -0.495 0.262 
Experience of discrimination -0.098 0.246 -0.400 0.693 -0.588 0.393 
INTERACTIONS:       
White * Rightist ideology  -0.233 0.282 -0.830 0.410 -0.794 0.327 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology   -14.472 0.748 -19.340 0.000 -15.960 -12.983 
White * Supports FTA with USA  1.537 0.648 2.370 0.020 0.248 2.826 
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA  69.839 3.274 21.330 0.000 63.324 76.354 
White * Limit opp. voice  -0.932 0.824 -1.130 0.261 -2.573 0.708 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 4.152 2.469 1.680 0.097 -0.761 9.065 
White * Strongman pop. Leader 0.296 0.904 0.330 0.744 -1.502 2.094 
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader 17.167 1.775 9.670 0.000 13.635 20.699 
White * Income -0.091 0.185 -0.490 0.624 -0.460 0.277 
Indigenous * Income 11.046 0.594 18.590 0.000 9.864 12.229 
White * Trust in indigenous movt. -0.261 0.329 -0.790 0.431 -0.915 0.394 
Indigenous * Trust in indigenous movt. -6.635 0.577 -11.490 0.000 -7.784 -5.486 
White * discrimination 0.085 0.507 0.170 0.867 -0.924 1.094 
Indigenous * discrimination -5.952 0.632 -9.410 0.000 -7.210 -4.693 
Constant -2.720 2.379 -1.140 0.256 -7.453 2.013 
N = 607. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-
identified group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics and ethnic attitudes. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 
Source: LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table C8: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .037^* .002 .019 .010 .088 (P) 
    .012 .096 (BC) 
Trust in parties .009 .000 .009 -.004 .028 (P) 
    -.003 .029 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .037^* .001 .017 .010 .077 (P) 
    .013 .082 (BC) 
FTA with USA -.001 -.001 .024 -.043 .048 (P) 
    -.038 .059 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .001 .001 .009 -.011 .024 (P) 
    -.009 .032 (BC) 
Direct democracy (pop5) .008 .002 .015 -.008 .053 (P) 
    -.005 .070 (BC) 
Trust in indigenous movement .000 .003 .010 -.013 .032 (P) 
    -.023 .021 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.008 .000 .014 -.043 .015 (P) 
    -.063 .009 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .084^* .008 .048 .012 .200 (P) 
    .011 .197 (BC) 
Direct effect .114* -.007 .065 -.031 .241 (P) 
    .000 .262 (BC) 
Total effects .198^* .001 .071 .078 .368 (P) 
    .094 .417 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .424      
N = 42. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. Notes: Coefficients (except 
totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Flores) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and 
personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated 
with bootstrap (869 repetitions, from 77 clusters, across 7 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
 
Table C9: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 
2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.006 .003 .016 -.029 .039 (P) 
    -.032 .034 (BC) 
Trust in parties .001 -.001 .008 -.013 .019 (P) 
    -.009 .033 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.004 .002 .017 -.030 .041 (P) 
    -.030 .041 (BC) 
FTA with USA -.009 .005 .031 -.049 .078 (P) 
    -.049 .080 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader .001 .000 .007 -.013 .017 (P) 
    -.009 .024 (BC) 
Direct democracy (pop5) .003 .001 .013 -.013 .039 (P) 
    -.009 .062 (BC) 
Trust in indigenous movement .000 -.001 .006 -.013 .010 (P) 
    -.013 .010 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination .002 -.002 .009 -.026 .010 (P) 
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Table C9: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 
2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
    -.016 .013 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.013 .007 .060 -.091 .141 (P) 
    -.085 .155 (BC) 
Direct effect -.146* .005 .068 -.265 .000 (P) 
    -.271 -.012 (BC) 
Total effects -.159 .012 .088 -.291 .058 (P) 
    -.292 .056 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .081      
N = 322. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. Notes: Coefficients (except 
totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Flores) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. 
Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. 
Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 
repetitions, from 76 clusters, across 7 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
 
Table C10: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, 
Peru 2006 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .027^* -.001 .015 .003 .061 (P) 
    .006 .069 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.006 .001 .009 -.027 .009 (P) 
    -.038 .003 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .019 .000 .018 -.018 .055 (P) 
    -.016 .057 (BC) 
FTA with USA .011 -.002 .025 -.035 .062 (P) 
    -.028 .073 (BC) 
Strong, populist leader -.003 -.001 .010 -.027 .011 (P) 
    -.050 .005 (BC) 
Direct democracy (pop5) .021^* .007 .026 .000 .099 (P) 
    .000 .099 (BC) 
Trust in indigenous movement .000 .000 .007 -.015 .013 (P) 
    -.030 .007 (BC) 
Experience of discrimination -.006 .001 .012 -.031 .021 (P) 
    -.044 .009 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .064 .005 .047 -.016 .178 (P) 
    -.016 .178 (BC) 
Direct effect .050 -.011 .085 -.148 .182 (P) 
    -.117 .188 (BC) 
Total effects .114 -.006 .105 -.104 .297 (P) 
    -.086 .308 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .562      
N=298. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. Notes: Coefficients (except 
totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Flores) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. 
Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. 
Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (886 
repetitions, from 70 clusters, across 7 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2006. 
able C11: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Peru 2011 
Family Linguistic Background Ethnic Self-Identification  
Vote Choice White Mestiza Indigenous Total 
Parents speak Spanish only     
Ollanta Humala 23 207 6 236 
Keiko Fujimori 14 139 10 163 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 8 61 0 69 
Alejandro Toledo 3 32 0 35 
Other/Null 6 53 1 60 
Parents speak an indigenous language     
Ollanta Humala 7 124 31 162 
Keiko Fujimori 5 35 6 46 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 2 6 1 9 
Alejandro Toledo 1 13 4 18 
Other/Null 0 21 3 24 
Total 69 691 62 822 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group. 
Source: Author’s elaboration from LAPOP 2012 
 
Table C12: Descriptive Statistics: Ethnic Attitudes Model Sample, Peru 2011 
 Ethnic Self-Identification  
Family Linguistic Background White Mestiza Indigenous Total 
Parents speak Spanish only     
Ollanta Humala 12 92 2 106 
Keiko Fujimori 7 72 5 84 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 1 19 0 20 
Alejandro Toledo 2 13 0 15 
Other/Null 2 22 0 24 
Parents speak an indigenous language    0 
Ollanta Humala 3 50 13 66 
Keiko Fujimori 3 16 3 22 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 1 2 0 3 
Alejandro Toledo 1 4 1 6 
Other/Null 0 11 3 14 
Total 32 301 27 360 
Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group. 




Table C13: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA base outcome      
FUJIMORI       
White (Mestizo) 0.190 0.347 0.550 0.585 -0.500 0.880 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.402 0.409 0.980 0.328 -0.410 1.215 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.746 0.312 -2.390 0.019 -1.366 -0.126 
Income -0.022 0.032 -0.670 0.506 -0.086 0.043 
Female 0.923 0.186 4.950 0.000 0.553 1.294 
Age -0.014 0.007 -2.160 0.034 -0.027 -0.001 
Trust in parties -0.018 0.062 -0.290 0.772 -0.142 0.106 
Participation in protests -0.810 0.283 -2.860 0.005 -1.372 -0.247 
National economy has improved 0.293 0.216 1.360 0.179 -0.136 0.722 
Personal finances have improved -0.286 0.257 -1.110 0.268 -0.797 0.224 
Resides in north -0.370 0.303 -1.220 0.225 -0.972 0.232 
Resides in Amazon -0.091 0.375 -0.240 0.808 -0.836 0.654 
Resides in highlands -0.362 0.394 -0.920 0.361 -1.145 0.421 
Resides in rural area -0.044 0.273 -0.160 0.873 -0.585 0.498 
Rightist ideology 0.056 0.047 1.190 0.238 -0.037 0.149 
Wealth redistribution -0.084 0.094 -0.890 0.374 -0.271 0.103 
Public health service 0.024 0.093 0.260 0.795 -0.161 0.209 
Nationalisations -0.110 0.051 -2.150 0.035 -0.212 -0.008 
Free trade 0.103 0.084 1.220 0.226 -0.065 0.271 
Limit opposition voice -0.068 0.074 -0.910 0.365 -0.216 0.080 
Direct democracy -0.072 0.073 -0.990 0.327 -0.217 0.073 
Minorities to follow majority 0.093 0.079 1.170 0.245 -0.065 0.250 
Constant 0.434 0.915 0.470 0.636 -1.384 2.253 
KUCZYNSKI       
White (Mestizo) 0.341 0.459 0.740 0.460 -0.572 1.254 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -1.336 1.249 -1.070 0.288 -3.819 1.147 
Parents speak indigenous language -1.413 0.340 -4.160 0.000 -2.088 -0.738 
Income 0.119 0.048 2.480 0.015 0.024 0.215 
Female 0.668 0.299 2.240 0.028 0.074 1.262 
Age -0.034 0.008 -4.200 0.000 -0.050 -0.018 
Trust in parties 0.017 0.090 0.190 0.852 -0.162 0.196 
Participation in protests -0.839 0.528 -1.590 0.116 -1.889 0.210 
National economy has improved 0.059 0.515 0.120 0.909 -0.965 1.083 
Personal finances have improved -0.496 0.369 -1.340 0.183 -1.229 0.238 
Resides in north -0.664 0.440 -1.510 0.134 -1.538 0.210 
Resides in Amazon -0.330 0.365 -0.910 0.368 -1.055 0.395 
Resides in highlands 0.230 0.463 0.500 0.621 -0.690 1.150 
Resides in rural area -0.831 0.472 -1.760 0.082 -1.770 0.108 
Rightist ideology 0.068 0.082 0.830 0.407 -0.094 0.231 
Wealth redistribution -0.234 0.134 -1.750 0.084 -0.500 0.032 
Public health service 0.083 0.150 0.550 0.582 -0.215 0.381 
Nationalisations -0.223 0.073 -3.050 0.003 -0.368 -0.078 
Free trade -0.041 0.109 -0.380 0.705 -0.258 0.175 
Limit opposition voice -0.012 0.094 -0.130 0.897 -0.199 0.175 
Direct democracy -0.079 0.093 -0.850 0.396 -0.263 0.105 
Minorities to follow majority 0.110 0.092 1.200 0.234 -0.073 0.293 
Constant 0.697 1.244 0.560 0.577 -1.775 3.168 
TOLEDO       
White (Mestizo) -0.054 0.536 -0.100 0.920 -1.118 1.010 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.024 0.759 0.030 0.974 -1.485 1.534 
Parents speak indigenous language 0.075 0.384 0.190 0.846 -0.688 0.838 
Income 0.132 0.054 2.440 0.017 0.025 0.240 
Female 0.745 0.333 2.240 0.028 0.084 1.407 
Age 0.004 0.009 0.390 0.698 -0.015 0.022 
Trust in parties 0.032 0.107 0.300 0.768 -0.181 0.245 
Participation in protests -0.378 0.421 -0.900 0.372 -1.214 0.459 
National economy has improved -0.450 0.426 -1.060 0.293 -1.296 0.395 
Personal finances have improved 0.172 0.341 0.500 0.616 -0.507 0.850 
Resides in north 0.132 0.429 0.310 0.760 -0.721 0.984 
Resides in Amazon 0.314 0.506 0.620 0.536 -0.691 1.319 
Resides in highlands -0.076 0.548 -0.140 0.890 -1.165 1.013 
Resides in rural area 0.250 0.421 0.590 0.555 -0.588 1.087 
Rightist ideology -0.033 0.069 -0.480 0.635 -0.169 0.104 
Wealth redistribution -0.191 0.128 -1.500 0.138 -0.445 0.063 
Public health service 0.233 0.158 1.480 0.143 -0.080 0.547 
Nationalisations -0.191 0.080 -2.380 0.019 -0.351 -0.032 
Free trade 0.004 0.108 0.040 0.970 -0.210 0.218 
Limit opposition voice -0.026 0.100 -0.260 0.795 -0.225 0.173 
Direct democracy 0.023 0.103 0.230 0.821 -0.182 0.229 
Minorities to follow majority 0.021 0.105 0.200 0.842 -0.188 0.230 
Constant -3.113 1.742 -1.790 0.077 -6.576 0.349 
N = 807. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Lima’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA base outcome      
FUJIMORI       
White (Mestizo) 0.193 0.363 0.530 0.597 -0.529 0.915 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.474 0.388 1.220 0.225 -0.297 1.244 
Parents speak indigenous language -0.522 1.514 -0.340 0.731 -3.530 2.486 
Income -0.051 0.034 -1.510 0.134 -0.119 0.016 
Female 0.943 0.187 5.050 0.000 0.572 1.314 
Age -0.015 0.007 -2.280 0.025 -0.029 -0.002 
Trust in parties -0.013 0.064 -0.210 0.836 -0.140 0.114 
Participation in protests -0.864 0.281 -3.070 0.003 -1.423 -0.305 
National economy has improved 0.285 0.221 1.290 0.200 -0.154 0.724 
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Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Personal finances have improved -0.297 0.265 -1.120 0.264 -0.824 0.229 
Resides in north -0.417 0.311 -1.340 0.183 -1.034 0.201 
Resides in Amazon -0.164 0.383 -0.430 0.669 -0.925 0.596 
Resides in highlands -0.341 0.392 -0.870 0.387 -1.119 0.438 
Resides in rural area -0.006 0.283 -0.020 0.982 -0.568 0.555 
Rightist ideology 0.079 0.051 1.560 0.124 -0.022 0.180 
Wealth redistribution -0.093 0.113 -0.830 0.410 -0.317 0.131 
Public health service 0.053 0.127 0.420 0.677 -0.199 0.305 
Nationalisations -0.103 0.066 -1.560 0.121 -0.233 0.028 
Free trade 0.082 0.100 0.820 0.412 -0.116 0.281 
Limit opposition voice -0.117 0.082 -1.420 0.158 -0.279 0.046 
Direct democracy -0.079 0.079 -1.000 0.320 -0.236 0.078 
Minorities to follow majority 0.148 0.081 1.830 0.070 -0.013 0.308 
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:       
Rightist ideology -0.166 0.137 -1.210 0.230 -0.438 0.107 
Wealth redistribution -0.018 0.220 -0.080 0.935 -0.456 0.420 
Public health service -0.074 0.213 -0.350 0.731 -0.497 0.350 
Nationalisations -0.035 0.135 -0.260 0.798 -0.303 0.233 
Free trade 0.110 0.170 0.650 0.519 -0.228 0.448 
Limit opposition voice 0.157 0.182 0.860 0.391 -0.205 0.519 
Direct democracy 0.068 0.182 0.370 0.709 -0.294 0.430 
Minorities to follow majority -0.212 0.159 -1.330 0.186 -0.527 0.104 
Income 0.105 0.071 1.490 0.141 -0.035 0.246 
Constant 0.541 0.970 0.560 0.578 -1.386 2.468 
KUCZYNSKI       
White (Mestizo) 0.401 0.467 0.860 0.393 -0.527 1.329 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.010 1.055 -1.900 0.060 -4.107 0.088 
Parents speak indigenous language -5.329 2.317 -2.300 0.024 -9.933 -0.725 
Income 0.074 0.052 1.430 0.157 -0.029 0.177 
Female 0.667 0.313 2.130 0.036 0.046 1.289 
Age -0.032 0.009 -3.780 0.000 -0.049 -0.015 
Trust in parties 0.026 0.090 0.290 0.773 -0.153 0.205 
Participation in protests -1.059 0.540 -1.960 0.053 -2.132 0.015 
National economy has improved 0.217 0.508 0.430 0.671 -0.793 1.227 
Personal finances have improved -0.587 0.395 -1.490 0.141 -1.372 0.197 
Resides in north -0.726 0.431 -1.690 0.095 -1.582 0.130 
Resides in Amazon -0.428 0.367 -1.170 0.246 -1.158 0.301 
Resides in highlands 0.284 0.477 0.590 0.553 -0.664 1.231 
Resides in rural area -0.666 0.463 -1.440 0.154 -1.587 0.255 
Rightist ideology 0.035 0.086 0.410 0.683 -0.136 0.206 
Wealth redistribution -0.192 0.133 -1.440 0.153 -0.457 0.073 
Public health service 0.095 0.160 0.600 0.553 -0.223 0.414 
Nationalisations -0.191 0.079 -2.420 0.018 -0.348 -0.034 
Free trade -0.069 0.126 -0.550 0.585 -0.319 0.181 
Limit opposition voice -0.023 0.103 -0.220 0.827 -0.227 0.182 
Direct democracy -0.060 0.102 -0.580 0.562 -0.263 0.144 
Minorities to follow majority 0.076 0.110 0.690 0.490 -0.142 0.295 
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:       
Rightist ideology 0.298 0.136 2.190 0.031 0.027 0.569 
Wealth redistribution -0.798 0.527 -1.520 0.133 -1.845 0.248 
Public health service 0.513 0.345 1.490 0.140 -0.172 1.199 
Nationalisations -0.208 0.191 -1.090 0.281 -0.588 0.173 
Free trade 0.123 0.235 0.520 0.602 -0.344 0.590 
Limit opposition voice -0.206 0.241 -0.860 0.395 -0.684 0.272 
Direct democracy -0.295 0.176 -1.680 0.097 -0.646 0.055 
Minorities to follow majority 0.523 0.221 2.370 0.020 0.084 0.961 
Income 0.378 0.167 2.260 0.026 0.046 0.709 
Constant 1.016 1.268 0.800 0.425 -1.504 3.535 
TOLEDO       
White (Mestizo) -0.109 0.544 -0.200 0.841 -1.190 0.972 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.243 0.788 0.310 0.758 -1.323 1.810 
Parents speak indigenous language -3.548 2.669 -1.330 0.187 -8.852 1.757 
Income 0.129 0.067 1.920 0.058 -0.004 0.262 
Female 0.830 0.333 2.490 0.015 0.168 1.492 
Age 0.005 0.009 0.520 0.601 -0.013 0.023 
Trust in parties 0.026 0.110 0.230 0.816 -0.192 0.243 
Participation in protests -0.379 0.425 -0.890 0.376 -1.224 0.466 
National economy has improved -0.524 0.476 -1.100 0.275 -1.470 0.423 
Personal finances have improved 0.142 0.349 0.410 0.685 -0.551 0.836 
Resides in north 0.115 0.450 0.260 0.799 -0.779 1.009 
Resides in Amazon 0.253 0.525 0.480 0.631 -0.790 1.295 
Resides in highlands 0.046 0.523 0.090 0.930 -0.994 1.086 
Resides in rural area 0.266 0.425 0.630 0.533 -0.578 1.110 
Rightist ideology -0.037 0.084 -0.440 0.664 -0.204 0.130 
Wealth redistribution -0.234 0.169 -1.380 0.170 -0.570 0.102 
Public health service 0.169 0.187 0.910 0.368 -0.202 0.540 
Nationalisations -0.148 0.114 -1.290 0.199 -0.375 0.079 
Free trade -0.109 0.120 -0.910 0.366 -0.347 0.129 
Limit opposition voice -0.103 0.137 -0.750 0.452 -0.376 0.169 
Direct democracy -0.056 0.139 -0.410 0.686 -0.332 0.219 
Minorities to follow majority 0.079 0.145 0.540 0.588 -0.209 0.366 
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:       
Rightist ideology -0.065 0.156 -0.420 0.678 -0.374 0.244 
Wealth redistribution 0.189 0.292 0.650 0.519 -0.392 0.771 
Public health service 0.079 0.355 0.220 0.825 -0.627 0.785 
Nationalisations -0.130 0.180 -0.720 0.473 -0.487 0.228 
Free trade 0.404 0.222 1.820 0.073 -0.038 0.846 
Limit opposition voice 0.213 0.235 0.910 0.366 -0.253 0.679 
Direct democracy 0.206 0.226 0.910 0.364 -0.243 0.656 
Minorities to follow majority -0.164 0.191 -0.860 0.391 -0.543 0.214 
Income 0.027 0.110 0.250 0.807 -0.192 0.246 
Constant -1.830 2.126 -0.860 0.392 -6.054 2.395 
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Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
N = 807. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between 
linguistic group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristic. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C15: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA       
FUJIMORI       
White (Mestizo) 2.848 2.466 1.150 0.251 -2.053 7.750 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -2.795 4.380 -0.640 0.525 -11.499 5.909 
Speaks an indigenous language -0.756 0.315 -2.400 0.018 -1.381 -0.130 
Income -0.032 0.034 -0.920 0.358 -0.100 0.036 
Female 1.001 0.198 5.060 0.000 0.607 1.394 
Age -0.015 0.007 -2.150 0.034 -0.030 -0.001 
Trust in parties -0.011 0.061 -0.180 0.858 -0.131 0.110 
Participation in protests -0.988 0.325 -3.040 0.003 -1.634 -0.343 
National economy has improved 0.281 0.220 1.280 0.204 -0.155 0.718 
Personal finances have improved -0.292 0.275 -1.060 0.291 -0.839 0.255 
Resides in north -0.470 0.314 -1.500 0.138 -1.093 0.154 
Resides in Amazon -0.277 0.380 -0.730 0.467 -1.032 0.477 
Resides in highlands -0.275 0.401 -0.690 0.495 -1.071 0.522 
Resides in rural area -0.006 0.288 -0.020 0.984 -0.577 0.566 
Rightist ideology 0.108 0.051 2.130 0.036 0.007 0.210 
Wealth redistribution -0.058 0.100 -0.580 0.565 -0.256 0.140 
Public health service 0.008 0.105 0.080 0.939 -0.200 0.216 
Nationalisations -0.112 0.057 -1.970 0.052 -0.225 0.001 
Free trade 0.046 0.084 0.540 0.589 -0.122 0.213 
Limit opposition voice -0.039 0.069 -0.570 0.571 -0.177 0.098 
Direct democracy -0.054 0.073 -0.740 0.460 -0.199 0.091 
Minorities to follow majority 0.003 0.084 0.030 0.973 -0.164 0.170 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.235 0.130 -1.810 0.073 -0.493 0.022 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.617 0.488 -1.270 0.209 -1.587 0.352 
White * Wealth redist. -0.043 0.480 -0.090 0.929 -0.997 0.911 
Indigenous * Wealth redist. -1.734 0.560 -3.100 0.003 -2.847 -0.621 
White * Public health service 0.024 0.553 0.040 0.965 -1.075 1.124 
Indigenous * Public health service 1.137 0.299 3.800 0.000 0.543 1.730 
White * Nationalisations -0.190 0.179 -1.060 0.293 -0.545 0.166 
Indigenous * Nationalisations -0.450 0.278 -1.620 0.108 -1.002 0.102 
White * Free trade -0.080 0.343 -0.230 0.815 -0.761 0.601 
Indigenous * Free trade 2.156 1.060 2.030 0.045 0.050 4.263 
White * Limit opp. voice -0.433 0.267 -1.620 0.108 -0.964 0.097 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice -0.253 0.485 -0.520 0.603 -1.218 0.711 
White * Direct democracy -0.110 0.257 -0.430 0.669 -0.621 0.400 
Indigenous * Direct democracy -0.237 0.264 -0.900 0.371 -0.762 0.287 
White * Minorities follow maj. 0.714 0.337 2.120 0.037 0.044 1.385 
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj. 0.527 0.345 1.530 0.130 -0.158 1.213 
White * Income -0.055 0.115 -0.480 0.634 -0.284 0.174 
Indigenous * Income 0.252 0.135 1.860 0.066 -0.017 0.521 
KUCZYNSKI       
White (Mestizo) -1.564 3.763 -0.420 0.679 -9.041 5.913 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -48.167 2.880 -16.730 0.000 -53.889 -42.444 
Speaks an indigenous language -1.610 0.344 -4.670 0.000 -2.295 -0.926 
Income 0.121 0.052 2.330 0.022 0.018 0.224 
Female 0.736 0.295 2.490 0.015 0.149 1.323 
Age -0.034 0.008 -4.070 0.000 -0.051 -0.018 
Trust in parties 0.019 0.088 0.210 0.833 -0.155 0.192 
Participation in protests -0.830 0.522 -1.590 0.116 -1.868 0.209 
National economy has improved 0.191 0.483 0.400 0.693 -0.768 1.151 
Personal finances have improved -0.522 0.367 -1.420 0.158 -1.252 0.207 
Resides in north -0.600 0.481 -1.250 0.215 -1.555 0.355 
Resides in Amazon -0.414 0.382 -1.080 0.281 -1.174 0.345 
Resides in highlands 0.371 0.493 0.750 0.454 -0.609 1.351 
Resides in rural area -0.808 0.483 -1.670 0.098 -1.767 0.152 
Rightist ideology 0.075 0.088 0.850 0.399 -0.100 0.250 
Wealth redistribution -0.216 0.138 -1.570 0.121 -0.491 0.058 
Public health service 0.064 0.152 0.420 0.676 -0.238 0.366 
Nationalisations -0.307 0.084 -3.650 0.000 -0.475 -0.140 
Free trade -0.102 0.113 -0.900 0.368 -0.326 0.122 
Limit opposition voice 0.078 0.110 0.710 0.480 -0.141 0.297 
Direct democracy -0.094 0.091 -1.030 0.306 -0.276 0.087 
Minorities to follow majority 0.050 0.115 0.430 0.666 -0.179 0.279 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -0.114 0.231 -0.490 0.622 -0.574 0.345 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology 0.113 0.211 0.540 0.592 -0.306 0.532 
White * Wealth redist. 0.655 0.782 0.840 0.404 -0.898 2.208 
Indigenous * Wealth redist. -7.421 0.546 -13.600 0.000 -8.506 -6.337 
White * Public health service -0.457 0.589 -0.780 0.439 -1.628 0.713 
Indigenous * Public health service 1.652 0.538 3.070 0.003 0.583 2.721 
White * Nationalisations 0.348 0.335 1.040 0.302 -0.318 1.014 
Indigenous * Nationalisations 5.188 0.513 10.120 0.000 4.169 6.207 
White * Free trade 0.540 0.411 1.320 0.192 -0.276 1.356 
Indigenous * Free trade 0.571 0.408 1.400 0.165 -0.239 1.381 
White * Limit opp. voice -0.498 0.298 -1.670 0.099 -1.090 0.095 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice -4.911 0.686 -7.160 0.000 -6.274 -3.548 
White * Direct democracy -0.097 0.249 -0.390 0.697 -0.592 0.398 
Indigenous * Direct democracy 3.361 0.537 6.260 0.000 2.294 4.429 
White * Minorities follow maj. 0.438 0.335 1.310 0.194 -0.227 1.104 
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj. 6.349 0.439 14.460 0.000 5.476 7.221 
White * Income -0.212 0.151 -1.400 0.164 -0.511 0.088 
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Table C15: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Indigenous * Income 0.650 0.119 5.460 0.000 0.413 0.886 
TOLEDO       
White (Mestizo) -285.284 17.246 -16.540 0.000 -319.557 -251.011 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 6.778 4.498 1.510 0.135 -2.161 15.717 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.006 0.413 0.010 0.988 -0.814 0.826 
Income 0.110 0.057 1.930 0.057 -0.003 0.223 
Female 0.592 0.335 1.770 0.081 -0.074 1.258 
Age -0.002 0.010 -0.190 0.848 -0.022 0.018 
Trust in parties 0.067 0.109 0.620 0.538 -0.149 0.283 
Participation in protests -0.466 0.391 -1.190 0.236 -1.242 0.310 
National economy has improved -0.332 0.452 -0.730 0.465 -1.231 0.567 
Personal finances have improved 0.269 0.367 0.730 0.466 -0.461 0.998 
Resides in north 0.214 0.422 0.510 0.613 -0.625 1.052 
Resides in Amazon 0.288 0.504 0.570 0.569 -0.714 1.291 
Resides in highlands 0.061 0.568 0.110 0.915 -1.068 1.189 
Resides in rural area 0.093 0.424 0.220 0.828 -0.750 0.935 
Rightist ideology -0.012 0.074 -0.160 0.870 -0.159 0.135 
Wealth redistribution -0.111 0.140 -0.790 0.431 -0.388 0.167 
Public health service 0.212 0.159 1.340 0.184 -0.103 0.528 
Nationalisations -0.238 0.094 -2.520 0.014 -0.426 -0.050 
Free trade -0.057 0.113 -0.500 0.615 -0.281 0.167 
Limit opposition voice 0.038 0.105 0.370 0.714 -0.169 0.246 
Direct democracy 0.006 0.126 0.050 0.961 -0.245 0.258 
Minorities to follow majority 0.013 0.113 0.120 0.906 -0.212 0.239 
INTERACTIONS       
White * Rightist ideology -6.553 0.392 -16.730 0.000 -7.331 -5.775 
Indigenous * Rightist ideology -0.374 0.213 -1.760 0.082 -0.797 0.049 
White * Wealth redist. -60.726 2.383 -25.480 0.000 -65.462 -55.991 
Indigenous * Wealth redist. -0.021 0.325 -0.070 0.948 -0.667 0.624 
White * Public health service 71.930 3.422 21.020 0.000 65.131 78.730 
Indigenous * Public health service -1.111 0.613 -1.810 0.073 -2.329 0.108 
White * Nationalisations 8.076 0.605 13.340 0.000 6.873 9.280 
Indigenous * Nationalisations -0.274 0.448 -0.610 0.542 -1.164 0.615 
White * Free trade -33.672 1.499 -22.460 0.000 -36.652 -30.693 
Indigenous * Free trade 1.458 0.605 2.410 0.018 0.255 2.661 
White * Limit opp. voice -9.147 0.571 -16.010 0.000 -10.283 -8.012 
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice 0.114 0.446 0.260 0.799 -0.772 0.999 
White * Direct democracy 3.657 0.715 5.110 0.000 2.236 5.079 
Indigenous * Direct democracy 0.365 0.494 0.740 0.462 -0.617 1.347 
White * Minorities follow maj. 9.425 0.804 11.720 0.000 7.827 11.022 
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj. -1.349 0.418 -3.230 0.002 -2.180 -0.518 
White * Income 24.933 0.904 27.590 0.000 23.137 26.730 
Indigenous * Income -0.168 0.234 -0.720 0.475 -0.633 0.298 
Constant -2.848 2.031 -1.400 0.165 -6.885 1.190 
N = 807. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-
identified group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristic. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C16: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA       
FUJIMORI       
White (Mestizo) 0.243 0.523 0.460 0.644 -0.797 1.283 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.295 0.582 0.510 0.614 -0.864 1.454 
Speaks an indigenous language -0.784 0.431 -1.820 0.073 -1.641 0.074 
Income -0.016 0.042 -0.380 0.708 -0.100 0.068 
Female 0.701 0.274 2.550 0.013 0.154 1.247 
Age -0.014 0.010 -1.440 0.153 -0.033 0.005 
Trust in parties -0.042 0.089 -0.470 0.636 -0.220 0.135 
Participation in protests -0.705 0.440 -1.600 0.113 -1.581 0.170 
National economy has improved 0.245 0.322 0.760 0.449 -0.396 0.886 
Personal finances have improved -0.014 0.381 -0.040 0.970 -0.773 0.744 
Resides in north -0.981 0.457 -2.150 0.035 -1.890 -0.073 
Resides in Amazon -0.788 0.560 -1.410 0.163 -1.902 0.325 
Resides in highlands -0.745 0.596 -1.250 0.215 -1.932 0.441 
Resides in rural area 0.081 0.374 0.220 0.829 -0.664 0.826 
Rightist ideology 0.084 0.065 1.290 0.201 -0.046 0.215 
Wealth redistribution -0.090 0.141 -0.640 0.524 -0.370 0.190 
Public health service -0.071 0.141 -0.500 0.615 -0.350 0.209 
Nationalisations 0.013 0.069 0.180 0.854 -0.125 0.150 
Free trade 0.139 0.116 1.200 0.235 -0.092 0.369 
Limit opposition voice -0.068 0.092 -0.740 0.462 -0.250 0.115 
Direct democracy -0.169 0.107 -1.580 0.118 -0.382 0.044 
Minorities to follow majority 0.152 0.089 1.710 0.090 -0.025 0.329 
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -1.115 0.714 -1.560 0.122 -2.536 0.306 
Supports racial quotas for university 0.040 0.065 0.620 0.539 -0.089 0.168 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause 0.031 0.324 0.090 0.925 -0.615 0.676 
Constant 0.694 1.138 0.610 0.543 -1.569 2.958 
KUCZYNSKI       
White (Mestizo) -0.494 0.801 -0.620 0.539 -2.088 1.101 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -13.058 0.641 -20.390 0.000 -14.332 -11.783 
Speaks an indigenous language -0.947 0.491 -1.930 0.058 -1.924 0.031 
Income 0.046 0.087 0.530 0.601 -0.127 0.218 
Female 0.064 0.458 0.140 0.890 -0.847 0.975 
Age -0.027 0.014 -1.980 0.051 -0.054 0.000 
Trust in parties 0.192 0.154 1.250 0.216 -0.114 0.498 
Participation in protests -1.740 0.819 -2.120 0.037 -3.370 -0.110 
National economy has improved -0.131 0.909 -0.140 0.886 -1.939 1.677 
Personal finances have improved -0.119 0.697 -0.170 0.865 -1.505 1.267 
Resides in north -0.542 0.575 -0.940 0.348 -1.686 0.602 
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Table C16: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Resides in Amazon -0.888 0.904 -0.980 0.329 -2.688 0.911 
Resides in highlands 0.525 0.959 0.550 0.585 -1.382 2.433 
Resides in rural area -1.890 1.392 -1.360 0.178 -4.660 0.880 
Rightist ideology 0.019 0.096 0.190 0.847 -0.172 0.209 
Wealth redistribution -0.033 0.222 -0.150 0.883 -0.475 0.409 
Public health service -0.356 0.195 -1.820 0.072 -0.745 0.033 
Nationalisations -0.336 0.149 -2.250 0.027 -0.633 -0.039 
Free trade 0.401 0.188 2.130 0.036 0.027 0.776 
Limit opposition voice 0.151 0.193 0.780 0.437 -0.234 0.536 
Direct democracy -0.038 0.161 -0.240 0.812 -0.359 0.282 
Minorities to follow majority -0.032 0.150 -0.220 0.830 -0.332 0.267 
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -0.600 1.065 -0.560 0.575 -2.718 1.519 
Supports racial quotas for university -0.136 0.132 -1.030 0.306 -0.400 0.127 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause 0.231 0.600 0.390 0.701 -0.962 1.424 
Constant 0.776 2.197 0.350 0.725 -3.594 5.147 
TOLEDO       
White (Mestizo) 0.593 0.802 0.740 0.462 -1.003 2.189 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.534 1.528 -0.350 0.728 -3.575 2.506 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.300 0.780 0.390 0.701 -1.251 1.852 
Income 0.224 0.096 2.330 0.022 0.033 0.414 
Female 0.167 0.494 0.340 0.736 -0.815 1.149 
Age 0.012 0.018 0.680 0.501 -0.023 0.047 
Trust in parties -0.067 0.146 -0.460 0.650 -0.358 0.225 
Participation in protests -0.625 0.729 -0.860 0.394 -2.076 0.826 
National economy has improved 0.276 0.676 0.410 0.684 -1.068 1.621 
Personal finances have improved 0.034 0.634 0.050 0.957 -1.228 1.297 
Resides in north 0.665 0.741 0.900 0.372 -0.809 2.138 
Resides in Amazon 0.482 1.123 0.430 0.669 -1.752 2.715 
Resides in highlands 0.173 0.830 0.210 0.835 -1.479 1.826 
Resides in rural area 0.790 0.731 1.080 0.283 -0.663 2.244 
Rightist ideology -0.148 0.100 -1.480 0.143 -0.347 0.051 
Wealth redistribution 0.345 0.251 1.370 0.174 -0.155 0.845 
Public health service 0.215 0.355 0.610 0.545 -0.490 0.921 
Nationalisations -0.238 0.130 -1.830 0.071 -0.496 0.021 
Free trade 0.027 0.144 0.190 0.852 -0.260 0.314 
Limit opposition voice -0.054 0.172 -0.320 0.753 -0.397 0.288 
Direct democracy 0.001 0.137 0.000 0.996 -0.272 0.273 
Minorities to follow majority 0.071 0.162 0.440 0.665 -0.252 0.394 
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -13.986 0.603 -23.200 0.000 -15.185 -12.787 
Supports racial quotas for university -0.096 0.129 -0.750 0.458 -0.353 0.161 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause 0.750 0.553 1.360 0.179 -0.350 1.851 
Constant -6.609 3.473 -1.900 0.061 -13.520 0.302 
N = 352. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base 
category ‘Lima’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C17: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
HUMALA base outcome      
FUJIMORI       
White (Mestizo) 0.261 0.522 0.500 0.618 -0.776 1.299 
Indigenous (Mestizo) 0.283 0.575 0.490 0.624 -0.861 1.427 
Speaks an indigenous language -0.775 0.662 -1.170 0.245 -2.092 0.542 
Income -0.014 0.043 -0.320 0.746 -0.100 0.072 
Female 0.682 0.273 2.490 0.015 0.138 1.225 
Age -0.013 0.010 -1.360 0.176 -0.032 0.006 
Trust in parties -0.049 0.089 -0.550 0.582 -0.226 0.128 
Participation in protests -0.695 0.444 -1.570 0.121 -1.579 0.188 
National economy has improved 0.245 0.324 0.750 0.453 -0.400 0.889 
Personal finances have improved -0.004 0.376 -0.010 0.992 -0.751 0.743 
Resides in north -0.982 0.460 -2.140 0.036 -1.898 -0.067 
Resides in Amazon -0.755 0.571 -1.320 0.190 -1.891 0.380 
Resides in highlands -0.798 0.603 -1.320 0.189 -1.999 0.402 
Resides in rural area 0.062 0.378 0.160 0.871 -0.691 0.814 
Rightist ideology 0.085 0.065 1.300 0.197 -0.045 0.214 
Wealth redistribution -0.082 0.140 -0.590 0.560 -0.361 0.197 
Public health service -0.079 0.138 -0.570 0.567 -0.355 0.196 
Nationalisations 0.013 0.071 0.180 0.856 -0.128 0.153 
Free trade 0.139 0.117 1.190 0.239 -0.094 0.372 
Limit opposition voice -0.068 0.093 -0.730 0.465 -0.252 0.116 
Direct democracy -0.172 0.109 -1.580 0.118 -0.388 0.044 
Minorities to follow majority 0.161 0.089 1.800 0.075 -0.016 0.339 
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -1.277 0.906 -1.410 0.163 -3.080 0.526 
Supports racial quotas for university 0.030 0.073 0.410 0.686 -0.115 0.174 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause -0.058 0.422 -0.140 0.891 -0.898 0.782 
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:       
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders 0.617 1.634 0.380 0.706 -2.634 3.868 
Supports racial quotas for university -0.021 0.187 -0.110 0.912 -0.393 0.352 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause 0.310 0.752 0.410 0.681 -1.186 1.806 
Constant 0.719 1.142 0.630 0.530 -1.552 2.991 
KUCZYNSKI       
White (Mestizo) -0.462 0.834 -0.550 0.581 -2.120 1.197 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -13.374 0.841 -15.900 0.000 -15.048 -11.701 
Speaks an indigenous language 0.324 0.897 0.360 0.719 -1.461 2.109 
Income 0.043 0.086 0.500 0.620 -0.128 0.214 
Female 0.074 0.450 0.170 0.869 -0.821 0.969 
Age -0.027 0.014 -1.920 0.058 -0.054 0.001 
Trust in parties 0.173 0.157 1.100 0.274 -0.140 0.487 
Participation in protests -1.654 0.845 -1.960 0.054 -3.335 0.027 
National economy has improved -0.041 0.925 -0.040 0.965 -1.882 1.799 
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Table C17: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% confidence intervals 
Personal finances have improved -0.221 0.715 -0.310 0.758 -1.644 1.202 
Resides in north -0.518 0.586 -0.890 0.379 -1.684 0.647 
Resides in Amazon -0.948 0.965 -0.980 0.329 -2.867 0.972 
Resides in highlands 0.740 0.996 0.740 0.460 -1.242 2.721 
Resides in rural area -1.762 1.362 -1.290 0.199 -4.473 0.948 
Rightist ideology 0.012 0.094 0.130 0.898 -0.175 0.199 
Wealth redistribution -0.027 0.213 -0.130 0.900 -0.450 0.396 
Public health service -0.346 0.192 -1.800 0.075 -0.729 0.036 
Nationalisations -0.330 0.135 -2.450 0.016 -0.597 -0.062 
Free trade 0.393 0.191 2.060 0.043 0.014 0.772 
Limit opposition voice 0.151 0.188 0.800 0.425 -0.224 0.525 
Direct democracy -0.042 0.157 -0.270 0.789 -0.356 0.271 
Minorities to follow majority -0.051 0.151 -0.340 0.736 -0.351 0.249 
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -0.411 1.173 -0.350 0.727 -2.745 1.923 
Supports racial quotas for university -0.117 0.148 -0.790 0.434 -0.412 0.178 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause 0.227 0.707 0.320 0.749 -1.180 1.634 
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:       
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -12.336 1.571 -7.850 0.000 -15.462 -9.211 
Supports racial quotas for university -0.462 0.252 -1.830 0.071 -0.963 0.040 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause -0.245 1.363 -0.180 0.858 -2.957 2.467 
Constant 0.802 2.143 0.370 0.709 -3.462 5.066 
TOLEDO       
White (Mestizo) 0.555 0.827 0.670 0.504 -1.090 2.200 
Indigenous (Mestizo) -0.810 1.705 -0.470 0.636 -4.202 2.582 
Speaks an indigenous language -3.688 1.770 -2.080 0.040 -7.210 -0.166 
Income 0.209 0.102 2.040 0.044 0.006 0.412 
Female 0.072 0.499 0.140 0.885 -0.920 1.064 
Age 0.014 0.018 0.770 0.444 -0.022 0.050 
Trust in parties -0.002 0.167 -0.010 0.992 -0.333 0.330 
Participation in protests -0.842 0.752 -1.120 0.266 -2.338 0.655 
National economy has improved 0.369 0.667 0.550 0.582 -0.959 1.697 
Personal finances have improved -0.076 0.689 -0.110 0.913 -1.446 1.295 
Resides in north 0.903 0.714 1.260 0.210 -0.517 2.323 
Resides in Amazon 0.769 1.158 0.660 0.508 -1.534 3.072 
Resides in highlands 0.756 1.078 0.700 0.485 -1.389 2.900 
Resides in rural area 0.477 0.817 0.580 0.561 -1.149 2.103 
Rightist ideology -0.134 0.094 -1.420 0.159 -0.321 0.053 
Wealth redistribution 0.314 0.273 1.150 0.253 -0.229 0.858 
Public health service 0.206 0.361 0.570 0.570 -0.512 0.924 
Nationalisations -0.226 0.127 -1.770 0.080 -0.480 0.027 
Free trade 0.022 0.148 0.150 0.884 -0.274 0.317 
Limit opposition voice -0.048 0.175 -0.270 0.785 -0.395 0.300 
Direct democracy -0.016 0.131 -0.120 0.903 -0.277 0.245 
Minorities to follow majority 0.046 0.155 0.290 0.769 -0.263 0.354 
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders -14.174 0.795 -17.820 0.000 -15.757 -12.592 
Supports racial quotas for university -0.301 0.152 -1.980 0.051 -0.603 0.002 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause 0.807 0.687 1.170 0.244 -0.560 2.175 
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:       
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders 0.408 1.231 0.330 0.741 -2.042 2.857 
Supports racial quotas for university 0.912 0.282 3.230 0.002 0.351 1.473 
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause -0.670 1.344 -0.500 0.619 -3.345 2.004 
Constant -5.803 3.310 -1.750 0.083 -12.390 0.783 
N = 352. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-
identified group and the indicated ethnic attitudes. Effects of region are compared to base category ‘Lima’. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C18: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .043^* .004 .020 .014 .089 (P) 
    .012 .085 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.002 .000 .007 -.016 .011 (P) 
    -.021 .007 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .004 .001 .008 -.010 .024 (P) 
    -.006 .027 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .006 .001 .009 -.008 .029 (P) 
    -.007 .030 (BC) 
Public health service .000 .000 .006 -.011 .011 (P) 
    -.017 .008 (BC) 
Nationalizations .036^* -.002 .017 .005 .072 (P) 
    .012 .081 (BC) 
Free trade -.003 .001 .009 -.021 .016 (P) 
    -.032 .006 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .001 .000 .008 -.016 .019 (P) 
    -.013 .023 (BC) 
Direct democracy .011 -.001 .012 -.011 .040 (P) 
    -.004 .053 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat -.005 .000 .010 -.029 .011 (P) 
    -.036 .007 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .091^* .004 .032 .038 .158 (P) 
     .034 .156 (BC) 
Direct effect .340^* .010 .085 .181 .510 (P) 
     .162 .498 (BC) 
Total effects .431^* .014 .077 .279 .590 (P) 
     .261 .567 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .211           
N=476. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (666 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2012. 
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Table C19: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, 
Peru 2011 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.004 .000 .009 -.025 .014 (P) 
    -.026 .011 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.001 .000 .006 -.014 .011 (P) 
    -.018 .008 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.001 .000 .005 -.013 .009 (P) 
    -.016 .006 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .004 .000 .008 -.012 .022 (P) 
    -.006 .033 (BC) 
Public health service .000 .000 .005 -.011 .012 (P) 
    -.016 .009 (BC) 
Nationalizations .012 .000 .014 -.013 .045 (P) 
    -.012 .047 (BC) 
Free trade -.001 .000 .005 -.013 .006 (P) 
    -.019 .004 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .002 .000 .012 -.022 .026 (P) 
    -.020 .033 (BC) 
Direct democracy .000 .000 .008 -.016 .019 (P) 
    -.017 .018 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .005 .000 .008 -.008 .026 (P) 
    -.004 .033 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .015 .000 .026 -.037 .069 (P) 
     -.038 .062 (BC) 
Direct effect -.024 .003 .073 -.155 .142 (P) 
     -.155 .136 (BC) 
Total effects -.009 .003 .069 -.130 .145 (P) 
     -.128 .145 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -1.746           
N = 438.  ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as mediated through the 
mediation variable indicated. Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy 
and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are 
calculated with bootstrap (995 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C20: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over 
Kuczynski, Peru 2011 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .000 -.001 .014 -.031 .027 (P) 
    -.029 .028 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.001 .000 .005 -.013 .008 (P) 
    -.020 .006 (BC) 
Rightist ideology -.007 -.001 .010 -.031 .007 (P) 
    -.034 .007 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 -.003 .011 -.028 .019 (P) 
    -.023 .027 (BC) 
Public health service .001 .001 .006 -.009 .017 (P) 
    -.006 .022 (BC) 
Nationalizations .002 .001 .013 -.023 .030 (P) 
    -.023 .031 (BC) 
Free trade -.007 .001 .012 -.030 .015 (P) 
    -.042 .012 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice -.001 -.001 .006 -.018 .009 (P) 
    -.023 .005 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.001 .001 .007 -.014 .016 (P) 
    -.017 .009 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .002 .000 .007 -.012 .017 (P) 
    -.005 .030 (BC) 
Total indirect effects -.012 -.002 .029 -.073 .043 (P) 
     -.066 .048 (BC) 
Direct effect .172* -.057 .088 -.068 .267 (P) 
     .051 .332 (BC) 
Total effects .159* -.060 .088 -.076 .251 (P) 
     .039 .318 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated -.078           
 N=436. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as mediated through 
the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national 
economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are 
calculated with bootstrap (647 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2012.  
 
Table C21: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011 (includes 
racial attitudes) 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income .017 -.006 .027 -.039 .073 (P) 
    -.013 .106 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.004 -.001 .014 -.039 .018 (P) 
    -.053 .012 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .004 -.003 .013 -.034 .026 (P) 
    -.012 .043 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .000 .000 .013 -.025 .031 (P) 
    -.025 .031 (BC) 
Public health service -.002 -.001 .033 -.074 .060 (P) 
    -.062 .061 (BC) 
Nationalizations .058* -.013 .031 -.009 .106 (P) 
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Table C21: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011 (includes 
racial attitudes) 
Mediation variable Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
    .020 .145 (BC) 
Free trade .041^ .009 .031 .001 .128 (P) 
    -.005 .103 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice -.005 -.003 .022 -.054 .033 (P) 
    -.058 .030 (BC) 
Direct democracy -.016 -.007 .033 -.099 .028 (P) 
    -.093 .031 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .003 .003 .019 -.040 .046 (P) 
    -.040 .046 (BC) 
Dark-skinned are bad leaders .005 -.004 .040 -.108 .079 (P) 
    -.067 .106 (BC) 
Supports racial quotas in universities -.015 -.002 .028 -.079 .040 (P) 
    -.079 .040 (BC) 
Cultural cause of dark-skinned poverty -.006 .001 .022 -.056 .036 (P) 
    -.107 .010 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .081 -.026 .093 -.128 .261 (P) 
     -.048 .315 (BC) 
Direct effect .383^* .031 .179 .076 .902 (P) 
     .006 .787 (BC) 
Total effects .464^* .005 .170 .112 .898 (P) 
     .099 .858 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .175           
N=180. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (181 repetitions across 18 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on LAPOP 2012. 
 
Table C22: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Fujimori, Peru 2011 
Mediation Variables Coefficient Bias SE 95% confidence intervals Type 
Income -.008 -.001 .010 -.029 .010 (P) 
    -.029 .010 (BC) 
Trust in parties -.002 .000 .005 -.015 .007 (P) 
    -.018 .004 (BC) 
Rightist ideology .004 .000 .007 -.008 .020 (P) 
    -.006 .024 (BC) 
Wealth redistribution .001 .000 .004 -.007 .012 (P) 
    -.005 .016 (BC) 
Public health services .000 .000 .004 -.008 .009 (P) 
    -.008 .007 (BC) 
Nationalisations .014* .001 .009 -.001 .035 (P) 
    .000 .036 (BC) 
Free trade .007 .000 .007 -.004 .024 (P) 
    -.003 .027 (BC) 
Limit opposition voice .003 .000 .005 -.006 .017 (P) 
    -.003 .020 (BC) 
Direct democracy .006 .000 .007 -.004 .024 (P) 
    -.002 .030 (BC) 
Minorities are a threat .001 .000 .005 -.008 .011 (P) 
    -.004 .017 (BC) 
Total indirect effects .025 .000 .019 -.011 .062 (P) 
    -.011 .062 (BC) 
Direct effects .185^* .002 .066 .051 .320 (P) 
    .047 .316 (BC) 
Total effect .210^* .002 .065 .080 .342 (P) 
    .078 .340 (BC) 
Proportion of total effect mediated .118      
N=607.  ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. 
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Fujimori) as 
mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the 
national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command “binary_mediation” (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence 
intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods. 
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Table D1: Peruvian Voting Experiment: Profile of Sample 
 
Age 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 Over 65 
91 49 39 23 13 2 
Gender Male Female 
108 109 
Residence Lima Met. Lima Prov. North Coast North Highlands South Coast South Highlands 
116 20 19 28 27 10 
Central highlands Amazon 
18 0 
Education Primary Secondary Superior 
7 49 161 
Parents' linguistic background Spanish only Indigenous language 
179 37 
      
Ethnic self-identification Indigenous Cholo Mestizo White Black Other 
4 41 124 31 5 12 
       
Occupation Unemployed Salaried work Informal work Student Retired Other 
28 88 32 54 3 12 
Total      217 
Notes: The table shows the key demographic indicators of the experimental sample. Lima Met. = Metropolitan Lima; Lima prov. = Province of Lima. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D2: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95% conf intervals 
P1 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero       
Perceived position on nationalisations P1 0.143 0.062 2.31 0.023 0.020 0.266 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P1 0.013 0.080 0.16 0.871 -0.146 0.172 
Perceived position  on social spending P1 0.044 0.074 0.59 0.557 -0.103 0.191 
Perceived leftist ideology P1 0.005 0.057 0.08 0.936 -0.108 0.118 
Age 0.104 1.418 0.07 0.942 -2.700 2.907 
Female -5.427 3.513 -1.55 0.125 -12.374 1.520 
Education 13.301 3.948 3.37 0.001 5.493 21.109 
Income -2.092 0.976 -2.14 0.034 -4.023 -0.161 
Parents speak indigenous language 1.813 4.499 0.40 0.688 -7.085 10.711 
Political knowledge -8.160 2.720 -3.00 0.003 -13.540 -2.779 
Support for labour flexibilisation 0.048 0.070 0.68 0.499 -0.091 0.187 
Support for social investment 0.052 0.075 0.69 0.494 -0.097 0.201 
Support for neoliberalism -0.105 0.084 -1.25 0.215 -0.271 0.061 
Support for indigenous rights 0.154 0.076 2.01 0.046 0.003 0.305 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.062 0.080 0.77 0.441 -0.097 0.221 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.033 0.071 -0.47 0.637 -0.173 0.106 
Leftist ideology -0.319 0.110 -2.89 0.004 -0.537 -0.101 
Constant -6.695 20.174 -0.33 0.741 -46.596 33.207 
P1 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez       
Perceived position on nationalisations P1 0.131 0.101 1.30 0.202 -0.073 0.336 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P1 -0.024 0.123 -0.20 0.844 -0.272 0.223 
Perceived position  on social spending P1 0.130 0.116 1.12 0.270 -0.105 0.364 
Perceived leftist ideology P1 -0.100 0.099 -1.01 0.320 -0.300 0.101 
Age 2.013 2.140 0.94 0.352 -2.305 6.332 
Female 4.933 5.778 0.85 0.398 -6.728 16.594 
Education 0.146 5.920 0.02 0.980 -11.801 12.093 
Income -2.161 1.871 -1.16 0.255 -5.936 1.614 
Parents speak indigenous language 1.528 9.951 0.15 0.879 -18.554 21.609 
Political knowledge -3.930 3.807 -1.03 0.308 -11.614 3.753 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.252 0.128 -1.97 0.056 -0.510 0.006 
Support for social investment -0.089 0.118 -0.76 0.453 -0.328 0.149 
Support for neoliberalism 0.065 0.117 0.55 0.584 -0.172 0.302 
Support for indigenous rights 0.032 0.130 0.25 0.806 -0.231 0.295 
Support for increased presidential powers -0.163 0.125 -1.31 0.198 -0.415 0.089 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.163 0.121 -1.34 0.186 -0.408 0.082 
Leftist ideology 0.172 0.199 0.87 0.392 -0.229 0.574 
Constant 22.990 31.553 0.73 0.470 -40.686 86.666 
N = 154 (T1/T2); N = 60 (C). 
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair) with the difference between each candidate’s P1 ‘feeling thermometer’ 
rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). ‘Perceived position…’ variables are the differences between the voter’s placement of the two candidates 
on the relevant issue-scales after P1. All other independent variables refer to the voter’s self-reported characteristics. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D3: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
P1 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero       
Perceived position on nationalisations P1 0.147 0.060 2.440 0.016 0.028 0.266 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P1 0.016 0.081 0.200 0.838 -0.143 0.176 
Perceived position  on social spending P1 0.046 0.074 0.620 0.537 -0.101 0.193 
Perceived leftist ideology P1 -0.001 0.057 -0.020 0.981 -0.113 0.110 
Age 0.129 1.413 0.090 0.928 -2.665 2.923 
Female -5.734 3.553 -1.610 0.109 -12.762 1.294 
Education 13.014 3.942 3.300 0.001 5.218 20.810 
Income -1.991 0.986 -2.020 0.045 -3.940 -0.041 
Self-identifies as white -3.331 5.538 -0.600 0.549 -14.284 7.622 
Political knowledge -8.158 2.711 -3.010 0.003 -13.520 -2.796 
Support for labour flexibilisation 0.050 0.070 0.710 0.477 -0.088 0.188 
Support for social investment 0.053 0.075 0.700 0.484 -0.096 0.201 
Support for neoliberalism -0.115 0.084 -1.370 0.174 -0.281 0.051 
Support for indigenous rights 0.152 0.076 2.000 0.048 0.002 0.303 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.062 0.080 0.780 0.439 -0.096 0.221 
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Table D3: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.035 0.071 -0.500 0.617 -0.175 0.105 
Leftist ideology -0.319 0.110 -2.910 0.004 -0.536 -0.102 
Constant -4.296 20.195 -0.210 0.832 -44.239 35.647 
P1 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez       
Perceived position on nationalisations P1 0.132 0.102 1.290 0.203 -0.074 0.338 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P1 -0.021 0.121 -0.180 0.862 -0.265 0.223 
Perceived position  on social spending P1 0.127 0.115 1.110 0.275 -0.105 0.359 
Perceived leftist ideology P1 -0.096 0.095 -1.010 0.316 -0.288 0.095 
Age 2.017 2.110 0.960 0.345 -2.239 6.273 
Female 4.799 5.684 0.840 0.403 -6.663 16.261 
Education 0.072 5.841 0.010 0.990 -11.707 11.852 
Income -2.219 1.754 -1.270 0.213 -5.756 1.317 
Self-identifies as white -0.369 7.499 -0.050 0.961 -15.491 14.754 
Political knowledge -3.988 3.784 -1.050 0.298 -11.619 3.643 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.251 0.126 -1.990 0.053 -0.506 0.003 
Support for social investment -0.092 0.116 -0.790 0.434 -0.326 0.143 
Support for neoliberalism 0.066 0.118 0.560 0.580 -0.173 0.304 
Support for indigenous rights 0.033 0.128 0.260 0.798 -0.226 0.292 
Support for increased presidential powers -0.162 0.122 -1.330 0.192 -0.408 0.084 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.165 0.122 -1.350 0.184 -0.411 0.081 
Leftist ideology 0.174 0.197 0.890 0.380 -0.222 0.571 
Constant 24.068 31.323 0.770 0.446 -39.102 87.237 
N = 154 (T1/T2); N = 61 (C). 
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair) with the difference between each candidate’s P1 ‘feeling thermometer’ 
rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). ‘Perceived position…’ variables are the differences between the voter’s placement of the two candidates 
on the relevant issue-scales after P1. All other independent variables refer to the voter’s self-reported characteristics. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D4: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous or cholo self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
P1 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero       
Perceived position on nationalisations P1 0.156 0.061 2.57 0.011 0.036 0.275 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P1 0.022 0.081 0.27 0.786 -0.138 0.182 
Perceived position  on social spending P1 0.050 0.074 0.67 0.502 -0.097 0.197 
Perceived leftist ideology P1 0.008 0.057 0.14 0.886 -0.104 0.121 
Age 0.370 1.430 0.26 0.797 -2.459 3.198 
Female -5.139 3.514 -1.46 0.146 -12.089 1.810 
Education 12.866 3.940 3.27 0.001 5.074 20.658 
Income -2.100 0.973 -2.16 0.033 -4.025 -0.175 
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo 4.128 4.469 0.92 0.357 -4.710 12.967 
Political knowledge -7.946 2.722 -2.92 0.004 -13.33 -2.561 
Support for labour flexibilisation 0.051 0.070 0.73 0.466 -0.087 0.189 
Support for social investment 0.061 0.075 0.81 0.418 -0.088 0.210 
Support for neoliberalism -0.118 0.084 -1.41 0.161 -0.284 0.048 
Support for indigenous rights 0.151 0.076 1.98 0.049 0.000 0.301 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.065 0.080 0.81 0.418 -0.093 0.223 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.044 0.072 -0.62 0.537 -0.186 0.097 
Leftist ideology -0.324 0.109 -2.96 0.004 -0.540 -0.107 
Constant -5.780 20.002 -0.29 0.773 -45.341 33.781 
P1 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez       
Perceived position on nationalisations P1 0.115 0.100 1.15 0.257 -0.086 0.316 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P1 0.007 0.123 0.05 0.957 -0.241 0.255 
Perceived position  on social spending P1 0.123 0.113 1.09 0.283 -0.105 0.352 
Perceived leftist ideology P1 -0.085 0.095 -0.90 0.374 -0.276 0.106 
Age 2.021 2.076 0.97 0.336 -2.165 6.208 
Female 5.599 5.679 0.99 0.330 -5.854 17.052 
Education -0.398 5.795 -0.07 0.946 -12.086 11.289 
Income -1.937 1.744 -1.11 0.273 -5.454 1.580 
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo 8.304 8.730 0.95 0.347 -9.301 25.909 
Political knowledge -4.236 3.657 -1.16 0.253 -11.611 3.140 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.271 0.127 -2.14 0.038 -0.527 -0.016 
Support for social investment -0.104 0.116 -0.90 0.372 -0.338 0.129 
Support for neoliberalism 0.082 0.115 0.71 0.481 -0.150 0.314 
Support for indigenous rights 0.030 0.127 0.24 0.815 -0.226 0.285 
Support for increased presidential powers -0.177 0.122 -1.45 0.154 -0.422 0.069 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.196 0.123 -1.59 0.118 -0.443 0.052 
Leftist ideology 0.161 0.195 0.83 0.412 -0.232 0.554 
Constant 26.035 30.285 0.86 0.395 -35.041 87.111 
N = 154 (T1/T2); N = 61 (C). 
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair) with the difference between each candidate’s P1 ‘feeling thermometer’ 
rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). ‘Perceived position…’ variables are the differences between the voter’s placement of the two candidates 
on the relevant issue-scales after P1. All other independent variables refer to the voter’s self-reported characteristics. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D5: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over 
Romero, T1 
      
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.094 0.112 0.840 0.407 -0.131 0.319 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 0.023 0.119 0.190 0.849 -0.217 0.262 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 -0.103 0.115 -0.900 0.372 -0.334 0.127 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.090 0.098 -0.920 0.363 -0.286 0.106 
Age 0.569 3.221 0.180 0.860 -5.885 7.023 
Female -1.602 6.387 -0.250 0.803 -14.402 11.198 
Education -6.971 8.506 -0.820 0.416 -24.017 10.075 
Income -2.670 1.716 -1.560 0.125 -6.108 0.768 
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Table D5: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
Parents speak indigenous language 7.126 8.601 0.830 0.411 -10.111 24.363 
Political knowledge -0.283 4.941 -0.060 0.954 -10.186 9.619 
Support for labour flexibilisation 0.326 0.137 2.390 0.020 0.052 0.599 
Support for social investment -0.181 0.152 -1.200 0.237 -0.485 0.123 
Support for neoliberalism 0.220 0.149 1.480 0.145 -0.078 0.519 
Support for indigenous rights 0.465 0.154 3.030 0.004 0.157 0.773 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.308 0.142 2.180 0.034 0.025 0.592 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.050 0.150 -0.340 0.738 -0.350 0.250 
Leftist ideology 0.404 0.193 2.100 0.041 0.018 0.791 
Constant -36.720 37.552 -0.980 0.332 -111.975 38.535 
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over 
Romero, T2 
      
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.022 0.150 0.150 0.883 -0.279 0.323 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 0.134 0.139 0.960 0.341 -0.145 0.412 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 0.022 0.155 0.140 0.890 -0.288 0.331 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.015 0.132 -0.110 0.911 -0.279 0.249 
Age -0.165 3.609 -0.050 0.964 -7.389 7.059 
Female -11.630 10.456 -1.110 0.271 -32.559 9.299 
Education -4.451 9.807 -0.450 0.652 -24.083 15.180 
Income -1.740 2.590 -0.670 0.504 -6.924 3.444 
Parents speak indigenous language -5.405 11.656 -0.460 0.645 -28.736 17.927 
Political knowledge -3.124 7.170 -0.440 0.665 -17.476 11.229 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.172 0.195 -0.880 0.381 -0.561 0.218 
Support for social investment -0.135 0.213 -0.630 0.529 -0.560 0.291 
Support for neoliberalism -0.074 0.245 -0.300 0.763 -0.565 0.416 
Support for indigenous rights -0.094 0.218 -0.430 0.667 -0.531 0.342 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.046 0.217 0.210 0.833 -0.389 0.481 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.318 0.173 -1.840 0.071 -0.664 0.028 
Leftist ideology -0.017 0.312 -0.060 0.956 -0.642 0.607 
Constant 98.105 51.891 1.890 0.064 -5.767 201.977 
P3 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over 
Rodriguez, C 
      
Perceived position on nationalisations 0.055 0.165 0.330 0.739 -0.277 0.388 
Perceived position  on presidential powers -0.102 0.160 -0.640 0.526 -0.424 0.220 
Perceived position  on social spending 0.134 0.125 1.070 0.290 -0.118 0.385 
Perceived leftist ideology -0.102 0.116 -0.870 0.387 -0.336 0.133 
Age -0.985 3.233 -0.300 0.762 -7.501 5.531 
Female 0.970 8.173 0.120 0.906 -15.501 17.441 
Education 4.571 8.811 0.520 0.606 -13.186 22.328 
Income -0.027 2.680 -0.010 0.992 -5.428 5.373 
Parents speak indigenous language 15.427 15.189 1.020 0.315 -15.185 46.039 
Political knowledge -6.976 5.833 -1.200 0.238 -18.732 4.780 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.347 0.177 -1.960 0.056 -0.703 0.010 
Support for social investment -0.180 0.171 -1.050 0.300 -0.525 0.166 
Support for neoliberalism -0.239 0.167 -1.430 0.159 -0.576 0.098 
Support for indigenous rights -0.248 0.192 -1.300 0.202 -0.635 0.138 
Support for increased presidential powers -0.387 0.173 -2.240 0.030 -0.735 -0.039 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.446 0.158 -2.820 0.007 -0.765 -0.127 
Leftist ideology -0.365 0.288 -1.270 0.211 -0.945 0.214 
Constant 105.608 39.571 2.670 0.011 25.857 185.359 
N =73 (T1), 76 (T2), 62 (C). 
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair/group) with the difference between each candidate’s P3 ‘feeling 
thermometer’ rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). ‘Perceived position…’ variables are the differences between the voter’s placement of the 
two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P3. All other independent variables refer to the voter’s self-reported characteristics. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D6: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous/cholo self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T1       
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.105 0.112 0.930 0.355 -0.120 0.330 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 0.028 0.121 0.230 0.819 -0.215 0.270 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 -0.108 0.117 -0.920 0.360 -0.341 0.126 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.096 0.099 -0.960 0.341 -0.295 0.104 
Age 1.060 3.193 0.330 0.741 -5.339 7.459 
Female -1.154 6.408 -0.180 0.858 -13.996 11.688 
Education -7.688 8.517 -0.900 0.371 -24.756 9.380 
Income -2.558 1.752 -1.460 0.150 -6.069 0.954 
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo -0.729 8.286 -0.090 0.930 -17.336 15.877 
Political knowledge -1.006 4.997 -0.200 0.841 -11.021 9.008 
Support for labour flexibilisation 0.352 0.134 2.630 0.011 0.083 0.621 
Support for social investment -0.168 0.152 -1.100 0.274 -0.472 0.137 
Support for neoliberalism 0.196 0.149 1.320 0.194 -0.103 0.496 
Support for indigenous rights 0.468 0.156 3.000 0.004 0.155 0.781 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.293 0.142 2.070 0.044 0.009 0.577 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.015 0.151 -0.100 0.922 -0.317 0.288 
Leftist ideology 0.403 0.195 2.070 0.044 0.012 0.794 
Constant -36.253 38.217 -0.950 0.347 -112.842 40.336 
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T2       
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 -0.007 0.156 -0.040 0.965 -0.320 0.306 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 0.161 0.144 1.120 0.269 -0.127 0.449 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 0.050 0.154 0.320 0.749 -0.259 0.358 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.010 0.127 -0.080 0.940 -0.265 0.246 
Age 0.284 3.674 0.080 0.939 -7.070 7.639 
Female -10.931 10.351 -1.060 0.295 -31.650 9.788 
Education -6.131 10.080 -0.610 0.545 -26.307 14.046 
Income -1.349 2.617 -0.520 0.608 -6.587 3.889 
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo 9.640 12.749 0.760 0.453 -15.880 35.160 
Political knowledge -0.954 7.453 -0.130 0.899 -15.873 13.964 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.150 0.196 -0.770 0.445 -0.542 0.241 
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Table D6: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous/cholo self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf. intervals 
Support for social investment -0.103 0.218 -0.470 0.639 -0.540 0.334 
Support for neoliberalism -0.081 0.244 -0.330 0.743 -0.570 0.409 
Support for indigenous rights -0.097 0.217 -0.440 0.659 -0.532 0.339 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.040 0.216 0.180 0.855 -0.394 0.473 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.344 0.177 -1.950 0.056 -0.697 0.010 
Leftist ideology -0.032 0.308 -0.100 0.918 -0.648 0.584 
Constant 94.326 51.615 1.830 0.073 -8.992 197.644 
P3 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez, C       
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.106 0.164 0.650 0.519 -0.223 0.436 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 -0.186 0.162 -1.150 0.257 -0.512 0.140 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 0.182 0.116 1.570 0.124 -0.052 0.416 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.123 0.116 -1.060 0.296 -0.356 0.111 
Age -0.518 3.161 -0.160 0.870 -6.886 5.849 
Female 1.103 7.968 0.140 0.891 -14.946 17.152 
Education 2.943 8.613 0.340 0.734 -14.405 20.290 
Income 0.454 2.498 0.180 0.856 -4.576 5.485 
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo 18.113 12.869 1.410 0.166 -7.807 44.032 
Political knowledge -8.753 5.546 -1.580 0.122 -19.923 2.417 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.369 0.175 -2.110 0.040 -0.722 -0.017 
Support for social investment -0.198 0.167 -1.190 0.241 -0.534 0.138 
Support for neoliberalism -0.221 0.164 -1.350 0.183 -0.550 0.108 
Support for indigenous rights -0.275 0.190 -1.450 0.155 -0.657 0.108 
Support for increased presidential powers -0.425 0.170 -2.500 0.016 -0.768 -0.083 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.484 0.156 -3.100 0.003 -0.798 -0.170 
Leftist ideology -0.377 0.281 -1.340 0.187 -0.943 0.189 
Constant 115.207 37.282 3.090 0.003 40.118 190.297 
N =73 (T1), 76 (T2), 63 (C). 
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair/group) with the difference between each candidate’s P3 ‘feeling 
thermometer’ rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). ‘Perceived position…’ variables are the differences between the voter’s placement of the 
two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P3. All other independent variables refer to the voter’s self-reported characteristics. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D7: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf.  intervals 
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T1       
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.108 0.123 0.880 0.383 -0.138 0.354 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 0.026 0.120 0.220 0.829 -0.215 0.268 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 -0.108 0.118 -0.910 0.367 -0.345 0.129 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.094 0.098 -0.960 0.342 -0.291 0.103 
Age 1.097 3.184 0.340 0.732 -5.284 7.479 
Female -1.031 6.637 -0.160 0.877 -14.331 12.270 
Education -7.748 8.529 -0.910 0.368 -24.840 9.344 
Income -2.598 1.737 -1.500 0.140 -6.078 0.883 
Parents speak indigenous language 0.702 12.949 0.050 0.957 -25.248 26.651 
Political knowledge -0.922 4.911 -0.190 0.852 -10.763 8.920 
Support for labour flexibilisation 0.349 0.141 2.480 0.016 0.067 0.631 
Support for social investment -0.167 0.154 -1.090 0.282 -0.475 0.141 
Support for neoliberalism 0.197 0.160 1.230 0.223 -0.124 0.518 
Support for indigenous rights 0.466 0.155 3.020 0.004 0.156 0.776 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.292 0.143 2.040 0.046 0.005 0.579 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.019 0.146 -0.130 0.898 -0.311 0.273 
Leftist ideology 0.402 0.194 2.070 0.043 0.012 0.791 
Constant -35.929 37.931 -0.950 0.348 -111.943 40.086 
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T2       
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.061 0.149 0.410 0.684 -0.238 0.360 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 0.112 0.138 0.810 0.420 -0.164 0.388 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 0.003 0.152 0.020 0.986 -0.302 0.307 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.003 0.125 -0.020 0.983 -0.253 0.248 
Age -0.116 3.533 -0.030 0.974 -7.187 6.956 
Female -8.701 10.356 -0.840 0.404 -29.431 12.029 
Education -0.420 10.018 -0.040 0.967 -20.473 19.632 
Income -2.518 2.614 -0.960 0.339 -7.751 2.715 
Parents speak indigenous language 21.442 15.074 1.420 0.160 -8.732 51.616 
Political knowledge -5.864 7.348 -0.800 0.428 -20.573 8.845 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.147 0.192 -0.760 0.449 -0.531 0.238 
Support for social investment -0.187 0.209 -0.900 0.374 -0.606 0.231 
Support for neoliberalism -0.101 0.242 -0.420 0.678 -0.585 0.384 
Support for indigenous rights -0.083 0.215 -0.390 0.699 -0.514 0.347 
Support for increased presidential powers 0.056 0.214 0.260 0.796 -0.373 0.484 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.255 0.175 -1.460 0.149 -0.605 0.094 
Leftist ideology 0.036 0.308 0.120 0.907 -0.581 0.653 
Constant 78.140 52.479 1.490 0.142 -26.909 183.189 
P3 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez, C       
Perceived position on nationalisations P3 0.060 0.163 0.370 0.714 -0.268 0.388 
Perceived position  on presidential powers P3 -0.125 0.157 -0.790 0.432 -0.441 0.192 
Perceived position  on social spending P3 0.156 0.118 1.320 0.193 -0.082 0.393 
Perceived leftist ideology P3 -0.086 0.115 -0.750 0.460 -0.318 0.146 
Age -0.585 3.207 -0.180 0.856 -7.044 5.874 
Female 0.201 8.027 0.030 0.980 -15.965 16.368 
Education 4.525 8.764 0.520 0.608 -13.126 22.176 
Income -0.500 2.537 -0.200 0.845 -5.609 4.610 
Parents speak indigenous language -8.980 9.806 -0.920 0.365 -28.731 10.770 
Political knowledge -8.395 5.606 -1.500 0.141 -19.687 2.896 
Support for labour flexibilisation -0.320 0.176 -1.820 0.075 -0.675 0.034 
Support for social investment -0.191 0.169 -1.130 0.264 -0.533 0.150 
Support for neoliberalism -0.252 0.166 -1.510 0.138 -0.587 0.084 
Support for indigenous rights -0.227 0.190 -1.190 0.239 -0.609 0.156 
Support for increased presidential powers -0.396 0.170 -2.330 0.024 -0.739 -0.053 
Support for restrictions on foreign companies -0.475 0.158 -3.000 0.004 -0.794 -0.156 
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Table D7: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification) 
Voter characteristic Coeff. SE t P < [t] 95 % Conf.  intervals 
Leftist ideology -0.421 0.285 -1.480 0.147 -0.995 0.153 
Constant 117.771 37.869 3.110 0.003 41.498 194.044 
N =73 (T1), 76 (T2), 63 (C). 
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair/group) with the difference between each candidate’s P3 ‘feeling 
thermometer’ rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). ‘Perceived position…’ variables are the differences between the voter’s placement of the 
two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P3. All other independent variables refer to the voter’s self-reported characteristics. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Table D8: Voter Characteristics and Final Vote Choice 
Voter characteristic Group and corresponding  
left-nationalist candidate 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Income T1 Olarte - .0594** .0226 
T2 Romero .0691* .0268 
C Rodriguez .0563^ .0298 
Indigenous language background T1 Olarte - .2033 .1170 
T2 Romero -.0172 .1309 
C Rodriguez - .4779** .1031 
Opposed to labour flexibilisation T1 Olarte .0038** .0012 
T2 Romero .0051** .0014 
C Rodriguez .0038** .0012 
Supports increased investment in social programs T1 Olarte - .0010 .0021 
T2 Romero .0027 .0022 
C Rodriguez - .0023 .0021 
Opposed to neoliberalism T1 Olarte .0061** .0022 
T2 Romero .0027 .0026 
C Rodriguez - .0018 .0020 
Supports expanded indigenous rights T1 Olarte .0046* .0022 
T2 Romero .0013 .0023 
C Rodriguez .0021 .0022 
Supports increased presidential powers T1 Olarte .0053** .0020 
T2 Romero .0028 .0024 
C Rodriguez .0038^ .0021 
Supports restrictions on foreign companies T1 Olarte - .0013 .0021 
T2 Romero .0009 .0020 
C Rodriguez .0058** .0017 
Identifies with Leftist ideology T1 Olarte .0050^ .0027 
T2 Romero .0013 .0033 
C Rodriguez -.0015 .0033 
Total significant measures (of which policy preferences) T1 7 (6)  
T2 2 (1)  
C 5 (3)  
N=209; ^ = p<.10; * = p<.05; ** = p<.01 
Coefficients are average marginal effects on the predicted probability of voting for the left-nationalist candidate, by each group. Results are based on a single logistic regression model, 
with two-way interactions between group and each voter characteristic. 
Source: Peruvian voting experiment 
 
Note to Figure 6.11: Possible explanation for unexpected vote pattern in the control group: 
It is quite conceivable that a voter first correctly identifies candidate placements (e.g. according to Figure 6.8), then votes for the 
candidate who was closest to their own profile (so ‘correctly’ according to the voter-candidate affinity measure; 6.12), but appears to vote 
incorrectly according to the voter issue stand variable (Figure 6.11). For example, a voter may correctly identify the difference between 
their two candidates, placing the left-nationalist candidate (Rodriguez) at an average position of ‘35’ and the neoliberal candidate 
(Sánchez) at ‘20’. The voter’s own average issue stand is ‘30’. According to the voter issue stand measure, the ‘correct’ choice would be 
Sánchez (the voter’s average stand is below ‘50’, thus closer to the neoliberal ‘pole’ than the left-nationalist ‘pole’), but according to the 
voter-candidate affinity measure, the ‘correct’ choice would be Rodriguez (5 points difference instead of 10). Although we might argue 
that the voter in question has not really identified the two candidates’ stands ‘correctly’, placing Rodriguez too low, it is clear that she/he 
has correctly perceived the candidates’ relative positions as well as their own position relative to both candidates. Overall, the voter-
candidate affinity measure is probably a better guide to voters’ motivations, although it does not consider misidentification of candidate 




FIGURE D1: The Effect of Ascribed Personal Characteristics on Final Vote Choice 
 
N = 214. 
The graphs show the predicted probability with 95 percent confidence intervals of voting for the Left-nationalist candidate (column 
one) and the Neoliberal candidate (column two) after Phase Three, by group, and according to whether a personal trait has been 
ascribed (green) or not ascribed (black ‘X’) to the candidate in question. Thus, a ‘green’ predicted probability above 0.5 suggests the 
ascription of the given trait is positively associated with a vote for the candidate, while a ‘green’ predicted probability below 0.5 
suggests the ascription of the trait is negatively associated with a vote for the candidate. It is noteworthy that two of the more positive 
traits – ‘hardworking, honest’, and ‘sophisticated’ – tend to be positively associated with a vote for each candidate. It is similarly 
noteworthy that the ascription of the populist label tends to be negatively associated with a vote for each candidate. However, see 
Chapter Six for discussion on the unequal distribution of ascribed traits, as well as differences in the effect on vote choice of trait 









































































































































































Ascribed Personal Characteristics and Predicted Probability of Vote Choice after Phase Three
Characteristic NOT ascribed Characteristic ascribed
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Appendix E: LAPOP Survey Questions and New Variable Coding 
 
Table E1: LAPOP Bolivia Survey 2006  
Table E2: LAPOP Bolivia Survey 2010  
Table E3: LAPOP Ecuador Survey 2004  
Table E4: LAPOP Ecuador Survey 2008  
Table E5: LAPOP Ecuador Survey 2010  
Table E6: LAPOP Peru Survey 2006  




Table E1: LAPOP BOLIVIA SURVEY 2006 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes192 New variable coding193 
Vote choice BOLVB3 [VBPTY05]  
Por cuál partido o candidato votó para 
presidente? (No lea las alternativas) 
 
FREPAB (Eliceo Rodriguez)[1] 
MAS (Evo Morales) [2] 
MIP (Felipe Quispe “Mallku”) [3] 
MNR (Michiaki Nagatani) [4] 
NFR (Gildo Angulo) [5] 
Podemos (Jorge Quiroga) [6] 
UN (Samuel Doria Medina) [7] 
USTB (Nestor Garcia) [8] 
Nulo, blanco[98] 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Evo Morales (2) 
[2] Jorge Quiroga (6) 
[3] Samuel Doria (7) 
[4] Michiaki Nagatani (4) 
[5] Other/Null (all other non-
missing responses) 
Speaks an indigenous 
language 
LENG1.  
Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su 
casa? (acepte una alternativa) 
 
Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymara [3] Otro (nativo) [4] __________ Otro extranjero 
[5]__________  
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = Indigenous (2, 3, 4) 




Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u 
originario? 
 
Blanca [1] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] Originaria [6] Otra ________  [7] 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 5, 7) 






[Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios 
o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones) 
 
Quechua [1] Aymara[2] Guaraní[3] Chiquitano[4] Mojeño[5] Otro nativo[6] ninguno 
[7] otros _____________ (especificar) 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = None (7) 
[2] = Aymara (2) 
[3] = Quechua (1) 
[4] = Other Indigenous (3, 4, 5, 
6, espicificar) 
Income Q10.  
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares  mensuales 
de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e 
hijos que trabajan? 
[Mostrar tabla de ingresos ] 
 
Nada [0] 
Menos de 250 Bs. [1] 
De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] 
De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] 
De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4] 
De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] 
De 5001 a 10.000 Bs. [6] 
De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7] 
más de 20.000 [8] 
Original coding. 
Female Q1. 
Sexo (no pregunte): Hombre [1] Mujer [2] 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años 
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21 [B30]. 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? 
 





¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas 
veces, casi nunca o nunca? 
 
Algunas veces [1] casi nunca [2] nunca [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (3) 
[1] = Yes (1, 2) 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
Coded so that: 
 
                                                          
191
 Variable used in vote analysis. 
192
 Original question wording in the LAPOP surveys, with original response coding in parentheses (in addition, 
most questions included ‘do not know’ and ‘no answer’ responses). 
193
 Coding of the new variables used in the analysis. Square brackets show response categories of the new 
variables (i.e., those constructed by the author). Parentheses show the original response categories that were 
recoded into each new variable response category.  
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hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]  
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace 
doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Resides in media luna DPT.  
Departamento: La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4]Chuquisaca [5] 
Potosí [6]Pando [7] Tarija [8] Beni [9] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Western highlands (1, 3, 4, 
5, 6) 
[1] Media luna (2, 7, 8, 9) 
Resides in rural area UR.  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Rightist ideology L1.  
Mostrar tabla #1: Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 
10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de 
tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que 
simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según 
el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando 
piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? 
 
Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha] 
Original coding. 
Support for gas 
nationalisation 
BOLREFM32 [REFM32].  
¿Con qué firmeza 
aprobaría o desaprobaría que el gobierno 
nacionalice las empresas petroleras para que YPFB se haga cargo de todas sus 
actividades? 
 





¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo? Lo que Bolivia 
más necesita es un Presidente fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, 
[1] o Lo que el país necesita más es un Presidente que sepa dialogar y concertar con 
todos los sectores de la poblacíon? [2] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] Yes (1) 
Direct democracy JC20.  
Agunas personas dicen que estaríamos mejor sin partidos políticos. Otros dicen 
que necesitamos los partidos para representar los intereses de la gente. ¿Con cuál 
esta más de acuerdo? 
 
Sin partidos [1] Con partidos [2] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
Minorities to follow 
majority 
AD2.  
De las siguientes frases ¿Cuál es la que mejor refleja su manera de pensar? En una 
democracia la minoría debe acatar y hacer lo que la mayoría diga. [1] En una 
democracia la mayoría manda pero se respetan los derechos de las minorías. [2] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
Prefer leader of same 
ethnicity 
REP1.  
¿Usted se sentiría mejor representado en el gobierno y el parlamento por líderes de 
su misma procedencia étnica o no importa la procedencia del líder sino su capacidad 
solamente? Líderes de la misma procedencia [1] 
No importa la procedencia [2] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
Prefer one national 
culture 
NEWTOL8.  
Sería mejor para el país que exista una sola cultura nacional para todos o... 2) Los 
pueblos indígenas deberían mantener sus valores, cultura y lenguaje. 
 
Una sola cultura nacional [1] 
Mantener sus valores [2]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
Experience of 
discrimination 
¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su 
apariencia física o su forma de hablar 
en los siguientes lugares: 
 
DIS1 
En la escuela, colegio o universidad 
Sí [1] No [2]  
 
DIS2 
En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) 
Sí [1] No [2]  
 
DIS3 
Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio 
Sí [1] No [2]  
 
Coded as an additive index, 







En reuniones o eventos sociales 
Sí [1] No [2]  
 
DIS5 
En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) 
Sí [1] No [2]  
Negative views of 
Aymara 
BOLIT1A [IT1A] 
Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los 
aymaras son gente ..? (lea alternativas) 
 
Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (1, 2) 
[1] = Yes (3, 4) 
Negative views of 
Quechua 
BOLIT1B [IT1B] 
Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los 
quechuas son gente ..? (lea alternativas) 
 
Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (1, 2) 
[1] = Yes (3, 4) 
Negative views of 
Camba 
BOLIT1C [IT1C] 
Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los 
cambas son gente ..? (lea alternativas) 
 
Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (1, 2) 
[1] = Yes (3, 4) 
Negative views of 
whites 
BOLIT1D [IT1D] 
Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los 
blancos en Bolivia son gente ..? (lea alternativas) 
 
Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (1, 2) 




Table E2: LAPOP BOLIVIA SURVEY 2010 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes Measure construction 
Vote choice VB3.  
¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? 
[NO LEER LISTA] 
 
(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) 
(1001) Gente (Román Loayza) 
(1002) MAS (Evo Morales) 
(1003) PP (Manfred Reyes Villa) 
(1004) AS (René Joaquino) 
(1005) BSD (Rime Choquehuanca) 
(1006) Pulso (Alejo Veliz) 
(1007) UN (Samuel Doria Medina) 
(1008) MUSPA (Ana María Flores) 
(77) Otro 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Evo Morales (1002) 
[2] Manfred Reyes Villa (1003) 
[3] Samuel Doria (1007) 
[4] Other/Null (all other non-
missing responses) 
Speaks an indigenous 
language 
LENG1.  
¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? 
[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] 
 
(1001) Castellano (1002) Quechua (1003) Aymara (1006) Guaraní (1004) Otro 
(nativo) (1005) Otro extranjero 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = Indigenous (1002, 1003, 
1006, 1004) 





¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena u originaria, negra o 
Afro-boliviana, mulata u otra? 
 
(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena/originaria (4) Negra o Afro-boliviana (5) Mulata 
(7) Otra 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 4, 5, 7) 






[Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios 
o indígenas? [Leer todas las opciones] 
 
(1) Quechua (2) Aymara (3) Guaraní (4) Chiquitano (5) Mojeño 
(6) Otro nativo (7) Ninguno (8) Otros ________ (especificar) 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = None (7) 
[2] = Aymara (2) 
[3] = Quechua (1) 
[4] = Other Indigenous (3, 4, 5, 
6) 
Income Q10.  
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de 
este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e 
hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su 
casa al mes?] 
 
(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01) Menos de 250 Bs. 
(02) De 251 a 500 Bs. 
(03) De 500 a 800 Bs. 
(04) de 801 a 1,200 Bs. 
(05) De 1.201 a 2.000 Bs. 
(06) De 2.001 a 3.000 Bs. 
(07) de 3.001 a 5.000 Bs. 
(08) De 5.001 a 10.000 Bs. 
(09) De 10.000 a 20.000 Bs. 
(10) Más de 20.000 Bs. 
Original coding. 
Female Q1.  
[Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años  
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21. 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? 
 





¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?  
 
(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado  (88) NS (98) NR 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
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doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8] 
[1] Improved (1) 
Resides in media luna PROV. Departamento: 
 
La Paz [01] Santa Cruz [02] Cochabamba [03] Oruro [04] 
Chuquisaca [05] Potosí [06] Pando [07] Tarija [08] Beni [09]] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Western highlands (01, 03, 
04, 05, 06) 
[1] Media luna (02, 07, 08, 09) 
Resides in rural area UR.  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Rightist ideology L1. 
Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de 
izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa 
derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de 
aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que 
tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su 
punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? 
 
Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha] 
Original coding. 
Wealth resdistribution ROS4.  
El Estado boliviano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de 
ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo 
con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Social security ROS5.  
El Estado boliviano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable 
de proveer las pensiones de jubilación ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
 
ROS6.  
El Estado boliviano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable 
de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Coded as the average (mean) of 




El Estado boliviano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las 
empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo 
o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
   
Free trade B48.  
¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la 
economía? 
 
Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho] 
Original coding. 
Limit opposition voice POP101.  
Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el 
voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Direct democracy POP107.  
El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Minorities are a threat POP113.  
Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el 
país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Mix of races ‘good’ RAC3A.  
La mezcla de razas es buena para Bolivia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta afirmación? 
 





Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona indígena. 




entrevistado no tiene hijos, pídale que suponga que los tiene] 
 




Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas indígenas u originarias son más 
pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal 
razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta] 
 
(1) Porque las personas indígenas no trabajan lo suficiente  
(2) Porque las personas indígenas son menos inteligentes  
(3) Porque las personas indígenas son tratadas de manera injusta  
(4) Porque las personas indígenas tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las 
personas indígenas no quieren cambiar su cultura 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = Disagree (3, 4) 




¿Ud. cree que las personas indígenas son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o 
mucho peor que las personas blancas? 
 
(1) Mucho mejor 
(2) Mejor 
(3) Igual  
(4) Peor 
(5) Mucho peor 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (1, 2, 3) 




¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la 
promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas] 
 
(1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca ( 4) Ninguna  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = None/little  (3, 4) 
[1] = Some/a lot (1, 2) 
Experience of 
discrimination 
Pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha 
sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: [Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas 
veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca] 
 
DIS11.  
Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, 
pocas veces, o nunca? 
 
(1) Muchas veces (2) Algunas veces (3) Pocas veces (4) Nunca 
 
DIS17.  
Se ha sentido discriminado por su forma de hablar o acento? 
 
(1) Muchas veces (2) Algunas veces (3) Pocas veces (4) Nunca 
 
DIS13.  
Por su condición económica 
 
(1) Muchas veces (2) Algunas veces (3) Pocas veces (4) Nunca 
Each variable was recoded so 
that: 
 
[1] Never (4) 
[2] Rarely (3) 
[3] Sometimes (2) 
[4] Many times (1) 
 
Then an additive index was 





Table E3: LAPOP ECUADOR SURVEY 2004 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes Measure construction 
Vote choice VB3.  
¿Por cuál candidato votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las eleccions 
pasadas de 2002? 
 
(1) Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua 
(2) Alvaro Noboa Pontón 
(3) León Roldós Agulera 
(4) Rodrigo Borja Cevallos 
(5) Antonio Xavier Neira Menendez 
(6) Jacobo Bucaram Ortiz 
(7) Jacinto Velasquez Herrera 
(8) Ivonne Leyla Juez Abuchakra 
(9) Cesar Augutso Alarcon Costa 
(10) Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea 
(11) Carlos Antonio Vargas Guatatuca 
(12) Voto nulo/voto en blanco 
Otro _______ 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Lucio Gutiérrez (1) 
[2] Alvaro Noboa (2) 
[3] León Roldós (3) 
[4] Rodrigo Borja (4) 





¿Cómo se considera: indígena, negro (afro-ecuatoriano), mestizo, mulato, blanco u 
otro? 
 
Blanco [1] Mestizo [3] Indígena [4] Negro o Afro-Ecuatoriano [5] Mulato [6] Otra 
________  [7] 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 5, 7) 
[3] = Indigenous (3) 
[4] = Black (4, 6) 
Income Q10.  
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares  mensuales? 
[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E ] 
 
(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01) Menos de $25 











(13) $2000 y más 
Original coding. 
Female Q1. 
ANOTE: Sexo: Hombre [1] Mujer [2] 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años 
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21. 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en los partidos políticos? 
 
Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho 
Original coding. 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Resides in coast, 
highlands, amazon 
Estrato 
(1) Costa urbana (2) Costa rural (3) Sierra urbana (4) Sierra rural (5) Oriente norte (6) 
Oriente sur (8) Frontera norte (9) Frontera sur 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Coast (1, 2) 
[2] Highlands (3, 4) 
[3] Amazon (5, 6) 
Resides in rural area Area  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Rightist ideology L1.  




izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias 
políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con 
la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que 
tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su 
punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? 
 




¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los 
problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? 
(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
President can bypass 
Congress 
D43. 
¿Qué tipo de President de República prefiere usted más? Uno que trate de 
solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto 
tarde mucho tiempo, o… Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, 
evidtando el Congreso si fuera necesario. 
 
(1) Leyes aprobadas por el Congreso (2) Rápidamente, evitando el Congreso 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (1) 





Table E4: LAPOP ECUADOR SURVEY 2008 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes Measure construction 
Vote choice VB3.  
¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? 
[NO LEER LISTA] 
 
(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) [Pasar a 
ECUVB20] 
(901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS 
(902) Gilmar Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP 
(903) Jaime Damerval, Concertación de Fuerzas Populares - CFP 
(904) Cynthia Viteri, Partido Social Cristiano – PSC 
(905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - PRIAN 
(906) Luís Macas, Movimiento Pachakutik 
(907) León Roldós, Alianza RED-ID 
(908) Fernando Rosero, Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano – PRE 
(909) Luís Villacís, Movimiento Popular Democrático MPD 
(910) Marco Proaño Maya, Movimiento Reivindicación Democrática 
(911) Carlos Sagñay, Integración Nacional Alfarista 
(912) Lenín Torres, Movimiento Revolucionario Participación Popular - MPP 
(913) Marcelo Larrea, Alianza ALBA – Tercera República 
(77) Otro 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Alvaro Noboa (905) 
[2] Rafael Correa (901) 
[3] Gilmar Gutiérrez (902) 
[4] León Roldós (907) 





¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-
ecuatoriana, mulata, u otra? 
 
(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-ecuatoriana (5) Mulata (7) Otra 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 7) 
[3] = Indigenous (3) 
[4] = Black (4, 5) 
Income Q10.  
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de 
este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e 
hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su 
casa por mes?] 
[10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país] 
 
(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01) Menos de $60 








(10) $2001 y más 
Original coding. 
Female Q1.  
[Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años  
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21. 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? 
 





¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?  
 
(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado  (88) NS (98) NR 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace 
doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 




(901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Coast (901, 902) 
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(905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur [2] Highlands (903, 904) 
[3] Amazon (905, 906) 
Resides in rural area UR.  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Rightist ideology L1. 
Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de 
izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa 
derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de 
aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que 
tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su 
punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? 
 
Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha] 
Original coding. 
Wealth resdistribution ROS4.  
El Estado ecuatoriano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad 
de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Nationalisations ROS1. 
El Estado ecuatoriano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las 
empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo 
o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Free trade B48.  
¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la 
economía? 
 
Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho] 
Original coding. 
Limit opposition voice POP101.  
Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el 
voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Direct democracy POP107.  
El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Minorities are a threat POP113.  
Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el 
país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 






Table E5: LAPOP ECUADOR SURVEY 2010 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes Measure construction 
Vote choice VB3.  
¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? 
[NO LEER LISTA] 
 
(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) 
( 901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS 
(902) Lucio Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP 
(903) Martha Roldos Bucaram, Alianza Izquierda Unida- RED/MIPD 
(904) Carlos Sagnay De La Bastida, Movimiento Triunfo Mil- MTM 
(905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - PRIAN 
(906) Melba Jacome, Movimiento Tierra Fertil- MTF 
(907) Diego Delgado Jara, Movimiento de Integracion y Transformacion Social- MITS 
(908) Carlos Gonzales Albornoz, Movimiento Independiente Justo y Solidario- MIJS 
(77) Otro 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Rafael Correa (901) 
[2] Lucio Gutiérrez (902) 
[3] Alvaro Noboa (905) 
[4] Other/Null (all other non-
missing responses) 
Parents speak an 
indigenous language 
LENG4.  
Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer 
alternativas]: 
(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, 
anotar 2.) 
 
(1) Sólo castellano (2) Castellano e idioma nativo (3) Sólo idioma native (4) 
Castellano e idioma extranjero 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = None (1, 4) 




¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? 
 
(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 7) 
[3] = Indigenous (3) 
[4] = Black (4, 5) 
Income Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares 
mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos 
los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en 
total a su casa al mes?] 
 
(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01) Menos de $60 








(10) $2001 y más 
Original coding. 
Female Q1.  
[Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años  
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21. 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? 
 





¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?  
 
(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado  (88) NS (98) NR 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace 
doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 




(901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Coast (901, 902) 
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(905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur [2] Highlands (903, 904) 
[3] Amazon (905, 906) 
Resides in rural area UR.  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Rightist ideology L1. 
Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de 
izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa 
derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de 
aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que 
tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su 
punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? 
 
Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha] 
Original coding. 
Wealth resdistribution ROS4.  
El Estado ecuatoriano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad 
de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Social security ROS5.  
El Estado ecuatoriano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal 
responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación ¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
ROS6.  
El Estado ecuatoriano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal 
responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o 
en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Coded as the average (mean) of 




El Estado ecuatoriano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las 
empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo 
o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Free trade B48.  
¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la 
economía? 
 
Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho] 
Original coding. 
Limit opposition voice POP101.  
Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el 
voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Direct democracy POP107.  
El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Minorities are a threat POP113.  
Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el 
país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 






Table E6: LAPOP PERU SURVEY 2006 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes Measure construction 
Vote choice PERVB3  
¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta? [NO LEER LISTA] 
 
0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo la cédula en blanco, o anuló su voto) 
01. Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú (UPP) 
02. Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA) 
03. Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional) 
04. Martha Chávez (Alianza por el Futuro) 
05. Valentín Paniagua (Frente de Centro) 
06. Humberto Lay (Restauración Nacional) 
77. Otro 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Ollanta Humala (01) 
[2] Alan García (02) 
[3] Lourdes Flores (03) 
[4] Martha Chávez (04) 





Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer 
alternativas] 
(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, 
anotar 2.) 
 
Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3] Castellano e 
idioma extranjero [4] 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = Indigenous (2, 3) 





Considera que su madre es o era una persona: blanca, mestiza, indígena, oriental, 
negra o mulata? 
 
(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Oriental (7) Otra 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 5, 6, 7) 
[3] = Indigenous (3) 
Income Q10.  
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de 
este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e 
hijos que trabajan? 
 
(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01 100 soles o menos 
(02) De 101 soles a 200 
(03) De 201 a 400 soles 
(04) De 401 a 600 soles 
(05) De 601 a 800 soles 
(06) De 801 a 1,200 soles 
(07) De 1,201 a 1,600 soles 
(08) 1,601 a 2,000 soles 
(09) 2,001 a 3,000 soles 
(10) Más de 3,000 soles 
Original coding. 
Female Q1. 
Sexo (no pregunte): Hombre [1] Mujer [2] 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años 
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? 
 





¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas 
veces, casi nunca o nunca? 
 
Algunas veces [1] casi nunca [2] nunca [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (3) 
[1] = Yes (1, 2) 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace 
doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 




(1) Costa Norte (2) Costa Sur (3) Lima (4) Selva (5) Sierra Centro (6) Sierra Norte (7) 
Sierra Sur (11) Ayacucho (12) Cusco (13) Huánuco (14) Junín (15) Pasco (16) San 
Martín (17) Ucayalí 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = Lima (2, 3) 
[2] = North (1) 
[3] = Amazon (4, 17) 
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[4] = Highlands (5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16) 
Resides in rural area UR.  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Grew up in rural area MIG1.  
Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió Ud principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O 
en una ciudad?: 
 
1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = Urban (2, 3) 
[1] = Rural (1) 
Rightist ideology L1.  
Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de 
izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias 
políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con 
la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que 
tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su 
punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? 
 
Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha] 
Original coding. 
Supports FTA with USA PERGI7  
¿Usted cree que su situación económica mejorará si el Perú aprueba el TLC? 
 
(1) Sí (2) No 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
Limit opposition voice POP1. [Leer alternativas] 
1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el 
voto de los 
partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 
2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y 
el voto de los 
partidos de la oposición. 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
‘Strongman’ populist 
leader 
POP5. [Leer alternativas] 
1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo 
impidan, [o al 
contrario], 
2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 







Table E7: LAPOP PERU SURVEY 2012 




LAPOP question(s) and response codes Measure construction 
Vote choice VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 
2011, en la primera vuelta? [NO LEER LISTA] 
 
(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la cédula en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) 
(1101) Ollanta Humala (Gana Perú) 
(1102) Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza 2011) 
(1103) Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Alianza por el Gran Cambio) 
(1104) Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible) 
(1105) Luis Castañeda Lossio (Solidaridad Nacional) 
(77) Otro 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] Ollanta Humala (1101) 
[2] Keiko Fujimori (1102) 
[3] Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 
(1103) 
[4] Alejandro Toledo (1104) 






Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer 
alternativas]: 
(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, 
anotar 2.) 
 
(1) Sólo castellano/español (2) Castellano/español e idioma native (3) Sólo idioma 
nativo (4) Castellano/español e idioma extranjero 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = Indigenous (2, 3) 
[0] = Non-indigenous (1, 4). 
White, Mestizo, 
Indigenous 
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u 
otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-peruana, codificar como (4) Negra] 
 
(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Oriental (7) Otra 
Coded so that: 
 
[1] = White (1) 
[2] = Mestizo (2, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
[3] = Indigenous (3) 
Income Q10NEW.  
¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiars mensuales de 
este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e 
hijos que trabajan? 
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] 
 
(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01) Menos de 110 soles 
(02) De 110 a 230 soles 
(03) De 231 a 340 soles 
(04) De 341 a 450 soles 
(05) De 451 a 560 soles 
(06) De 561 a 680 soles 
(07) De 681 a 790 soles 
(08) De 791 a 900 soles 
(09) De 901 a 1010 soles 
(10) De 1011 a 1180 soles 
(11) De 1181 a 1350 soles 
(12) De 1351 a 2030 soles 
(13) De 2031 a 2700 soles 
(14) De 2701 a 3380 soles 
(15) De 3381 a 4050 soles 
(16) Más de 4050 soles 
Original coding. 
Female Q1.  
[Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer 
Original coding. 
Age Q2.  
¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años  
Original coding. 
Trust in parties B21. 
¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? 
 





¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?  
 
(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado  
Coded so that: 
 
[0] = No (2) 
[1] = Yes (1) 
National economy has 
improved 
SOCT2.  
¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que 
hace doce meses? 
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Personal finances have 
improved 
IDIO2.  
¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de 
hace 
doce meses?  
 
Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Not improved (2, 3) 
[1] Improved (1) 
Resides in Lima, north, ESTRATOPRI. Coded so that: 
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Amazon, highlands  
(1101) Costa Norte (1102) Costa Sur (1103) Lima Metropolitana (1104) Selva 
(1105) Sierra Centro (1106) Sierra norte (1107) Sierra Sur 
 
[1] Lima (1102, 1103) 
[2] North (1101) 
[3] Amazon (1104) 
[4] Highlands (1105, 1106, 
1107) 
Resides in rural area UR.  
 
(1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] 
Coded so that: 
 
[0] Urban (1) 
[1] Rural (2) 
Rightist ideology L1. 
Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de 
izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa 
derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de 
aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que 
tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su 
punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? 
 
Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha] 
Original coding. 
Wealth resdistribution ROS4.  
El Estado peruano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de 
ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo 
con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Public health service ROS6.  
El Estado peruano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de 









El Estado peruano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas 
e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
   
Free trade B48.  
¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la 
economía? 
 
Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho] 
Original coding. 
Limit opposition voice POP101.  
Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el 
voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Direct democracy POP107.  
El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. 
¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
Minorities are a threat POP113.  
Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el 
país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] 
Original coding. 
 
